SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


CASE NUMBER: A2024 - 094541


DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE

1.REPORTABLE: NO
2.OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.REVISED: NO

14 JANUARY 2026 Judge Dippenaar



In the matter between:



JABU JOHANNES MAHLABA APPELLANT

and

MINISTER OF POLICE RESPONDENT

Coram: Dippenaar, Yacoob JJ et M van Nieuwenhuizen AJ

Heard: 29 October 2025

Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail and uploading it onto the electronic
platform. The date an d time for hand -down is deemed to be 10h00 on the
14th of JANUARY 2026.

Summary: Appeal against dismissal of claim for unlawful arrest and detention –
principles restated – hearsay evidence admissible in determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists for purposes of s 40(1)(b) of Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 . Not necessary to call witnesses to prove the
truth of the contents of their statements – no adverse inference to be
drawn from the failure to call the arresting officer as a witness - arrest and
detention lawful.




ORDER

On appeal from: The Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg ( Wepener J
sitting as Court of First Instance)

1. The appeal is dismissed.


JUDGMENT

DIPPENAAR J (YACOOB J et M VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN AJ concurring):

[1] The appellant appeals a portion of the judgment and order granted by Wepener J
(the court a quo ) on 11 June 2024. In terms of the order, the appellant’s claims for
unlawful arrest and detention , impairment of his reputation, honour, self -esteem,
violation of dignity and emotional shock as well as his claim for malicious prosecution
were dismissed with costs. Th e court a quo granted leave to appeal against the
dismissal of the appellant’s claim based on unlawful arrest and detention on 30 July
2024. The present appeal relates to this claim only. The respondent did not oppose the
appeal and did not appear at the hearing.
[2] In his notice of appeal, the appellant raised some sixteen grounds of appeal in
support of the contention that the court a quo erred and misdirected itself. He sought the
setting aside of the order of the court a quo and an order substituting it with the
following order:
‘(1.1) The Respondent (sic) is to pay the plaintiff the sum equivalent to R15 000 (fifteen
thousand rand) or a reasonably determined figure per day fo r the 255 days Appellant (sic)
was unlawfully detained as a result of his unlawful arrest;
(1.2) That Respondent (sic) be ordered to pay the costs of suit in the Court a quo including
the costs of this appeal on Scale A’.
[3] The background facts are not contentious. The arrest claim constitutes two
different arrests based on the same set of facts : the first of which was effected on 2
April 2007 without a warrant; the second an arrest on 12 June 2012 which was effected
with a warrant, although the app ellant testified it was effected without a warrant. The
appellant is a police officer and was arrested at his workplace at the Germiston Flying
Squad. It was common cause that the appellant was arrested on those dates by
members of the South African Police Services in the exercise of their duties.
[4] On 3 April 2007, the appellant was charged with the murder of a former girlfriend,

[4] On 3 April 2007, the appellant was charged with the murder of a former girlfriend,
Ms F[...] T[...] (the deceased) on 1 April 2007 . The appellant appeared in the

Magistrates’ Court on 4 April 2007 , when t he mat ter was remanded. The senior
prosecutor, Mr Strydom, received the docket on 12 April 2007 and decided to prosecute
the appellant. The matter was remanded for a bail application and t he appellant
remained in custody. Bail was refused on 25 April 2007. The appellant was detained
from 2 April 2007 until 14 December 2007 when the matter was struck off the roll by a
magistrate and he was released.
[5] The appellant was again arrested on 12 June 2012 pursuant to a warrant of
arrest on the same charge. Some seven days later he was granted bail. The matter was
again struck off the roll in December 2012.
[6] During 2013 a summons was served on the appellant to secure his arraignment
in the High Court. The appellant was charged with the same count of murder and three
additional charges. He was ultimately discharged under s 174 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’) on 23 May 2014.
[7] In his particulars of claim t he appellant pleaded that the employees of the
Minister of Police maliciously or wrongfully , without reasonable suspicion that the
appellant had committed the crimes mentioned in the charge sheet , arrested and
detained him and set the law in motion . He further pleaded that e mployees of the
Director of Public Prosecution caused the unl awful arrest and det ention on 12 June
2012 and that he was maliciously , wrongfully and without evidence prosecu ted for
crimes he had not committed. The present appeal concerns only the first arrest and
detention.
[8] It was expressly pleaded that the members of the S outh African Police Services
had no prob able or reasonable grounds upon whi ch to arrest and did not have a
reasonable belief in the veracity of the information at their disposal, if any, that led to the
unlawful arrest, detention and malicious prosecutio n of the appellant. In his particulars
of claim, the appellant claimed R1.5 million for unlawful arrest and de tention, R1 million

for malicious prosecution and R500 000 for impairment of reputation, honour and self-
esteem, violation of dignity and emotional shock.
[9] In response the respondent’s case as pleaded was that the plaintiff was arrested
by Inspector Makola for the murder of the deceased who was murdered on 1 April 2007
and that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the appellant was the
person who committed the murder. A docket was opened and the allegations properly
investigated and found to be accurate. The appellant was a rrested after a witness,
Margaret Mogoane (now deceased) had positively pointed him out as the person who
was last seen in the company of the deceased immediately before she was murdered.
[10] At the trial, only the prosecutor, Mr Strydom , testified for the defence on the
merits, and the appellant testified on his own behalf . The arresting officer, Inspector
Makola, was not called as a witness. The respondent’s attorney of record, Mr Lebanye ,
testified that Inspector Makola had been dismissed from the South African Police
Services and was not available to testify , despite attempts to secure his attendance.
Despite cross examination, that version was not disturbed.
[11] On the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, t he central dispute to be
determined at the trial was whether the arrest was lawful because it was executed in
accordance with s 40(1)(b) of the CPA and whether there was a rea sonable suspicion
that the appellant had murdered the deceased. The appellant contended that there
could be no reasonable suspicion as reliance was placed on the evidence of a minor
child, T[...] T[...], who was three years old at the time and on the ev idence of the late
Margaret Mogoane, who admitted to consuming alcohol.
[12] The respondent contended the opposite . It averred that the allegations against
the appellant were properly investigated and objectively supported a reasonable
suspicion that it was the appellant who committed the murder of the deceased. In the

suspicion that it was the appellant who committed the murder of the deceased. In the
minutes of the pre -trial conference, it was recor ded that the respondent intended
introducing the statement of Margaret Mogoane under rule 38 and s 3 of the Law of

Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 and s 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25
of 1965.
[13] During the trial the statements of all the witn esses who had provided statements
to the arresting officer were admitted into evidence, some of them elicited during the
cross examination of the appellant. The appellant did not admit the truth of the
statements and objected only to the statements of the arresting officer , Inspector
Makola.
[14] T[...] T[...] was an eyewitness to the murder of his mother, the deceased. He
verbally reported to his grandmother and aunt that his mother had been shot by
“Lerato’s father’. It was common cause that the appellant was Lerato’s father. At the
time of the appellant’s arrest, the minor child had not been interviewed. Such interview
occurred a day later. His grandmother (M[...] P[...] T[...]) and aunt (N[...] M[...] T[...]) had
made statements prior to the appellant’s arrest. These statements confirmed what T[...]
had told them immediately after the murder of the deceased.
[15] The statement of Margaret Mogoane was also available and made before the
appellant’s arrest. She stated that on the 1st of April 2007 at about 13h00 she was sitting
with her friend the deceased at 1 […] L[...] Street, Mapleton Extension 10 who just
bought her two (2) beers. At that time the deceased’s son T[...] was also in the house
as she found the deceased and T[...] sitting together. She had just commenced drinking
the first glass from the first bottle of Hansa beer when a person fitting the description of
the appellant arrived. She identified a tall sl im person of light complexion , in clothing
which led her to believe he was a policeman, as the person who arrived where she and
the deceased were sitting shortly before the murder of the deceased. According to
Margaret Mogoane, the person asked h er to leave upon his arrival. She stated that she
did not even finish her beer before leaving, because “that male looked angry ”. She

did not even finish her beer before leaving, because “that male looked angry ”. She
stated that she walked away to the other street at a house where there was a funeral.
As she just got to “that house she he ard a sound of two gunshots from the side she
came from . She heard a scream in that street ”. She immediately went back to L[...]

Street and when she got to the deceased’s house “she found the deceased lying
towards the door bleeding heavily ”. It was not in contention that the aforementioned
statements were available to Inspector Makola when he made the arrest.
[16] From the record it is clear that the appellant’s counsel, Mr Dikolomela , stated
during the trial: ‘I indicated to my learned colleague that ... the statements of all
witnesses may be … admitted, except the statement of the arresting offic er, because
the arresting officer, when deciding to arrest, he looks at the statements…of the
witnesses’. Counsel admitted that the statements of Margaret Magoane , N[...] M[...]
T[...], M[...] P[...] T[...] and T[...] T[...] were before the prosecution when it took the
decision to prosecute the appellant . The truth of the statements were not admitted. It
was common cause that there were four statements co ntained in the docket which the
prosecution had regard to in order to exercise their discretion to prosecute the
appellant. The investigating diary of Inspector Makola was also put to the appellant in
cross- examination. This diary particularised the vario us investigations conducted by
him inter alia prior to affecting the arrest of the appellant on 2 April 2007 and his
observations at the crime scene.
[17] At the trial, the appellant testified. In broad terms, he denied any knowledge of
the incident or that he knew where the deceased lived. Mr Strydom testified as to the
information and the four witness statements contained in the docket which he received
on 12 April 20 07 and on which the decision to prosecute was based. The court a quo
found that it was u ncontested that much of the evidence considered by Mr Strydom
existed when the arresting officer arrested the appellant. It held that t he statements of
N[...] T[...] and M[...] T[...], which were available to the investigating officer , contained
facts which were consistent with the child’s report that was later obtained. T[...] T[...]’s

facts which were consistent with the child’s report that was later obtained. T[...] T[...]’s
statement was later added to the docket and formed part of the decision to prosecute.
The c ourt a quo found that on the probabilities the same facts were available to the
arresting officer , Inspector Makola, as were available to Mr Strydom. It was held that
this r aised a suspicion on reasonable grounds that the appellant had committed the

murder and that the ch ild’s ( T[...]’s) direct evidence led to more than a reas onable
suspicion when Mr Strydom took the decision to prosecute.
[18] The court a quo further concluded that the hearsay rule did not come into play . It
concluded that on the facts the jurisdictional prescripts of s 40(1)(b) of the CPA were
met and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for the suspicion that the
appellant committed the murder. It further held that the law is clear - once the
jurisdictional facts were pr esent, it was for the appellant to show that the discretion to
arrest him without a warrant was exercised in an improper manner 1. It held that the
appellant did not do so. On that basis, the court a quo dismissed the appellant’s claim.
[19] The crisp issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the court a quo
correctly found that the arrest and detention of the appellant was lawful. Put differently,
whether the jurisdictional requirements of s 40(1)(b) of the C PA were met. It was
common cause that the arr esting officer was a peace officer and that murder was a
Schedule 1 offence. The appellant’s challenge was aimed at the reasonable suspicion
of the arresting officer. He did not aver that the arresting officer exercised his discretion
to arrest in an improper manner.
[20] Central to the appeal is the appellant’s contention that no evidence was led by
the respondent pertaining to the arrest and detention of the appellant , which rendered it
lawful. He submitted that nobody testified about the jurisdictional presc ripts and it was
impermissible to infer them without any oral evidence by the arresting officer. The
appellant also submitted that the court a quo erroneously accepted that the jurisdictional
prescripts for affecting the arrest on 2 April 2007 were present and erred in accepting
that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion without his evidence or that of any
police officials who attended the murder scene with him. I n sum, i t was argued that it

police officials who attended the murder scene with him. I n sum, i t was argued that it
was incumbent on the respondent to have led the oral evidence of the arresting officer,
Inspector Makola.

1 Minister of Safety and Security v Linda 2014 (2) SACR 464 (GP) at 472D.

[21] The appellant submitted that the court a quo erred in concluding that the facts
which were considered for the decision to prosecute the appellant were the same facts
available to the arresting offic er and that the prosecutor who made the decision to
prosecute, Mr Strydom, could attest to those facts. Underpinning that submission was
the fact that the arrest occurred on 2 April 2007 , whilst the docket was received by the
prosecutor on 12 April 2007, ten days after the arrest.
[22] The appeal was further predicated on the contention that the respondent was
obliged to call the various witnesses who had made the statements, which resulted in
the arrest of the appellant. It was submitted that such evidence was necessary to prove
the truth of the statements.
[23] On that basis the appellant submitted that the court a quo erred in dismissing his
claim and that the claim should have succeeded. The appellant submitted that he was
entitled to damages for the full period of his incarceration subsequent to his arrest on 2
April 2007 until he was released on14 December 2007 (255 days). Reliance was placed
on Motladile v Minster of Police 2 in contending that the appellant would be entitled to
damages in an amount of R3 825 000 or more given his status as police officer. The
amount was calculated at a rate of R15 000 per day for a period of 255 days. That
amount significantly exceed the amount claimed in the appellant’s particulars of claim.
[24] It is trite that the onus rested on the respondent to establish that the appellant’s
arrest and detention was lawful. 3 It is also well established that a peace officer making
a warrantless arrest must comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites set out in s 40(1)
of the CPA. These grounds are to be interpreted objectively. It was undisputed that the
arrestor was a peace officer.4 A suspicion that a person committed an offence must rest
on reasonable grounds. 5 Once the jurisdictional facts are established, a discretion

on reasonable grounds. 5 Once the jurisdictional facts are established, a discretion

2 Motladile v Minister of Police 2023 (2) SACR 274 (SCA), para 17.
3 Syce and Another v Minister of Police 2024 (2) SACR 1 (SCA) para 40.
4 Under s 1 of the Act, peace officers include police officers.
5 Mabona and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Others 1988 (2) SA 654 (SE) at 658E-H.

arises whether to arrest or not. 6 The arresting officer must consider the facts and
exercise his or her discretion based on those facts. 7 The arresting officer (or
respondent, as happens in most cases) bears the onus of establishing the jurisdictional
facts. If he succeeds, the arrest will be lawful , unless the plaintiff is able to establish
that the arresting officer exercised his discretion to arrest in a manner that was
unlawful.8 The relevant principles are set out in Minister of Safety and Security v
Sekhoto and Another9 and it is not necessary to repeat them.
[25] The jurisdictional requirements are set out in s 40(1)(b) of the CPA as follows:
‘A peace officer may, without warrant, arrest any person whom he reasonably suspects of
having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1, other than the offence of escaping
from custody’.
[26] On the issue of hearsay evidence, the Supreme Court of App eal in Biyela v
Minister of Police, explained the position as follows:10
“[23] The majority, in the court a quo, found that the magistrate erred in concluding that the
information that qualified to be considered whether a reasonable suspicion to arrest existed,
had to be evidence which would be admissible in a court of law. They properly characterised
the issue and said the following:
‘The issue is not whether there is evidence admissible in a court available to the arresting
officer, but whether there was information available which would cause him to reasonably
suspect the suspect of having committed the relevant offence. The reasonableness

6 National Commissioner of Police and Another v Coetzee 2013 (1) SACR 358 (SCA) para 14.
7 Groves NO v Minister of Police 2024 (1) SACR 286 (CC) para 52; MR v Minister of Safety and Security
and Another 2016 (2) SACR 540 (CC) paras 42-46; Olivier v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
2009 (3) SA 434 (W) at 445C-F.
8 Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another 2011 (1) SACR 315 (SCA) at 30, 38; Lepota v

Minister of Police (Unreported GJ case number 29067/2013), 2 October 2015) at 9 -11; Dunjana and
Others v Minister of Police (Unreported, ECP case number 01/ 2015, 9 March 2017) at 24; Matsietsi v
Minister of Police (Unreported GJ case number 03103/2015, 20 February 2017) at 11.
9 Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another 2011 (5) SA 367 SCA paras 28 -34, 39 -41
(131/10) [2010] ZASCA 141 (19 November 2010) 2011 (5) SA 367 SCA paras 28 -34, 39-41; See also
the authorities cited regarding the exercise of discretion, above.
10 Biyela v Minister of Police 2023 (1) SACR 235 (SCA).

requirement therefore extends inter alia to the reliability or accuracy of the information upon
which an arrest is founded, including the quality and ambit thereof.’
…
“[33] The question whether a peace officer reasonably suspects a person of having
committed an offence within the ambit of s 40(1)(b) is objectively justiciable. 11 It must, at the
outset, be emphasised that the suspicion need not be based on information that would
subsequently be admissible in a court of law.
[34] The standard of a reasonable suspicion is very low. The reasonable suspicion must be
more than a hunch ; it should not be an unparticularised suspicion. It must be based on
specific and articulable facts or information. Whether the suspicion was reasonable, under
the prevailing circumstances, is determined objectively.
[35] What is required is that the ar resting officer must form a reasonable suspicion that a
schedule 1 offence has been committed based on credible and trustworthy information.
Whether that information would later, in a court of law, be found to be inadmissible is neither
here nor there for the determination of whether the arresting officer at the time of arrest
harboured a reasonable suspicion that the arrested person committed a schedule 1 offence.
[36] The arresting officer is not obliged to arrest based on a reasonable suspicion because
he or she has a discretion. The discretion to arrest must be exercised properly. 12 Our legal
system sets great store by the liberty of an individual and, therefore, the discretion must be
exercised after taking all the prevailing circumstances into consideration.
…
[38] I, therefore, agree with the majority’s characterisation of the issues and its conclusion
that a reasonable suspicion can, depending on the circumstances, be formed based on
hearsay evidence, regardless of whether that evidence is later found to be admissible or not.
Furthermore, I agree with the conclusion that the court of first instance erred in its

Furthermore, I agree with the conclusion that the court of first instance erred in its
conclusion that the police officers could not form a reasonable suspicion because such
suspicion was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence.”

[27] These principles are fatal to the appellant’s submissions . Biyela is dispositive of
the appellant’s co ntentions that the witnesses should have been called to testify and
that reliance could not be placed on hearsay evidence . In the present circumstances,
the arresting officer’s reasonable suspicion could cogently be based on hearsay

11 Minister of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another 1986 (3) SA 568 (A) at 579H.
12 Groenewald v Minister van Justisie 1973 (3) SA 877 (A) at 883G.

evidence and it was not incumbent on the respondent to call those witnesses to prove
the truth of the contents of their statements. It was also not necessary for the arresting
officer to testify. Considering the evidence available to the arresting officer, the e xercise
of his discretion to arrest the appellant in the circumstances, cannot b e faulted. It must
be remembered that the reasonableness of the suspicion is objective and therefore can
be inferred from what was before him.
[28] The appellant’s contention that the evidence of Mr Strydom should not have been
accepted as evidence for the Minister of Police and that absent the evidence of the
arresting officer , no evidence was presented to discharge the onus resting on the
respondent to prove that the appellant’s arrest and detention was lawful , does not pass
muster. The same applies to the app ellant’s contention that nobody other than the
arresting officer and the witnesses he interviewed could testify about how the arresting
officer formed the suspicion that appellant had committed the offence of murder. The
evidence on which the arresting off icer relied was placed before the Court and c ould be
assessed objectively. The approach adopted by the appellant is thus flawed. The
submission that an adverse inference should have been drawn against the respondent
for its failure to call those witnesses, similarly does not bear scrutiny.
[29] Considering the facts, the finding of the court a quo that objectively speaking
there was a reasonable suspicion that the appellant was the person who perpetrated
the murder on the deceased, cannot be faulted. Even though the court a quo found that
on the probabilities the evidence which was placed before the prosecutor, Mr Strydom,
was the same as the evidence available to the arresting officer, and it appears that the
actual statement taken from the eye witness, T[...] T[...], was only taken a day later, this
does not mean that the court’s conclusion that the arresting officer had formed a

reasonable suspicion was wrong. It is trite that an appeal does not lie against the
reasons for judgment but against the substantive order of the court a quo.13
[30] If the officer who actually made the arrest is unavailable to give evidence it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to look at the totality of the evidence to decide whether
the suspicion harboured by the arresting officer was reasonable. This the court a quo
did. Considering the contents of the statements which ha d been taken from Margaret
Mogoane, N[...] M[...] T[...] and M[...] P[...] T[...], when considered together with the
contemporaneous recordals made by the investigating officer in his investigation diary,
there were, objectively speaking, facts pres ented which were sufficient to link the
appellant with the commission of the murder of the deceased and for the arresting
officer to have harboured a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had murdered the
deceased. There was evidence that the deceased wa s shot in the presence of the
eyewitness who identified Lerato’s father, being the appellant, as the person who shot
the deceased. From the statements it is clear that T[...] immediately reported this to his
grandmother and aunt, the persons who provided the statements. It is evident from the
police docket and diary that these statements as well as the statement of Margaret
Mogoane was available to the arresting officer, Inspector Makola prior to making the
arrest. Her evidence also linked the appellant to the murder of the deceased, as being
the last person to see her alive.
[31] The fact that such facts may be based on hearsay does not mean that they must
be disregarded. A peace officer is entitled to avail himself of any information at his
disposal. This may lead to a reasonable suspicion even if the information is hearsay in
nature, since a suspicion can be reasonable even if there is insufficient evidence for a
prima facie case to be constituted. 14 Section 40(1)(b), said the court in Pule, “does not

prima facie case to be constituted. 14 Section 40(1)(b), said the court in Pule, “does not
require certainty, only a reasonable suspicion ”. The officer does not have to be

13 ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize and two similar cases [2013] ZASCA 139; 2014 (5) SA 16 (SCA) at [64];
Akani Retirement Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd and Others v Moropa and Others (1125/2022;
1129/2022) [2025] ZASCA 13 (21 February 2025 at [22].
14 Pule and Others v Minister of Police and Another (Unreported GP case number 17527/2013, 10
February 2017) at [20]; Ntuli and Another v Minister of Police (Unreported GP case number 2858/2017,
10 March 2021) at [39].

convinced that there is in fact evidence proving the guilt of the arrestee beyond
reasonable doubt. 15 It was unequivocally stated by the Sup reme Court of Appeal in
Biyela16 that the admissibility of the evidence about the information relied upon by the
arresting officer in the forming of a suspicion “is neither here nor there” for determination
of whether a reasonable suspicion was harboured by that officer. The information does
not h ave to derive from eyewitness accounts; circumstantial or real evidence may
suffice.17
[32] In Lifa v Minister of Police and Another 18 the court, following what had been said
in Biyela,19 held that it was not a requirement that a thorough investigation be held
before an arrest without a warrant .20 The need to carry out further investigatio ns, before
exercising the disc retion to arrest depended, said the court, on the facts of each
particular case. 21 It seems clear, at the very least, that it is not necessary for the
relevant police members to have completed the investigation before effecting the
arrest.22
[33] The court a quo’s conclusion that the arresting officer harboured a reasonable
suspicion to arrest the appellant for committing a schedu le 1 offence, thus cannot be
faulted.
[34] This conclusion is dispositive of the appeal and it is not necessary to consider the
remaining issues in any detail. Suffice it to s tate that the appellant’s submissions
regarding the existence of a causal nexus between the unlawfulness of the arrest and

15 Gombakomba and Another v Minister of Police and Another (Unreported GP case number 66631/2012,
16 October 2014); TKS v Minister of Police and Others (Unreported GP case number 75903/2013, 12
September 2017) at [22].
16 Fn 10 supra at [35].
17 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Khumalo; Khumalo v Minister of Police (Unreported,
WCC case number A182/2022, 5 September 2022) at [64].
18 Lifa v Minister of Police and Another 2023 (1) All SA 132 GJ at [49].
19 Supra at [33]-[34].

19 Supra at [33]-[34].
20 Malatjie and Others v Minister of Police (Unreported, GP case number 16853/2020, 6 June 2022).
21 Ibid at [66].
22 Rakhotso v Minister of Police and Another 2023 JDR 3924 (GP at [41J]).

the continued detention of the appellant and his reliance on De Klerk 23 does not pass
muster. Each case is fact specific and the present facts are distinguishable from those
in De Klerk . Moreover, on the facts the conclusion cannot be reached that Inspector
Makola misled the court at the bail application by relying on incomple te information as
contended by the appellant. The appellant’s reliance on Motladile24 is also misplaced.
There the Supreme Court of Appeal deprecated the very practice the appellant relies on
of awarding an amount of R15 000 per day for the detention period.
[35] The court a quo’s finding that the appellant’s claim for unlawful arrest and
detention must fail, thus cannot be faulted. For these reasons, the appeal must fail.
Given that the respondent did not oppose the appeal, no costs order should be granted.
[36] The following order is granted:
The appeal is dismissed.

_______________________________
EF DIPPENAAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG JOHANNESBURG

HEARING

DATE OF HEARING : 29 OCTOBER 2025

DATE OF JUDGMENT : 14 JANUARY 2026

APPEARANCES

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL : Mr. L Dikolomela
APPELLANT’S ATTORNEYS : TM Serage Inc.
Mr Serage

23 De Klerk v Minister of Police 2019 (12) BCLR 1425 (CC); 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); 2021 (4) SA 585
(CC).
24 Motladile v Minister of Police [2023] ZASCA 94.

RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL : No appearance

RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEYS : State Attorney
Mr Lebenya