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[2025] ZALMPPHC 240
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Limpopo Provincial South African Legal Practice Council v Moeng and Another (10977/2024) [2025] ZALMPPHC 240 (5 December 2025)
SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
CASE NO:
10977/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
5/12/2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
THE
LIMPOPO PROVINCIAL SOUTH AFRICAN
LEGAL
PRACTICE COUNCIL
APPLICANT
And
NKOMA
ERIC
MOENG
FIRST RESPONDENT
(Member
Number: M[...])
MOENG
NKOMA ERIC ATTORNEYS
SECOND RESPONDENT
(Firm
Number: F[...])
Delivered
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail. The
date and
time for hand down of the judgment is deemed to be
05 December
2025.
Date
heard
:
27
NOVEMBER 2025
Coram
:
Muller
J,
et
Maunatlala AJ
JUDGMENT
MULLER
J:
[1]
The South African Legal Practice Council
[1]
applies to strike the name of the first respondent Nkoma Eric Moeng
from the roll of legal practitioners of the High Court of South
Africa.
[2]
Mr Moeng was admitted as a legal practitioner
[2]
on 29 November 2012 and commenced practising as an attorney. He is
the sole director of the second Respondent who is Moeng Nkoma
Attorneys Incorporated at Burgersfort. Why the second respondent is
joined to the proceedings is unclear since only a person who
is
admitted and enrolled to practice as legal practitioner in terms of
the Legal Practice Act,
[3]
may practice as such. It follows, therefore, that only a person who
has been admitted and enrolled to practice as a legal practitioner
is
capable of being struck from the roll of practitioners. A firm or a
commercial juristic entity is incapable of being struck
from the
roll.
[3]
The LPC was established in terms of section 4 of the LP Act and acts
in the public
interest as
custos
mores
of
all legal practitioners. The council has the power to institute legal
proceedings to promote and protect the public interest.
It regulates
all legal practitioners and the enhancement and maintenance of the
integrity and status of the legal profession. It
was stated in
Van
den Berg v General Council of the Bar of South Africa
:
[4]
“
The applicant’s
role in bringing such proceedings is not that of an ordinary
adversarial litigant but is rather to bring evidence
of a
practitioner’s misconduct to the attention of the court, in the
interests of the court, the profession and the public
at large, to
enable a court to exercise its disciplinary powers.”
[4]
The proceedings are of a disciplinary nature and are
sui
generis
and are not subject to all the strict rules of ordinary civil
proceedings.
[5]
[5]
Two complaints were brought against Mr Moeng. The first relates to a
complaint lodged
by magistrate MA Monyama of the Praktiseer
Magistrate’s Court. The allegation was that Mr Moeng shouted at
the magistrate
on 20 December 2019 during the proceedings when he
moved an
ex parte
application. The application was dismissed
by the said magistrate. A court order embodying a provisional order
with a return date
was served on the respondents in the application
who opposed the application and delivered answering affidavits. On
the return
date, the second respondent delivered a notice of
withdrawal. The application was, accordingly, struck from the roll.
[6]
An investigative committee on 12 June 2023 recommended that Mr Moeng
be charged with
misconduct. A disciplinary committee was convened on
28 June 2023.
The charge sheet against Mr Moeng
reads as follows:
(1)
“Contravention of paragraph 16.7 of the
Code
of Conduct of the
Legal Practice Act 28 of
2014
, in that you failed to respond to Legal Practice Council’s
letters dated 14 July 2023 and 28 November 2020.
(2)
Contravention of paragraph
Rule 41.1
-
3
of the
Code
of Conduct of the
Legal Practice Act 28 of
2014
in that having been served with a notice dated 5 June 2023 you
failed to attend the Investigating Committee meeting on 12 June 20023
for a discussion.
(3)
Contravention of paragraph
Rule 3.1
read
with
Rule 3.15
of the Code of Conduct of
Legal Practice Act 28 of
2014
, in tht during appearance on 20 December 2019, you shouted at
Magistrate MA Monyama in court during proceedings and thereafter the
dismissal of your application at the Magistrate’s Court for the
District of Tubatse held at Praktiseer under case number;1863/2019,
you falsified a court processes to the effect that a Rule nisi was
issued.
Furthermore you set the
law in motion without legal reason by considering the Sheriff to
serve the said court order, respondent
to file answering affidavit
and appear in court where the matter was struck of the roll.”
[7]
The disciplinary committee recorded its recommendation to the Council
on 18 August
2023 as follows:
“
1. Count 1 the
attorney is found not guilty and count1 dismissed.
2. Count 2 the
legal practitioner is found guilty of misconduct in contravention of
code 3.1 and 3.15 of all Legal practitioners’
code of conduct
as charged.
[6]
3. The Name of the
Legal Practitioner Mr Nkona Eric Moeng be removed from the roll of
practising attorneys in terms of
Rule 43.4.1.4.1.
2
.75cm; text-indent: -0.5cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; line-height: 150%">
4. The legal practitioner
has a right in terms of
section 41
of the
Legal Practice Act to
appeal these recommendations within 30 days of the recommendations.”
Section
40(8) of the LP Act reads:
“
The Council must
give effect to the advice and decision of a disciplinary committee.”
[8]
In the answering affidavit, dealing, generally, with the purpose of
the application,
Mr Moeng
inter alia
averred:
“
The purpose of
this application is to mislead the Honourable Court into believing
that the Respondent is guilty of misconduct and
therefore is not fit
and proper person to practice as a Legal Practitioner, whereas the
Applicant just want to harmer the Respondent
and strip him off his
status and profession without having followed the proper channels
established by the
Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014
.”
[9]
It is prudent to also deal with the point
in limine
raised in
the answering affidavit before moving on to the merits of the
opposition. Mr Moeng averred that the application was launched
prematurely. He admitted that he attended a disciplinary meeting on
28 June 2023 but contended that he had sight of the recommendation
of
the disciplinary meeting for the very first time when this
application was served with the result that he was deprived of the
right to note an appeal in terms of section 41 of the LP Act.
Section
41(1) of the LP Act provides:
“
Subject to section
44, a legal practitioner, candidate legal practitioner or juristic
entity, may as determined in the rules and
within 30 days of being
informed of the decision by a disciplinary committee, lodge an appeal
with an appeal tribunal established
in terms of subsection (2)
against a finding of misconduct by the disciplinary committee or
against the sanction imposed, or both.”
In
addition, section 44(2) states:
“
Nothing contained
in this Act precludes a complainant or a legal practitioner,
candidate legal practitioner or juristic entity from
applying to the
High Court for appropriate relief in connection with any complaint or
charge of misconduct against a legal practitioner,
candidate legal
practitioner or juristic entity or in connection with any decision of
a disciplinary body, the Ombud or the Council
in connection with such
complaint or charge.”
[10]
The papers were served on 20 June 2025 by affixing them to the outer
principal door of the respondents.
[7]
The opposing affidavit was served on the attorney acting on behalf of
the LPC on 18 July 2025. Mr Moeng was obviously aware of
his rights
contained in the provisions of both section 41 and 44 of the LP Act.
He had the right to note an appeal within 30 days
from the date that
the papers were served, if he had received notice of the outcome of
the disciplinary meeting for the very first
time, on that date. He
failed to note an appeal. He could have approached this court for
relief, in addition to noting an appeal,
if any of his rights were
compromised by the institution of these proceedings. The LPC attached
a letter to the replying affidavit
which indicates that he had been
notified of the outcome of the disciplinary committee on 31 July
2024.
[8]
[11]
Mr Moeng cannot rely on his inaction to take the necessary steps even
after receipt of the papers.
He received the notification on 31 July
2024 and took no steps to note an appeal. His attempt, when the shoe
started to pinch,
to create an illusionary perception that the LPC is
mala fide
by instituting this application in terms whereof he
was only informed of the outcome of the disciplinary meeting when the
papers
were served, is unacceptable.
[12]
In respect of the merits Mr Moeng admitted that after receipt of the
complaint he submitted his
written response that it was impossible
for him to have forged the court order based on the fact the order
displayed the stamp
of the magistrate and because the order was an
interim order that needed to be confirmed or dismissed by the court.
In his written
response to the LPC, Mr Moeng stated that the
magistrate, contrary to what is stated in his complaint to the LPC,
granted an interim
order which he had signed and that he placed the
official date stamp on the order. He stated that his problems with
the magistrate
commenced when the magistrate refused to entertain an
application brought by Mr Moeng because it was defective due to
non-compliance
with rule 55. He argued before the Magistrate that the
application was governed by rule 74. The magistrate conceded that Mr
Moeng
was correct. That incident caused the magistrate to hold a
grudge because the magistrate insisted that his cases be presented in
open court and not in the office of the magistrates. On another
occasion the magistrate upheld a point
in limine
raised by
him, but refused to grant him the costs, stating that he did not pray
for a costs order. He stated that on this occasion
the magistrate
deliberately “dealt with him” by “trapping him”
and then reported him to the LPC.
[13]
The allegation that the magistrate was dishonest to the extent that
he granted an order and has
placed his signature and date stamp on
it, only to pretend to the LPC that he dismissed the application, is
a very serious allegation.
It rightly caused the LPC to convene an
investigative committee. Mr Moeng was charged with misconduct.
He was found guilty
by a disciplinary committee after a hearing of
forging the particular court order.
[14]
Apart from referring to his written response to the LPC, his
answering affidavit concentrated
on the failure of the LPC to notify
him of the outcome and recommendation of the disciplinary committee.
[15]
This court is satisfied that Mr Moeng has had the opportunity to note
an appeal and that he has
elected not to follow that route. His
acquiesce is a clear indication that he accepted the outcome reached
by the disciplinary
committee. He cannot now at the eleventh hour be
heard to complain that his rights are affected when he has failed to
exercise
his rights at all or timeously.
[16]
The second complaint against Mr Moeng is that he forged a letter of
good standing on the letterhead
of the LPC. The background facts,
briefly stated, are that on 19 January 2024 Legal Aid South Africa
requested the LPC to verify
the authenticity of a letter of good
standing issued by the LPC which purportedly was submitted by Mr
Moeng as a supporting document
in an application for a vacant post at
Legal Aid South Africa. The LPC was at that time in the process
of processing an application
by Mr Moeng for a letter of good
standing.
[17]
The purported letter of good standing could not be authenticated as
the letterhead contained
the names of the previous members of the
executive committee and the previous address of the LPC.
[18]
The LPC notified Legal Aid South Africa that the said letter is not
authentic and that Mr Moeng
was not a member in good standing. Mr
Moeng was requested in an email to provide the LPC with a copy of his
request for a letter
of good standing from the LPC and proof of
payment of R200 for such a letter on 22 January 2024. It seems as if
Mr Moeng has not
replied to the request of the LPC and that the LPC
has failed to follow up on their letter or to investigate whether
such a letter
of good standing was previously issued to Mr Moeng
under that letterhead which would have enabled him to forge the
letter of good
standing. And, if not, was it possible for Mr Moeng,
himself, or with the aid of an employee of the LPC, to forge the
letter.
[19]
It is unfortunate in an application which potentially have very
serious consequences for Mr Moeng,
that he is not confronted in the
papers with his application together with the supporting documents
purportedly submitted by him
to Legal Aid South Africa. The author of
the letter, KP Matsaung, made no affidavit in this matter to shed
light on the alleged
forgery.
[20]
In answer to the allegation that he forged the letter, Mr Moeng only
complains that he was never
informed that he purportedly forged the
letter and was not afforded the opportunity to reply to such
allegation before a disciplinary
committee. He stated that had he be
given the opportunity to “state my side of the story” he
would not have been found
guilty. The immediate problem for Mr Moeng
is that he has not been found guilty of forging the letter. He, of
course, has been
given the opportunity to explain “his side of
the story” in the answering affidavit, but has elected, to his
detriment,
only to complain without any attempt to put up an
explanation in the answering afidavit that he so desperately wanted
to give.
[21]
The test to determine whether a person is fit and proper to be a
legal practitioner is a three-stage
enquiry. In
Hewetson
v Law Society of the Free State
[9]
the court explained:
“
The first enquiry
is to determine whether the offending conduct has been proven on a
balance of probabilities. Once this is shown,
the second enquiry is
to determine whether the person is fit and proper taking into account
the proven misconduct. The final enquiry
is to determine whether the
person concerned should be suspended for a fixed period or should be
struck off the roll. The last
two enquiries are matters for the
discretion of the court, which involved a value judgment.”
[10]
[22]
The Supreme Court of Appeal made it clear in
General
Council of the Bar of South Africa v Geach and Others
[11]
that:
“
It was said in
Malan
that ‘if a court finds dishonesty, the
circumstances must be exceptional before a court will order a
suspension instead of
a removal’. That does not purport to lay
down a rule of law but expresses what follows naturally from a
finding of dishonesty.
Once an advocate has exhibited dishonesty it
might be inferred that the dishonesty will recur and for that reason
he or she should
ordinarily be barred from practice. What was said in
Malan
means only that when the person concerned has been shown
to have been dishonest a court will need to be satisfied that the
circumstances
of the case are such that that inference,
exceptionally, need not be drawn, and thus that striking off need not
follow.”
[23]
This court is satisfied that it was proved on a balance of
probabilities that Mr Moeng forged
the court order and submitted a
forged letter of good standing to Legal Aid South Africa.
[24]
Forgery and uttering of the document is a species of fraud. The
misrepresentation takes place
by way of falsification of a document
and uttering of the document takes place when the false document is
passed off to the actual
or potential prejudice of another.
Dishonesty is intrinsically part of the act of forging or uttering of
such a document.
[25]
This court is entitled to consider the dishonest explanation of the
misconduct under discussion.
In that respect Mr Moeng suggested that
the magistrate falsely stated that he dismissed the
ex parte
application when in truth he granted an interim order and then
submitted a complaint to the LPC to “deal with him”
because of a difference of opinion where his submissions according to
him, was held to be correct by the magistrate. The reason
proffered
by him is so inherently improbable that it can be rejected on the
papers before us. It is not unusual in litigation that
a presiding
officer has a
prima facie
view which he/she has changed after
hearing argument. There is no reason why the Magistrate should have
harboured a grudge after
he had changed his view in accordance with
the argument presented by Mr Moeng.
[26]
Falsifying of court orders is a scourge. Legal practitioners who are
guilty of such conduct are
not fit and proper to practice. The courts
(high and lower courts) as well as the public are entitled rely on
scrupulous honesty
and personal integrity of legal practitioners. As
officers of the court, they should serve the interests of justice by
being the
bulwark against fabricated court documents and the
deception of the courts. These qualities are sadly lacking. Mr Moeng
is not
a fit and proper person to practice.
[27]
In view of the seriousness of falsifying court documents and in,
addition, submitting a forged
letter of good standing from the LPC to
Legal Aid in support of his application is an indication that Mr
Moeng have no appreciation
of the seriousness of his wrongdoing.
There are no exceptional circumstances present to warrant any other
sanction, but an order
to strike the name of the Mr Moeng from the
roll of legal practitioners.
ORDER:
An order in terms of
the draft is issued.
G.C MULLER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
I
concur
M.I
MAUNATLALA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPLICANT
: ADV
BUTHELEZI
INSTRUCTED
BY
: LEGAL
PRACTICE COUNCIL, SA
FOR
THE RESPONDENT
: ADV T.
MOSEAMEDI
INSTRUCTED
BY
: MOENG
NKOMA ATTORNEYS
DATE
HEARD
: 27
NOVEMBER 2025
DELIVERED
ON
: 05
DECEMBER 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
Case
No.: 2393/2025
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE JUDGE MULLER
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE ACTING JUDGE MAUNATLALA
DATE:
05 DECEMBER 2025
In
the matter between:
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
APPLICANT
and
MR
NKOMA ERIC MOENG
FIRST RESPONDENT
(Member
Number: M[…])
MOENG
NKOMA ERIC ATTORNEYS
SECOND RESPONDENT
(Firm
Number: F[…])
DRAFT
ORDER
HAVING
read the documents filed of record, heard counsel and having
considered the matter:-
IT
IS ORDERED:
1.
That the name of the First Respondent be removed from the roll of
legal practitioners
and he be prohibited from practicing as a legal
practitioner.
2.
That the Director / Acting Director I Nominee of the Applicant of the
Limpopo
Provincial Legal Council be appointed as the Curator Bonis to
administer and control the trust accounts of the Respondents, and
any
accounts relating to insolvent and deceased estates and any deceased
estate and any estate under Curatorship connected with
the
Respondents practice as attorney and including, also, the separate
banking accounts opened and kept by the Respondents at a
bank in the
Republic of South Africa in terms of Section 86(1) of the LPA and/or
any separate savings or interest-bearing accounts
as contemplated by
Section 86(3) and/or Section 86(4) of the LPA, in which monies from
such trust banking accounts have been invested
by virtue of the
provisions of the said sub-sections or in which monies in any manner
have been deposited or credited (the said
accounts being hereafter
referred to as "the trust accounts"), with the following
powers and duties:
2.1.
immediately to take possession of the Respondents accounting records,
files and documents as
referred to in paragraph 6 and subject to the
approval of the board of control of the attorney's fidelity fund
(hereinafter referred
to as the fund) to sign all forms and generally
to operate upon the trust account(s), but only to such extent and for
such purpose
as may be necessary to bring to completion current
transactions in which Respondents was acting at the date of this
order;
2.2.
subject to the approval and control of the board of control of the
fund and where monies had
been paid incorrectly and unlawfully from
the undermentioned trust accounts, to recover and receive and, if
necessary in the interests
of persons having lawful claims upon the
trust account(s) and/or against the Respondents in respect of monies
held, received and/or
invested by the Respondents in terms of section
78 ( 1) of Act No 53 of 1979 or section 86 (1) of Act No 28 of 2014
and/or any
separate savings or interest-bearing trust accounts as
contemplated by section 86 (3) and 86 (4) of Act No. 28 of 2014
(hereinafter
referred to as trust monies), to take any legal
proceedings which may be necessary for the recovery of money which
may be due to
such persons in respect of incomplete transactions, if
any, in which the Respondents were and may still have been concerned
and
to receive such monies and to pay the same to the credit of the
trust account(s);
2.3.
to ascertain from the Respondents accounting records the names of all
persons on whose account
the Respondents appears to hold or to have
received trust monies (hereinafter referred to as trust creditors);
to call upon the
respondents to furnish him, within 30 (thirty) days
of the date of service of this order or such further period as he may
agree
to in writing, with the names, addresses and amounts due to all
trust creditors;
2.4.
to call upon such trust creditors to furnish such proof, information
and/or affidavits as he/she
may require enabling him/her, acting in
consultation with, and subject to the requirements of, the board of
control of the fund,
to determine whether any such trust creditor has
a claim in respect of monies in the trust account(s) of the
Respondents and, if
so, the amount of such claim;
2.5.
to admit or reject, in whole or in part, subject to the approval of
the board of control of the
fund, the claims of any such trust
creditor or creditors, without prejudice to such trust creditor's or
creditors' right of access
to the civil courts;
2.6.
having determined the amounts which, he/she considers are lawfully
due to trust creditors, to
pay such claims in full but subject always
to the approval of the board of control of the fund;
2.7.
in the event of there being any surplus in the trust account(s) of
the Respondents after payment
of the admitted claims of all trust
creditors in full, to utilise such surplus to settle or reduce (as
the case may be), firstly,
any claim of the fund in terms of section
78(3) of Act No 53 of 1979 or section 86 (1) of Act No 28 of 2014 in
respect of any interest
therein referred to and, secondly, without
prejudice to the rights of the creditors of the Respondents, the
costs, fees and expenses
referred to in paragraph 10 of this order,
or such portion thereof as has not already been separately paid by
the Respondents to
Applicant, and, if there is any balance left after
payment in full of all such claims, costs, fees and expenses, to pay
such balance,
subject to the approval of the board of control of the
fund, to the Respondents, if he is solvent, or, if the Respondents is
insolvent,
to the trustee(s) of the Respondents insolvent estate;
2.8.
in the event of there being insufficient trust monies in the trust
banking account(s) of the
Respondents, in accordance with the
available documentation and information, to pay in full the claims of
trust creditors who have
lodged claims for repayment and whose claims
have been approved, to distribute the credit balance(s) which may be
available in
the trust banking account(s) amongst the trust creditors
alternatively to pay the balance to the Attorneys Fidelity Fund;
2.9.
subject to the approval of the chairman of the board of control of
the fund, to appoint nominees
or representatives and/or consult with
and/or engage the services of attorneys, counsel, accountants and/or
any other persons,
where considered necessary, to assist him in
carrying out his duties as curator; and
2.10. to
render from time to time, as curator, returns to the board of control
of the fund showing how the trust account(s)
of the Respondents
has/have been dealt with, until such time as the board notifies him
that he may regard his duties as curator
as terminated.
3.
Respondents immediately delivers his accounting records, records,
files and documents
containing particulars and information relating
to:
3.1.
any monies received, held or paid by the Respondents for or on
account of any person while practicing
as an attorney;
3.2.
any monies invested by the Respondents in terms of section 78(2)
and/or section 78 (2A) of Act
No 53 of 1979;
3.3.
any interest on monies so invested which was paid over or credited to
the Respondents;
3.4.
any estate of a deceased person or an insolvent estate or an estate
under curatorship administered
by the Respondents, whether as
executor or trustee or curator or on behalf of the executor, trustee
or curator;
3.5.
any insolvent estate administered by the Respondents as trustee or on
behalf of the trustee in
terms of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936
;
3.6.
any trust administered by the Respondents as trustee or on behalf of
the trustee in terms of
the Trust Properties Control Act, No 57 of
1988;
3.7.
any company liquidated in terms of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973
or the
Companies Act No 71 of 2008
, administered by the Respondents
as or on behalf of the liquidator;
3.8.
any close corporation liquidated in terms of the
Close Corporations
Act, 69 of 1984
, administered by the Respondents as or on behalf of
the liquidator; and the Respondents practice as an attorney of this
Honourable
Court, to the curator appointed in terms of paragraph 2.4
hereof, provided that, as far as such accounting records, records,
files
and documents are concerned, the Respondents shall be entitled
to have reasonable access to them but always subject to the
supervision
of such curator or his nominee.
4.
That should the Respondents fail to comply with the provisions of the
preceding
paragraph of this order on service thereof upon him/them or
after a return by the person entrusted with the service thereof that
he has been unable to effect service thereof on the Respondents (as
the case may be), the sheriff for the district in which such
accounting records, records, files and documents are, be empowered
and directed to search for and to take possession thereof wherever
they may be and to deliver them to such curator.
5.
That the curator shall be entitled to:
5.1.
hand over to the persons entitled thereto all such records, files and
documents provided that
a satisfactory written undertaking has been
received from such persons to pay any amount, either determined on
taxation or by agreement,
in respect of fees and disbursements due to
the firm;
5.2.
require from the persons referred to in paragraph 8.1 to provide any
such documentation or information
which he may consider relevant in
respect of a claim or possible or anticipated claim, against him
and/or the Respondents and/or
Respondents clients and/or fund in
respect of money and/or other property entrusted to the Respondents
provided that any person
entitled thereto shall be granted reasonable
access thereto and shall be permitted to make copies thereof;
5.3.
publish this order or an abridged version thereof in any newspaper he
considers appropriate;
and
5.4.
wind-up of the Respondents practice.
6.
That the Respondents be and is hereby removed from office as –
6.1.
executor of any estate of which the Respondents has been appointed in
terms of
section 54(1)(a)(v)
of the
Administration of Estates Act, No
66 of 1965
or the estate of any other person referred to in
section
72(1)
;
6.2.
curator or guardian of any minor or other person's property in terms
of
section 72(1)
read with
section 54(1)(a)(v)
and
section 85
of the
Administration of Estates Act, No 66 of 1965
;
6.3.
trustee of any insolvent estate in terms of
section 59
of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936
;
6.4.
liquidator of any company in terms of
section 379(2)
read with 379(e)
of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973;
6.5.
trustee of any trust in terms of section 20(1) of the Trust Property
ControlAct, No 57 of 1988;
6.6.
liquidator of any close corporation appointed in terms of section 7 4
of the Close Corporation
Act, No 69 of 1984; and
6.7.
administrator appointed in terms of Section 74 of the Magistrates
Court Act, No 32 of 1944.
7.
That the Respondents be and are hereby directed:
7.1.
to pay, in terms of section 78(5) of Act No. 53 of 1979, the
reasonable costs of the inspection
of the accounting records of the
Respondents;
7.2.
to pay the reasonable fees of the auditor engaged by Applicant;
7.3.
to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator, including
travelling time;
7.4.
to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any person(s) consulted,
and/or engaged by the curator
as aforesaid;
7.5.
to pay the expenses relating to the publication of this order or an
abbreviated version thereof;
8.
That if there are any trust funds available the Respondents shall
within 6 (six)
months after having been requested to do so by the
curator, or within such longer period as the curator may agree to in
writing,
satisfy the curator, by means of the submission of taxed
bills of costs or otherwise, of the amount of the fees and
disbursements
due to him in respect of his former practice, and
should he fail to do so, he shall not be entitled to recover such
fees and disbursements
from the curator without prejudice, however,
to such rights (if any) as he may have against the trust creditor(s)
concerned for
payment or recovery thereof;
9.
That a certificate issued by a director of the Attorneys Fidelity
Fund shall
constitute prima facie proof of the curator's costs and
that the Registrar be authorised to issue a writ of execution on the
strength
of such certificate in order to collect the curator's costs.
Registrar of this Honourable Court, his certificate(s) of enrolment
as a legal Practitioner of this Honourable Court.
10.
That the first Respondent immediately surrenders and delivers to the
Registrar of this Honourable
Court, his certificate (s) of enrolment
as a Legal Practitioner of this Honourable Court.
11.
That in the event of the First Respondent failing to comply with the
terms of this order
detailed in paragraph 10 above, within two (2)
weeks from the date of this order, the Sheriff of the district in
which the certificate
(s) are, be authorised and directed to take
possession of that/ those certificate (s) and immediately to hand
it/them to the Registrar
of this Honourable Court;
12.
That the Costs of this application be paid by the Respondents on an
attorney and client
scale.
BY
THE COURT
REGISTRAR
[1]
Hereinafter called “the LPC”.
[2]
“
legal
practitioner”
means an advocate or attorney admitted and enrolled as such in terms
of section 24 and 30, respectively. And “
attorney”
means
a legal practitioner who is admitted and enrolled as such under this
Act.
[3]
Act 28 of 2014. (Hereinafter “the LP Act”).
[4]
[2007] 2 All SA 499
par 2.
[5]
Johannesburg
Society of Advocates and Another
v
Nthai
and Others
2021 (2) SA 343
(SCA) para 23-25.
[6]
The reference to count 2 is incorrect. According to the charge sheet
it is count 3.
[7]
The notice to oppose the application is not included in the papers.
[8]
Per email address e[...].
[9]
2020 (5) SA 86
(SCA) par 4.
[10]
Malan
and Another v Law Society Northern Provinces
[2008] ZASCA 90
;
2009 (1) SA 216
(SCA) par 4.
[11]
2013 (2) SA 52
(SCA) par 69.