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[2025] ZALMPPHC 242
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Mophuting v Road Accident Fund (239/2024 ; 8552/2023) [2025] ZALMPPHC 242 (9 December 2025)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
CASE
NO: 239/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
09 December 2025
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
MOPHUTING
TLOPO ENIFA
Applicant
And
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
CASE
NO: 8552/2023
In
the matter between:
MABASA
TILAH
Applicant
And
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
Delivered
:
This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties through their legal representatives’ email addresses.
The date for the hand-down is deemed to be
09 December 2025
.
JUDGMENT
Makoti
AJ
Introduction
[1]
These two consolidated matters concern special pleas which were
raised by the Road
Accident Fund (the Fund) as a defendant to the
claims of the plaintiffs. The consolidation was intended to have both
cases heard
simultaneously and so that one judgment covering both of
them be penned. I deemed it prudent to do in light of the
similarities
of the special pleas raised by the Fund in both cases.
[2]
In both cases the defendant was served with summons detailing the
plaintiffs’
respective claims. Also, in both cases the
plaintiff allege that they fell victims in road accidents in which
the driving or operation
of motor vehicles was involved. They allege
that they sustained damages as a result of the motor vehicle
accidents in which they
were involved, accordingly, that the Fund
should be ordered to compensate them.
[3]
The plaintiff in the first case (Case No: 239/2024) is
Ntlopo
Enifa Mophuting
(Mophuting) who is claiming damages for injuries
that she allegedly sustained out a motor vehicle accident that took
place on 14
May 2021. Regarding the second case (Case No: 8552/2023),
the plaintiff is
Tilah Mabasa
(Mabasa) who alleges that she
was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 17 February 2022. She too
claims compensation for injuries
that she allegedly suffered from the
accident.
The
claims against the Fund
[4]
Mophuting is suing the fund for an amount of
R4 000 000-00
(Four Million Rand Only) in compensation for the injuries allegedly
sustained in the said motor vehicle accident. She stated in
her
summons that she was a passenger when the car that she was travelling
in got involved in an accident. The driver of the motor
vehicle lost
control and the car overturned along 33 Vaalwater, Limpopo. She
described the vehicle as a Mazda 3 with registration
numbers
F[...]
and that it was at the time of the accident driven on the occasion by
one T E Moeng.
[5]
In her explanation of the accident, her averment was that it was
caused by the negligent
driving of the insured driver of the Mazda 3
car. She alleged that the insured driver drove the car at an
excessive speed and that
he failed to keep a proper lookout whilst
driving. Mophuting also blamed the insured driver for failing
properly control the motor
vehicle and that because of that the
accident happened.
[6]
She detailed the injuries sustained as: soft tissue injuries to the
head, soft tissue
injuries to the neck and back, as well as various
other soft tissue injuries. Further, that the injuries were medically
treated
by health care practitioners at the hospital where she was
taken after the occurrence of the accident. As a result of the
accident,
she alleged that she suffered pain, emotional shock and
trauma for which she needs to be compensated.
[7]
Mabasa was a driver of a motor vehicle with registration numbers
F[...]
when it collided with another motor-vehicle, the
identity of which she does not know. She alleged in her claim that
the collision
occurred at Thohoyandou Road at or near Nandoni dam. In
her claim she alleges that the collision occurred as a result of the
negligent
driving of the insured driver who drove his vehicle
recklessly; who failed to pay proper lookout for other road users,
and who
drove the vehicle at an excessive speed.
[8]
As a result of the accident, she indicated as part of the claim that
she sustained
serious body injuries which included: blunt abdominal
trauma; right tibia and fibula open fracture; cervical spine injury
as well
as other multiple injuries. In relation to her injuries she
indicated that she was admitted at hospital where she was treated by
the medical stuff. She claims against the Fund compensation in the
amount of
R4 500 000-00
(Four Million, Five Hundred
Thousand Rand Only).
[9]
Upon filing their respective claims the two plaintiffs were served
with letter from
the Fund rejecting them. The reasons advanced for
rejecting the claims was that the claims did not have full
information to enable
the Fund to assess them. As a result, the Fund
did not register the claims and demanded from the two claimants to
submit the outstanding
information before the claims are accepted.
[10]
The claimants issued summons upon receipt of the letters from the
Fund rejecting their claims.
This is the genesis of the point of law
that I am called to adjudicate in both cases.
[11]
The Fund contends that the claims ought not to proceed as both
Mophuting and Mabasa have not
provided it with the full information
that it has asked them to submit. As expectedly, the claimants oppose
the technical points
raised by the Fund against their claims. I am
not called to engage with the merits of the claims at this point and
I deal only
with the technical points raised by the Fund. If the
points succeed, that will spell the end of the claims in their
present forms.
The converse is that the claims will proceed to be
heard on the merits if the
in limine
points are not sustained.
The
essence of the special defenses raised by the Fund against both
claims
[12]
Starting with the case of Mophuting, the Fund contends that her claim
does not comply with the
provisions section 24(1)(a) of the Road
Accident Fund Act
[1]
(the Act).
The letter from the Fund contains a list of documents that the
plaintiff is required to have submitted with her claim.
The claim
form was completed, in respect of medical information, by a
qualifying medical practitioner. The Fund appears not to
be taking
issue with this part of the form.
[13]
The Fund raised a special plea against the Mophuting’s claim,
firstly alleging that the
claim was lodged on 28 September 2023.
Because of that, the Fund had filed its objection notice on 13
November 2023. This was incorrect
as contemporaneous documents show
that the claim was served through the sheriff on 26 June 2023 and by
registered post on 31 July
2023. Sixty days had lapsed with no
objection. Claim was accordingly deemed valid
ex lege
.
[14]
The objection purported to be about the alleged non-compliance with
section 24(1) of the Act.
In exact terms the statutory provision of
relied upon by the Fund read as follows:
“
(1) A claim for
compensation and accompanying medical report under section 17 (1)
shall—
(a)
be set out in the prescribed form,
which shall be completed in all
its particulars
;
(b)
be sent by registered post or delivered by hand to the Fund at its
principal, branch or
regional office, or to the agent who in terms of
section 8 must handle the claim, at the agent’s registered
office or local
branch office, and the Fund or such agent shall at
the time of delivery by hand acknowledge receipt thereof and the date
of such
receipt in writing.”
[15]
I understand the Act to be requiring from claimants to fill the
prescribed form, providing the
information that is required in it
which should include medical report. The part which contains the
medical report is to be filled
by a medical practitioner who treated
the injured (or deceased) person, or another qualifying
practitioner.
[2]
Section 24(1)
of the Act does not contemplate the submission of a separate document
but a medical report that is filled into the
form itself.
[16]
The Fund took a similar objection to the claim submitted on behalf of
Mabasa. For the avoidance
of prolixity, I do not wish to rehash the
contents of the Fund’s letter to Mabasa. I note, however, that
the information
that was submitted to the Fund included hospital
records, special power of attorney, claimant’s ID copy,
accident report
and plaintiff’s affidavit.
[3]
The Fund required from Mabasa to submit other documentation such as
pay slips and tax records.
[17]
While I understand that such information would go a long way in
assisting the Fund to investigate
the claim and to confirm her
employment or income status, I believe that the such information
could simply have been called for
upon acceptance of the claims.
[18]
At subsection (4) the Act stipulates that any prescribed form must be
fully completed and that
a form ‘…
which is referred
to in this section which is not completed in all its particulars
shall not be acceptable as a claim under this
Act
.’ My view
at this point is that the provision is still concerned with the
completion of the prescribed forms, and that all
questions should be
fully answered with requisite details.
[19]
The Fund tied its objections on the provisions of Board Notice 271 of
2022
[4]
and contends that the
plaintiffs have not complied with its terms. That is a notice which
enlists stipulates the standard documents
or information that must be
submitted together with the claim when it is lodged. In view of the
fact that the Fund considered the
information deficient, it refused
to accept the claim. The form wants actual submission of the physical
information such as, where
applicable, tax certificates and pay slips
etc.
[20]
In
Pithey
v Road Accident Fund
[5]
the court noted a long list of authorities in which it was held that
the requirement relating to the submission of the claim form
is
peremptory and that the prescribed requirements concerning the
completeness of the form are directory, meaning that substantial
compliance with such requirements suffices. My understanding of the
authority is that no claim can lie without submission of the
form,
but that, in respect of completion of the form, substantial
compliance in providing the information will be sufficient. That
the
test for substantial compliance is an objective test.
[21]
In
Ndlumbini Mlamli v Road Accident
[6]
Fund the court concurred with an earlier obiter dictum from
Mautla
and Others v Road Accident Fund
[7]
which observed the following:
“
The date of
delivery of the claim is the essential first step for the enforcement
of any rights in terms of the Act. This first
step is crucial for
claimants because it determines whether or not their claim in the
first instance has been submitted timeously.
There is no
provision in the Act which permits the RAF to refuse to accept the
delivery of a claim or to refuse to acknowledge receipt
of that
claim
. Had the legislature contemplated such a situation,
it would have provided for it specifically”.
[Emphasis
added]
[22]
The above is congruent to the determinations in
Mphuti
Lettie Limakatso obo Mojalefa Mphuti
,
[8]
which was relied upon by the Fund in
Mphuting
case, in which the court held that:
“
It has been
held in a long line of cases that the requirement relating to the
submission of the claim form is peremptory and that
the prescribed
requirements concerning the completeness of the form are directory,
meaning that substantial compliance with such
requirements suffices.
As to the latter requirement this Court in SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd
v Pretorius reiterated that the test
for substantial compliance is an
objective one.”
[23]
Both claimants have complied with the peremptory aspect by submitting
their claim forms, which
is the first step towards compliance with
the requirements of the legislation. What remains is whether the
forms submitted substantially
comply with the requirement to provide
information to enable the Fund to perform its part. Having considered
the claims in both
matters, I am satisfied that the test for
substantial compliance has been met. It is worse for the Fund in
Mophuting case where
its objection was filed out of time.
[24]
In
Maarman
and Others v Road Accident Fund
[9]
it was held the Fund may :
“
84. This Court
finds that defendant is entitled to refuse to accept claims which do
not comply with section 24. This Court also
finds that defendant is
not entitled to reject claims which substantially comply with section
24 given peculiar circumstances of
each case if the facts of the
matter looked upon as a whole objectively leads to a finding of
substantial compliance with section
24. Consequently, any ancillary
directives or regulation cannot as a matter of law trump application
of that provision.”
[25]
What must be kept in mind is that the legislation is intended to
compensate the qualifying victims
of motor vehicle accidents. It is
not intended to disentitle them, by being overly technical, from
being fairly compensated for
the damages sustained as a result of the
motor vehicle accidents. Where there is substantial compliance, the
Fund ought not reject
valid claims only because the information that
it has been provided with is insufficient. Moreover, the Act
envisages the submission
of a claim form that is fully completed with
available information.
[26]
On behalf of the Fund it was argued that submission of the documents
is peremptory. I am not
persuaded by this argument. A duly completed
form is one which, on its face, has answers to the questions posed in
it. The submission
of additional documents is distinct from what a
duly completed form is, in my view. More so if one has regard to the
fact that
the form has a portion for completion of a medical report
on it. Thus, the Fund’s ability to make a decision is not
dependent
on the submission of the actual medical documents from
hospital.
[27]
Much of the information is already there on the rejected forms,
including medical reports which
were provided on the forms and
completed by qualifying medical practitioners. To demand that the
medical records, which must still
be obtained from hospitals must be
submitted simultaneously with the prescribed form may leave many
claimants without recourse.
That is not what the statute envisages.
[28]
I make the statements in the preceding paragraphs emboldened by what
was enunciated in
Road
Accident Fund v Busuku
[10]
(Busuku) in which the following was observed by the SCA:
“…
the
primary concern of the Act is to give the greatest possible
protection to persons who have suffered loss through negligence
or
through unlawful acts on the part of the driver of a motor vehicle.
For this reason, the provisions of
the Act must be
interpreted as extensively as possible in favour of third parties to
afford them the widest possible protection
”.
[29]
To agree with the Fund, and non-suit the claimants, this court would
have failed to do what the
SCA has advised in
Busuku
.
[30]
It is the case of the Fund that the claims were instituted
prematurely and that, for that reason,
they should be dismissed. The
substratum of the contention being that the plaintiffs should be
instructed to withdraw their actions
and relodge their duly completed
claim forms with the Fund. Then, that should the Fund reject the
claims on the merits, the plaintiffs
can institute their respective
actions against the Fund. The Fund bears the onus of proving that the
claims were invalid to be
rejected.
[11]
[31]
A decision to refuse a party to litigate or access the court for
resolution of dispute should
not be taken lightly. This is because of
the guarantees provided in section 34 of the Constitution. The court
should interfere
with such rights sparingly. In
Chief
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank [1999] ZACC 16; 2000 (1) SA
409; 1999 (12) BCLR 1420 (CC)
,
[12]
Mokgoro J stated:
“
The right of
access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly
society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and
institutionalised
mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to self-help. The
right of access to court is a bulwark against
vigilantism, and the
chaos and anarchy which it causes. Construed in this context of the
rule of law and the principle against
self-help in particular, access
to court is indeed of cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful
considerations would be required
for its limitation to be reasonable
and justifiable.
[32]
The rights of the litigants to approach court should be counter
balanced with the legislative
benefits afforded the Fund when making
its decision to accept or to reject a claim. The statutory benefits
afforded the Fund by
the provisions of the Act were explained a while
ago in
Multilateral
Motor Vehicle Accident Fund v Radebe
[13]
the court noted the following:
“
It is true that
the object of the Act is to give the widest possible protection to
third parties. On the other hand the benefit
which the claim form is
designed to give the fund must be borne in mind and given effect to.
The information contained in the claim
form allows for an assessment
of its liability, including the possible early investigation of the
case. In addition, it also promotes
the saving of the costs of
litigation … These various advantages are important and should
not be whittled away. The resources,
both in respect of money and
manpower are obviously not unlimited. They are not to be expected to
investigate claims which are
inadequately advanced. There is no
warrant for casting on them the additional burden of doing what the
regulations require should
be done by the claimant”.
[33]
That being said, I am still of the view that there was sufficient
information that was provided
to the Fund in both cases. Its
objections fall to be rejected by this court. On the facts before me
the special pleas raised by
the Fund for non-compliance with section
24 of the Act cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.
Order
[34]
I make the following order:
[a]
The point
in limine
taken in Case No: 239/2024 is dismissed
with costs.
[b]
The point
in limine
raise in Case No: 8552/2023 is dismissed
with costs.
[c]
Costs awarded in terms of the order in [a] and [b] above are to be
calculated on party
and party scale A.
M. Z. MAKOTI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION
APPEARANCE:
FOR
PLAINTIFF (239/2024):
ADV A TRUMPIE
804 TERBLANCHE ATTORNEYS
C/O A J ALDERSON INC
POLOKWANE
FOR
PLAINTIFF (8552/2023) :
ADV O MALULEKE
MASHAMBA INC ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
FOR
DEFENDANT (239/2024) : MR K
PHASWANA
OFFICE OF THE STATE
ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
FOR
DEFENDANT (8552/2023): MR R MUDAU
OFFICE OF THE STATE
ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
DATE
HEARD:
02 JULY 2025
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED:
09 DECEMBER 2025
[1]
Act No. 56 of 1996.
[2]
Section 24(2)(a) of the Act.
[3]
Letter dated 05 April 2023.
[4]
Government Gazette No. 46661 of 04 July 2022.
[5]
2014 (4) SA 112
(SCA).
[6]
955/2024 EC at paragraph 29.
[7]
(29459/2021)[2023] ZAGPPHC 1843 at para 64.
[8]
Unreported. Case No. 24261/2014.
[9]
Maarman and Others v Road Accident Fund (993/2023)
[2025] ZAWCHC 106
(12 March 2025).
[10]
Road Accident Fund v Busuku
2023 (4) SA 507
(SCA) at para 6.
[11]
Scott v Road Accident Fund (13/33469) [2015] ZAGPJHC 120 (11 June
2015). At para 21, 29 and 30.
[12]
Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank [1999] ZACC 16; 2000 (1)
SA 409; 1999 (12) BCLR 1420 (CC).
[13]
[1995] ZASCA 80
;
1996 (2) SA 145
(A).