REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
02/01/2026
DATE SIGNATURE
1
CASE NO: 2022/ 030165
In the matter between:
LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWOR K
(A voluntary associat ion witho ut gain-Universitas)
REYNO DAWID DE BEER NO
(Nomine Officio Offic ial of 1st Applican t)
and
REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT,
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
COURT MANAGER OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
1st Applicant
2nd Applican t
1st Respondent
2nd Respondent
2
IN RE:
Case Number:2022/30280
In the matter between:
LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK 1st Applicant
REYNO DE BEER 2nd Applicant
and
SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH PRODUCTS REGULATORY
AUTHORITY Respondent
IN RE:
Case Number: 2022/030165
In the matter between:
LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK 1st Applicant
(Voluntary Association without gain)
REYNO DE BEER 2nd Applicant
NICOLE CANDICE LAWRENCE 3rd Applicant
BROTHERSIT CC
(REG. NO. 2007/133663/23) 4th Applicant
and
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK 1st Respondent
MINISTER OF FINANCE 2nd Respondent
NATIONAL TREASURY DEPARTMENT 3rd Respondent
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA 4th Respondent
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 5th Respondent
3
_________________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT: OPPOSED MOTION
(The matter was heard in Court 6/B in open court on 28 October 2025. Judgment was
reserved after hearing all parties’ arguments and the parties were informed that judgment
will be delivered when ready by uploading thereof onto the electronic file of the matter on
CaseLines. The date of uploading onto CaseLines is deemed to be the date of the
judgment.)
BEFORE: HOLLAND-MUTER J:
[1] The matter allocated to this court on the Duty Roster for Judges for the 4 th term 2025
as the special motion court (3 rd court). The Duty Roster appears at the end of a term for
the next term setting out the allocations of judicial work for the judges for the following
term. The drafting of the Duty Roster and the allocation of Judge/Judges is the prerogative
of the Judge President of the division.
[2] The second respondent, Mr De Beer, objected to the application being heard by this
court sitting as a single judge because he apparently requested hearing by a full court
from the Deputy Judge President. After deliberation, this issue was resolved. De Beer’s
next objection was not to address the court in the usual way as “My Lord” because
according to his religious belief he addresses only the Almighty in such way. To minimise
potential conflict, I invited him to address the court as “Mr Justice’” . He started off as
requested but very soon continued by merely addressing the court as “Judge” . To avoid
any further objections or other issues with De Beer, he was allowed to continue to
address the court as “Judge” . The underlying reason for th e court’s latitude was that
during preparation for the application, the court became aware of his continuous
contemptuous conduct towards the judiciary with reference to the matter of Minister of
Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v De Beer and Another (Ca se no
Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v De Beer and Another (Ca se no
538/2020)[2021] ZASCA 95 (I July 2021). The admonishment of De Beer by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in that matter does not seem to be taken to heart by De Beer.
[3] The application before this court is a culmination of litigation between the applicant(s)
and the respondents in two previously determined applications under case numbers
2022/30280 and 2022/030165. I will refer to these matters as the SARB and the SAHPRA
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matters. De Beer further referred to other matters with similar “problems” but elected to
continue with the two mentioned matters. The other matters complained about by De
Beer was referred to on passing without any particularity thereto. De Beer did not hesitate
to inform the court that he was no stranger to court procedures even though appearing in
person. This was a further issue being labelled as a “layman” .
[4] The present respondents are the Registrar and Court Manager of the Pretoria High
Court. The two officials elected not to oppose the application but the respondents from
the two consolidated matters under case numbers 2022/30280 (SARB) and 2022/03015
(SAHPRA) filed opposing papers. This became a bone of contention by the second
applicant (De Beer) as to joinder procedure vs intervention by SARB and SAHPRA. De Beer
took issue with the representatives of SARB and SAHPRA procedurally for not formally
applying for intervention/joinder to the present application. This argument cannot
succeed as the applicants in its prayer 4 of the Notice of Motion moved for an order to
consolidate the SARB and SAHPRA matters with the present application. The applicants
move for cons olidation resulting in SARB and SAHPRA being before this court. The
applicants Notice of Motion sets out the perceived consolidation in its heading. This non-
joinder argument by De Beer is rejected.
[5] The SARB matter involved the South African Reserve Bank while the SAHPRA matter
involved the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority. The applicant elected
to have the two matters joined with the present application.
[6] The issue with the SARB matter was that the typed order presented after the hearing
incorrectly cited SARB (Reserve Bank ) as . The second complaint was that not all the
parties’ names were reflected in the heading of the typed order. The typed order was
corrected by the clerk of Van der Westhuizen J when approached by one of the parties.
corrected by the clerk of Van der Westhuizen J when approached by one of the parties.
The approach of Van der Westhuizen’s J clerk by the opponents was a further issue for De
Beer. De Beer’s objection was that the correction must be done on formal application and
not “informally” via mail to the clerk. De Beer levelled critique on this procedure by
claiming that legal representatives have far easier approach of Judges to the detriment of
non-presented parties. The underlying inuendo is that Judges are more open for approach
by legal parties if compared with non-legal parties. This is void of any truth and amounts
to another unjustified attack on the judiciary.
[7] The complaint with the SAHPRA matter is threefold namely (i) that reference is made
to “The Applicant” and not to the First and Second Applicants separately; (ii) a spelling
5
mistake in the full names of the Respondent SAHPRA and (iii) the capacity of persons
representing the parties were faulty because it indicated that De Beer as counsel while
he was in person. It is important to note that these errors did not affect the material terms
of the judgment by Lenyai J. De Beer’s objection was that this amounts to the
clerk/registrar to alter court orders which may be devastating later. The misdirection in
this argument is that it is non-material typographic mistakes corrected and what De Beer
is unaware of that clerks will not make such amendments without the particular judge’s
knowledge.
[8] The position in the SARB matter reflects similar typo errors having no effect on the
material contents of the order granted by Van der Westhuizen J.
NOTICE OF MOTION:
[9] Prayer 1 of the Notice of Motion moves for condonation of non -compliance with the
Rules of Court, particular Rule 6(12) regarding urgency. The matter was enrolled on the
urgent court role for 13 May 2025 but was removed from the urgent roll and Deputy Judge
President Ledwaba was approached for a special allocation. The issue s of urgency and
resulting costs w ere not addressed in the urgent court or at the meeting with DJP
Ledwaba (as he then was). De Beer now accused DJP Ledwaba of dragging heels for not
attending timeously to the matter allegedly forcing De Beer to approach the then Judge
President Mlambo to request DJP Ledwaba to attend to the request. This outcry by De
Beer is evident from one of the Emails he addressed to the Judge President. There is no
substance in this allegation by De Beer. This aspect needs no further attention but to
state that this in indicative of the attitude of De Beer to cross swords with the judiciary.
This is but one example of De Beer insulting the judiciary and practitioners.
[10] I started by requesting De Beer to reply to certain questions posed regarding the issue
of urgency and costs. De Beer was referred to the Practice Directive in Urgent matters
of urgency and costs. De Beer was referred to the Practice Directive in Urgent matters
exceeding the page limits of 500 pages and the request for a hearing exceeding one day.
There are direct prescripts that in such a matter the parties must approach the DJP for a
special allocation before enrolling the matter on the urgent roll. This did not happen and
was the reason why the matter was removed from the urgent roll.
[11] I repeatedly asked De Beer to explain why the applicants (as represented by himself)
dragged on since 15 October 2024 when Lenyai J granted leave to appeal in the SAHPRA
6
matter until the end of April 2025 before issuing the urgent application. Six months went
by before the urgent application was lodged. The urgency, if any, was self-created and no
explanation was given why the applicants would not be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. See Erasmus, Superior Court Practice 2nd Ed D1 Rule 6-60. He
did not answer but kept on arguing around in circles than to address the rather strait
forward question posed by the court at least five times. I waited in vain for an acceptable
explanation why this conduct was not self -created urgency. The reason for debating the
issue of urgency was to decide on the outstanding cost issue for the urgent application.
De Beer failed to give any acceptable explanation and no acceptable explanation on
urgency was forthcoming from him. He tried to hide behind the Plascon-Evans Rule
arguing that because of the non -joinder by SARB and SAHPRA resulted in inadmissible
opposing papers and that the applicants were unopposed before court and that the court
had to accept its version. This is a futile attempt by De Beer to circumvent his
predicament and the argument has no merit. The only reasonable finding on urgency is
that it was self-created and had no substance to jump the queue.
[12] The next aspect discussed with De Beer was prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion. The
respondents requested the court to determine whether De Beer was authorised to litigate
on behalf of the first applicant (referred to as LFN). The averment in the prayer is that De
Beer was nominated by LFN to represent it. I requested De Beer to produce any form of
written authorisation/nomination by the executive of LFN in this regard. After a long
evasive discussion by De Beer he could not produce any written authorisation at all. He
tried to circumvent the issue by stating that he was the president of LFN (also no proof
thereof) and that the constitution of LFN authorises him to litigate. There is no supporting
thereof) and that the constitution of LFN authorises him to litigate. There is no supporting
proof that De Beer is the president of LFN and that he was authorised to litigate this
specific application on behalf of LFN. His attempt to convince the court in this instance
fell woefully short of any proof. The fact that he appeared in past matters representing
LFN does not authorise him to litigate in this matter. In the SAHPRA case there was a
document purporting to be authorization by LFN that De Beer may represent it in that
matter but it does not authorise De Beer in general. His argument is rejected.
[13] In prayer 3 of the Notice of Motion the court is requested to grant the applicants leave
to bring this application in their own capacities as well as in the interest of the members
of LFN and in the interests of the public in general. The failure to obtain prior written
authority from LFN has been dealt with supra. There is no proof of kind for De Beer to
represent the members of LFN in this application. No minutes of meetings of members
authorising him was forthcoming from De Beer. The next hurdle to cross is authority to
represent the public in general. This amounts to a disguised class action on behalf of
the public in general and granting such relief will open the sluices of unimaginable
7
litigation i n the alleged interest of public in general by opportunists . De Beer’s vague
unconvincing arguments takes this issue no further. The question of representing the
general public was dealt with in the Minister of Co -Operative Governance and
Traditional Affairs supra and De Beer’s representation and expertise was rejected.
[14] The gist of the relief sought is to prevent the apparent gross negligent conduct of the
court personal (the Court Manager and Registrar of the court and their personal )
regarding alleged improper documentation and alleged unilateral correction of final court
orders. The gravemen of the De Beer’s complaints is that in tw o separate matters (the
SARB and SAHPRA matters) the respondents purported to unilaterally amend or reissue
corrected orders without judicial oversight. There is no evidence supporting t his
argument.
[15] De Beer stated under oath (in the founding affidavit) that the conduct of the
respondents was reckless whereby published court orders without being formally
declared invalid, unilaterally corrected in a piecemeal fashion . De Beer’s tendency to
continuously insult judicial personal (judges and clerks) has been the subject of past
comment as in Minister of Co -Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (supra)
but it seems that this has no effect on his conduct. The court will deal with other similar
issues below.
[16] De Beer further argued that there was a misconception to what constitutes a court
order. He argued that the mere pronouncement of an order in court by the presiding judge
does not in itself render the order enforceable. Such order only becomes binding an d
enforceable once it has been properly documented, signed by the Registrar and sealed
with the official seal of the court. This argument has no merit.
[17] De Beer further argued that the Registrar, who is not a judicial officer, by altering or
correcting a typed order without the formal intervention of the court, usurps judicial
correcting a typed order without the formal intervention of the court, usurps judicial
functions when purporting to correct a typed order encroaching upon judicial functions.
This is impermissible because the Registrar is not the court. He however counter argues
his own argument by stating that the Registrar is not expected to make any material
errors. Again the argument lacks any merit.
[18] The constitutional attack by De Beer against the corrected court orders is so vague
and without any substance that it needs little if any discussion. On his own version the
8
orders granted by Lenyai and Van der Westhuizen JJ in the two matters are not challenged.
The challenge is against the later documentation of the respective orders to be invalid
and unconstitutional, De Beer argues that an order pronounced by a Judge in court does
not render that order enforceable. It is only after the order is properly documen ted,
signed by the Registrar and sealed with the official seal of the court that it becomes
enforceable. This is with respect incorrect. The documentation afterwards is only
embodiment of the pronounced order.
[19] The interpretation of Rule 42 by De Beer leaves much to be desired and he faile d to
note the contents of Rule 42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules. This subrule empowers the court
to mero motu rescind or vary (b) an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity,
patent error or omission. This enables a court to correct a clerical, arithmetical or other
error in its judgment or order to give effect to its true intention. This exception is confined
to the mere correction of an error in expressing the judgment or order; it does not extend
to altering its intended sense or substance. Erasmus supra D1 Rule 42-29 and S v Wells
1990 (1) SA 816 (A) at 820 C.
[20] It is further clear from Erasmus supra that the High Court has the inherent
competence to correct an incorrect typed version of the court order to correspond with
the order which was pronounced by the court. A similar approach was followed in Isaacs
v Williams 1983 (2) SA 723 (NC) and in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd V Gentiruco AG
1977 (4) SA 298 (A) at 306 -307. The court there dealt with the status of a court after
pronouncing an order to be functus officio but as an exception thereto held that a court
may supplement or alter the order in respect of accessory or consequential matters not
altering the material terms of the order. If any error in a court order, whether non-material,
has to be formally enrolled on the court rolls to correct non-material errors, the result will
be that the already congested court rolls will be burdened with trivial applications using
precious court resources and time that other matters will be enrolle d on later days
resulting in what De Beer tries to prevent and that is to ensure access to court on the
earliest possible time. Clogging the roll with these trivial issues is not in the interest of
justice and will counter section 34 of the Constitution to ensure timeous access to court
for real disputes. De Beer’s relief sought is counter productive and clearly with out any
foundation.
[21] If the above is applied to the SARB and SAHPRA cases the correct finding will be that
the correction of the typed versions of the orders after the order s were granted in court
is justified and in line with the practice as set out in Rule 42 (1) (b) a nd the relevant case
law. The argument by De Beer is unconvincing and his constitutional challenge cannot
9
succeed. If what he proposes is granted it would result in an administrative minefield for
court personal. The court is further not convinced that the mere typing and subsequent
corrections to a typographical error qualifies as an administrative decision. The typing of
the order does not amount to an administrative decision subject to a review as envisaged
in Rule 53 and the provisions of The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
[22] Returning to the Notice of Motion the relief sought in prayers 5 to 9 is still born. The
corrected typographical errors do not amount to administrative action of kind and no
relief is granted.
[23] The relief sought in prayer 10 of the Notice of Motion is superfluous in that is what
the administrative personal in the Office of the Registrar and Court Manager ought to do
when issuing typed version of court orders from the different courts. The further attempt
to engage with the management of the Equality Court, Tax Court or any other statutory
forum regarding the performance of office duties has n o merit. This court cannot
prescribe to these courts directives concerning those courts functioning. Such proposed
directives as to correctly complete orders regarding citations, accurate reflection of the
orders and other is another unsuccessful attempt to be prescriptive to officials. The
request is refused.
[24] The interdict sought in prayer 11 of the Notice of Motion is refused. To obtain an
interdict the applicant has to allege and prove certain requirements for an interdict. There
is nothing in the founding papers justifying such relief. De Beer is referred to Erasmus
supra D6-1 and further on interdicts in general. It would serve the purpose to acquaint
himself with the requisites for a final and interlocutory interdict and w hat needs to be
alleged and proved. There is no indication of irreparable harm suffered by De Beer. He is
the author of his own demise by stalling the process to correct the non-material errors on
the author of his own demise by stalling the process to correct the non-material errors on
the typed court orders. The applicants do not make any case for the granting of a n
interdict or to prohibit the Registrar and Court Manager to have non -material errors in
typed court orders corrected. Rule 42(1)(b) and the relevant case law is clear that what
the clecks have been doing is not illegal nor unconstitutional.
[25] The balance of the relief sought in prayers 12 to 15 is superfluous because that it
what the administrative court personal is doing all along. As held supra, the actions by
the court personal do not amount to any administrative action subject to re view. It is
correct that the matter was enrolled as a special motion but that does not elevate the
application in importance. The reason was the non -compliance with the directive on
10
volume. All applications are important to the individuals involved but this does not
elevate this application to be more important than other applications.
COSTS:
[26] The normal rule is that costs follow success. There is no reason why that should not
apply in this matter. The argument by De Beer in par [par 35] of his heads of arguments
that there was a selective targeting of the applicants’ representatives amount ing to
unconstitutional discrimination and undermines the right to access to court is without
any foundation. To further argue in par [44] the representatives try to shield themselves
from potential accountability and misconduct is completely void of any t ruth. The
allegation that their conduct is a misuse of public funds in pursuing personal vendettas
is as far as the west apart from the east.
[27] These allegations, rounded off in par [46] of the heads of arguments that the
attorneys mislead the court regarding their clients’ positions and their participation in the
es proceedings without formal authority, is indicative of the unacceptable conduct of De
Beer. He is the reason for the matters delay b y his frivolous conduct contesting the
correcting of non-material aspects in the orders.
[28] It was mentioned supra that the conduct of De Beer leaves much to be desired. He
was very generous in his insults to all who disagree with him. He constantly accused the
Registrar and the Office Manager of gross negligence, reckless approach to the
documentation of court orders, their misconception of what constitutes court orders,
invalid conduct, etc. his conduct is unbecoming.
[29] I fail to find that the relief sought will enhance the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of
the Constitution. There is nothing un lawful or procedurally unfair in the way that
typographical and similar errors in court orders are corrected. The present way of
correcting orders as provided for in Rule 42(1)(b) is to ensure legal clarity and certainty.
correcting orders as provided for in Rule 42(1)(b) is to ensure legal clarity and certainty.
De Beer accuses SARB and SAHPRA of interjecting themselves in these proceedings to
obscure their own irregularities and delaying the applicants’ progression towards a full
court appeal. the facts are clear that the opposite is true.
11
[30] It was mentioned supra that De Beer accused DJP Ledwaba of dragging heels for not
allocating a date for hearing. He bemoaned his position with the previous JP Mlambo in
this regard. He levelled accusations against Van der Westhuizen J at the JSC. He will leave
no stone unturned to raise his objections. He objected to this court he aring the
application in the 3rd court and not by a full court of the division.
[31] it was necessary to request him on several occasions during address not to interrupt
the court but to listen to questions posed. He clearly overstepped all boundaries during
address to “warn” Advocate Berger appearing obo SAHPRA that he, De Beer, will
personally oppose any application by Mr Berger should he appear before the JSC for
consideration of appointment to the bench. This was done in open court in the presence
of Mr Berger’s junior, Advocate Ncloko, and Advocate Kromhout appearing obo SARB. He
was requested to withdraw this allegation, but it is illustrative of De Beer’s disrespect the
judiciary and others.
[32] His final complaint was that he is referred to as a “layman” . This was not done during
these proceedings but in the SCA in the matter of Minister of Co-Operative Governance
and Traditional Affairs (supra). He was taken to task in that judgment that his
unjustifiable defamatory scurrilous utterances against judicial officers will not be
tolerated. He seems not to take this advice to heart.
[33] De Beer bemoaned the situation that, in view thereof that he was referred to as a
“layman” , like all other persons appearing without legal representation, he found it more
difficult to engage with the office of a judge and that legal representatives had an almost
straight door off access. This is not true. All parties have access to a judge via the judge’s
cleck. This is again indicative of De Beers disrespect for the judiciary. In the matter of
SARB all communications with the cleck of Vander Westhuiz en J’s cleck was via E -mail
SARB all communications with the cleck of Vander Westhuiz en J’s cleck was via E -mail
copying the other party. This is another example of De Beer’s attitude.
[33] Having considered all aspects above the court is of the view that the applicants be
ordered to pay the costs of the respondents inclusive of counsels’ fees.
ORDER:
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1. The application (dated 1 May 2025) is dismissed.
2. The applicants is to pay the costs of the respondents SARB and SAHPRA on an
attorney-and-client-scale on the appropriate scale “B” , including the costs of two
counsel where employed.
3. The applicants are to pay the wasted costs of both respondents SARB and
SAHPRA of the earlier urgent application on 13 May 2025 on a party -and-party
scale on scale “B” , the costs of two counsel included where appointed.
Signed at Pretoria on January 2026.
_____________________________________
HOLLAND-MUTER J
Judge of the Pretoria High Court
APPEARANCES:
APPLICANTS: R de Beer (in person)
RESPONDENTS: SARB Advocate E Kromhout
SAHPRA: Advocate J Berger and Advocate Y Ncloko
DATE IN COURT: 28 October 2025 (Judgment reserved)
DATE DELIVERED: 2 January 2026 (On Electronic file on CaseLines)