Saambegin (Pty) Ltd and Others v Overhex Wines International (Pty) Ltd (21575/2022) [2026] ZAWCHC 5 (16 January 2026)

80 Reportability
Commercial Law

Brief Summary

Sale and delivery — Payment of purchase price — Plaintiffs claim balance of price for grapes sold to Defendant — Defendant’s reliance on price adjustment clause due to Covid-19 pandemic — Discretion under clause not exercised properly — Reasonableness of delay in consultation process evaluated — Defence dismissed, Plaintiffs entitled to judgment for undisputed balance.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The judgment concerns an action for payment of a contractual debt arising from the sale and delivery of grapes. The Plaintiffs, Saambegin (Pty) Ltd together with three trustees cited nomine officii (Jacobus Hendrik Slabber N.O., Anna Magdalena Neethling N.O., and Cornelius Johannes Neethling N.O.), sued the Defendant, Overhex Wines International (Pty) Ltd, for payment of the undisputed balance of the purchase price for grapes supplied during the 2020 harvest season.


The proceedings were heard in the High Court of South Africa, Western Cape Division, Cape Town, before Moosa AJ, on several dates during 2025, with judgment delivered electronically on 16 January 2026. Each side called one witness, and the court recorded that the material factual narrative was largely common cause and that both witnesses were credible and reliable.


The dispute centred on the Defendant’s reliance on a contractual price adjustment clause (clause 3.2 of the governing terms) to justify a unilateral reduction of 17% in the purchase price, allegedly prompted by Covid-19 lockdown restrictions and the resultant market disruption. The Plaintiffs contended that the clause did not apply in the circumstances and, in any event, that the discretion was not validly exercised.


2. Material Facts


The Plaintiffs produced grapes at the farm Saamstaan near Malmesbury and had supplied grapes to Overhex for many years. The parties’ contractual relationship for the period relevant to the dispute was governed by a written memorandum of agreement dated 19 December 2016 (“the 2016 agreement”), incorporating Overhex’s standard terms and conditions, together with a written supply and delivery agreement dated 3 December 2019 (“the 2019 agreement”) which functioned as an annexure to the 2016 agreement.


Under the 2019 agreement, Saambegin undertook to sell and deliver 660 tons of specified cultivars of grapes for the 2020 harvest season, and Overhex undertook to purchase and pay for the grapes. Although fewer tons were delivered, the court recorded that nothing turned on that shortfall. Deliveries occurred in stages, with the final delivery on 13 March 2020, and the total value of grapes actually supplied was R3 696 900,00. Overhex paid R3 070 939,96, leaving a balance of R622 960,04, which was undisputed as a mathematical shortfall prior to any purported adjustment.


It was common cause that, on about 25 March 2020, Covid-19 lockdown regulations came into effect, including prohibitions affecting alcohol sales and transport, resulting in Overhex’s trading operations being shut down temporarily. In early April 2020, Overhex communicated to Saambegin that the pandemic constituted a force majeure event and purported to rely on clause 10 of the 2016 agreement (force majeure) to suspend payment obligations. Subsequent communications to suppliers in May 2020 referred to operational changes and payment plans but did not initially raise the price adjustment mechanism.


During 2020 and into 2021, Overhex made payments on altered schedules and in altered instalment amounts, not aligned with the payment terms originally recorded in the 2019 agreement. Overhex engaged Saambegin in discussions and meetings over an extended period, during which Overhex proposed price reductions, first of 20% and later 17%, while Saambegin consistently rejected any reduction in price but remained willing to consider extended payment terms.


By 25 January 2021, the parties were at an impasse: Saambegin would not accept a price reduction, and Overhex would not pay the full price on the existing basis. No further substantive consultation on price reduction occurred after that date. In September 2021, a meeting on 22 September 2021 ended abruptly within minutes when a senior Overhex representative walked out after Saambegin reiterated that full payment was expected.


On 1 October 2021, Overhex paid R214 384,35 and informed Saambegin by email that this payment constituted the final instalment, and that Overhex had applied a 17% reduction, producing a total reduction equal to R622 960,04. Saambegin demanded payment of the balance, which Overhex refused, leading to the action.


A further material factual feature was that the contractual documents included Fairtrade-related provisions, under which Overhex undertook to strive to sell as much wine as possible as Fairtrade, and the evidence accepted by the court was that Fairtrade sales carried premium payments due to Saambegin. The court found that Overhex did not make allowance for Fairtrade-related distinctions in its price adjustment calculation and did not lead evidence identifying which portion of Saambegin’s grapes was used for Fairtrade sales.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether Overhex’s invocation of clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement (the price adjustment term) had the legal effect of reducing the agreed price and thereby absolving Overhex from paying the undisputed outstanding balance claimed by the Plaintiffs.


This required determination of issues of law and fact. The legal component concerned the interpretation of clause 3.2 and its relationship to other contractual provisions, including the non-variation clause and Fairtrade-related provisions. The factual component concerned whether, on the evidence, Overhex had complied with the clause’s prerequisites, including consultation, whether the adjustment was in line with market trends, whether the contractual discretion was exercised arbitrio boni viri, and whether it was exercised within a reasonable time.


The dispute therefore concerned the application of legal standards to established facts, including the objective evaluation inherent in the arbitrio boni viri test and the assessment of the reasonableness of delay.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the dispute on the basis that the Plaintiffs would succeed if Overhex’s clause 3.2 defence failed. It applied established principles of contractual interpretation, emphasising that interpretation is a unitary exercise grounded in the text, context, and purpose of the agreement, and that interpretive method is not a licence to impose a meaning unmoored from the contractual language and structure.


The Shifren / non-variation argument


Saambegin argued that Overhex’s conduct amounted to an amendment of the agreement and that the non-variation clause (clause 15.3) rendered the price reduction invalid because it was not reduced to writing and signed by both parties. The court rejected this argument. It reasoned that clause 3.2 expressly contemplated that Overhex could adjust the price after consultation, and that “consultation” does not mean agreement. In the court’s analysis, clause 3.2 therefore authorised a unilateral adjustment (subject to the clause’s constraints), and it would be commercially and linguistically incoherent if clause 15.3 were read to neutralise clause 3.2 by requiring bilateral written agreement for what clause 3.2 permitted unilaterally after consultation.


The court held that clause 15.3 was not intended to apply to price adjustments effected under clause 3.2, and thus non-compliance with the non-variation clause did not, by itself, invalidate reliance on clause 3.2.


Arbitrio boni viri and misuse of the contractual discretion


The court reaffirmed that a contractual discretion must be exercised reasonably and with reasonable judgment (arbitrio boni viri), assessed against an objective standard. It rejected the contention that the use of estimates, industry experience, and forward-looking judgments necessarily rendered the decision subjective and therefore invalid; instead, it accepted that discretion may involve evaluative elements, provided the outcome is objectively reasonable and consistent with the contractual framework.


However, the court found that Overhex did not exercise its discretion in a manner meeting the arbitrio boni viri standard. Several features drove this conclusion.


First, the court characterised Overhex’s approach as using clause 3.2 to pass on losses arising from abnormal conditions caused by the Covid-19 trading restrictions, rather than to adjust price in response to the type of market trends envisaged by the clause. The court reasoned that Overhex’s calculation was geared towards achieving a break-even outcome for Overhex based on its own sales performance and projected losses, rather than effecting an adjustment “in line with market trends” as contemplated by clause 3.2.


Second, the court held that Overhex’s reliance on its internal sales data, without reference to external, independent indicators of broader market trends, undermined the claim that the adjustment was aligned with “market trends” as contemplated contractually. The court considered Overhex’s internal figures to be self-serving and not, on their own, objective evidence of general market trends.


Third, the court found that Overhex failed to give proper consideration to the Fairtrade framework. The contractual documents contemplated Fairtrade certification and the payment of Fairtrade premiums, and the evidence was that premiums were indeed paid for some Fairtrade sales. Yet Overhex did not make allowance for Fairtrade premiums that could become payable on sales after the adjustment date, nor did it segregate Fairtrade-related grapes or wine from the adjustment. This, in the court’s view, was unfair and unreasonable and inconsistent with the contract as a whole.


In addition to the evaluative conclusion that the discretion was unreasonably exercised, the court also held that Overhex’s defence failed evidentially because Overhex did not establish what portion of the grapes (and value) fell within the Fairtrade scheme, which the court interpreted as excluded from clause 3.2. The court considered this information to be within Overhex’s exclusive knowledge and necessary for adjudicating the scope and quantum of any permissible adjustment.


Timing, consultation, and reasonable time for exercise of discretion


The court addressed the absence of an express cut-off date in clause 3.2. It rejected the Defendant’s submission that the clause permitted adjustment at any time after a harvest season. The court held that where a party is empowered to adjust an agreed price unilaterally, time is of the essence, and it is implied that the discretion must be exercised within a reasonable time. Otherwise, the contractual arrangement would be infected with uncertainty about the payable price and would impede enforcement rights, an outcome the court viewed as commercially unbusiness-like.


The court interpreted “harvest season” in the agreement as a finite annual period during which grapes are harvested and delivered, and on the accepted evidence held that the 2020 harvest season ran from 20 January 2020 to 10 March 2020. It further reasoned that clause 3.2’s reference to “annual fluctuating market trends” contemplated monitoring over a roughly twelve-month window, and that while Overhex did not have to wait the full twelve months, it had to complete consultation and then decide and act within a reasonable time.


On the facts, the court found that the meaningful consultation process about price reduction effectively ended on 25 January 2021, when the parties were plainly deadlocked and Saambegin’s position was inflexible. The court rejected any suggestion that the aborted meeting of 22 September 2021 constituted proper consultation, emphasising that consultation requires meaningful engagement and a fair opportunity to be heard, which did not occur when the Overhex representatives left within minutes.


The court concluded that Overhex’s decision to impose the reduction only on 1 October 2021, almost eight months after the impasse of January 2021, was an unreasonable delay for which no adequate justification was offered. The court found the timing prejudicial to Saambegin, particularly given that Saambegin’s right to full payment had accrued by 7 March 2021 (the due date for the final instalment under the agreed payment schedule). The court inferred that the proximate cause of the eventual imposition of the reduction was the fallout from the September 2021 meeting rather than a timely exercise of a contractual discretion directed at annual market trends.


Whether clause 3.2 applied to Covid-19 conditions at all


Even beyond the defects in reasonableness, evidence, and timing, the court held that clause 3.2 was not triggered by the conditions Overhex relied upon. The court accepted that the circumstances were akin to a force majeure event (and noted Overhex’s own reliance on the force majeure clause earlier), and held that clause 3.2 was designed to address ordinary, normal market forces producing annual fluctuations, rather than extraordinary disruptions caused by a legislated trading ban and “abnormal market conditions”.


The court held that interpreting clause 3.2 to cover the Covid-19 trading ban and its cascading effects would stretch the clause beyond its text, context, and purpose, and would effectively amount to creating an agreement the parties did not make. On this reasoning as well, Overhex’s reliance on clause 3.2 was misplaced.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Plaintiffs’ claim succeeded. The court ordered Overhex to pay the Plaintiffs jointly R622 960,04, together with interest at the prescribed legal rate calculated from 7 March 2021 to date of final payment (both days included).


The court awarded costs to the Plaintiffs on a party-and-party scale, including counsel’s fees on scale B.


Cases Cited


Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).


The City of Tswane v Blair Atholl Homeowners’Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA).


Juglal NO and Another v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA).


NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA).


Erasmus and Others v Senwes Ltd and Others 2006 (3) SA 529 (T).


Sentrale Ko-Op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 (4) SA 760 (A).


Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA).


S v Smit 2008 (1) SA 135 (T).


Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).


Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC).


Knoetze v Saddlewood CC [2001] 1 All SA 42 (SE).


Unilever South Africa Ice Cream (Pty) Ltd (known as Ola South Africa (Pty) Ltd) v Jepson 2008 (2) SA 456 (C).


Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1961 (1) SA 704 (C).


Joosub Investments (Pty) Ltd v Maritime & General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (3) SA 373 (C).


FW Knowles (Pty) Ltd v Cash-In (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 641 (C).


Koumantakaris Group CC v Mystic River Investment 45 (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 404 (D).


Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees of the Oregan Trust and Others 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC).


3M South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS and Another [2010] 3 All SA 361 (SCA).


Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch 1963 (4) SA 147 (A).


Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Knight Frank South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2001] (3) All SA 295 (A).


City of Cape Town (CMC Administration) v Bourbon-Leftley and Another NNO 2006 (3) SA 488 (SCA).


Café Chameleon CC v Guardrisk Insurance Co Ltd [2020] 4 All SA 41 (WCC).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited by name in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that Overhex’s purported exercise of the price adjustment discretion in clause 3.2 did not validly reduce the contract price and did not extinguish Overhex’s obligation to pay the undisputed balance of the purchase price.


The court held that the non-variation clause did not invalidate a price adjustment purportedly made under clause 3.2, because clause 3.2 contemplated unilateral adjustment after consultation and was not subject to the written bilateral formalities in clause 15.3.


The court held that Overhex did not exercise its clause 3.2 discretion arbitrio boni viri, including because it used the mechanism to pass on Covid-19-related losses, relied on internal sales data without adequate objective market trend evidence, failed to account for Fairtrade-related contractual features, and failed to provide necessary evidence to distinguish Fairtrade-excluded quantities and value.


The court held further that, even if clause 3.2 were otherwise applicable, the discretion had to be exercised within a reasonable time, and Overhex’s delay from the January 2021 impasse to the October 2021 imposition was unreasonable, with the September 2021 meeting not constituting proper consultation.


Finally, the court held that clause 3.2, properly interpreted, was not intended to apply to extraordinary market conditions arising from the Covid-19 trading ban, which was characterised as a force majeure-type disruption rather than ordinary annual market fluctuation.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Contractual interpretation is a unitary exercise grounded in the language used, considered in its context and in light of the purpose of the provision, without importing meanings unmoored from the text or attempting to improve the bargain.


Where a contract confers a discretion on a party affecting the parties’ rights and obligations, that discretion must be exercised reasonably and with reasonable judgment (arbitrio boni viri) assessed against an objective standard, consistent with good faith as an informing value in contractual performance.


A contractual requirement of consultation does not equate to agreement, but it requires a meaningful opportunity for affected parties to express views within a constructive process of engagement, rather than a mere formal or aborted interaction.


Where a contract confers power to effect a unilateral price adjustment without specifying a cut-off date, the discretion must be exercised within a reasonable time, assessed with regard to the contract’s structure, the circumstances, and the impact of delay on the other party.


A price adjustment clause designed to address annual fluctuating market trends was interpreted as directed at fluctuations arising from ordinary market forces, and not necessarily extraordinary disruptions such as those associated with an external trading ban and abnormal conditions, where applying the clause would stretch the agreement beyond what the parties bargained for.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

CASE NO: 21575/2022
REPORTABLE

In the matter between:
SAAMBEGIN (PTY) LTD First Plaintiff
JACOBUS HENDRIK SLABBER N.O. Second Plaintiff
ANNA MAGDALENA NEETHLING N.O. Third Plaintiff
CORNELIUS JOHANNES NEETHLING N.O. Fourth Plaintiff
and
OVERHEX WINES INTERNATIONAL (PTY) LTD Defendant

Coram: MOOSA AJ
Heard: 7 AUGUST 2025, 11 AUGUST 2025, 18 SEPTEMBER 2025, 21
OCTOBER 2025
Delivered: 16 JANUARY 2026 (delivered electronically to the parties)
Summary: Sale and delivery – Plaintiff sues for sale price – Defendant’s
business interrupt ed due to Covid -19 lockdown – Defendant
exercised its discretion under price adjustment clause –
discretion not exercised properly – concept of arbitrio boni viri
discussed – exercise of discretion delayed – reasonableness of

delay evaluated – hallmarks for proper ‘consultation’ process
before exercise of discretion is discussed – defence dismissed.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
1. The Plaintiffs’ claim succeeds with costs.
2. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiffs jointly the sum of R622 960,04
together with interest thereon at the prescribed legal rate computed from 7
March 2021 until the date of final payment, both days included.
3. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs’ costs on a party and party scale, such
costs to include counsel’s fees on scale B.

___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
Moosa AJ
Introduction
[1] This judgment concerns a joint claim by the Plaintiffs (“Saambegin”) against
the Defendant (“Overhex”) for payment of R622 960,04, being the undisputed
balance of the price for grapes sold and delivered by Saambegin to Overhex. The
facts giving rise to Saambegin’s cause of action are largely uncontroversial and
common cause.

[2] Saambegin produces grapes at the farm Saamstaan in Malmesbury, Western
Cape. Overhex is a wine producer. For this purpose, Overhex bought grapes from
Saambegin during the 2020 harvest season . The grapes were used to make a
variety of wines that were bottled and sold in the domestic and international markets.

[3] Saambegin’s claim against Overhex has its genesis in a written supply and
delivery agreement concluded between them on 3 December 2019 (“the 2019
agreement”). That agreement must be read with a written memorandum of
agreement dated 19 December 2016 (“the 2016 agreement”) . The latter agreement

is the main contract . It contains Overhex’s standard terms and conditions of
purchase from its grape producers. The 2019 agreement is annexure A to the 2016
agreement. In this judgment, unless the context indicates otherwise, “the parties”
mean Overhex and Saambegin as the contracting parties to the 2016 agreement and
the 2019 agreement.
[4] The 2016 agreement read with the 2019 agreement create d binding and
legally enforceable rights and obligations for the parties (i.e., Saambegin and
Overhex).

[5] The material terms of the 2019 agreement are that Saambegin agreed to sell
and deliver 660 tons of grapes to Overhex during the 2020 harvest season
comprising certain classes (or cultivars) of grapes , subject to annexures B (grape
classification) and C (Overhex’s harvest rules) . Overhex agreed to buy and receive
the grapes and pay Saambegin the total price of R3 952 500,00 in 12 equal monthly
instalments, starting on 7 April 2020 and ending on 7 March 2021 . Overhex also
agreed to strive to sell much of the wine produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes as
Fairtrade within the contemplation of clause 2 of the 2016 agreement (read with
annexure D thereto).

[6] In February and March 2020, Saambegin delivered the agreed cultivars
(classes) of grapes, but fewer tons. The total value supplied was R3 696 900,00.
Overhex p aid R3 070 939,96. That left a shortfall of R622 960,04. Saambegin
demanded payment of the balance. Overhex refused to pay, culminating in this
action.

[7] Overhex denies liability for payment of the purchase price balance, or any part
thereof. The nub of its defence stems from clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement. To that
end, the following paragraphs in Overhex’s plea are significant:
‘5. In terms of clause 3 of the agreement and a proper interpretation thereof:
5.1 The price payable by Overhex for the grapes would be the price
agreed upon in writing by the parties before the last day of December
preceding the relevant wine making season, w hich price would be

preceding the relevant wine making season, w hich price would be
determined per class of grapes and per grading, and which would be
based upon the then prevailing conditions of the wine market. [clause
3.1]

5.2 Because Overhex was continuously exposed to the annual fluctuating
tendencies of the wine market, which played a material role in
contracts with its buyers, Overhex would be entitled, despite the
provisions in clause 3.1, during and after a wine making season and
after consultation with the Plaintiffs, to adjust the agreed purchase
price upwards or downwards in accordance with the tendencies and
conditions of the wine market [clause 3.2] (“ the price adjustment
term”) …
9. Subsequent to the Plaintiffs’ sale and delivery of the grapes during 2020:
9.1 The Covid-19 pandemic and the legal restrictions imposed as a result thereof
caused a significant decline in the wine market.

9.2 Overhex informed the Plaintiffs accordingly and consulted them regarding its
proposed 17% reduction of the total purchase price, as contemplated in the
price adjustment term.

9.3 The Plaintiffs refused to consent to any price reduction whatsoever.

9.4 In the event, Overhex duly exercised its right under the price adjustment term
and reduced the total purchase price by 17%, amounting to a reduction of
R622 960,04.

9.5 Overhex accordingly paid to the Plaintiffs a duly reduced purchase price of
R3 070 939,96, thereby discharging its total indebtedness to the Plaintiffs.’

[8] Saambegin disputes the validity of Overhex’s reliance on clause 3.2 of the
2016 agreement and, therefore, the purported exercise of its discretion thereunder.1

Issues for adjudication

1 The 2016 agreement is drafted in Afrikaans. An agreed English translation forms part of the record.
The relevant provisions of clause 3 in the translated version reads:
‘3.1 The price payable by Overhex for the grapes is the price agreed upon in writing by
the parties before the last day of December p receding the relevant harvest season,
which price will be determined per class of grapes and per grading and which would
be based upon the then prevailing market conditions (The South African and
International Wine Industry).

International Wine Industry).
3.2 As Overhex is continuousl y exposed to the annual fluctuating market trends, which
play a significant role in contracts with its buyers, Overhex is entitled, notwithstanding
the provisions of clause 3.1, to adjust the agreed purchase price, during and after a
harvest season, after consultation with the Producer, in line with market trends, either
upwards or downwards, according to the circumstances.’

[9] Based on the pleadings, Saambegin is entitled to judgment if Overhex’s
defence fails. Therefore, the issue here is a crisp one, namely, whether Overhex’s
exercise of its discretion under the price adjustment term in clause 3.2 had the legal
effect of absolving it from the duty to pay Saambegin the undisputed balance.

[10] The adjudication of this issue turns on both question s of law and fact. The
former involves an interpretation of clause 3.2 with a view to ascertaining the legal
prerequisites for its proper utilisation. The latter involves determining whether, on the
facts of this case, the prerequisites were fulfilled at all material times.
Material factual matrix
[11] Each party only led a single witness. Whereas Saambegin led Cornelius
Johannes Neethling (“Neethling”), Overhex led Gert van Wyk (“Van Wyk”). The facts
narrated by the se witnesses are largely undisputed. B elow is a chronological
summary of relevant facts emerging from the ir testimony, including relevant facts
emerging from documents included in a common trial bundle which was referred to
during the trial.

Evidence by Cornelius Johannes Neethling
[12] Since 1984, Neethling is a farmer in the Swartland wine district of
Malmesbury, Western Cape . In 2018, Neethling sold his farm Saamstaan and
farming business in a Black Economic Empowerment deal. Through the CJ
Neethling Boerdery Trust, Neethling now co-owns the farming business with his
farmworkers. The y own their shares through the Saamstaan Workers’ Trust. The
farm is owned by a different entity.

[13] About 95% of the grapes harvested on the farm Saamstaan are sold to wine
producers. From 2006, Neethling sold grapes to Overhex. The terms and conditions
of supply were initially regulated by a 10 -year contract; later, by a 5 -year contract,
being the 2016 agreement. Both agreements contained substantially the same terms
and conditions of supply, including the price adjustment term in clause 3.2.

and conditions of supply, including the price adjustment term in clause 3.2.

[14] Throughout th e subsistence of both agreements, Overhex purchased large
quantities of grapes during every harvest season . For every season fr om 2006 to
2019, Overhex never exercised its discretion under clause 3.2. It did so for the first
time in relation to the 2020 season that ran from 20 January 2020 to 10 March 2020.

[15] Overhex placed its purchase order s with Saambegin before the start of every
harvest season. During November 2019, and in anticipation of the 2020 grape
harvest, Overhex sent Saam begin its offer to buy 660 tons of grapes, including a
proposed price per ton for each class of grapes that it intended to buy. Overhex also
offered to strive to sell as Fairtrade much of the wine produced with the grapes to be
purchased.

[16] On receipt of Overhex’s offer with its proposed pric ing structure , Neethling,
acting for Saambegin, enquired from neighbouring farmers as to the prices they were
achieving at that time for the forthcoming 2020 harvest season.
[17] On 3 December 2019, and at the farm Saamstaan, a meeting took place
between Overhex, represented by Van Wyk, and Saambegin, repres ented by
Neethling and his co-directors. The purpose of that meeting was to finalise Overhex’s
purchase order for the 2020 harvest season and the agreed terms of supply.

[18] At that meeting, the prices proposed by Overhex for the 2020 grape harvest
were discussed. A negotiation ensued. Ultimately, Overhex’s proposed price per ton
for Sauvignon Blanc, Merlot , and Shiraz w as revised upwards at the insistence of
Saambegin. The meeting adjourned after the parties signed the 2019 agreement.

[19] I pause to reiterate that the material terms of the 2019 agreement are those
summarised under the heading ‘Introduction’ (see para [5] above). It is common
cause that Saambegin fulfilled its contractual obligations, except that it delivered
fewer tons of grapes than was specified in the 2019 agreement. Nothing turns on this
latter fact.

[20] Saambegin delivered the grapes to Overhex in stages. The final delivery
occurred on 13 March 2020. Saambegin then invoiced Overhex for the aggregate
value of the grapes actually sold and delivered, being R3 696 900,00.

[21] After delivery of the grapes, Neethling next interacted with Van Wyk when the

[21] After delivery of the grapes, Neethling next interacted with Van Wyk when the
latter visited him in mid-March 2020. Van Wyk discussed the impact of Covid -19 on
Overhex’s cash flow and finances in general . Neethling explained that Van Wyk
labelled the situation in which Overhex found itself at that time as a ‘force majeure’.

[22] I pause to mention that it is common cause that , on or about 25 March 2020,
regulations were gazetted that imposed a national lockdown due to the Covid-19
pandemic. During th at lockdown, alcohol sales, including the transportation of
alcohol, was prohibited. By law, Overhex’s trading operations were temporarily shut
down.

[23] On 1 April 2020, Neethling and Van Wyk spoke telephonically on the issue of
the lockdown and its effect on Overhex’s ability to pay its agreed monthly instalments
due to Saambegin. During that discussion, Neethling informed Van Wyk that
Saambegin would be agreeable to extending the period over which the
R3 696 900,00 debt is to be settled. As in all other conversations on this subj ect,
Neethling informed Van Wyk that no other arrangement would be accept able to
Saambegin.
[24] A week later, Van Wyk sent an email to Neethling with a letter attached thereto
dated 8 April 2020 . Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the letter recorded that the Covid-19
pandemic is a force majeure event which trigger ed clause 10 of the 2016
agreement.2 In paragraph 2, Van Wyk wrote that, as a result, payment under the
2019 agreement is suspended, pending termination of the pandemic and the
legislated restrictions. In paragraph 4, Overhex proposed two options for
Saambegin’s consideration. Neither option involved any price reduction. Both options
were rejected by Saambegin.

[25] I pause to flag Overhex’s reliance on clause 10 of the 2016 agreement . Later,
Overhex enforced clause 3.2 of the same agreement. Overhex’s use of both clauses
arising out of the same facts is an aspect to which I will revert later in this judgment.

[26] On 8 May 2020, Van Wyk sent a letter to all Overhex’s suppliers, including
Saambegin. That letter recorded a material change in circumstance, namely, that the
Covid-19 prohibition on the exporting of wine had been lifted and, as a result,
Overhex had resumed its exporting operations with effect from 1 May 2020.

Overhex had resumed its exporting operations with effect from 1 May 2020.

2 Clause 10 of the 2016 agreement is headed ‘Force Majeure’. In the translated version, it reads:
‘The failure of a party to perform the provisions of the agreement will be excused to the extent
that it was caused by an event that can be classified as force majeure. Force majeur is
classified for the purposes of this Agreement as an event caused by fac tors that are
completely and entirely beyond the control of a party to this Agreement.’

[27] The letter recorded that the loss of sales over the preceding 5 weeks had
adversely impacted Overhex’s financ ial position. The letter recorded further that this
situation w ould continue for some time , although it was anticipated to improve as
markets reopen ed and wine sales improve d. The letter concluded with a plan of
action for the settlement of debts to all suppliers related to the 2020 grape harvest.
Overhex’s plan was conditional on it receiving financial assistance from the Covid-19
term loan scheme. Overhex failed to pay suppliers according to its own proposed
action plan.

[28] As with the letter of 8 April 2020, the letter of 8 May 2020 also made no
mention of clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement, nor mentioned any proposed price
reduction.

[29] Overhex paid Saambegin on 30 June 2020, 31 July 2020, and 31 August
2020, R123 120,00 per month, including for wine sold as part of Fairtrade. The value
of each instalment and its date of payment w ere unilaterally changed by Overhex
from that
agreed to with Saambegin in the 2019 agreement.
[30] On 3 September 2020, a meeting took place at Saamstaan between Van Wyk
and Neethling. They discussed Overhex’s then proposed price reduction of 20%
(equated to R738 780,00), and its proposed settlement of the reduced balance over
at R152 101,70 per month c ommencing September 2020 and ending January 2022 .
Neethling rejected the idea of a price reduction but indicated that Saambegin w ould
agree to an extended payment period. Neethling’s suggestion did not s atisfy
Overhex.

[31] On 4 September 2020, Van Wyk sent an email to Neethling. Attached thereto
was a copy of Overhex’s proposed contract changes which were discussed on 3
September. In response, Neethling telephoned Van Wyk on 7 September 2020 and
repeated Saambegin’s position as communicated in the meeti ng of 3 September
2020.

[32] On 15 September 2020, Van Wyk sent an email to Neethling in which he (Van

2020.

[32] On 15 September 2020, Van Wyk sent an email to Neethling in which he (Van
Wyk) explained that Overhex’s sales had reduced substantially since March 2020

due to the prohibition on wine sales associated with the Covid -19 pandemic . Van
Wyk explained that this prohibition resulted in Overhex having substantial surplus
stocks.

[33] Neethling testified that Overhex made additional payments to Saambegin on
30 September 2020 (R152 101,76), 31 October 2020 (R202 802,35), and 30
November 2020 (R202 802,35). The value of these instalments and the ir payment
dates did not align with the agreed terms recorded in the 2019 agreement.

[34] On 9 November 2020, a meeting took place between Neethling and Van Wyk.
It was followed up by a meeting on 16 December 2020. At the latter meeting, t hey
discussed Overhex’s revised price reduction proposal of 17% (equated to
R622 960,04), and its settlement of the proposed reduced contract balance at the
rate of R214 384,35 per month commencing December 2020 and ending September
2021. As before, Neethling rejected the idea of a price reduction in favour of
settlement of the full price ove r an extended payment period. Overhex rejected that
suggestion.

[35] On 22 January 2021, a further meeting was held at the farm Saamstaan. That
meeting was followed up with a telephonic discussion on 25 January 2021 between
Neethling and Van Wyk. On the same day, Van Wyk sent an email to Neethling
which recorded the thrust of the ir discussions on 22 and 25 January 2021
respectively.
[36] The nub of the email of 25 January 2021 is Van Wyk’s recordal that he
informed Neethling of O verhex’s inability to pay the full contract price for the 2020
season owing to the impact of the trading restrictions during lockdown and the
abnormal conditions in the wine market which ensued from March 2020 owing to the
Covid-19 pandemic.

[37] In the period from December 2020 to August 2021, Overhex paid Saambegin
R214 384,35 per month, including at least one payment as part of Fairtrade . T he
value of the se instalments and the ir dates of payment were unilaterally determined

value of the se instalments and the ir dates of payment were unilaterally determined
by Overhex. As before, no consultation took place with Saambegin on these matters.

[38] On 22 September 2 021, a meeting took place at the farm Saamstaan .
Representing Overhex were Van Wyk and Gerhard van der Wat h (“Gerhard”), a
senior member of Overhex’s management team and ownership structure .
Saambegin was represented by, inter alia , Neethling and his co -directors. Th e
meeting ended abruptly within 5 minutes. Gerhard walked out after Neethling stated
that Overhex was indebted to Saambegin for the full agreed price and that
Saambegin expected full payment.

[39] On 1 October 2021, O verhex paid Saambegin the sum of R214 384,35. Van
Wyk then sent an email to Neethling which enclosed proof of that payment. In the
body of his email, Van Wyk recorded that the sum of R214 384,35 paid on 1 October
2021 was the final payment instalment under the 2019 agreement. The email
confirmed that Overhex paid Saambegin R3 070 904,00, which sum is R622 960,04
(or 17%) less than the original agreed contract value for grapes actually supplied and
delivered by Saambegin to Overhex. The essence of Overhex’s reasons for the price
adjustment appears from the following statement by Van Wyk in his email of 1
October 2021:

‘Overhex was vanwee die verklaring van ‘n ramptoestand, met gepaargaande
inperkings, as gevolg van die Covid -19 pandemie en abnormale marktoestande, wat
sedert einde Maart heers, genoodsaak om aanpassings aan die druiwepryse en
betaalterme te maak, iets wat ek reeds by verskeie kere aan jou kommunikeer het.’3

[40] On 18 October 2021, Neethling telephoned Van Wyk to enquire whether the
payment made on 22 September 2021 was really the f inal payment for the 2020
harvest season purchases . Van Wyk confirmed th at to be s o. Saambegin did not
accept that position. Saambegin then demanded payment of R622 960,04, being the
admitted balance before the price adjustment effected by Overhex. It refused to pay.

Evidence by Gert van Wyk

3 This statement is loosely translated into English as follows:

Evidence by Gert van Wyk

3 This statement is loosely translated into English as follows:
‘Due to the declaration of a state of disaster, with associated lockdowns, due to the Covid -19
pandemic and abnormal market conditions, which have prevailed since the end of March,
Overhex has been forced to make adjustments to the grape prices and payment terms,
something that I have already communicated to you on several occasions.’

[41] From Van Wyk’s testimony viewed holistically, the fact s narrated above are
common cause . Th us, they are not repeated here. I will now summarise the
remaining aspects of Van Wyk’s evidence which are germane to adjudicating the
disputed issues.

[42] In this regard, the following aspects will be dealt with: (i) the general nature of
Overhex’s business ; (ii) Van Wyk’s role at Overhex; (i ii) the considerations that
informed Overhex’s price offer to Saambegin in November 2019 for grapes sought in
the 2020 harvest season; (i v) the considerations that informed Overhex’s decision to
effect a price reduction in October 2021; and (v) the factors that informed Overhex’s
decision to impose the reduction at 17% of the final contract value.

[43] Van Wyk testified that he commenced employment with Overhex in
2013/2014. At all material times to this case , Van Wyk is Overhex’s managing
director. Overhex is a private company producing bottled wine for sale mainly, but
not exclusively, in overseas markets. Its wine products include Mensa, Survivor, and
Balance. For this purpose, Overhex requires substantial quantities of quality grapes.

[44] Overhex operates a sophisticated wine production and bottling process with
stringent harvesting rules and grape classification. While some wine s are produced
with grapes source d from a single supplier, other s are produced using a blend (or
mixture) of grapes sourced from different suppliers. Overhex uses technology that,
inter alia, tracks a supplier’s grapes from its delivery to their sale as a wine product.

[45] Except for wine produced at Overhex’s plant in Darling with the so-called ‘B
sap’, Overhex track ed the use of Saambegin’s grapes in its wine manufacturing
process. About 30% of Saambegin’s grapes for the 2020 harvest season were used
in wines produced for a client of Overhex in Denmark. The rest of Saambegin’s
grapes were used to produce wine mainly for sale in the domestic (South African)
market.

grapes were used to produce wine mainly for sale in the domestic (South African)
market.
[46] Van Wyk prepared Overhex’s offer to Saambegin for the purchase of 660 tons
of grapes in relation to the 2020 harvest season. Van Wyk used his experience in the
wine industry and knowledge of the historic performance of Saambegin’s grapes
when he formulated the details of the offer . The price offered per ton f or the cultivar
of grapes sought to be purchased (such as, Chardonnay, Pinot Gris, Merlot, Shiraz,

Pinotage, Grenache, Cabernet Sauvignon, and Viognier) was based on a projection
of the average price that Overhex would earn on the sale of wine produced with each
cultivar.

[47] Van Wyk testified that sometimes Overhex would purchase a particular
cultivar of grapes at a high price that would bring about losses on the sale of the
wine produced from it. Van Wyk explained that this practice is part of the cost for
doing business in a competitive market. If Overhex d id not do so , then it would
struggle to retain its market share. Van Wyk explained that l osses incurred in th at
context do not affect Overhex’s overall annual profitability. He explained that this is
because such losses are factored into Overhex’s business model and the pricing
structure for its wine products.

[48] The Covid -19 pandemic led to a national disaster. Businesses were p laced
under lockdown. That occurred after Saambegin delivered its grapes under the 2019
agreement. A ban was imposed on wine sales, including on exports. While the ban
on wine exports lasted about 5 weeks ( from 27 March 2020 to 30 April 2020), the
ban on domestic wine sale s lasted approximately 5 months (from 27 March 2020
onwards).

[49] Van Wyk explained that t he ban on all wine sales was unexpected . It was
imposed on short notice. He explained that Overhex did not, nor could it, anticipate
Covid-19 and the ban on trade . Therefore, Overhex did not factor Covid-19 or the
ban’s impact into the price negotiations with Saambegin on 3 December 2019.

[50] Consistent with Van Wyk’s written communications to suppliers during
March/April 2020, Van Wyk testified that the situation which existed owing to Covid-
19 and the associated ban on wine sales (including exports) is a force majeure
event. He testified that Overhex’s business was hit hard by the trading restrictions
imposed in response to the Covid -19 pandemic. Van Wyk testified that, in the
circumstances that prevailed at the relevant time in 2020, Overhex was entitled to

circumstances that prevailed at the relevant time in 2020, Overhex was entitled to
exercise its discretion under clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement. Van Wyk’s evidence
to this effect was disputed, both during his cross -examination and during Neethling’s
testimony.

[51] The implementation of a complete ban o n all wine sales , including exports,
resulted in Overhex being unable to process orders in its system when the ban took
effect. Under the ban, Overhex’s South African retail clients were also unable to
trade. Thus, some of them cancelled orders; others returned stock. While uncertainty
existed about the ban’s duration and effects, new wine orders were not placed with
Overhex.

[52] The ban ’s impact on Overhex was severe . Wine sales halted. In response,
Overhex’s management adopted a proactive pos ture that, u nderstandably so, was
geared to protecting Overhex and it s interests, both commercial and financial .
Overhex’s management had two key concerns: first, the payment to suppliers for
purchases arising from the 2020 grape harvest season; secondly, limiting losses.

[53] As regards payment, Van Wyk engaged with suppliers, including Saambegin.
He sent periodic updates on Overhex’s plan s for payment. Van Wyk ’s first
communication on this issue was an email on 25 March 2020 . In relevant part, it
read:

‘Dear Overhex producer, supplier and partner,

Attached herewith is a letter to inform you about the arrangements that Overhex must
implement with immediate effect to manage the potential economic impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic to “insure” the business and its partners’ sustainability.’

[54] The lifting of the ban was not followed by an immediate return to the level s of
domestic wine sales and overseas exports as they were prior to the ban. The
demand for wine grew steadily over time. Van Wyk explained that consumers did not
drink more wine to mak e up for lost drinking during the ban . Consequently, wine
producers and retailers , including Overhex, did not make up their revenue losses
incurred as a result of the ban. The loss of sales and profits owing to the ban were,
thus, irrecoverable.

[55] Surplus stock levels made matters worse. The ban on domestic wine sales

[55] Surplus stock levels made matters worse. The ban on domestic wine sales
and on exports resulted in a build -up of stocks in the hands of producers and
retailers. In December 2020, Overhex had 2 million litres of surplus stock. When
markets reopened, high levels of surplus stock and low demand led to reduced wine
prices, both locally and overseas. To remain competitive and to increase its local

sales and overseas exports , Overhex reduced its prices on wine , including wine
produced with grapes delivered by Saambegin in 2020 . In this way, Overhex worked
away surplus stocks and created much -needed space for new bottled wines
produced at that time.
[56] Overhex’s loss of profits increased with the reduction in wine prices . Van Wyk
testified that Overhex’s financial woes would have been exacerbated if it paid each
supplier the full contract price for grapes purchased during the 2020 harvest season.
To limit Overhex’s losses and improve its profitability and cash flow, a decis ion was
taken that Overhex would approach every supplier and discuss a price reduction.

[57] Except for Saambegin, a ll of Overhex’s grape suppliers agreed to a price
reduction. Those agreements were recorded in writing. A similar agreement to vary
the 2019 agreement was presented to Saambegin . Its directors rejected any price
reduction. Therefore, they refused to sign the variation agreement . After the failed
meeting on 22 September 2021 (see para [38] above) , Van Wyk and Gerhard
decided to exercise Overhex’s discretion under clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement .
On 1 October 2021, Overhex effected a price reduction equal to 17% (or
R622 960,04).

[58] The sum of R622 960,04 was an estimate of the aggregate loss that Van Wyk
computed would be suffered by Overhex from the total sales of wine produced with
grapes delivered by Saambegin in February/March 2020. In computing that estimate,
Van Wyk used information available from Overh ex’s database at the time of his
calculation. As his point of departure, Van Wyk applied the following formula:

(i) actual wine yield per ton of grapes supplied by
Saambegin
Multiplied by: (ii) average selling price realised by Overhex from wine
produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes
Less: (iii) Cellar costs incurred by Overhex
Add: (iv) Saambegin’s pro-rata portion of insurance pay-outs
received by Overhex for damage to its cellar tank.

received by Overhex for damage to its cellar tank.

[59] Van Wyk decided that provision should also be made for the estimated future
sales of wine produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes that were unsold when the

calculation of the estimated loss took place. Using his knowledge of, and experience
in, the wine industry, Van Wyk estimated the selling prices that Overhex would likely
generate on the unsold wine. He computed that Overhex would, in due course, suffer
further losses due to reduced selling prices . Van Wyk then added the estimated loss
on the future sales i nto his aforementioned calculation of the aggregate, estimated
loss to be recovered from Saambegin . In this way, he reached the 17% price
reduction.
[60] Van Wyk testified that the objective sought to be achieved with the price
reduction was to ensure that Overhex, at least, br oke even as concerns the sale of
wine produced with grapes bought from Saambegin in the 2020 harvest season. Van
Wyk conceded that the price reduction mechanism was used to pass losses suffered
by Overhex to Saambegin. In that way, Overhex minimised the adverse financial
impact that the ban on wine sales and exports had on its business.

[61] Van Wyk testified that o nce Overhex had sold all the wines produced with all
of Saambegin’s grapes that were purchased during the 2020 harvest season , Van
Wyk then calculated the actual position. It transpired that Van Wyk had
underestimated Overhex’s potential loss. Its actual loss was R770 852,42 (not
R622 960,04). Van Wyk testified that if Overhex had known the true loss when the
price adjustment was effected, then it would have used the increased loss figure for
purposes of clause 3.2.

[62] However, Van Wyk explained that once Overhex exercised its discretion under
clause 3.2 on 1 October 2021, it could not thereafter reduce the adjusted price again.

Submissions by counsel
[63] Adv Whitaker, for Saambegin , and Adv Du Toit , for Overhex , were ad idem
that the outcome of the issues arising for adjudication is not a matter to be decided
on the probabilities. The disputed issues are to be determined bas ed on certain

on the probabilities. The disputed issues are to be determined bas ed on certain
principles and their application to the conspectus of admissible evidence.4 They were
also ad idem that Neethling and Van Wyk were both credible and reliable. On all this,
I agree.


4 The City of Tswane v Blair Atholl Homeowners’Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) para 65.

[64] Applying the trite rules of interpretation enunciated in , for e.g. Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality,5 Adv Whitaker argued that, except
for the consultation requirement, the remaining prerequisites under clause 3.2 of the
2016 agreement for the valid exercise of the discretion conferred therein were not
met. He argued that, on this basis, Overhex’s exercise of its discretion to reduce the
agreed price is invalid. In contrast, Adv Du Toit submitted that the prerequisites of
clause 3.2 were met . He contended that , as was required by clause 3.2, the price
adjustment was effected ‘in line with market trends’ that existed when the agreed
contract price was unilaterally adjusted downwards by Overhex.
[65] Adv Whitaker argued further that if the prerequisites for the invocation of
clause 3.2 are met, then the exercise thereof is invalid for three reasons. First,
relying on Juglal NO and Another v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise
Division,6 he argued that the arbitrio boni viri 7 standard for the valid exercise of
Overhex’s discretion was not met. Relying on NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg
River Drive CC and Others 8 and Erasmus and Others v Senwes Ltd and Others ,9
Adv Du Toit submitted that the methodology used by Van Wyk in determining the
quantum of the price adjustment involved reasonable conduct and the exercise of a
reasonable discretion.

[66] The second string in Adv Whit aker’s bow is his argument that, based on the
modalities of linguistic, contextual cum purposive inte rpretation, clause 3.2 of the
2016 agreement d id not permit a price adjustment after Saambegin’s rights to
payment of the full agreed contract price accrued on 7 March 2021, being the date
when the last instalment became due and payable for the 2020 harvest . Adv
Whitaker argued that insensible and unbusiness -like results would ensue if clause
3.2 was interpreted to permit a price reduction after the full contract price had

3.2 was interpreted to permit a price reduction after the full contract price had
accrued. This is more so, the argument proceeded, in circumstances where the price
reduction under clause 3.2 would purge Overhex’s then extant and ongoing breach
of contract, namely, its failure to pay the full agreed price by the deadline agreed
inter partes.

5 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 18.
6 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA) para 26.
7 This Latin expression is loosely translated to mean ‘ according to the discretion/judgment of a good
man’.
8 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA).
9 2006 (3) SA 529 (T).

[67] The highwater mark of Adv Du Toit’s opposition in this regard is his
submission that clause 3.2 d id not cater for a cut -off date to effect a price reduction.
He argued that a reduction c ould be effected at any time after a harvest season. He
also contended that there is nothing inherently insensible or unbusiness-like with a
clause that permit ted Overhex to purge its breach of contract by way of a price
reduction.

[68] Finally, relying on the Shifren principle emanating from Sentrale Ko -Op
Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren ,10 Adv Whitaker argued that the purported price
reduction was intended to amend the 2019 agreement. Thus, so he reasoned, the
non-variation (or Shifren) provision in clause 15.3 of the 2016 agreement w as
triggered.11 As such, the thesis advanced by Adv Whitaker is that an amendment
could be effected by Overhex , provided the formalities prescribed in clause 15.3
were met. It is common cause that they were not met. On this basis, Adv Whitaker
hypothesised that the price reduction purported to be effected by Overhex is invalid
and unenforceable in law. The pillar on which Adv Du Toit hinged his opposition to
this argument is his submission that the non -variation provision in clause 15.3 f ound
no application when clause 3.2 was applied . The lynchpin of Adv Du Toit’s
submission is that clause 15.3 a pplied to bilateral amendments effected by mutual
consensus. It did not apply, so his argument proceeded, to unilateral amendments ,
such as those catered for in clause 3.2.

[69] In my analysis below, I assess and evaluate the different strands of both
counsels’ arguments so far as doing so may be necessary for this judgment.

Discussion (analysis)
[70] Central to this case is the question of the proper interpretation to be accorded
to clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement. That clause is not a model of drafting clarity. In
its formulation, concepts are used for its purpose without any definition being given

its formulation, concepts are used for its purpose without any definition being given
for their meaning (for e.g., ‘market trends’; and ‘harvest season’). Nevertheless,

10 1964 (4) SA 760 (A).
11 Clause 15.3 reads:
‘It is hereby agreed that no amendment or cancellation or replacement of this agreement or
any part thereof shall be of any force whatsoever, unless such amendment or cancellation or
replacement is reduced to writing and signed by the parties hereto.’

clause 3.2 requires interpretation. To that end, the oft -cited Endumeni test is
instructive.

General principles on interpretation
[71] Owing to the deficiencies identified above in relation to clause 3.2 , the
following warning by the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) bears repetition:

‘Endumeni is not a charter for judicial constructs premised upon what a contract
should be taken to mean from a vantage point that is not located in the text of wha t
the parties in fact agreed. Nor does Endumeni licence judicial interpretation that
imports meanings into a contract so as to make it a better contract, or one that is
ethically preferable.’12

[72] In Coral Lagoon Investments supra , the test for judicial interpretation of
contracts and documents generally was usefully framed. The SCA held:13
It is the language used, understood in the context in which it is used, and having
regard to the purpose of the provision that constitutes the unitary exercise of
interpretation. I would only add that the triad of text, context and purpose should not
be used in a mechanical fashion. It is the relationship between the words used, the
concepts expressed by those words and the place of the contested provision within
the scheme of the agreement (or instrument) as a whole that constitutes the
enterprise by recou rse to which a coherent and salient interpretation is determined.
As Endumeni emphasised …, ‘[t]he inevitable point of departure is the language of
the provision itself.’

[73] Using these principles as a lodestar, I now interpret and apply clause 3.2 read
in its proper context within the 2016 agreement viewed as an integral, cohe sive
whole.

Assessment of the non-variation (or Shifren) clause argument
[74] The express wording in cl ause 3.2 (see footnote 1 above) record ed that
Overhex ‘is entitled … to adjust the agreed purchase price, during and after a
harvest season, after consultation with the Producer, in line with market trends,

harvest season, after consultation with the Producer, in line with market trends,
either upwards or downwards, according to the circumstances’ . Clause 3.2 further

12 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2022
(1) SA 100 (SCA) para 26.
13 At para 25. Also, see para 51.

recorded that this entitlement is conferred because ‘Overhex is continuously
exposed to annual fluctuating market trends, which play a significant role in contracts
with its buyers’.

[75] The purpose served by the price adjustment clause is clear: broadly, clause
3.2 is designed to benefit Overhex . Inter alia, it provides protection against ill-effects
arising from annual fluctuations in the wine market. To enable Overhex to offset the
adverse impact of annual fluctuations in market trends, Saambegin agreed that
Overhex may adjust the contract price agreed by them pursuant to clause 3.1.

[76] A price adjustment is permissible only ‘after consultation ’ with Saambegin.
This is a procedural pre-condition. Adv Du Toit submitted , correctly so, that the
dictionary meaning of the word ‘consultation’ indicates that it does not equate to
‘agreement’. Rather, consultation requires ‘a full opportunity for views to be stated’ in
relation to the subject matter of the intended consultative process.14 I would add that,
in line with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that underpin our contract
law,15 consultation entails the sharing of views through a constructive process of
meaningful engagement.
[77] Overhex and Saambegin engaged in a consultative process. It comprised
formal meetings, telephonic discussions, and correspondence . This is common
cause.

[78] Owing to the legal concept of ‘consultation’ falling short of actual agreement, I
endorse Adv Du Toit’s submission that clause 3.2 authorises unilateral amendments.
It would be absurd if clause 3.2 conferred, as it did, a discretion on Overhex to effect
a price reduction without Saambegin’s consent, but Overhex could not implement the
reduction without Saambegin’s agreement in writing pursuant to clause 15.3.16

[79] The ineluctable conclusion is that clause 15.3 was not intended to apply when
a price adjustment is effected under clause 3.2 . This is a coherent interpretation of

a price adjustment is effected under clause 3.2 . This is a coherent interpretation of
the 2016 agreement that leads to sensible results on a practical level . For these

14 S v Smit 2008 (1) SA 135 (T) at 148J.
15 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 57; Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014
(4) SA 124 (CC) paras 24, 45.
16 Compare Knoetze v Saddlewood CC [2001] 1 All SA 42 (SE).

reasons, I reject the argument that the price adjustment effected by Overhex is an
invalid amendment for want of compliance with clause 15.3 of the 2016 agreement.

Assessment of the arbitrio boni viri argument
[80] Did Overhex exercise its discretion under clause 3.2 arbitrio boni viri? Viewed
objectively, the answer is ‘no’. My reasons are enumerated in the ensuing
discussion.

[81] It is necessary to recount some guiding legal principles. A contractual
discretion must be exercised reasonably and with reasonable judgment (i.e., arbitrio
boni viri ).17 The objective standard of reasonableness applies when assessing
whether a discretion was properly exercised.18 The exercise of discretion reasonably
accords with the notion of good faith that mediates our contract law.19 In Botha v
Rich NO supra para 46, the apex court held:

‘Bilateral contracts are almost invariably cooperative ventures where two parties have
reached a deal involving performances by each in order to benefit both. Honouring
that contract cannot therefore be a matter of each side pursuing his or her own self -
interest without regard to the other party’s interests. Good faith is the lens through
which we come to understand contracts in that way. ’ (My italics added for
emphasis)

[82] Saambegin did not complain that the price adjustment of R622 960,04 is, per
se, unfair or unreasonable. It assailed the price adjustment by asserting that
Overhex exercised its discretion unreasonably. Saambegin contended, inter alia, that
Van Wyk used objective and subjective considerations, rather than purely objective
ones. The subjective elements are contended to be Van Wyk’s experience in, and
knowledge of, the wine industry, and the adjustment being an ‘estimate’ computed by
Van Wyk.

[83] As a matter of law, the use of the objective standard of reasonableness when
deciding if a contractual discretion was properly exercised does not mean that the

17 Juglal v Shoprite Checkers supra para 26.

17 Juglal v Shoprite Checkers supra para 26.
18 Unilever South Africa Ice Cream (Pty) Ltd (known as Ola South Africa (Pty) Ltd) v Jepson 2008 (2)
SA 456 (C) at 461.
19 NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive supra para 28; Erasmus v Senwes supra at 538.

actual exercise thereof may not involve some subjective element s. Parties to a
contract may, for e.g., stipulate criteria that would guide the exercise of a contractual
discretion.20 Nothing precludes contractants from intending to permit criteria that
would involve some subjectivity. Doing so is part and parcel of their contractual
freedom.

[84] The following dictum reinforces my view that an objective standard has long
been used to assess contractual decision-making that involves subjective elements:

‘Even where a provision in a contract gives a party a discretion or allows a party's
opinion or satisfaction to determine the parties' rights and obligations, it is either
interpreted as importing the standard of the arbitrium boni viri , or at least as
precluding such party from making an unreasonable decision. In both classes of
case, an objective standard is taken to be implied and the decision is justiciable by
the Court.’21
(My italics added for emphasis)

[85] For these reasons, the submission that Overhex’s d iscretion was exercised
unreasonably because it entailed subjective elements does not, in law, hold water.

[86] Importantly, the considerations relied on by Saambegin (see para [82] above)
are not subjective in nature. Van Wyk’s experience in, and knowledge of , the wine
industry are objectively verifiable facts. Van Wyk’s background and expertise allowed
him to forecast the likely trend in wine prices. In that way, and using available data of
actual selling prices yielded, Van Wyk was able to estimate the possible future selling
prices for wines produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes that were still unsold when
the price adjustment was calculated.
[87] An issue that was not debated before me, nor addressed by counsel in their
heads of argument, is whether, as a matter of law, the onus rests on Saambegin to
prove the unreasonableness of Overhex’s exercise of discretion; or whether the onus

prove the unreasonableness of Overhex’s exercise of discretion; or whether the onus
rests on Overhex to prove the reasonableness thereof. While this question was left
open in FW Knowles (Pty) Ltd v Cash -In (Pty) Ltd ,22 it appears to have been

20 Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1961 (1) SA 704 (C) at 708.
21 Joosub Investments (Pty) Ltd v Maritime & General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (3) SA 373 (C) at 383.
22 1986 (4) SA 641 (C) at 650H.

answered in Koumantakaris Group CC v Mystic River Investment 45 (Pty) Ltd .23
Without the benefit of counsels’ submissions on this question of law, I will merely
assume, but without definitively deciding, that the onus rests on Saambegin as the
plaintiff.

[88] For purposes of the arbitrio boni viri standard, the exercise of a contractual
discretion would be unreasonable if the impugned decision, when viewed through an
objective lens, exceeds the bounds of what would be reasonable or equitable in the
particular case.24 A reasonable discretion entails an honest judgment arrived at fairly
and in good faith. To determine whether these benchmarks are met, relevant
considerations emerging from case law are: (i) the circumstances prevailing when
the discretion was exercised; 25 (ii) the intention when the particular contract was
concluded;26 (iii) the agreed terms in the contract (for e.g., the criterion to be used
when the discretion is exercised) ;27 and (iv) whether the impugned decision is
commercially rational .28 I would add that consideration should also be given to
whether any relevant consideration was overlooked in the process of exercising the
discretion. The a bove list is not a numerus clausus for assessing a discretion’s
reasonableness.

[89] I find that Overhex did not exercise its discretion arbitrio boni viri. This finding
is based on several grounds. First, Overhex’s decision to reduce the agreed
purchase price was aimed at offsetting Overhex’s estimated loss of R622 960,04.
When the ban on wine sales and exports was lifted, Overhex sold wine made with
Saambegin’s 2020 grapes at prices substantially lower than Overhex anticipated
when Van Wyk prepared his projections during November 2019. There is nothing in
the contract indicating that clause 3.2 was intended to insulate Overhex against
losses incurred in the abnormal
market conditions that prevailed in 2020 arising from the Covid-19 pandemic.

market conditions that prevailed in 2020 arising from the Covid-19 pandemic.
[90] In a supplementary note, Adv Du Toit conceded that if Overhex exercised its
discretion under clause 3.2 for the purpose of passing a ‘loss of profit’ to Saambegin,

23 2007 (6) SA 404 (D) para 38.
24 Koumantakaris Group CC supra para 50.
25 Ibid para 39.
26 Ibid para 39.
27 Ibid para 49.
28 Ibid para 42.

then that discretion would not be arbitrio boni viri . The distinction drawn between a
loss of profit and an ordinary commercial (or business) loss is disingenuous.

[91] It is absurd to contend , as Adv Du Toit does, that Overhex’s discretion would
be unreasonable if it pass ed a loss of profit to Saambegin, but that the
unreasonableness thereof would disappear if the loss passed is of a different kind. I
hold that the nature of the loss passed is of no legal consequence when determining
whether, viewed objectively, the discretion under clause 3.2 was exercised
(un)reasonably.

[92] At any rate, Van Wyk’s testimony is that the lockdown rules in 2020 caused
Overhex to incur losses of sales and of profits. The prices of wines plummeted in the
abnormal market conditions that f ollowed the ban on wine sales and exports .
Overhex sold its wine at substantially lower prices than it forecasted when Van Wyk
negotiated grape prices for the 2020 harvest season. The profit losses were not of
the kind referred to in para [47] above which Overhex was prepared to absorb. Its
management d ecided to take steps to protect Overhex and it s business interests.
They decided that Overhex would pass its losses to suppliers, including Saambegin.
The exercise of Overhex’s discretion to achieve that goal was, in my view,
unreasonable in this case.

[93] A second reason for my view that Overhex’s discretion was exercised
unreasonably also relates to its use of clause 3.2 for a purpose and in a manner
inconsistent with the parties’ intention. Overhex is empowered to unilaterally adjust
the agreed price for grapes . This is a significa nt power that may not be misused.
Moreover, Overhex must satisfy the agreed criteria for the proper exercise of its
discretion.

[94] Overhex exercised its discretion to protect itself against losses flowing from
the trading restrictions that were imposed during March 2020 due to Covid-19. See

the trading restrictions that were imposed during March 2020 due to Covid-19. See
paras [55] to [56], and [60] above. Overhex did not exercise its discretion to counter
‘annual fluctuating m arket trends’ and ‘in line with market trends’ . These are
stipulations expressly recorded in clause 3.2. When viewed objectively, t he agreed
price was adjusted in line with Overhex’s losses and its projected break-even point.
Doing so is unreasonable. In my view, it is a misuse of the enormous power

conferred by clause 3.2 . As such, it does not rise to the legal standard of a
reasonable, honest judgment.
[95] Since Overhex’s management was focu sed on offsetting the losses suffered
by Overhex , Van Wyk’s attention, at material times during the price adjustment
process, was on Overhex’s internal data of its own wine sales. Consequently, no
attention was given to external markers (i.e., indicators) of market trends prevailing
at the relevant time . Overhex’s conduct in this regard does not accord with the
stipulation in clause 3.2 that a price adjustment must be effected ‘in line with market
trends’. On this basis too, I find that Overhex’s discretion was not exercised arbitrio
boni viri.

[96] In dealing with th e requirement under clause 3.2 of consideration to market
trends, Adv Du Toit argued that Overhex’s sales figures are representative of the
general market trends because , so he reasoned, Overhex was involved in the wine
industry for many years and traded with regular buyers o f bulk wine, both locally and
internationally. I disagree. Overhex’s internal sales data is self-serving information.

[97] Clause 3.2 imbued Overhex with significant power to unilaterally adjust a key
aspect of the 2019 agreement and one which was important to Saambegin: the
agreed price. Therefore, w hen interpreting ‘market trends’ and ‘fluctuating market
trends’ in the context of clause 3.2 , I hold that it was never intended that Overhex’s
records would be reflective or determinative of trends in the wine market , nor of
fluctuations in those trends for any purpose arising under clause 3.2 . A contrary
interpretation is unmoored from the text and structure used i n the design of clause
3.2.

[98] Moreover, an objective assessment of reasonableness in relation to the
discretion exercised by Overhex must, of necessity, include evidence of the trends in
the broader wine industry at the relevant time. Those trends are reflected in sources

the broader wine industry at the relevant time. Those trends are reflected in sources
of information that are independent of, and external to, Overhex’s own sales data.

[99] While Overhex’s internal sales records may serve as evidence that, for e.g.,
negative trends in the marketplace were mirrored in its sales figures at a particular
time, I hold that Overhex’s sales data does not, in and of itself, constitute objective
evidence of the broader market trends; nor did the parties intend that Overhex’s own

sales figures would serve th at function. In these circumstances, the reliance on
Overhex’s internal sales data to the exclusion of any external data of the prevailing
market trends, both locally and internationally, rendered the discretion exercised by
Overhex, in my view, as not satisfying the standard of arbitrio boni viri.
[100] A final reason militating against a finding that Overhex exercised its discretion
reasonably lies in its failure to give any consideration to the Fairtrade provisions in
the 2019 agreement, read with clause 2 of the 2016 agr eement (and annexure D
thereto). Overhex failed to give Saambegin any benefit in the price adjustment
calculation for sales before and after 1 October 2021 that occur red as part of the
Fairtrade scheme. On this basis too , I find that Overhex did not exercise its
discretion arbitrio boni viri.

[101] As regards Fairtrade, the 2019 agreement expressly stipulated as follows:

‘Payment terms: Total grapes must comply with Fairtrade standards and be Fairtrade
certified as a whole. If not Fairtrade certified, other terms will apply.

Fairtrade: Overhex will actively strive to sell as much grapes/wine as possible as
Fairtrade.’

[102] The common cause evidence is that there is a financial benefit to Saambegin
being registered for Fairtrade and having wine produced with its grapes that are sold
as part of Fairtrade. Neethling explained that t he reward for Saambegin is that, in
addition to payment for the cost of its grapes, Overhex is contractually obliged to pay
Saambegin a premium in accordance with the Fairtrade International Premium Table.

[103] Saambegin’s 2020 grapes met the Fairtrade standards. As a result, Neethling
testified that Overhex paid Saambegin the premiums it earned on wine sold as part
of Fairtrade before the price adjustment was effected . However, in the price
adjustment calculation, no allowance was made for premiums that Saambegin would

adjustment calculation, no allowance was made for premiums that Saambegin would
earn when Overhex sold wine produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes that w ere
still unsold when the price adjustment was calculated. The failure to make such
allowance represents a financial saving in Over hex’s hands and a further revenue
loss to Saambegin. The effect of all this is both unfair and unreasonable.

[104] Van Wyk failed to explain his failure to make allowance for any Fairtrade
premiums. Based on Overhex’s case at the trial, it was obliged to allow for an
estimate of Fairtrade premiums that it may well have become contractually obliged to
pay Saambegin on wine sales that occurred after 1 October 2021 . On this basis too,
I conclude that Overhex’s discretion was, on its case, not exercised arbitrio boni viri.
[105] Although Neethling accepted that the price adjustment clause applied to wine
produced by Overhex with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes that were not sold under the
Fairtrade scheme, he objected to Overhex applying clause 3.2 to all Fairtrade grapes
purchased. For the reasons adduced here, I find that Neethling’s objection is
merited.

[106] Properly interpreted, the contract was to the effect that all wine sold as part of
Fairtrade, whether prior to or after 1 October 2021 , was not subject to price
adjustment.

[107] Price adjustments were limited to the purchase price of grapes determin ed in
terms of clause 3.1. Clause 3.2 did not apply to the purchase of grapes regulated by
clause 2 of the 2016 agreement. The subject of the latter provision is indicated in its
heading, namely, ‘Fairtrade’. Clause 2 in its entirety read: ‘See Annexure “D”’.

[108] Clause 3 of annexure D regulated the determination of the price for
Saambegin’s grapes that f ell within the Fairtrade scheme. Clause 3 of annexure D
was similar in material respects to clause 3 of the 2016 agreement. There was one
material difference: clause 3 of annexure D d id not include a price adjustment
clause. Put differently, properly understood in its entirety, the 2016 agreement did not
confer on Overhex any discretion to effect a price adjustment for grapes used by
Overhex to produce wine that it later sold as part of the Fairtrade scheme.

[109] I hold that w hen Overhex exercise d its discretion under clause 3.2 , it was
contractually obliged to exclude from the price adjustment all grapes purchased in

contractually obliged to exclude from the price adjustment all grapes purchased in
the 2020 harvest season that were sold as part of Fairtrade. Overhex was
contractually obliged to pay the agreed price thereon in full. Under our law, Overhex
is obliged to honour the contractual obligations entered into by it freely and

voluntarily. Pact sunt servanda, a ‘profoundly moral principle on which the coherence
of any society lies’.29

[110] Overhex treat ed all Saambegin’s 2020 grapes as being subject to price
adjustment. See paras [58] to [59] above. In doing so, Overhex acted contrary to the
parties’ agreed contract terms. When this conduct is viewed objectively, it is evident
that Overhex exercised its discretion in a manner that did not satisfy the standard of
arbitrio boni viri.
[111] As concerns wine produced with Saambegin’s 2020 grapes that were unsold
when the discretion was ex ercised, a reasonable discretion necessitated that
Overhex should have estimated a fair percentage of grapes which would, after 1
October 2021, be sold in Fairtrade. It was contractually obliged to strive to sell wine
in Fairtrade.

[112] In these circumstances, Overhex should have made provision for a further
exclusion from the price adjustment. It did not do so. Overhex treated all
Saambegin’s 2020 grapes as if none were subject to e xclusion under annexure D .
On this basis too, I find that Overhex did not exercise its discretion arbitrio boni viri.

[113] I reiterate that, for reasons explained in paras [105] to [111] above, Overhex
had no discretion to adjust the price agreed for classes of grapes used to produce
wine that was later sold in the Fairtrade scheme. They are excluded from clause 3.2.
As a result of this fact, it was necessary for Overhex to lead evidence on precisely
which classes of grapes delivered in the 2020 harvest season were used to produce
wine that was sold in the Fairtrade scheme, and the tonnage thereof. Th at
information fell squarely and exclusively within Overhex’s knowledge. It did not lead
that evidence.

[114] Overhex needed to establish what amount of the purchase price in the 2019
agreement was regulated by clause 2 of the 2016 agreement (read with clause 3.1 of
annexure D thereof) and, thus, excluded from the price adjustment mechanism in

annexure D thereof) and, thus, excluded from the price adjustment mechanism in
clause 3.2 of the main agreement . That evidence would enable a court to properly

29 Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees of the Oregan Trust and Others 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC) para
35.

adjudicate Overhex’s defence by, inter alia, determining what amount of the agreed
price was regulated by clause 3.1 and, therefore, subject to possible adjustment.

[115] Without clarity about the quantity and value of the grapes that were subject to
price adjustment and those which were not, Overhex’s defence cannot succeed. This
basis for my dismissal of its defence is separate from my finding that Overhex’s
defence cannot succeed because its discretion was not exercised arbitrio boni viri.

Assessment of the price adjustment timing argument
[116] Even if I am wrong in my findings expressed under the previous subheading, I
am satisfied that, for the reasons advanced in this part, Overhex’s defence must fail.
Concomitantly, judgment should be granted in Saambegin’s favour.

[117] Clause 3.2 did not fix a time by which the discretion was to be exercised. Did
this mean that Overhex was free to exercise its discretion at any time ? In my view,
‘no’. When a contracting party is conferred discretion to unilaterally adjust an agreed
price, then time is of the essence for the exercise of that power. An interpretation of
clause 3.2 that permits a price adjustment to occur at any time of Overhex’s
choosing would create an unhealthy dose of uncertainty in the parties’ commercial
relationship about the price due. It would also create obstacles to Saambegin’s
ability to enforce payment. These are unbusiness -like results that could not have
been intended.

[118] If the prerequisites are met for the legitimate use of clause 3.2, then it is an
implied term that the discretion be exercised within a reasonable time. Determining
what constitutes a reasonable time is a fact -intensive enquiry . Relevant
considerations would include the nature and terms of the parties’ contract; the
circumstances of the case ; any delay in the exercise of the discretion and, if so, its
reasonableness.

[119] Overhex is empowered to adjust an agreed price ‘during and after a harvest

[119] Overhex is empowered to adjust an agreed price ‘during and after a harvest
season’. The architects of clause 3.2 failed to clarify the meaning of ‘harvest season’
within the design of this provision. As such, ‘harvest season’ requires interpretation.

[120] Clause 1 of the 2016 agreement recorded its duration to be ‘from and
including the 2016 grape harvest season up to and including the 2021 grape harvest

season’. Clause 4 provided that payment by Overhex is ‘for quality wine delivered in
respect of each separate harvest season’, of which ‘the first instalment is p ayable
before/on 7 April of the relevant harvest year and the 13 (thirteen) subsequent
instalments before/on the 7th day of each following month’. Clause 5.3 stipulate d that
‘[d]elivery of the grapes shall take place during the grape harvest season’. Clause
8.1 obliged Saambegin to deliver ‘an IPW certificate before the start of the harvest’.

[121] When the term ‘harvest season’ is understood in the context s of clauses 1,
3.2, 4, 5.3, 8.1, and other provisions in the 2016 agreement read as a whole , then it
is clear that a coherent meaning of this term entails a finite period annually when
Saambegin harvested the grapes cultivated by it for a particular season.30
[122] The undisputed evidence is that Saambegin’s harvest season for 2020 ran
from 20 January 2020 to 10 March 2020. For the dispute before me, t his period
comprised the ‘harvest season’ for purposes of the price adjustment provision in
clause 3.2.

[123] Consequently, the agreed price determined under clause 3.1 could be
adjusted ‘during and after’ the period from 20 January 2020 to 10 March 2020, but
only after due process was followed, namely, after proper consultation envisaged by
clause 3.2.

[124] Clause 3.2 allowed Overhex to adjust the agreed contract price in
circumstances where Overhex had been ‘exposed to the annual fluctuating market
trends’ that ‘play a significant role in contracts with its buyers’ . Common sense
dictates that, for this purpose , the parties intended to allow Overhex adequate time
to monitor ‘the annual fluctuating market trends’ and then, if ne cessary, to react
through a price adjustment ‘in line with market trends’ prevailing at the relevant time.

[125] A critical question here is this: how much time did the parties intend to give
Overhex for monitoring ‘market trends ’ and to exercise its discretion under clause
3.2?

Overhex for monitoring ‘market trends ’ and to exercise its discretion under clause
3.2?


30 The interpretation accorded to ‘harvest season’ here aligns with the trite interpretive rule that t he
same word or term used in a contract or other instrument bears the same meaning throughout, unless
its context indicates differently. See 3M South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS and Another [2010] 3 All SA
361 (SCA) para 25.

[126] When the expression ‘the annual fluctuating market trends’ is understood
within its context in clause 3.2, and having regard to the purpose of clause 3.2 (see
para [75] above), then it is evident that the parties intended the discretion to be
exercised in response to the wine market trends that emerge in relation to a twelve-
month period.

[127] Logic dictates that Overhex can only react to ‘annual fluctuating market
trends’ if it is a ble to monitor the direction of the market trends over an affected 12-
month window. This interpretation enables a price adjustment ‘in line with’ the market
trends that precipitated the exercise of Overhex’s discretion in the first place.

[128] Considering the terms and context of the parties’ contract and their respective
business operations, I opine that the 12-month monitoring period started when the
2020 harvest season commenced on 20 January 2020. It ended 12 months later.

[129] Overhex did not need to wait 12 months before acting under clause 3.2 . It
could act thereunder once the trends in the market became evident. Van Wyk
testified that this is what happened. However, Overhex was obliged to follow due
process. It needed to first engage in proper consultation with Saambegin .
Consultation indeed occurred.
[130] The consultation process was aimed at achieving consensus. Once it ended,
Overhex was obliged to decide , within a reasonable time, whether to exercise its
discretion, or not. If yes, then it was obliged to act within a reasonable time.

[131] Three questions now aris e: (i) when did the consultation process end? (ii)
when did Overhex decide to exercise its discretion under clause 3.2? and (iii) did the
exercise of that discretion occur within a reasonable time frame after the end of the
consultation process? I now turn my attention to answering these questions of fact.

[132] In mid -2020, Overhex was satisfied that it had enough information to

[132] In mid -2020, Overhex was satisfied that it had enough information to
undertake the processes intended by clause 3.2 . On 3 September 2020, Overhex
consulted with Saambegin . Overhex proposed a 20% price adjustment . On 16
December 2020, it revised that proposal downwards to 17%. Further consultations
took place on 22 and 25 January 2021. Saambegin rejected both proposals. See
paras [30] to [36] above.

[133] Overhex initially invoked clause 10 of the 2016 agreement and declared that
its duty to pay Saambegin was suspended . During the consultation meetings
spanning from mid -2020 to 25 January 2021 , Overhex proposed a price reduction
under clause 3.2. Overhex’s aim was to offset the losses it sustained due to the ban
on wine sales and exports, which ban had earlier prompted Overhex’s invocation of
clause 10.

[134] During Neethling’s discussions with Van Wyk up to and including 25 January
2021, he made Saambegin’s position abundantly clear: under no circumstance
would its directors agree to a price reduction , no matter what the percentage. The
directors of Saambegin were emphatic in their rejection of the very idea of a price
reduction.

[135] As at 25 January 2021, Overhex and Saambegin were manifestly at an
impasse. Unless Overhex capitulated, the only off-ramp was a unilateral imposition
of a price reduction. For inexplicable reasons , Overhex failed to act. It delayed
exercising its discretion under clause 3.2. It did so for an unreasonable period of
time.

[136] After 25 January 2021 , no consultation took place . On 1 October 2021,
Overhex exercised its discretion. It made a final payment to Saambegin. These facts
were communicated to Saambegin in an email sent on 1 October. The context and
timing of Overhex’s decision are important when evaluating if it acted in a reasonable
time.
[137] In August 2021, Van Wyk sent an email in which he promised that Overhex
would settle its debt by the end of August. 31 Since there was n o further discussion
after 25 January 2021 on the price adjustment issue and Van Wyk’s email did not
mention any specific sum, Neethling expected Overhex would pay the full
outstanding balance. However, Overhex only paid the sum of R214 384,35. See para
[37] above.

[138] Neethling became aware of this payment during September 2021. Dissatisfied
with the situation in relation to Overhex’s substantial arrear account f or 2020 ,

with the situation in relation to Overhex’s substantial arrear account f or 2020 ,

31 Van Wyk wrote: ‘Ons betaal einde Augustus die laaste paaiement tov die 2020 oes.’

Neethling requested a meeting to discuss Overhex’s arrears. A meeting was
arranged for 22 September 2021 at the farm Saamstaan. See para [38] above.

[139] Importantly, Neethling requested Gerhard’s presence at the meeting. He is a
director and co-owner of Overhex with whom Neethling had been doing business
since 2006. Neethling hoped that he could bring the issue of Overhex’s arrear
account to an end by dealing directly with Gerhard . Neethling’s hopes were soon
dashed.

[140] Within minutes of the meeting having commenced, Gerhard walked out.
Based on Neethling and Van Wyk’s description, it is not an overstatement to say that
Gerhard stormed out. Van Wyk left because Gerhard exited. Van Wyk explained that
Gerhard refused to engage with Saambegin. Gerhard was angered by Neethling’s
statement upfront that Saambegin was owed the full price and expected full
payment. Gerhard told Van Wyk that the trip to Saamstaan was a waste of his time.
Against the backdrop of Gerhard’s anger and attitude at that time , Overhex’s next
move is unsurprising.

[141] During his testimony, I understood Van Wyk to suggest that the meeting on 22
September 2021 was part of the consultation process envisaged by clause 3.2. If I
understood him correctly on this aspect , then I record that the evidence does not
support his suggestion. I will now briefly outline my reasons for this view.

[142] First, there is no link in time and context between the parties’ engagements up
to 25 January 2021 on the one hand, and the meeting on 22 September 2021 on the
other. Whereas the engagement in January 2021 was part of the consultative
process that was ongoing from, at least, September 2020 through to December
2020, the meeting on 22 September 2021 was isolated from any engagement
process that occurred before then. I find that there is no evidence that establishes a
correlation between the parties’ engagement s up to 25 January 2021 and th e

correlation between the parties’ engagement s up to 25 January 2021 and th e
intended engagement on 22 September 2021. Adv Du Toit also did not contend
otherwise.

[143] Secondly, the purpose of the parties’ engagements up to 25 January 2021, as
recorded in Van Wyk’s email s sent on and before that date , is different to the

purpose of the meeting convened on 22 September 2021 . See para [138] above.
Whereas the engagement s in January 2021 was part of a broader consultati ve
process in which Saambegin and Overhex discussed the latter’s proposal for a price
adjustment, the meeting on 22 September 2021 had a purpose unrelated to the aims
of clause 3.2.

[144] Thirdly, aligned with para [76] above, consultation within the framework of due
process in a contractual or other setting is not a tick -box exercise in which a party
merely goes through the motions (as it were) . Due process requires meaningful
engagement. For a meeting to bear the hallmarks of a proper consultation in a wider
consultative process aimed at reaching consensus on a ny matter of mutual interest
and/or concern, as dealt with in clause 3.2, attendees from th e protagonists must
afford each other the necessary time and space to express themselves fully and
freely on a ny aspect requiring ventilation in that process . Only in this way can
constructive engagement take place. If one party denies the other an opportunity to
be heard, then the former has not engaged in good faith, a key value that underpins
our contract law. In such event, due process was not followed. Without meaningful
engagement, a proper meeting for ‘consultation’ purposes has not occurred.

[145] Owing to Gerhard and Van Wyk aborting the meeting on 22 September 2021
before any discussions could take place, the meeting on that day cannot qualify as a
consultation for purposes of the consultative process contemplated by clause 3.2.

[146] If Overhex truly regarded the meeting on 22 September 2021 as part of the
consultation process that Overhex was obliged to complete before it could validly
exercise the discretionary power in clause 3.2, then I hold that Overhex’s discretion
was exercised prematurely on 1 October 2021 and it cannot have legal force. This is
because Overhex aborted the meeting on 22 September. Flowing from that objective

because Overhex aborted the meeting on 22 September. Flowing from that objective
fact, the consultati on process had not been completed. Th e meeting should have
been reconvened to allow Saambegin a fair opportunity to be heard . That did not
happen.
[147] In para [131] above, a trinity of questions are formulated that require
answering for purposes of determining whether the exercise of Overhex’s discretion
on 1 October 2021 occurred within a reasonable period as intended by the parties .

For reasons that are evident from paras [132] to [1 45] above, I hold that the
consultation process ended on 25 January 2021. On 1 Octo ber 2021, Overhex
decided to exercise its discretion under clause 3.2. In the circumstances of this case,
Overhex failed to exercise its discretion within a reasonable period after 25 January
2021. Consequently, I hold that the exercise of Overhex’s discretion cannot validly
bring about a price adjustment.

[148] My reasons for holding that Overhex’s delay in the exercise of its discretion
was unreasonable are set forth in the succeeding paragraphs.

[149] First, the delay from 25 January 2021 until 1 October 2021 is not
insubstantial. It was almost 8 months. Some justification for the delay, and a
plausible one at that, was required. Van Wyk offered no ne. Also, I can find no
justification for Overhex’s decision to delay effecting a price adjustment . The
consultations that took place by 25 January 2021 was extensive. It yielded no fruit
(speaking proverbially) and there was no reason to believe that Saambegin would
acquiesce to a price reduction later.

[150] By 25 January 2021, Van Wyk knew Saambegin’s position on the issue of a
price adjustment. He also knew , or should reasonably have known, that its position
was inflexible. Despite th is knowledge and that an impasse had been reached after
extensive consultations up to that time, Overhex elected not to effect a price change.

[151] Secondly, by 25 January 2021, the reduced wine selling prices and its impact
on Overhex’s business that precipitated Overhex’s decision to invoke clause 3.2 and
commence the consultati on process were all known. Van Wyk used his knowledge
and experience of the wine market a nd Overhex’s internal sales data to formulate
the initial price adjustment proposal of 20%. That proposal was made in September
2020. L ater, in December 2020, after observing some improvement in Overhex’s
wine selling prices, Overhex reduced its proposed price adjustment to 17%. On 1

wine selling prices, Overhex reduced its proposed price adjustment to 17%. On 1
October 2021, Overhex exercised its discretion under the aegis of clause 3.2 and
imposed the 17% price adjustment. No plausible reason exists, and none was given,
for the delay unti l 1 October 2021 to effect the same price adjustment that was
proposed on 16 December 2020 and that was the subject of engagement again in
mid-January 2021.

[152] Thirdly, on the facts before me, ‘the more natural or plausible conclusion’ 32 is
that the cause , or the proximate cause, for Overhex exercising its discretion at the
time when it did is the fallout of the aborted meeting on 22 September 2021 . It led to
Gerhard’s anger and change of attitude to Saambegin . It can hardly be coincidence
that Overhex imposed a price reduction shortly afterwards.

[153] Fourthly, the timing of the price adjustment is prejudicial to Saambegin and its
interests. In litigation, prejudice is usually a two -way street. Therefore, in general,
prejudice is judicially considered fr om the vantage point of both sides to a dispute . A
fair balance is then sought to be struck between competing interests. However, when
considering prejudice as part of evaluating the reasonableness or not of a delay in
exercising a contractual discretion, prejudice takes the form of considering the
impact of a delay on an affected contracting party.

[154] When Overhex failed to exercise its discretion after more than a year had
lapsed from the end of the trading ban during lockdown and after a se ries of
consultations spanning from mid-2020 to January 2021 , Saambegin was entitled to
accept, as it did, that Overhex elected not to invoke a price reduction . Saambegin
appears to have been influenced in that direction also by the fact that, on 22 January
2021, it released Overhex from the latter’s obligation to purchase grapes for the
2021 harvest season. Overhex’s release was a concession agreed to by Saambegin
during a consultation meeting that formed part of the consultative process under
clause 3.2.

[155] By 7 March 2021, Saambegin’s right to the full purchase price accrued. In the
circumstances that prevailed at that time, Saambegin was entitled to accept, as it
did, that Overhex was liable for the full agreed price contemplated by clause 3.1.

[156] In sum , viewed objectively, I find that Overhex’s decision to exercise its

[156] In sum , viewed objectively, I find that Overhex’s decision to exercise its
discretion under clause 3.2 at the time when it did was unreasonable. The exercise
of its discretion did not occur within a reasonable time. The delay in the exercise of
its discretion w as, in the circumstances of this case , unreasonable . Consequently,
Overhex’s defence rooted in clause 3.2 is bad as a matter of fact. In the premises,
Overhex’s defence must fail and Saambegin’s action should succeed.

32 Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch 1963 (4) SA 147 (A) at 159D.

Assessing whether the prerequisites for clause 3.2’s operation were met
[157] My findings under the previous subheadings are predicated on the
assumption that clause 3.2 was applicable in the context of this case . Under this
subheading, I deal with Adv Whitaker’s argument that clause 3.2 was not triggered
by the conditions in the wine market flowing from the lockdown rules that were
implemented in March 2020 in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

[158] For the reasons ad vanced in this part, I conclude that t he circumstances in
which Overhex found itself during 2020 are not covered by clause 3.2 of the 2016
agreement. Therefore, I hold that Overhex’s defence rooted in clause 3.2 is
misplaced.

[159] Although not strictly necessary, it bears mention that the situation which arose
in 2020 appears to have been a ‘force majeure’ event within the meaning of this term
as defined in clause 10 of the 2016 agreement.33 Overhex expressed the same view.
It communicated that message to Saambegin, both orally and in writing . See paras
[21], [24] and [50] above. At the trial, Van Wyk testified that the situation in 2020 was
a force majeure event. As this part of my judgment will also demonstrate, the net of
clause 3.2 is not cast wide enough to encompass event s of that kind, if it applie d
here.

[160] The question that begs asking is: what type of situations fall within the remit of
clause 3.2? In other words, what is the intended scope of its operation? In that
regard, the purpose and language of clause 3.2, as explained in para [75] above, are
relevant. I will not repeat the contents of para [75] , save to say that Saambegin
agreed that Overhex may effect a price reduction to counter ‘ the annual fluctuating
market trends’.

[161] The language used in c lause 3.2 makes plain that the m echanism created
therein is not available to counter every fluctuation in the wine market which
adversely affects Overhex. Clause 3.2 is intended to apply much more narrowly.

adversely affects Overhex. Clause 3.2 is intended to apply much more narrowly.

[162] When the situation used by Overhex as its reason for effecting a price
reduction is shorn of all its frills, then it is evident that the situation concerned did not

33 Clause 10 is quoted in footnote 2 above.

fall into th e agreed type that would entitle Overhex to enjoy the benefits of clause
3.2. The factual basis for this finding is explained in the ensuing paragraphs.
[163] In contracts of purchase and sale, an agreed price for a commodity is not only
an essential term for the coming into existence of a valid contract, but it is a vital
provision for sellers and buyers alike. As in most other instances, Saambegin’s
interest in the transaction with Overhex is purely financial in nature.

[164] Neethling point ed out that once Saambegin delivered the grapes, it had no
further in volvement in how they were used, or sold as wine . After delivery,
Saambegin’s sole interest was on receiving payment. Therein lay its profits. When
viewed in this light, and considering the commercial context in which clause 3.2
functioned, the narrow remit of clause 3.2’s net is logical and makes business sense.

[165] The nub of Overhex’s case for its reliance on clause 3.2 boils down to this: in
March 2020, its business, and that of all wine producers and retailers nationally, was
shut down in a nation wide lockdown that was imposed to prevent the spread of
Covid-19 . By law, trading in wine was prohibited. The ban on wine sales and exports
brought Overhex’s business, and the domestic wine industry generally, to a standstill.
The ban interrupted Overhex’s business . That interruption had a domino -effect for
Overhex, namely, loss es of sales, income, and profits; poor cash flow; high wine
stocks on hand ; and reduced wine prices. Although the ban was only of a limited
duration in 2020, its effects cascaded into the rest of 2020 and into 2021. To counter
the immediate effect of the trading ban, early in April 2020, Overhex declared the
situation to be a force majeure . Overhex then enforced the contractual term dealing
with force majeure. It suspended payment to all its grape suppliers. Sometime later,
the extent of Overhex’s losses became clearer. Its management decided to curtail

the extent of Overhex’s losses became clearer. Its management decided to curtail
the losses by enforcing the price adjustment clause in its st andard form contract. All
its suppliers agreed to a price reduction, except Saambegin. It refused, despite
extensive consultation. On 1 October 2021, being more than a year after the ban on
wine sales and exports was lifted, Overhex imposed a 17% price reduction
amounting to R622 960,04.

[166] A survey of judgments reported on Saflii and in our law reports reveals that
this dispute is not an isolated case having its origins in the trading ban imposed
during the so-called ‘hard’ lockdown of March 2020 . A distinguishing feature in casu,

however, is that Overhex seeks to recoup its losses by passing them onto a supplier.
In other cases, businesses recouped, or tried to recoup, their losses from insurers.
See, for e.g., Café Chameleon CC v Guardrisk Insurance Co Ltd [2020] 4 All SA 41
(WCC).
[167] Although Overhex had insu rance for certain insurable risks (see para [58]
above), it did not have insurance for business interruption . This is a logical
conclusion. In para [53] above, I quote d Van Wyk’s email sent on 25 March 2020. In
that first salvo after the trading ban was announced, Van Wyk recorded that Overhex
will implement a plan that would ‘insure’ its business against the economic impact of
Covid-19.

[168] After considering the minutiae of the trial evidence and relevant documents in
the trial bundle, the conclusion is inescapable that Overhex used its price adjustment
clause as an insurance-like mechanism to recover losses suffered due to the trading
ban that interrupted its business for a considerable period during 2020. There would,
in principle, be nothing untoward in doing so if, in the exercise of their contractual
freedom, Overhex and Saambegin contracted along those lines. They did not.34

[169] Having regard to the language, purpose and context of c lause 3.2 , this
provision is intended to provide Overhex with protection against the impact of
adverse fluctuations in the prices of wine, but only so far as the fluctuations occurred
due to ordinary, normal market forces. For this reason, clau se 3.2 expressly referred
to Overhex being ‘continuously exposed to the annual fluctuating market trends’.

[170] The ban on wine sales and exports linked to Covid-19 is not a regular event.
That ban was out of the ordinary. It interrupted free trade. The market conditions that
flowed from that interruption was unusual. In the wake of the ban, Overhex itself
described the conditions in the wine market as ‘abnormal’ . This is an appropriate

described the conditions in the wine market as ‘abnormal’ . This is an appropriate
label. It reinforces my view that the degree of fluctuation in wi ne prices was highly
unusual.

[171] The abnormally low wine prices in the unusual market conditions that
prevailed in 2020 were caused by a trading ban in extraordinary circumstances that
was beyond the control of stakeholders and players in the wine industry (such as,

34 Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Knight Frank South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2001] (3) All SA 295 (A) para 1.

wine producers). The market trend in 2020 for wine prices was not the result of the
ordinary or usual market forces that influence d the annual fluctuation of prices .
Accordingly, the market conditions did not fit the mould of the ‘continuous’, ‘annual’
market fluctuating trend contemplated by clause 3.2. These words have an important
gravitational pull when interpreting clause 3.2 in its proper context and for its
purpose.
[172] It is a settled principle that courts interpret contracts and do not make
agreements for parties that they have not made for themselves. Therefore, courts do
dot not transform or supplement contracts in a way contrary to their provisions.35

[173] The situation described in paras [170] to [171] above is unmoored from the
text and structure with which clause 3.2 was designed.36 Consequently, an
interpretation of clause 3.2 that renders its provisions applicable to such a situation
would be tantamount to this Court engaging in the impermissible practice of divining
an agreement for Saambegin and Overhex for which they had not bargained.

[174] The undisputed evidence of Neethling is that , from 2006 to 2019, Overhex
never sought to effect any price adjustment. This is not because there were no price
fluctuations during those years that occurred after Overhex agreed to a purchase
price for g rapes. Price fluctuations were experienced in the wine market. That is a
natural occurrence on an annual basis , as Saambegin and Overhex recorded in
clause 3.2.

[175] It is reasonable to infer that the usual, annual market fluctuations in the years
from 2006 to 2019 did not swing wine prices so drastically that they caused financial
pain which necessitated Overhex to effect a price adjustment. That begs the
question: what made 2020 different from all the other years? The answer lies in the
trading ban and the abnormal market conditions that followed from it (such as, the
downward spiral in wine prices that resulted in significant financial losses for

downward spiral in wine prices that resulted in significant financial losses for
Overhex).


35 City of Cape Town (CMC Administration) v Bourbon -Leftley and Another NNO 2006 (3) SA 488
(SCA) para 9.
36 In Coral Lagoon Investments supra para 51, the SCA held that ‘[t] he proposition that context is
everything is not a license to contend for meanings unmoored in the text and its structure ’.

[176] For all the foregoing reasons, I hold that it was not open for Overhex to use
clause 3.2 of the 2016 agreement in the circumstances that prevailed in 2020 .
Therefore, its defence must fail and it should be ordered to pay the undisputed
balance of the agreed price for grapes purchased from Saambegin in the 2020
harvest season.

Costs
[177] Both Adv Whitaker and Adv Du Toit submitted that costs should be awarded to
the successful litigant and on a party -and-party basis, with counsel’s fees to be
awarded on scale B. I agree. I find no sound, rational basis for not doing so in casu.
Order

[178] In the result, the following orders are made:

(a) The Plaintiffs’ claim succeeds with costs;

(b) The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiffs jointly the sum of R622 960,04
together with interest thereon at the prescribed legal rate computed from 7
March 2021 until the date of final payment, both days included

(c) The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs’ costs on a party and party scale,
such costs to include counsel’s fees on scale B.



_____________________
F. MOOSA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances
For Plaintiffs: J Whitaker
(First to Fourth Plaintiffs)
Instructed by: TSP Attorneys Inc (N van der Merwe)

For Defendant: HL Du Toit
Instructed by: Van Der Spuy Cape Town (CH van Breda)