SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case no: 819/2024
In the matter between:
WATERFORD ESTATE HOMEOWNERS APPELLANT
ASSOCIATION NPC
and
RIVERSIDE LODGE BODY CORPORATE FIRST RESPONDENT
101 OWNERS OF UNITS IN RIVERSIDE
LODGE SECTIONAL TITLE SCHEME SECOND – ONE HUNDRED AND
SECOND RESPONDENTS
KHOSI MABASO ONE HUNDRED AND
THIRD RESPONDENT
THE COMMUNITY SCHEMES OMBUD
SERVICE ONE HUNDRED AND
FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF THE
COMMUNITY SCHEMES OMBUD SERVICE ONE HUNDRED AND
FIFTH RESPONDENT
2
THE CHIEF OMBUD OF THE COMMUNITY SCHEMES
OMBUD SERVICE ONE HUNDRED AND
SIXTH RESPONDENT
THE OMBUD FOR THE GAUTENG
REGIONAL OFFICE ONE HUNDRED AND
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
OF SOUTH AFRICA ONE HUNDRED AND
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Waterford Estate Homeowners Association NPC v Riverside
Lodge Body Corporate and Others (819/2024) [2026] ZASCA 03
(14 January 2026)
Coram: SCHIPPERS, HUGHES and SMITH JJA and CLOETE and
CHILI AJJA
Heard: 10 November 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website
and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down of the judgment is deemed to
be 11h00 on 14 January 2026.
Summary: Constitutional Law – s 39(1)(c) and (e) of Community Schemes Ombud
Service Act 9 of 2011 – power of adjudicator to declare contribution unreasonable –
whether unconstitutional for vagueness and the absence of guidelines – no prospect of
success – application to amend notice of appeal to include unconstitutionality challenge
dismissed – review – whether adjudicator committed reviewable irregularity in deciding
membership of homeowners’ association, contribution levies and interest.
3
ORDER
On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Makume J,
sitting as court of first instance):
1. The appellant’s application to amend its notice of appeal to include an order that
s 39(1)(c), read with s 39(1)(e) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9
of 2011 (the Act) , is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, is dismissed.
The appellant shall pay the costs of the application for amendment of the one
hundred and fifth to one hundred and eighth respondents, including the costs of
two counsel where so employed.
2. The appeal is upheld in part. The order of the high court is set aside and
replaced with the following order:
‘(a) The application for an order declaring that s 39(1) (c), read with s
39(1)(e) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the
Act) is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, is dismissed. The
applicant shall pay the associated costs of the one hundred and fifth to
one hundred and eighth respondents, which costs shall include the
costs of two counsel, where so employed.
(b) The orders of the one hundred and third respondent (the adjudicator),
set out in paragraphs 86.1; 86.2; 86.3 and 86.4.3 of the adjudicator’s
determination of 10 March 2021, are reviewed and set aside.
(c) The order of the adjudicator that the second to one hundred and
second respondents are not members of the applicant, is reviewed and
set aside, and replaced with an order declaring that those respondents
are members of the applicant.
(d) The adjudicator’s determinations regarding levies and contributions
owed to the applicant by the first to one hundred and second
respondents in respect of the 2017 to 2020 financial years are remitted
for investigation and determination by a new adjudicator. The new
adjudicator shall be chosen by the parties from the Ombud’s list (as
provided for in s 48 of the Act), by 30 January 2026, failing which the
4
adjudicator shall be chosen by the one hundred and seventh
respondent, by 20 February 2026.
(e) The adjudicator’s decision in paragraph 1.2 of the order that the first
respondent shall pay annual interest at the rate contemplated in s
1(2)(a) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, from date of
delivery of the order, is reviewed, set aside and substituted with a
decision that the applicant is entitled to charge interest on the arrear
levies:
(i) during the period 1 January 2017 to 31 January 2019 at the
prescribed rate of interest, as at the time when such amounts
became due; and
(ii) from 1 February 2019, at the rate of 1% per month.
(f) The first to one hundred and second respondents are ordered to pay
the costs of this application, jointly and severally, the one paying the
others to be absolved, including the costs of two counsel, where so
employed.’
3. The first to one hundred and second respondents shall pay the costs of the
appeal jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, including
the costs of two counsel, subject to paragraph 4 below.
4. The first to one hundred and second respondents’ legal representatives, Eugene
Marais Attorneys, shall pay the costs relating to the preparation and perusal of
volumes 6 to 13 of the appeal record, de bonis propriis.
JUDGMENT
Smith JA and Chili AJA ( Schippers and Hughes JJA and Cloete AJA
concurring)
[1] This is an appeal against an order of the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Johannesburg (the high court), dismissing with costs, an application by the appellant,
Waterford Estate Homeowners Association NPC (Waterford): (a) to declare s
39(1)(c) read with s 39(1) (e) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of
2011 (the Act), unconstitutional; and (b) to review and set aside various decisions of
5
the 103 rd respondent, Ms. Khosi Mabaso, an attorney and adjudicator appointed in
terms of the Act (the adjudicator), to resolve disputes regarding contributions and
levies payable to Waterford by the first respondent, Riverside Lodge Body Corporate
(Riverside).
[2] The second to 102 nd respondents are the owners of units in the Riverside
Lodge Sectional Title Scheme (the Scheme). Where appropriate, we refer to the first
to 102 nd respondents collectively, as the Riverside respondents. The 10 4th
respondent is the Community Schemes Ombud Service (the Ombud Service),
established in terms of s 3 of the Act. The 105 th to 107 th respondents are the
Chairperson, the Chief Ombud, and the Ombud for the Gauteng Regional Office of
the Service, respectively (the Ombud Service respondents). The 108th respondent is
the Minister of Human Settlements of South Africa (the Minister), the executive
authority responsible for the administration of the Act. Th e high court granted leave
to appeal to a full court only in respect of t hat portion of its order pertaining to the
review relief. Waterford then petitioned this Court for special leave to appeal against
the entire order of the high court and such leave was granted.
[3] The basic facts are uncontroversial. Waterford is the hom eowners’
association of a residential development known as Waterford Estate (the Estate).
The Estate comprises 328 residential units consisting of 215 full title erven, 101
sectional title units in the Scheme and 12 sectional title units in the Waterford Villas
Sectional Title Scheme. Riverside is responsible for the administration and
management of the Scheme.
[4] Since 2002 the unit owners paid Waterford approximately the same
contributions to levies, as full title owners in the Estate . However, in 2007 the unit
owners insisted on a reduction of their contributions and stopped making payment
thereof. This resulted in litigation which was resolved in a settlement agreement
thereof. This resulted in litigation which was resolved in a settlement agreement
concluded on 14 October 2007 (the settlement agreement). That agreement
contained a formula for the determination of the contributions payable by Riverside
to Waterford (the formula).
[5] Waterford cancelled the settlement agreement with effect from
28 February 2018, when Riverside failed to make payment of the contributions levied
6
by Waterford. In November 2017 , Waterford applied to the 106 th respondent, in
terms of s 38 of the Act, to resolve the dispute. It sought payment of the contributions
levied on Riverside for the period 1 January 2017 to 28 February 2018 (the 2017 and
2018 financial years) with interest; and in respect of the unit owners, for the period
from 1 March 2018, with interest.
[6] The Riverside respondents raised three main defences: (a) the unit owners
were not members of Waterford and therefore Waterford was not entitled to claim
contributions from them directly; (b) the contributions in respect of the 2017 and
2018 financial years were not calculated in accordance with the formula; and (c) the
contributions levied on the unit owners since 1 March 2018 were unreasonable. In a
counterapplication, the Riverside respondents sought repayment of allegedly
overpaid contributions.
[7] The adjudicator investigated the application and counterapplication. After
hearing evidence, she made certain orders. She found that the unit owners are not
members of Waterford; that the contributions were not made in accordance with the
formula in the settlement agreement; and th ose contributions levied on the Riverside
respondents were not correctly calculated and unreasonable.
[8] Waterford then brought an application in the high court to declare s 39(1)(c)
read with s 39(1)(e) of the Act (the impugned provisions) unconstitutional; and to
review and set aside various decisions of the adjudicator. As stated, that application
was dismissed.
[9] Waterford's notice of appeal did not include a prayer relating to the
constitutional challenge. At the commencement of the hearing before us, counsel for
Waterford applied for leave to amend the notice of appeal to include a prayer that the
impugned provisions be declared unconstitutional. The first to 102 nd respondents did
not oppose the application for amendment . The Minister and Ombud Service
respondents, however, opposed that application.
7
[10] It is trite that, when considering an application to amend a pleading, a court
will take several factors into account. These include: (a) the explanation why the
grounds were omitted from the original notice of appeal; (b) whether any party would
be prejudiced by the late amendment; (c) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation; (d)
the relevance of the proposed amendment; and (e) the prospects of success. In
addition, the court is guided by the overriding consideration of the interests of justice
and whether granting the amendment would ensure a just and prompt resolution of
the real issues between the parties.1
[11] Waterford’s counsel gave the following explanation from the bar for its failure
to include the prayers relating to the constitutional challenge in the notice to appeal.
This Court , on petition, granted leave to appeal in respect of the constitutional
challenge. The pra yers concerning the constitutional challenge were inadvertently
omitted when the notice of appeal was prepared.
[12] Although the respondents conceded that they would not be prejudiced if the
amendment is granted , this Court must still consider whether there are reasonable
prospects that the constitutional challenge will succeed. We deal with this issue
below.
[13] The main issues on appeal are consequently : (a) Waterford’s constitutional
challenge to the impugned provisions; (b) whether the unit owners are members of
Waterford; and ( c) whether the adjudicator’s decisions relating to the contributions
levied for the period 2017 to 2020, and interest on those contributions, should have
been reviewed and set aside.
The alleged unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions
[14] The impugned provisions read as follows:
‘Prayers for relief
39. An application made in terms of section 38 must include one or more of the following
orders:
1 Caxton Ltd. and Others v Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd. and Another [1990] ZASCA 47; 1990 (3) SA 547
(AD); [1990] 2 All SA 300 (A).
8
(1) In respect of financial issues-
. . .
(c) an order declaring that a contribution levied on owners or occupiers, or the way it is to be
paid, is incorrectly determined or unreasonable, and an order for the adjustment of the
contribution to a correct or reasonable amount or an order for its payment in a different way;
(d) . . .
(e) an order for the payment or re-payment of a contribution or any other amount.’
[15] The founding affidavit states that the references to ‘reasonable’ and
‘unreasonable’ in s 39(1) (c) are vague, and that the Act does not specify the criteria
that an adjudicator must use to determine the reasonableness of a contribution or
the way it must be paid. Then it is s aid that an ‘association does not know how to
determine contributions (or the way they are to be paid)’ and ‘therefore cannot
regulate its conduct to avoid such relief’; and that adjudicators are not given
guidance as to the criteria they should use to exercise the s 39(1) (c) power, which
leads to procedurally unfair administrative action and ‘potentially arbitrary, unfair and
inconsistent results and (in extreme cases) even corruption’.
[16] In its heads of argument, Waterford attempts to broaden its constitutional
challenge. It asserts that s 39(1)(c) grants an adjudicator statutory power ‘to interfere
with the terms of the contract between the members on the basis that the board
exercised its contractual powers ‘unreasonably’. This point can be dealt with
summarily. It is impermissible . The Minister and the Ombud Service respondents
were not calle d upon to meet a case that s 39(1)(c) is unconstitutional because it
grants an adjudicator the power to interfere with contractual relations.
[17] The respondents assert that the impugned provisions are constitutional. They
submit that s 50 of the Act restricts an adjudicator’s discretion by requiring due
process and consideration of all relevant evidence. Waterford’s proposal to limit
process and consideration of all relevant evidence. Waterford’s proposal to limit
adjudicator intervention to cases of public policy is not supported by the statutory
language and would amount to a substantive amendment, which is impermissible
under the separation of powers doctrine.
9
[18] The high court dismissed the constitutional challenge. It concluded that the
Act does not grant unfettered power to adjudicators. It held that s 50 provides
necessary procedural safeguards, ensuring fair and proper consideration of all
relevant evidence.
Discussion
[19] There is no merit to Waterford’s constitutional challenge. Waterford ignores
the purposes of the Act , the context in which it applies and the plain wording of its
provisions.
[20] The purposes of the Act are set out in s 2. These include the establishment of
the Ombud Service , the determination of its functions and operations and the
provision of a dispute resolution mechanism in community schemes. The functions of
the Ombud Service include developing and provi ding a dispute resolution service
under the Act ; providing training for conciliators and adjudicators; 2 promoting good
governance of community schemes; and monitoring community scheme
governance.3
[21] The situation in which the Act applies, appears from its preamble. The Act is
designed to provide an informal, effective and speedy dispute resolution mechanism
in community schemes, with the least amount of time, effort or resources. It seeks to
ensure fairness ; to protect owners from exploitative or inequitable contributions,
particularly in the context of collective living arrangements where individual
bargaining power may be limited ; and to promote equitable governance in
community schemes. To these ends, s 38 provides that any person who ‘is a party to
or affected materially by a dispute’, may apply to the Ombud Service for the
resolution of that dispute.4
2 Section 4(1) of the Act.
3 Section 4(2) of the Act.
4 ‘Applications
(1) Any person may make an application if such person is a party to or affected materially by a
dispute.
(2) An application must be-
(a) made in the prescribed manner and as may be required by practice directives;
10
[22] The relief that may be granted in relation to a dispute, is set out in s 39 of the
Act. It includes orders concerning financial issues, behavioural issues, scheme
governance issues, meetings, management services and general issues such as the
denial of access to information or documents. Various provisions of s 39 grant an
adjudicator the power to determine the reasonableness or otherwise , of certain
actions. For example, an adjudicator may issue an order that a scheme governance
provision is unreasonable, having regard to the interests of all owners and occupiers
in the community scheme. 5 Similarly, an order may be issued declaring that a
resolution passed at a meeting is void on the ground that it unreasonably interferes
with the rights of an individual owner or occupier or a group of owners or occupiers .6
An adjudicator may also issue an order that an owner or occupier reasonably
requires exclusive use rights to a part of a common area, and that the association
has unreasonably refused to grant such rights.7
[23] It will immediately be observed, firstly, that there is nothing vague about these
provisions, nor the impugned provisions . They indicate to associations (responsible
for the administration of a community scheme ), occupiers (persons who legally
occupy private areas) and owners (persons who have legally secured rights to
possession and occupation of private areas ) with reasonable certainty what is
required of them, so that they may regulate their conduct accordingly.8
[24] Secondly, no criteria are required for an adjudicator to determine
reasonableness of a contribution or the way it is to be paid . In adjudicating an
application under s 38 of the Act, an adjudicator considers the facts of the relevant
(b) lodged with an ombud; and
(c) accompanied by the prescribed application fee.
(3) The application must include statements setting out-
(a) the relief sought by the applicant, which relief must be within the scope of one or more of the
prayers for the relief contemplated in section 39;
(b) the name and address of each person the applicant considers to be affected materially by the
application; and
(c) the grounds on which the relief is sought.
(4) If the applicant considers that the application qualifies for a discount or a waiver of adjudication
fees, the application must include a request for such discount or waiver.’
5 Section 39(3)(d) of the Act.
6 Section 39(4)(e) of the Act.
7 Section 39(6)(e) of the Act.
8 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [2005] ZACC 3; 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC); 2005 (6)
BCLR 529 (CC) para 108.
11
case and the relief sought – which must include the orders listed in s 39 . What is
more, the Act requires an adjudicator to investigate an application to decide the
appropriateness of an order. Thus, s 50 provides:
‘Investigation by adjudicator
The adjudicator must investigate an application to decide whether it would be appropriate to
make an order, and in this process the adjudicator-
(a) must observe the principles of due process of law; and
(b) must act quickly, and with as little formality and technicality as is consistent with a proper
consideration of the application; and
(c) must consider the relevance of all evidence, but is not obliged to apply the exclusionary
rules of evidence as they are applied in civil courts.’
[25] Waterford’s reliance on Dawood v The Minister of Home Affairs 9 for its claim
that in the absence of additional criteria, adjudicators lack the necessary
qualifications to assess whether a contribution is reasonable, is misplaced. In
Dawood the Constitutional Court emphasized the difference between a court or
tribunal exercising a discretion when interpreting legislation in a manner consistent
with the Constitution; and an official untrained in law, doing so. The latter requires
guidelines to interpret legislation . However, the adjudicators appointed in terms of
the Act are not untrained officials. They are required in terms of s 21(2) (b) to have
suitable qualifications and experience necessary to adjudicate disputes in community
schemes.
[26] Further, s 51 (1) of the Act confers extensive investigative powers on an
adjudicator. It reads:
‘Investigative powers of adjudicator
(1) When considering the application, the adjudicator may-
(a) require the applicant, managing agent or relevant person-
(i) to give to the adjudicator further information or documentation;
(ii) to give information in the form of an affidavit or statement; or
(iii) subject to reasonable notice being given of the time and place, to come to the office of
(iii) subject to reasonable notice being given of the time and place, to come to the office of
the adjudicator for an interview.’
9 Dawood v The Minister of Home Affairs [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837
(CC) (7 June 2000).
12
[27] Sections 50 and 51 of the Act make it clear that the power of an adjudicator
under s 39(1)(c) is not unfettered. It must be exercised rationally, reasonably, and in
accordance with due process. This ensures a balance between regulatory oversight
in communal living and compliance with contractual agreements, all within the
bounds of constitutional principles and subject to judicial review.
[28] It goes without saying that an adjudicator’s powers under the impugned
provisions are central in the scheme of the Act. Without the ability to assess the
reasonableness or otherwise of contribution s, the Act’s purposes and effectiveness
would be subverted., This, in turn, would undermine the recourse of property owners
to dispute unfair contributions and exacerbat e the power imbalance between
community schemes and owners.
[29] And the standard of reasonableness is commonplace in administrative
decision-making. As the Constitutional Court held in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others , s 6(2)(h) of PAJA which
requires a reasonable exercise of a power or the performance of a function, must be
construed consistently s 33 of the Constitution; and posits a simple test, namely that
an administrative decision will be reviewable if it is one that a reasonable decision
maker could not reach.10 The Court went on to say:
‘What will constitute a reasonable decision will depend on the circumstances of each case,
much of what will constitute a fair procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case.
Factors relevant to determining whether a decision is reasonable or not will include the
nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision maker, the range of factors
relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing
interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well -being of those
affected…’11.
affected…’11.
[30] For the above reasons, Waterford’s submission that the impugned provisions
are unconstitutional because (i) they are vague in that an association does not know
how to determine contributions (or the way they are to be paid ); and (ii) the
provisions contain no guidelines to assist the adjudicator, is misconceived. Waterford
10 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA
490 (CC) [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 44.
11 Bato Star fn 10 para 45.
13
has for more than 20 years determined levies and contributions owed by the
Riverside respondents. And the answering affidavit states that ‘historically Waterford
has been raising unreasonable and unfair levies’ against the Riverside respondents
(emphasis added). They had no difficulty with unreasonableness as an objective
standard. Indeed, the settlement agreement was concluded on that basis , which
included payment of the historic debt owed by those respondents.
[31] Moreover, our courts have consistently upheld the presumption of
constitutional validity in statutory interpretation. In Hyundai,12 the Constitutional Court
emphasised that legislation must be interpreted, where reasonably possible, to avoid
constitutional invalidity. 13 The Court affirmed that if a legislative provision is
reasonably capable of a meaning consistent with the Constitution, that interpretation
should be preferred.
[32] On a proper reading of the Act, the impugned provisions set a reasonable and
objective standard for an adjudicator to adjust contributions or payment methods.
This standard informs the adjudicator’s discretion. Given the diversity of potential
disputes within community schemes, imposing circumscribed criteria for
reasonableness would undermine the effectiveness of this provision. Assessments of
reasonableness are inherently fact-specific and must be determined according to the
circumstances of each case.
[33] The adjudicator’s power under s 39(1) (c) of the Act is thus both broad and
bounded: intervention is permitted to ensure fairness, but decisions must be rational,
reasonable and procedurally fair, and are open to judicial scrutiny. The provisions
accordingly set reasonable objective standards for an adjudicator to adjust
contributions or payment methods.
[34] In conclusion, the impugned provisions grant adjudicators powers that
balance contractual autonomy with the necessary regulatory oversight ; and provide
balance contractual autonomy with the necessary regulatory oversight ; and provide
protection against abuse or unfairness in communal living. These powers are neither
12 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd [2000]
ZACC 12; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC); 2000 (2) SACR 349 (CC).
13 Ibid.
14
absolute nor unconstrained: they are governed by principles of rationality,
reasonableness, and procedural fairness, and remain subject to judicial review. For
these reasons, there is no reasonable prospect that the constitutional challenge will
succeed. Consequently, Waterford’s application for leave to amend its notice of
appeal must be refused with costs.
Are the unit owners members of Waterford?
[35] The Waterford scheme originated from the consolidation of erven 380 and
381 into erf 6[...]. The estate, which includes Maroeladal Extension, was initially
owned by Ilro Housing (Pty) Ltd (Ilro), referred to as the developer in the relevant
articles. Waterford contends that, pursuant to condition 4(9) of the schedule which
accompanied the application for the opening of a sectional title register ( the
schedule), all owners of erven within the township automatically become members of
the residents’ association upon transfer of ownership. This condition stipulates that
each owner of an erf shall become a member of a residents’ association, which is
responsible for maintaining the access erf and essential services. Waterford, in its
capacity as the residents’ association, manages the security gatehouse and private
roads for the benefit of all property owners and residents.
[36] On the other hand, the Riverside respondents argue that although the
township establishment conditions impose statutory obligations, these do not have
statutory force against the respondents. They maintain that any legal requirement for
an owner to join Waterford can only be enforced by the local authority, not by
Waterford itself. Article 3 of Waterford’s articles of association merely identifies who
may become members and does not mandate automatic membership. While article
5 provides that property o wners who become members also join Waterford,
Riverside points out that under s 103(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and item
Riverside points out that under s 103(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and item
4(2)(a)(ii) of Schedule 1 to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, actual membership still
requires the owner’s consent and formal registration in the company’s register. This
position is reinforced, they argue, by Waterford’s own articles, which allow for refusal
of membership in certain circumstances. The obligations from the sale agreement
and schedule were limited to ensuring that Riverside became a member and that
15
subsequent sale agreements required purchasers to acknowledge Riverside’s
membership. Accordingly, the adjudicator did not err in law and rendered a rational
decision.
[37] The high court found that c ondition 4(9)(f) of the schedule does not refer to
the consolidated erf (comprising erven 380 and 381), but specifically applies to erven
431 and 432, which are zoned for access purposes. The high court further held that
this condition conflicts with the title conditions and s 11(3) (b) of the Sectional Titles
Act 95 of 1986 (Sectional Titles Act). As a result, the high court concluded that there
is no indication in the title conditions that unit owners must become members
Waterford.
[38] Before addressing the parties’ submissions regarding the unit owners’
membership of Waterford, it is necessary to consider whether this issue impacts the
unit owners’ liability for levies imposed by Waterford according to their participation
quotas. In this regard, the relief Waterford sought in its s 38 application is significant.
In prayer 1, it sought a determination of levies and contributions owed by the
Riverside respondents under the 2007 settlement agreement. In prayer 2, it
requested a determination of levies and contributions due by the second to 102 nd
respondents from 1 March 2018, under the memorandum of incorporation or articles
of association, or alternatively, by each owner under s 47 of the Sectional Titles Act.
[39] At that time, there was no dispute that unit owners were liable for
contributions based on their participation quotas – whether to Riverside or Waterford.
This point was affirmed in a 2006 summary judgment application, where Mr Theunis
Botha (Mr Botha), then a director of Riverside, in his affidavit, referred to Waterford’s
memorandum and articles of association, and admitted that each sectional title unit
owner in Riverside was liable for contributions to Waterford. As we demonstrate
owner in Riverside was liable for contributions to Waterford. As we demonstrate
below, the adjudicator did not fully appreciate the distinction between the liability of
the sectional title holders for levies and their membership status in Waterford.
Importantly, the obligation of the sectional title owners to pay levies does not arise
from, nor is it contingent upon, their membership in Waterford. Rather, the issue of
membership serves only to identify the entity to which these lev ies are payable. This
16
means that while membership may determine the recipient of the payments, it has
no bearing on whether the levies themselves are reasonable or not.
[40] In any event, the settlement agreement clearly indicates that the parties
accepted both the liability of unit owners for levies and their membership in
Waterford. Clause 3.11, for example, states that levies are ‘payable by its
(Riverside’s) members to Waterford,’ and clause 3.12 affirms that ‘all the members of
Riverside will continue to hold one vote each and continue to remain members of
Waterford’. Thus, the agreement did not create new obligations but rather confirmed
the existing relationship. Th e cancellation of the agreement did not affect the unit
owners’ liability for levies nor their membership status.
[41] The high court, in upholding the adjudicator’s finding that unit owners are not
Waterford members, failed to consider the relevance of the settlement agreement or
Mr Botha’s concession. Its subsequent brief mention of the agreement in the context
of PAJA review was insufficient, and its conclusion – that cancellation of the
agreement and denial of AGM participation meant Waterford never considered unit
owners to be members – rests on a misinterpretation of the settlement agreement.
[42] Riverside’s argument that neither Waterford’s articles of association nor the
Township Conditions confer membership on unit owners is also untenable. Article 3
of Waterford’s memorandum restricts membership to bodies corporate, homeowners’
associations, and registered property owners (including erf, sectional title, or cluster
unit owners within the development). Articles 5 and 10 specify that membership is
automatically conferred on all registered owners and only ends upon cessation of
ownership; resi gnation is not permitted. Thus, both the statutory framework and
Waterford’s own rules ensure that unit owners automatically become its members
upon transfer of ownership of a unit.
upon transfer of ownership of a unit.
[43] Section 11(2) read with s 11(3) (b) of the Sectional Titles Act, allows a
developer to impose registrable conditions in the schedule accompanying the
sectional plan’s registration. These conditions become part of the sectional title
deed, binding owners to the specified terms.
17
[44] Capferrat Properties CC (Capferrat), the scheme’s developer, purchased erf
6[...] from Ilro. The schedule conditions14 required Capferrat to become and remain a
member of Waterford upon registration of erf 6[...], to pay all levies charged by
Waterford, and to ensure that any sale of a unit included purchaser acknowledgment
of Waterford and the members’ agreement.
[45] Upon transfer of erf 6[...] to Capferrat, it became a Waterford member, and
the schedule confirmed that both Capferrat and Riverside would be members. When
the sectional title register was opened, Capferrat received certificates of registered
sectional title for each section and its undivided share in the common property,
making it (and, upon transfer, the unit owners) co -owners of erf 6[...]. ‘Common
property’ includes the land in the scheme, so when Capferrat transferred a unit, both
it and the unit owner became co-owners of the land in undivided shares.
[46] Riverside contends that Capferrat’s membership in Waterford ceased once
Riverside was established as the body corporate. This assertion is based on
Riverside’s reading of condition E.(a), which stipulates that Capferrat would, upon
registration of transfer of erf 6[...] into its name, become a member of Waterford and,
prior to the establishment of a body corporate in terms of the Sectional Titles Act,
remain a member of Waterford for as long as it is the registered owner of erf 6[...].
However, as previously demonstrated, Riverside’s interpretation is at odds with the
plain language of condition E.(a) and the requirements of condition 4(9)( f). Accepting
Riverside’s position would not only create a conflict between the conditions but
would also result in an interpretation that is contrary to law.
[47] Condition E.(a) also applies to Capferrat’s successors-in-title, namely, the unit
owners who are joint owners of the common property. Condition E.(b) imposes a
duty on Capferrat (and any member transferring ownership) to comply with article 6,
duty on Capferrat (and any member transferring ownership) to comply with article 6,
which requires that no member may sell or transfer property unless the transferee
irrevocably undertakes, to Waterford’s satisfaction, to become a member upon
registration. This ensures continuity of membership as properties change hands.
14 Conditions E.(a), E.(b), E.(d), and E.(e) of the schedule.
18
[48] For these reasons, we conclude that unit owners are members of Waterford
and are liable for levies in line with their respective participation quotas. Against this
backdrop, we now address the disputes concerning levies for the 2017 to 2018
financial years.
Levies for the 2017 and 2018 financial years
[49] In respect of the 2017 and 2018 financial year s (the period up to
28 February 2018), Waterford claimed levies and contributions in the sum of
R1 070 346.83, with interest, calculated in terms of the formula contained in the
settlement agreement. By agreement, the adjudicator was tasked with determining: if
disputed budget items for the 2017 and 2018 financial years fell under the settlement
agreement’s formula; whether dispute resolution procedures were followed; if
Riverside is estopped from challenging contributions; and, if required, whether
Riverside should contribute to such expenses. She ruled against Waterford on the
first three issues but did not address the question of Riverside’s liability (the fourth
issue).
[50] In respect of th ose financial years, the adjudicator determined that the main
contested line items – such as garden services and other major capital expenses –
were not included within the scope of the formula set out in the settlement
agreement. She found that t he formula used to calculate contributions, as specified
in the agreement, applies only to standard operational costs and excludes additional
charges like major repairs or special projects. As a result, Riverside was not obliged
to contribute to these particular items. Nevertheless, the adjudicator ordered
Riverside to pay Waterford the sums of R34,566.02 and R20,243.26 in respect of
contributions levied for the 2017 and 2018 financial years, respectively.
[51] The adjudicator ’s failure to decide the fourth issue effectively absolved the
Riverside respondents of liability for the expenses without a reasoned decision on
Riverside respondents of liability for the expenses without a reasoned decision on
the merits of their obligation. This omission is significant because the agreed
structure of adjudication required a sequential and comprehensive determination of
all issues. The failure to address the issue deprived the parties of a final and
reasoned resolution on a key matter in dispute, undermining both the procedural
fairness and the completeness of the adjudicatory process. The omission constitutes
19
a reviewable irregularity and necessitates that this issue be remitted for proper
determination.
[52] The remaining substantive issue is whether expenses for ‘Garden Service
Company’ were included within the formula set out in the settlement agreement. The
adjudicator determined that ‘garden services’ and ‘estate management’ are distinct
functions and should be separately accounted for, particularly given the scale of the
expense. She found that there was an absence of documentary evidence – such as
a contract or invoice – from the garden service provider in support of Waterford’s
claim.
[53] In reaching her conclusion, the adjudicator found that the settlement
agreement did not anticipate Waterford providing garden services, especially as
Riverside maintained its own contract for such services. She interpreted the formula
as only allowing for a maintenance contribution regarding gardens, not for major
expenses, inferring that only repairs and maintenance were agreed upon, not
ongoing service fees. She was consequently not prepared to accept that
‘Management Fee in the Formula included the Garde n Service fees without an
indication that a clause 9 consultative process was followed’.
[54] However, this approach failed to consider material evidence.
Mr Richard Paul Evans (Mr Eva ns), a director of Waterford from 2004 to 2018,
testified that at the time of the settlement agreement, the estate manager’s
responsibilities included providing gardening services to Waterford, and that this was
encompassed within the ‘management fee’ line item in the formula. He further
explained that the subsequent division of the ‘management fee’ into ‘estate
management fee’ and ‘garden service co’, resulted from the appointment of two
separate service providers, not from a change in the nature of the servi ces or the
formula’s intent. The adjudicator’s written determination contains no reference to this
testimony, nor does it engage with the substance of Mr Evans’s evidence. This
testimony, nor does it engage with the substance of Mr Evans’s evidence. This
omission is critical, as it directly relates to the interpretation of the settlement
agreement and the scope of liability for expenses.
20
[55] By disregarding the evidence of Mr Evans, the adjudicator’s decision is not
rationally connected to the information before her or the reasons given for it.
Consequently, the decision must be set aside for want of rationality and proper
consideration of relevant evidence.
[56] The adjudicator was also tasked with determining whether certain other
expenses – specifically, ‘Major Expenses Security Cameras ’, ‘Hardware Upgrades’,
and ‘All Major Expenses Main Entrance ’ – were covered by the settlement
agreement formula. While the adjudicator addressed these items as they appeared
in Riverside’s 2018 schedule, she failed to consider individually other significant
expenses listed in the 2017 schedule, such as costs related to the electric fence,
boundary wall, gardens, and the clubhouse. Instead, she issued a blanket ruling that
all ‘Major Capital Expenses’ should be deducted from amounts payable by Riverside,
without providing any reasons or explanations.
[57] This lack of individuali sed analysis and the absence of reasons for excluding
these line items from Riverside’s obligations contravene the requirement that
administrative decisions must be explained and justified. Furthermore, the
adjudicator’s determination that no formula items could be included in the budget
without following the consultative process in clause 3.9 of the settlement agreement
reflects a misreading of that clause. Clause 3.9 requires consultation only for
expenses not already included in the formula, namely unforeseen or new costs, not
those expressly contemplated by the agreement. The formula’s explicit exclusion of
Riverside’s obligation to contribute to phase 3 of the electrical fence supports the
inference that other listed items remain subject to contribution.
[58] In summary, the adjudicator’s findings regarding garden services were
materially influenced by a failure to consider relevant and uncontradicted evidence
(namely, Mr Evans’s testimony) and a misinterpretation of the settlement
(namely, Mr Evans’s testimony) and a misinterpretation of the settlement
agreement’s provisions. The omission to decide the fourth issue constitutes a
procedural irregularity requiring remittal. The approach to other disputed line items
lacked individualised analysis and failed to apply the correct legal standard.
21
[59] Accordingly, the decisions and orders relating to the contributions for the 2017
and 2018 financial years should be reviewed, set aside, and remitted for
reconsideration by a different adjudicator.
Levies for the 2019 and 2020 financial years
[60] In its s 38 application, Waterford claimed payment from Riverside in the sum
of R750 433.74 for contributions levied for the 2019 financial year. For the 2020
financial year, Waterford sought an order that it must repay R83 260.74 to Riverside.
These sums were levied on the individual unit owners in accordance with their
respective participation quotas as members of Riverside.
[61] In respect of the 2019 financial year, the adjudicator found it fair and
reasonable to use the contribution formula contained in the settlement agreement,
noting that it had been successfully applied for more than ten years. She further
ruled that her findings regarding contested line items should be incorporated into the
calculation of how much Waterford owes Riverside for that period.
[62] Regarding the 2020 financial year, the adjudicator determined that calculating
Riverside’s contribution to estate expenses on a one -to-one basis – meaning each
unit owner pays an equal amount, regardless of property size or value – was
unreasonable and unfair. This was the case even though Waterford had applied a
45% discount to the levies. Instead, she ruled that levies should be recalculated
using the municipal valuation method, which determines contributions according to
the official property value assigned by local authorities.
[63] Consequently, the adjudicator ordered Riverside to pay R566 355.04 to
Waterford for the 2019 financial year. In respect of contributions levied for the 2020
financial year, Waterford was ordered to pay R939 151.58 to Riverside.
[64] Waterford proffered an alternative argument concerning the levies owed by
Riverside for the 2019 and 2020 financial years, in the event of its constitutional
Riverside for the 2019 and 2020 financial years, in the event of its constitutional
challenge failing. Concerning the levies assessed for the 2019 financial year, it
contended that the adjudicator erroneously relied on findings in respect of the 2017
and 2018 financial years ; and applied the formula contained in the cancelled
22
settlement agreement as if it were still in effect. Consequently, Riverside’s 2019
contribution was reduced to 14.83% instead of the 19.65% set by the formula.
[65] Riverside proposed that unit owners' contributions for 2019 and 2020 should
be either 9.94 % of the total estate budget , based on the municipal valuation or
10.29%, based on the participation quota calculation method.15 Alternative scenarios
suggested contributions ranging from 19.65 % to 30.79%, depending on the method
used. The Riverside respondents proposed a calculation based on the municipal
valuation method and submitted that they should only contribute 1/217 of Waterford’s
administration costs.
[66] The adjudicator ruled that Waterford’s proposed one -to-one levy was
unreasonable and burdensome for unit owners. She decided to calculate
contributions using the municipal valuation method since Waterford allegedly did not
challenge its application.
[67] Waterford challenged this ruling on the grounds of error of law; irrationality;
taking into account irrelevant considerations; and bias. At the outset, the challenge
based on bias – that the adjudicator ruled in favour of the Riverside respondents on
every dispute on dubious grounds – has no merit. It does not begin to meet the test
articulated by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa
and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others , 16 namely. ‘whether a
reasonable, objective and informed person would, on the correct facts, reasonably
apprehend that [the decision -maker] has not or will not bring an impartial mind to
bear on the adjudication of the case’.
[68] The adjudicator ’s decision was influenced by her conclusion that Waterford
did not challenge the municipal valuation method . However, Waterford’s legal
representative had explicitly challenged the appropriateness of applying that formula.
Furthermore, the decision is also tainted by her erroneous finding regarding the unit
Furthermore, the decision is also tainted by her erroneous finding regarding the unit
owners’ membership of Waterford. This is evidenced by her statement that she
15 This approach allocates each owner's contribution based on the proportion of their unit’s size or
value relative to the total size or value of all units within the estate.
16 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and
Others [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) para 48.
23
would have regarded Riverside as one erf for purposes of the calculation of
contributions had she been requested to do so . This means that she regarded a
monthly contribution of R32.20 per unit for the 2020 financial year as reasonable.
[69] The adjudicator disregarded the evidence and took into account irrelevant
considerations. Further, her decision is not rationally connected to the evidence and
the reasons given for it. Consequently, the decision falls to be reviewed and set
aside.
[70] There are compelling reasons why the matter should not be remitted to the
same adjudicator. The material error regarding the unit owners’ membership of
Waterford would irredeemably compromise her ability objectively to determine the
reasonableness of the contributions. That this in fact happened is evidenced by her
statement that if she had been requested by Riverside, she would have regarded
Riverside as one consolidated erf for the purposes of levies. For all these reasons,
the contested issues must be remitted for determination by a different adjudicator
chosen by the parties from the Ombud’s list, failing which by an adjudicator
appointed by the 107th respondent.
Interest on arrear levies
[71] The adjudicator ruled that the interest rate charged from 1 January 2017 to
31 January 2019 was in excess of the rate mandated in Waterford’s articles of
association. She further ruled that the interest should be deducted from the amounts
Riverside owed Waterford, and that Waterford was only entitled to 1% interest per
annum from 1 February 2019. However, this was an error: the correct rate was 1%
per month. The adjudicator’s order also awarded interest at the prescribed rate as of
the order date, conflicting with both the factual finding and s 1 of the Prescribed Rate
of Interest Act 55 of 1975 (the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act) , which applies only if
no other rate is agreed or applicable.
[72] Waterford had conceded during the adjudication that it was not entitled to
[72] Waterford had conceded during the adjudication that it was not entitled to
charge its members interest at the rate of 1% per month, as it had previously done.
Consequently, at its November 2018 annual meeting, Waterford resolved to delete
the words ‘not exceeding ’ in the proviso to article 13, which limited interest to the
24
prescribed rate under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act. The Waterford board then
set the interest rate at 1% per month effective 1 February 2019.
[73] Waterford therefore correctly submitted that there is no basis for disallowing
interest on arrears for the period before 1 February 2019. The adjudicator lacked
authority to apply the prescribed rate because the contractual rate was already
determined. Therefore, the interest -related decisions should also be reviewed and
set aside and replaced with an order that Waterford is entitled to charge interest on
arrear levies during the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2019, at the rate
contemplated in s 1(2) (a)17 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act, as at the time
when such interest begins to run, and for the period from 1 February 2019, at the
rate of 1% per month.
Costs
[74] The main issues regarding costs are: should the first respondent’s attorneys,
Eugene Marais Attorneys, pay wasted costs for including unnecessary documents in
the record, de bonis propriis; and whether the principle enunciated in Biowatch Trust
v Registrar, Genetic Resources and Others,18 (Biowatch) applies.
[75] We deal first with the question whether it is appropriate to order costs de
boniis against Eugene Marais Attorneys. Waterford submits that the attorneys’
insistence that the whole record of proceedings in the high court should be included
in the appeal to this Court was unreasonable, misguided and a blatant disregard of
the terms of rule 8(9)( a)(i) of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) Rules . This
resulted in the inclusion in the record of all confirmatory affidavits, documents
submitted by the parties in the adjudication, and the transcripts of ten days of
hearing. These documents, contained in volumes 6 to 13 of the record, consist of
some 1564 pages of irrelevant matter.
[76] Rule 8(9)( a)(i) of the SCA Rules provides that whenever the decision of an
appeal is likely to hinge exclusively on part of the record in the court a quo, the
appeal is likely to hinge exclusively on part of the record in the court a quo, the
17 Section 1(2)(a) provides: ‘For the purposes of subsection (1), the rate of interest is the repurchase
rate as determined from time to time by the South African Reserve Bank, plus 3,5 percent per
annum.’
18 Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources and Others 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC).
25
appellant shall, within ten days of the noting of the appeal request the respondent’s
consent to omit the unnecessary parts from the record.
[77] It is trite that the main consideration in the award of costs de bonis propriis is
whether the attorneys acted mala fide, negligently to a serious degree, or
unreasonably, thereby abusing the court process. Other factors include the bulk of
the unnecessary material, duplication of documents, the extent to which the conduct
wasted the court’s time and effort and placed an undue burden of unnecessary
expense and labour on the opposing party.
[78] In our view, the attorneys’ decision to decline to agree to the omission of
volumes 6 to 13, despite repeated requests from Waterford’s attorneys, constitutes a
serious departure from the professional standards expected under rule 8(9)(a)(i) of
the SCA Rules. The documents contained in those volumes were manifestly
irrelevant, as evidenced by the fact that only about four pages from those volumes
were referenced during argument.
[79] Furthermore, if the attorneys believed those specific pages were pertinent to
the Court’s consideration, it would have been appropriate to include only those in a
core bundle, rather than insisting on the inclusion of eight entire volumes. By failing
to exercise this professional judgment and by insisting on including extensive
irrelevant material, the attorneys not only disregarded procedural expectations but
also imposed unnecessary burdens on both Waterford and this Court. As a result,
their actions led to wasted judicial resources and additional expenses for Waterford.
For these reasons, we conclude that the attorneys’ conduct warrants censure, and
they should accordingly be ordered to pay the attendant costs associated with the
inclusion of volumes 6 to 13 in the appeal record, de bonis propriis.
[80] Regarding the issue of costs relating to the constitutional challenge, Waterford
[80] Regarding the issue of costs relating to the constitutional challenge, Waterford
submitted that, pursuant to the Biowatch principle, it should not be liable for costs
arising from the constitutional challenge if the appeal is unsuccessful. It argued that
the high court erred in characterising the challenge as lacking merit and frivolous,
thereby warranting a departure from the Biowatch principle.
26
[81] The Riverside respondents and the Minister maintained that the high court
correctly determined that the appellant’s constitutional challenge was insubstantial
and unsupported, rendering the issue of costs pertinent. They argued that the
meaning of the impugned provisions is unambiguous and manifestly confer neither
unfettered nor unguided discretion. Waterford’s constitutional challenge was
therefore manifestly devoid of merit.
[82] The Constitutional Court in Biowatch explained the test as follows:
‘At the same time, however, the general approach of this Court to costs in litigation between
private parties and the state, is not unqualified. If an application is frivolous or vexatious, or
in any other way manifestly inappropriate, the applicant should not expect that the
worthiness of its cause will immunise it against an adverse costs order. Nevertheless, for the
reasons given above, courts should not lightly turn their backs on the general approach of
not awarding costs against an unsuccessful litigant in proceedings against the state, where
matters of genuine constitutional import arise. Similarly, particularly powerful reasons must
exist for a court not to avoid cost s against the state in favour of a private litigant who
achieved substantial success in proceedings brought against it.’19
[83] In our view, and for the reasons explained above, Waterford’s challenge to the
impugned provisions did not raise any constitutional issues of import, was without
any merit and frivolous. Furthermore, Waterford was quite willing to utili se the
remedies provided for in terms of the impugned provisions. It was only after the
adjudicator had made adverse findings against it that it cynically launched an
application to challenge the constitutionality of those provisions.
[84] We therefore find that the Biowatch principle does not apply in this matter and
that Waterford should be ordered to pay the costs attendant upon the unsuccessful
that Waterford should be ordered to pay the costs attendant upon the unsuccessful
constitutional challenge. Regarding the costs relating to the challenge to the
adjudicator’s orders, Waterford has been substantially successful and is accordingly
entitled to those costs.
Order
19 Biowatch ibid para 24.
27
[85] In the result we make the following order:
1. The appellant’s application to amend its notice of appeal to include an order
that s 39(1) (c), read with s 39(1) (e) of the Community Schemes Ombud
Service Act 9 of 2011 (the Act) , is inconsistent with the Constitution and
invalid, is dismissed. The appellant shall pay the costs of the application for
amendment of the one hundred and fifth to one hundred and eighth
respondents, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
2. The appeal is upheld in part. The order of the high court is set aside and
replaced with the following order:
‘(a) The application for an order declaring that s 39(1)(c), read with s
39(1)(e) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the
Act), is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, is dismissed. The
applicant shall pay the associated costs of the one hundred and fifth to
one hundred and eighth respondents, which costs shall include the
costs of two counsel, where so employed.
(b) The orders of the one hundred and third respondent (the adjudicator),
set out in paragraphs 86.1; 86.2; 86.3 and 86.4.3 of the adjudicator’s
determination of 10 March 2021, are reviewed and set aside.
(c) The order of the adjudicator that the second to one hundred and
second respondents are not members of the applicant, is reviewed and
set aside, and replaced with an order declaring that those respondents
are members of the applicant.
(d) The adjudicator’s determinations regarding levies and contributions
owed to the applicant by the first to one hundred and second
respondents in respect of the 2017 to 2020 financial years are remitted
for investigation and determination by a new adjudicator. The new
adjudicator shall be chosen by the parties from the Ombud’s list (as
provided for in s 48 of the Act), by 30 January 2026, failing which the
adjudicator shall be chosen by the one hundred and seventh
respondent, by 20 February 2026.
adjudicator shall be chosen by the one hundred and seventh
respondent, by 20 February 2026.
(e) The adjudicator’s decision in paragraph 1.2 of the order that the first
respondent shall pay annual interest at the rate contemplated in s
1(2)(a) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, from date of
delivery of the order, is reviewed, set aside and substituted with a
28
decision that the applicant is entitled to charge interest on the arrear
levies:
(i) during the period 1 January 2017 to 31 January 2019 at the
prescribed rate of interest, as at the time when such amounts
became due; and
(ii) from 1 February 2019, at the rate of 1% per month.
(f) The first to one hundred and second respondents are ordered to pay
the costs of this application, jointly and severally, the one paying the
others to be absolved, including the costs of two counsel, where so
employed.’
3. The first to one hundred and second respondents shall pay the costs of the
appeal jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved,
including the costs of two counsel, subject to paragraph 4 below.
4. The first to one hundred and second respondents’ legal representatives,
Eugene Marais Attorneys, shall pay the costs relating to the preparation and
perusal of volumes 6 to 13 of the appeal record, de bonis propriis.
_________________
J E SMITH
JUDGE OF APPEAL
________________________
N CHILI
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
29
Appearances
For the appellant: H F Oosthuizen SC with D J Smit
Instructed by: Warrener De Agrela & Associates Inc,
Johannesburg
Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For 1st to 102nd respondents: H P van Nieuwenhuizen
Instructed by: Eugene Marais Attorney, Johannesburg
Symington De Kok Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For 103th to 107th respondents: T Manchu SC with F Sangoni
Instructed by: Seanego Attorneys, Johannesburg
Blair Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For 108th respondent: M Makumu
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Johannesburg
The State Attorney, Bloemfontein.