In re: Inquest into the Highgate Hotel Attack and the deaths of Hacking and Others (CC66/2024) [2025] ZAECMKHC 103 (1 December 2025)

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)

Case No.: CC66/2024
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

In re: Inquest into the Highgate Hotel attack and the deaths of-

1. STANLEY HACKING
2. DOUGLAS WILLIAM GATES
3. ROYCE MICHAEL WHEELER
4. DEON WAYNE HARRIS
5. DERIC JOHN WHITFIELD


JUDGMENT

POTGIETER J

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION: ......................................................................................................................................... 3
2. CONTEXT OF THE ATTACK: ............................................................................................................................ 3
3. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INCIDENT: ............................................................................................................... 5
4. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: ..................................................................................................................... 7
5. THE EVIDENCE: ........................................................................................................................................ 15
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE: THE AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS…………………………………………………………..16
5.1.1 VICTIMS: .............................................................................................................................. 16
5.1.2 SURVIVORS: .......................................................................................................................... 17
5.1.3 RELATIVES: ........................................................................................................................... 18
5.2 EARLY INTERACTIONS WITH THE AUTHORITIES AND THE APLA THEORY: ......................................................... 19
5.3 ROLE OF DR EDLMANN: ...................................................................................................................... 20
5.4 INVESTIGATION BY CAPTAIN DARRYL ELS AND BETRAYAL OF THE SURVIVORS: .................................................... 21
5.5 INTIMIDATION AND SURVEILLANCE: ........................................................................................................ 22

5.6 ENCOUNTERS WITH INFORMANTS AND WITNESSES: .................................................................................... 23
5.7 SYSTEMIC, INVESTIGATIVE, AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: .......................................................................... 25
5.8 THE FINGERPRINTS DEBACLE: ............................................................................................................... 29
5.9 BALLISTICS AND EXPLOSIVES FAILURES: ................................................................................................... 32
5.10 OTHER INVESTIGATIVE LAPSES: ............................................................................................................ 34
5.11 FAILURE TO HOLD A TIMELY INQUEST :.................................................................................................. 36
5.12 POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND 'CLOSURE' OF APARTHEID ERA CASES: ........................................................... 37
5.13 NARRATIVES: ................................................................................................................................... 39
5.13.1 THE APLA NARRATIVE: ......................................................................................................... 39
5.13.2 THE HAMMER UNIT NARRATIVE: ............................................................................................. 41
5.13.3 THE DISGRUNTLED PATRONS NARRATIVE: ................................................................................... 42
5.13.4 THE ASKARI NARRATIVE : ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 43
5.13.5 THE FALSE FLAG NARRATIVE: …………………………………………………………………………….. …………………..45
6. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE : .................................................................................................................... 46

7. CONCLUSION : ......................................................................................................................................... 46
8. FINDINGS : ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48
9. CLOSING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................... 49

INTRODUCTION

[1] On 1 May 1993, at approximately 22h00, unidentified gunmen armed with automatic
rifles launched a deadly attack on the unsuspecting patrons who, at the time, were
frequenting the Highgate Hotel situated at […] V[...] Road, Cambridge, East London,
Eastern Cape. Five people were killed, and several others were wounded during the
incident.

[2] The present proceedings in terms of the Inquests Act, 58 of 1959 (‘the Act’), are a
belated sequel to that occurrence. It is not entirely clear why it took more tha n three
decades for these proceedings to materialise. There can be no doubt that this must
have added significantly to the anguish and trauma of the affected parties. It is a blight
on the efforts of the country to come to terms with its disgraceful past t hat this matter
was seemingly allowed to simply linger for far too long. It is neither helpful nor
constructive to compare the history of this matter to investigations of similar incidents
that also occurred during the past political conflict, but suffice it to say that it is difficult to
ignore the impression that this matter was previously treated with indifference. In some
material respects, the police investigation was substandard, and after such a significant
time lapse, relevant records, information, and exhibits have become untraceable or are
no longer available. Nonetheless, the patent gratitude of the affected parties that the
matter has finally received the necessary attention stands as a testament to their
admirable magnanimity and generosity of spirit.

CONTEXT OF THE ATTACK

[3] During the period relevant to these proceedings, South Africa was emerging from
almost 5 decades of oppressive and racially discriminatory Apartheid rule and was well
on its way to becoming a constitutional democracy. The Interim Constitution, Act 200 of
1993, which provides for an entrenched Bill of Rights, was drafted between May and

November 1993 and assented to on 27 January 1994. It commenced on 27 April 1994
and governed South Africa’s first democratic non -racial elections. It was replaced by
the final Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, on 4 February 1997.

[4] By May 1993, the country was in a state of transition and intense political conflict.
The assassination of Mr Chris Hani on 10 April 1993 sparked widespread and
escalating violence and demonstrations across the country, causing a climate of
increasing political instability and volatility, with the potential of the country descending
into a spiral of chaos. There was growing resistance to the inevitable political ch ange
from the right -wing groups, and there was a third force at work coordinating deadly
attacks and fomenting so -called ‘black on black’ violence, particularly involving
supporters of the African National Congress (‘ANC’) and the Inkatha Freedom Party
(‘IFP’). By way of illustration, townships in the then Pretoria, Witwatersrand and
Vereeniging (‘PWV’) Area, such as Boipatong and Thokoza, were sites of intense
conflict and deadly violence, leaving scores of people dead and rendering the affected
areas effe ctively ungovernable. Deadly clashes took place in Thokoza between ANC
and IFP supporters on 22 May 1993, leading to at least nine deaths and 69 injuries, the
vast majority among the non -IFP group, according to the Truth & Reconciliation
Commission (‘TRC’) final report. The incident reportedly resulted from a march by ANC
supporters from the Thokoza Stadium to the Alberton police station to present a
memorandum. The violence erupted when the marchers reached the Thokoza hostel
compounds (housing mainly IFP supporters). Armed IFP supporters were present
outside the hostel, and both sides engaged in shooting. Afterwards, both sides gave
conflicting accounts of the incident. The ANC claimed police shot at marchers, while the
IFP hostel-dwellers stated that the police fired tear gas at them. I should add that both

IFP hostel-dwellers stated that the police fired tear gas at them. I should add that both
accounts are in keeping with the fact that some state actors instigated so -called ‘black
on black’ violence at the time.

[5] The purpose of those who were behind these incidents was to derail the negot iations
to end Apartheid rule. The country was on the proverbial knife -edge. A coalition of 21
right-wing parties, the Afrikaner National Front, was founded in May 1993, signalling

increased resistance to the political negotiations. This era was probably t he bloodiest in
the history of the liberation struggle. It was only steadfast, insightful, and committed
political leadership that had managed to keep the country on the right course to a
political settlement and transition to a constitutional democracy.

[6] The Highgate attack was undoubtedly a false flag operation. The perpetrators clearly
intended to pass the incident off as a racially inspired armed attack on defenceless
white citizens by the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (‘APLA’), the military wing of the
Pan Africanist Congress (‘PAC’), likely to fuel inter -racial conflict and undermine a
political settlement. That false impression has been debunked and rebutted in the
present proceedings, as more fully appears from the summary of the evidence that
accompanies this judgment as Annexure ‘A’. I should point out that the then commander
of APLA, Mr Letlapa Mphahlele, testified and effectively refuted the view that APLA was
responsible for the attack or that the telephone call a few days later to the Cit izen
Newspaper by a Mr Karl Zimbiri claiming responsibility for the attack on behalf of APLA,
was genuine. I will return to this issue later in the judgment.

[7] Ironically, the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize was shared by the South African political
leaders, Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr FW de Klerk, as it was stated ‘for their work for the
peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new
Democratic South Africa’.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INCIDENT

[8] The incident occurred on a Sat urday evening at a time when the hotel was busy.
There were patrons in all the bars, namely the Public/Men’s Bar, the Ladies Bar, and
the Open Arms Bar. The attack started around 22:05, reportedly in the Public Bar, when
a gunman entered through the door a rmed with an automatic rifle (confirmed to have
been an AK -47) and started firing indiscriminately at the patrons, spraying them with

been an AK -47) and started firing indiscriminately at the patrons, spraying them with
bullets. A hand grenade and a teargas canister were also detonated in the bar. Another
gunman entered the Ladies Bar and fired at the patrons, also with an AK -47. One of the

patrons, Mr Edward Beyman Lombard, returned fire from the direction of the bar counter
with a .38 Special Rossi revolver. Mr Lombard testified that he is a reasonable shot and
he is convinced that he stru ck the attacker on the body with a few rounds. He
expressed the view that the attacker must have been wearing body armour because the
bullets did not affect him.

[9] The attackers intended to cause maximum harm and loss of life. According to the
relevant ballistics report, exhibit ‘N’, fifty -six 7.62 x 39mm (assault rifle) calibre spent
cartridges were recovered at the scene. Nineteen were fired from one rifle and twenty -
eight from a second rifle. Seventeen 7.62 x 39mm calibre discharged bullet points wer e
recovered. Four were fired from one rifle and six from the second. One bullet was
recovered from the leg of a survivor, Mr Karl Webber, who was shot in the Ladies Bar. It
came from the second rifle.

[10] Nine .38 Special spent cartridges, all fired from the same revolver, were recovered
at the scene. One discharged .38/.357 calibre bullet point was also found in the door
frame at the hotel entrance, which was fired from the position occupied by Mr Lombard.

[11] Various bullet holes were found. Seven in the foyer leading to the Ladies and Open
Arms Bars, which were fired from the hotel entrance. One was fired through the wooden
panel of the door of the Open Arms Bar. Seven more resulted from shots fired inside the
bar from the direction of the door. Three holes towards the back of the bar were caused
by gunfire from a direction consistent with the position of Mr Lombard. Thirty holes were
found in the Public Bar, mostly through the bar counter, caused by gunfire from the
direction of the bar door.

[12] A teargas grenade was detonated inside the Public Bar. A hand grenade was
lobbed over the counter and landed in the adjacent pool room, where it exploded and
damaged the wall. The explosives expert, Mr Charl Naude, in his report exhibit ‘O’, had

damaged the wall. The explosives expert, Mr Charl Naude, in his report exhibit ‘O’, had
regard to the used teargas canister and the fly -off levers of the strike (igniting)
mechanisms of both devices that were found afterwards inside the bar. He identified the

teargas canister as a hand smoke/anti -riot grenade deployed to emit teargas. These
grenades were manufactured at the Swartklip Products factory in Mitchells Plain, Cape
Town, and were primarily supplied to the police and the defence force, as well as to the
TBVC States (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei). He identified the type of
hand grenade by means of the fly -off lever and the damage which resulted when it
exploded, causing a typical crater associated with high -explosive hand grenades. He
concluded that it was an RPG -5 anti -personnel fragmentation grenade. These were
manufactured either in China, the Soviet Union, or other Eastern Bloc countries and
were never procured by the South African Defence Force.

[13] Mr Deric Whitfield, one of the patrons who was shot in the Public Bar, managed to
crawl to the front parking area, where he later succumbed. Four patrons were shot and
killed in the Ladies Bar: Mr Douglas William Gates, Mr Stanley Hacking, Mr Deon
Wayne Harris, and Mr Dave Royce Michael Wheeler. In addition, a total of 7 people
were injured in the attack.

[14] Eyewitnesses te stified that the attackers were wearing balaclavas. There was an
indication that they had black cream on their faces, and one attacker was wearing police
issue boots.

[15] After the attack, the perpetrators nonchalantly left the scene. They were apparentl y
in no hurry to get away and seemingly had no fear of being arrested. Two of them were
seen by a witness, Ms Broderick, who lived close to the hotel as they were moving on
Voortrekker Road, which runs past the hotel. One assailant had a rifle openly slung over
his shoulder.

[16] Security forces and emergency services arrived at the hotel shortly after the
incident and took control of the crime scene.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

[17] An inquest is a judicial investigation into a death not due to natural causes, where
no resultant criminal proceedings are instituted. Section 5 1 of the Act requires, in such a
case, that the prosecuting authority submit the relevant documentation to the magistrate
of the district where the incident oc curred, who is in turn obliged to ensure that an
inquest is held into the incident and that the documentation is provided to the judicial
officer who is to hold the inquest.

[18] Section 62 authorises the Minister of Justice to request the relevant judge president
to designate a judge to hold an inquest at any place determined by the judge. I should
add that this procedure was followed in the present matter, where I determined that the
proceedings would be held at the Special Investigating Tribunal premises in East
London, mainly for the convenie nce of the victims, the next -of-kin of the deceased, and
the other affected parties.

[19] At the commencement of the proceedings, I granted an order in terms of section
6A3, that a joint inquest be held into the deaths of all 5 decea sed. The matter then
proceeded on that basis and was held in public. Attorneys and counsel represented

1 The section provides as follows:
5 When inquest to be held
(1) If criminal proceedings are not instit uted in connection with the death, or alleged death, the
public prosecutor referred to in section 4 shall submit those statements, documents and
information submitted to him to the magistrate of the district concerned.
(2) If on the information submitte d to him in terms of subsection (1) it appears to the magistrate that
a death has occurred and that such death was not due to natural causes, he shall, subject to the
directions of the Minister, take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that an inquest as to
the circumstances and cause of death is held by a judicial officer in terms of section 6 …
2 The section is to the following effect:
6 Judicial officer who is to hold inquest

2 The section is to the following effect:
6 Judicial officer who is to hold inquest
An inquest shall be held –
…
(d) where the Minister has so requested a judge president of a provincial division of the Supreme
Court, by any judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa designated by the judge president
concerned, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, such inquest may
be held at any place from time to time determined by such judge.
3 The section provides in relevant part that:
6A Multiple deaths which are connected
(1) Where more than one death has oc curred, the attorney-general or the public prosecutor within
whose area of jurisdiction the incident is alleged to have occurred may request the judicial
officer who is to hold an inquest to hold a joint inquest into the deaths of the persons involved.
(2) After the hearing of the request referred to in subsection (1) the judicial officer may order that
a joint inquest shall be held if he is of the opinion that the deaths concerned are connected.

some of the victims and affected families. The Director of Public Prosecutions was
represented by a team of 6 counsel.
[20] The object of the Act is ‘in the interest of the public and for the administration of
justice, to conduct an official investigation into and to obtain a finding by a judicial officer
on whether or not the death of a person who has died from other than natural causes
was caused by an a ct or omission which includes or amounts to an offence by
anybody.’4. Section 16(2) of the Act requires the court to record findings as to the
identity of the deceased, the cause or likely cause of death, the date of death, and
whether the death was brought about by any act or omission prima facie involving or
amounting to an offence on the part of any person.

[21] The courts have frequently commented on the purpose of an inquest. The Appellate
Division stated in Tiley5:

The function of an inquest is to determine the identity of the deceased person; the cause or
likely cause of death; the date of death; and whether the death was brought about by any
act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person … The
underlying purpose of an inquest is to promote public confidence and satisfaction; to
reassure the public that all deaths from unnatural causes will r eceive proper attention and
investigation so that, where necessary, appropriate measures can be taken to prevent
similar occurrences, and so that persons responsible for such deaths may, as far as
possible, be brought to justice.

[22] The court in Tiley6 further referred with approval to the following dicta in Timol7:

[F]or the administration of justice to be complete and to instill confidence, it is necessary
that, amongst other things, there should be an official investigation in every case where
a person has died of unnatural causes, and the result of such investigation should be
made known. Therefore, the Inquests Act provides that, if there is reason to believe that

made known. Therefore, the Inquests Act provides that, if there is reason to believe that

4 LAWSA Vol 20(2) para 251.
5 Marais NO v Tiley 1990(2) SA 899(A) at 901E-G.
6 At 901G-J.
7 Timol & Another v Magistrate, Johannesburg & Another 1972(2) SA 281 (T) at 287H-288A and 292A-B.

a death has occurred, that such death was not due to natural causes and that it was not
followed by the institution of criminal proceedings, there shall be an inquest as to the
circumstances of the death.
…
[T]he inquest must be so thorough that the public and the interested parties are satisfied
that there has been a full and fair investigation into the circumstances of the death.

[23] In De’Ath8 the court referred to the historical position regarding inquests:

The predecessors of the Act show clearly that the purpose of all inquests is to
investigate whether, when someone has died or is suspected of having died otherwise
than of natural causes, his death has been the result of a criminal offence, and, if so,
who the offender is. An inquest is not aimed at proving anyone’s guilt, but is most
certainly aimed at ensuring that, if possible, where guilt exists, it will not remain hidden.

[24] The court in Padi9 referred to the following statement in an academic article
emphasising the public importance of inquests, which are particularly pertinent to the
present matter:

By statute, the inquest serves to ascertain the identity of the deceased, c ause of death,
date of death, and whether or not the death was brought about by any act or omission
involving an offence on the part of any person. Where sufficient evidence is brought to
light, the inquest yields to a criminal prosecution.

An inquest’s m ost important function is not this simple determination of facts, however.
Public satisfaction is its raison d’etre; to reassure the public that every possible step will
be taken to prevent similar deaths in the future; preserve, where pertinent, the integ rity
of the State by refuting all allegations of official misconduct, malfeasance, or negligence;
and where the State’s, an agency’s or person(s)’s culpability is substantiated, bringing

8 De’Ath (substituted by Tiley) v Additional Magistrate, Cape Town 1988(4) SA 769 (C) at 775G;

8 De’Ath (substituted by Tiley) v Additional Magistrate, Cape Town 1988(4) SA 769 (C) at 775G;
cf In re: Goniwe & Others (Inquest) 1994(3) SA 877 (SE) at 878A-E (Goniwe).
9 Padi & Another v Botha NO & Another 1996(3) SA 732 (W) at 740J - 741B.

forth criminal indictments, remedial measures and policy changes nece ssary to quickly
restore confidence in the central authority.10

[25] The importance of properly investigating deaths is explained as follows in Van
Heerden11:

The State has an interest in the proper investigation of deaths due to other than natur al
causes. Even if nobody can be held responsible for a death in a particular case, it may
still remain pertinent to determine the circumstances and cause of death in order that
appropriate measures can be taken to prevent similar occurrences.

[26] As indicated, the Act obliges the judicial officer to make findings as to the identity of
the deceased, the cause or likely cause of death, the date of death, and whether prima
facie the death resulted from an offence committed by any person 12. Where it is not
possible to make any one of such findings, this fact must be recorded by the judicial
officer.13

[27] The courts have adopted differing approaches to the standard of proof applicable to
findings under section 16(2) of the Act. Section 16(2)(d) was amended by Act 45 of
1990, which introduced the term ‘prima facie’ in relation to the cause of the death under
investigation. Pursuant to the amendment, the court is required to make a finding
whether the death was caused by conduct which prima facie amounts to or involves an
offence.


10 DJ Akerson An Inquest – Law Inquest (1989) 5 SAJHR 209.
11 Van Heerden & Another v Joubert NO & Others 1994(4) SA 793 (A) at 795D.
12 Section 16(2) provides that:
16 Finding
…
(2) The judicial officer holding an inquest shall record a finding upon the inquest –
(a) as to the identity of the deceased person;
(b) as to the cause or likely cause of death;
(c) as to the date of death;
(d) as to whether the death was brought about by any act or omission prima facie involving or
amounting to an offence on the part of any person.
13 Section 16(3) provides that:

amounting to an offence on the part of any person.
13 Section 16(3) provides that:
(3) If the judicial officer is unable to record any such finding, he shall record that fact.

[28] Commenting on the previous version of section 16(2)(d), ie, excluding the words
‘prima facie’, the court pointed out in Claassen14 that the subsection does not indicate
what standard of proof should be applied. The court thus accepted that in the absence
of any other obvious standard, the judicial officer was required to decide on a balance of
probabilities.15 The test envisioned by the Legislature was accordingly unclear.

[29] The court in Webster16 dealt with the interpretation of the amended subsection and
concluded that the test to be applied is the criminal standard, namely, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court further held that the words ‘prima facie’ were introduced in
the subsection merely to show that inquest findings are not final and binding
determinations immediately affecting the legal rights and obligations of the affected
parties. The latter remains to be determined in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.

[30] The court in Goniwe differed from the decision in Webster, indicating that when the
amendment was introduced, it was already known that inquest findings are not finally
determinative of any legal rights or obligations. No amendment was accordingly
necessary to clarify this fact. The decision in Claassen shows that the test to be applied
was not clear. This was the mischief that the amendment sought to address; it was not
to clarify a well-established position. The court indicated that:

The section, as I read it, now provides that the presiding officer must record a finding in
terms of s 16(2)(d) if, in his opinion, the evidence establishes prima facie that an offence
causing the death of the deceased has been committed by any person. This conclusion
is, in my view, supported by the fact that s 16(1) of the Act specifically requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for a positive finding that a death has occurred in a case

14 Claassen v Landdros, Bloemfontein 1964(4) SA 4 (O) at 11C.

14 Claassen v Landdros, Bloemfontein 1964(4) SA 4 (O) at 11C.
15 It is stated as follows in the or iginal text: ‘Art. 16(2)(d) dui nie aan watter maatstaf eerste verweerder
moes gebruik het om tot n bevinding te geraak nie. Vir doeleindes van hierdie uitspraak sal dit
aanvaar word – aangesien daar geen ander voor die hand liggende maatstaf is nie – dat eerste
verweerder geroepe was om op n oorwig van waarskynlikhede te beslis.’
16 Inquest into the Death of Dr David Joseph Webster Unreported WLD judgment by Stegmann J dated
22/1/1993 referred to, but not followed in Goniwe (supra note 8) at 879A–F.

where no body is found. When s 16(2)(d) was amended the Legislature, in my opinion,
provided for a different standard of proof.17

[31] The court continued to consider the exact meaning of the words prima facie in this
context. It rejected the contention that the applicable test is that applied in a discharge
application in a criminal trial or for absolution from the instance in a civil trial and pointed
out that it is problematic to apply a test applicable to adversarial proceedings in
inquisitorial proceedings, such as an inquest. The court went on to say that:18

In deciding whether a prima facie case has been established some regard must, in my
opinion, be had to the reliability and credibility of witnesses if they had given evidence at
the inquest. The fact that evidence has been produced which, if accepted, would prove
that some person has committed an offence which brought about the deceased’s death
will, in my opinion, not be sufficient to justify a positive finding if it is obvious to the officer
presiding at the inquest that there is no prospect of such evidence being believed at a
subsequent criminal trial.

[32] Insofar as the applicable standard of proof is concerned, the court stated that:19

Bearing in mind the object of an inquest it is my opinion that the test to be applied is not
the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ test but som ething less stringent. In my opinion, the test
envisaged by the Inquests Act is whether the judicial officer holding the inquest is of the
opinion that there is evidence available which may at a subsequent criminal trial be held
to be credible and acceptab le and which, if accepted, could prove that the death of the
deceased was brought about by any act or omission which involves or amounts to the
commission of a criminal offence on the part of some person or persons.

[33] In the matter of Padi,20 the court considered the above -mentioned conclusions in
the matters of Webster and Goniwe concerning the standard of proof applicable to

the matters of Webster and Goniwe concerning the standard of proof applicable to
findings in terms of section 16(2)(d) of the Act. The court supported the reasons

17 At 879 E – F.
18 At 879H – 880A.
19 At 880B-C.
20 Supra note 9.

advanced in Goniwe for disagreeing with the conclusion in Webster that the standard is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Reference is then made to the unreported judgment
of Levy J delivered on 23 June 1994 in the Namibia High Court in the inquest into the
death of Adv ATEA Lubo wsky that fully supports the rejection by the court in Goniwe of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Webster, describing it as ‘obviously
incorrect’. Levy J then commented as follows with regard to the application of the
standard:21

However, I respectfully do not agree with Zietsman JP when he says in respect of the
words ‘prima facie’ that ‘the test envisaged by the Inquests Act is whether the judicial
officer … is of the opinion that there is evidence available which may at a subsequent
criminal trial be held to be credible and acceptable’. For reasons I have already stated,
there may be no criminal trial. The judicial officer is required on the evidence and
documentation submitted to him to decide whether or not a witness is ‘credible and
acceptable’ and if he is not his evidence must be rejected. If the judicial officer rejects
that evidence, he may nevertheless be left with some remaining evidence ‘ prima facie
involving’ a person or ‘amounting to an offence’ by a person. If the person so
incriminated gives evidence in the inquest court, which is acceptable to the judicial
officer and which gainsays the ‘remaining evidence’, there is then no prima facie
evidence involving or amounting to an offence. Should the evidence not be acceptable to
the inquest officer, the remaining evidence may well ‘ prima facie involve’ a person or
‘amount to an offence’.

[34] The court in Padi22 supported the approach of Levy J to the application of the
standard, which differs from that set out in Goniwe. The court indicated that the judicial
officer holding the inquest is not required to determine the section 16(2)(d) findings, with

officer holding the inquest is not required to determine the section 16(2)(d) findings, with
reference to the credibility and acceptability that the evidence at the inquest might enjoy
in a criminal trial. An inquest would not necessarily result in a criminal prosecution. It is
an independent, separate process of si gnificant import. The findings must be based on
the presiding officer's own impressions and insights, and directed at the object of the

21 This extract has been reproduced in (and is quoted from) Padi at 739G-I.
22 At 740G-I.

inquest and fulfilling the task of the presiding officer. In this regard, presiding officers are
not required to place themselves notionally in the shoes of the criminal court.

[35] I agree with the conclusion that the beyond reasonable doubt standard does not
apply to inquests. I respectfully disagree with the application of the prima facie test set
out in Goniwe and appr oach the present matter on the basis set out in Padi and
Lubowski, with which I concur. The credibility and acceptability of the evidence must be
decided on the totality of the evidentiary material placed before the hearing. The critical
question is whether, in the opinion of the presiding officer, the evidence, on the face of it
(or at first sight), indicates that the death resulted from criminal conduct on the part of a
person or persons. In my view, this exercise is best captured by the following
description of a prima facie case set out in Mazibuko23 (and to be applied mutatis
mutandis), namely whether ‘ a court, applying its mind reasonably, could conclude on
the evidence in the case that the injuries to the plaintiff were caused by the negligence
of the insured drivers’.

[36] Applying the last -mentioned approach to the present matter, the issue is wheth er
the court could conclude, applying its mind reasonably to all the evidentiary material,
that the deaths were caused by criminal conduct on the part of a person or persons.
This is the approach that I will adopt to the matter.

THE EVIDENCE

[37] Extensive evidence was presented at the hearing, which lasted approximately five
weeks. To promote a better understanding of the expansive account of the evidence
that was led contained in the summary annexed to this judgment, I will proceed to give
an overview o f the evidence under the following subheadings: (a) the affected
individuals; (b) early interactions with the authorities and the APLA theory; (c) the role of
Dr Edelmann; (d) investigation by Captain Darryl Els; (e) intimidation and surveillance;

Dr Edelmann; (d) investigation by Captain Darryl Els; (e) intimidation and surveillance;
(f) enco unters with informants and witnesses; (g) systemic, investigative, and

23 Mazibuko v Santam Insurance & Another 1982(3) SA 125 (A) at 133E-F.

institutional failures; (h) the fingerprints debacle; (i) ballistics and explosives failures; (j)
other investigative
lapses; (k) failure to hold a timely inquest; (l) political interference; and (m) narratives.



Overview of the evidence

(a) The affected individuals

[38] The evidence showed that the victims, survivors, and affected relatives were deeply
impacted by this senseless attack.

Victims

[39] Royce Michael Wheeler was a 46-year-old married man who was shot and killed.

[40] Deric John Whitfield was a 42-year-old married man and a respected businessman.
During the shooting, he sustained a bullet wound to the chest and abdomen, which
resulted in his death.

[41] Stanley Hacking was a 65 -year-old widowed father. He was a regular patron at the
hotel. He sustained bullet wounds to the chest, which ruptured his heart and lungs,
resulting in his death.

[42] Deon Wayne Harris, the youngest victim, was a 26 -year-old man with a bright
future ahead. He was watching rugby on the day of the massacre. He sustained bullet
wounds to his right and left lungs, which killed him. Deon would have celebrated his 27 th
birthday on 13 May, which was also the date that his sister, Lyndene Page, was due to
give birth to his first niece.

[43] Douglas William Gates, a well -known and lov ed figure in East London, was 56
years old. He had a deep love for animals and worked at the SPCA. Douglas sustained
a bullet wound to the abdominal wall, rupturing the blood vessels in his groin and
buttocks, which led to his death.

Survivors

[44] Survivors described how their lives were not only devastated on the night of 1 May
1993, but in the decades that followed.

[45] The immediate aftermath of the Highgate Massacre left survivors and victims'
families not only dealing with catastrophic physical an d psychological trauma but also
confronting the justice system, seeking justice for over three decades.

[46] Neville Beling ("Neville") was 20 years old at the time of the attack. He is a survivor
of the Highgate Massacre. He is permanently disabled as a result of being shot. Neville
sustained multiple gunshot wounds to his left arm, leg, and back, never worked again
after the attack, and endured more than 15 major surgeries, developing sepsis and
suffering multiple instances of heart failure due to anaest hesia. His life has been one of
physical suffering and emotional trauma, compounded by the lack of justice. He testified
in the inquest.

[47] Karl Andrew Weber was 37 years old at the time of the attack. He is another
survivor who continues to live with e motional and physical scars. He was at the Ladies’
Bar at the hotel when gunmen opened fire. He was shot, which resulted in his left arm
being amputated below the elbow, rendering him partially disabled with only 40%
functionality in his remaining right ar m. This led to the loss of his job, home, car, and
relationships. He also testified in these proceedings.

[48] Bureaucratic indiffe rence was exemplified when Weber was initially denied a
disability grant, with authorities arguing he still had one functional arm and both legs,
receiving only R460.00 per month after legal intervention.

[49] Another survivor, William Freddie Baling, was 45 years old at the time. He went to
the hotel with his brother, Keith Baling. They went to the public bar where they intended
to play pool. He was shot in his lower back, which resulted in serious injuries. He has
also been in and out of the hospital eve r since the attack. He indicates that he has not
gone a single day without pain since the Highgate Massacre and says that he has never
been able to return to work since.

[50] Megan Nadine Boucher was 22 years old at the time of the shooting. She was
present with Karl Webber, Doreen Rossouw, and Douglas William Gates. Whilst sitting
at the old Ladies' Bar, she was shot in her right leg, which resulted in serious mental
and physical injuries.

[51] Nkosinathi Alfred Gontshi was a barman at the hotel and on d uty on the night in
question. He was 30 years old. Nkosinathi was sitting behind the bar counter when
gunmen opened fire, which resulted in a gunshot wound to his right leg. Although he
survived the attack, he has since passed away.

[52] Doreen Rossouw, a nother survivor who has since passed away, was at the
Highgate Hotel having a drink with a colleague when gunmen opened fire. She was 57
at the time of the shooting and sustained injuries as a result of being shot in the leg.

[53] Finally, Charles John Bodington was 40 years old at the time and sustained serious
injuries in the attack.

Relatives

[54] As indicated, Lyndene Page is the sister of Deon Wayne Harris. She was 25 years
old and pregnant with her first child at the time of the attack, which resulted in the
untimely death of her brother.

[55] She has fought to keep the story of her brother alive and to demand accountability.
Her advocacy reflects the resilience of the families who have had to endure the burden
of living without loved ones, losing their solace and support.

[56] Bernice Whitfield was left without money or food to support her three children after
the death of her husband, Deric Whitfield, having not received any insurance payout.
Ten months later, she lost her 20 -year-old daughter, Chantelle, in a hit-and-run incident
that police never meaningfully pursued.

[57] Yvette Wheeler, the daughter of the late Royce Michael Wheeler, confirmed that
her father was the sole breadwinner of their household when he was murdered and tha t
their family lost their house after his death. Further, she could not afford to go to
university as a result of the dire economic impact of losing her father had on their family.

[58] The prolonged delay in addressing the Highgate Massacre has meant th at some
family members have since departed. Among those are:

58.1 The parents of Neville – Neville Beling Snr, who passed away on 8 June
2016, and Zilla Beling, who passed away on 24 November 2017.
58.2 The father of Lyndene Page and the late Deon Wayne Harris, Neville
Henry Harris, died on 18 August 2002. Lyndene’s mother, Cynthia Lynette
Harris, passed away on 22 July 2023

[59] They went to their graves without closure.

(b) Early interactions with the authorities and the APLA theory

[60] Initially, survivors accepted the widespread media and police attribution of the
Highgate Massacre to the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (‘APLA’). Neville Beling
testified that he believed this narrative until 200 5, when, during a mediation with former
APLA commander Letlapa Mphahlele (“Mphahlele”), he was told that the attack did not
match APLA's operational style and that a "third force" might have been involved. This
revelation fundamentally altered the survivor s' views of the Highgate Massacre and
catalysed the formation of the Highgate United Group to seek a coherent investigation
from the authorities.

[61] Karl Weber described in his testimony the profound psychological impact of
learning that the accepted or dominant narrative might be false. He described how
some of the survivors, when they felt insecure or threatened, received personal
protection arranged by Mphahlele. Such support was not forthcoming from the South
African Police Services ("SAPS").

(c) Role of Dr Edlmann

[62] Dr. Tessa (Theresa) Edlmann’s ("Dr. Edlmann") involvement marked a critical
turning point in the survivors' and families' quest for justice. Her December 2006
memorandum to the National Prosecuting Authority (‘NPA’) formally requesting renewed
investigation and regular quarterly updates represented the first systematic attempt to
re-engage official channels.

[63] Dr. Edlmann helped to organise the first gathering of Highgate Massacre survivors
in September 2006 at the Kenn away Hotel, East London. This was their first meeting in
13 years, where an emotional reunion exposed deep anger and confusion among
survivors who had all along firmly believed that APLA was responsible.

[64] Dr. Edlmann's support extended far beyond orga nising meetings to encompass
comprehensive advocacy and personal care for survivors over two decades. Through

the Spirals Trust, she facilitated critical reconciliation processes, including the 2005
mediation between survivors and former APLA Director of Operations, Mphahlele.

[65] She provided extensive personal support to survivors like Neville Beling, facilitating
his medical treatment, surgeries, and accommodation during health crises, while
highlighting his immense courage and resilience despite overw helming physical and
emotional trauma.
[66] Dr. Edlmann also documented the severe neglect experienced by survivors,
revealing that, contrary to assumptions about white victims having adequate
insurance/financial stability, many lived in dire poverty, such as Francina Wheeler, the
widow of Royce Michael Wheeler, who resided in a garage without running water, as
she received no insurance payout.

[67] Her work involved coordinating multiple families and survivors, as is apparent from
her 2006 memorandum, ens uring they remained collectively engaged with authorities
and maintaining detailed records that would later prove crucial to this inquest.

(d) Investigation by Captain Darryl Els and betrayal of the survivors

[68] In 2007, the survivors' desperation for answers led them to fund their own
investigation, raising R5,000.00 to send SAPS Captain Daryl Els (“Els”), who had been
the investigating officer from 13 May 1994 to 5 December 1998, on an investigation
mission to G qeberha/Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. Els claimed to have discovered
evidence linking the attack to military -trained operatives of the Hammer Unit who had
used a training site near Addo Elephant Park, where structures mimicking the Highgate
Hotel were allegedly used for training.

[69] However, after completing his mission and claiming he had identified the
perpetrators in a telephone call with Neville Beling, Els abruptly stopped

communicating, later claiming his laptop containing all evidence had been stolen,
leaving the families further traumatised.

[70] Els' investigation introduced tantalising, but ultimately unverifiable leads, including
claims about Wayne Grobler ("Grobler") allegedly confessing to driving the getaway
vehicle and Pieter John Woest Hall as giving the order, along with Major General CP
van der Westhuizen, Andries Struwig, Captain FP du Preez, and Sergeant Major MD
Hom as participants. This explosive confession was relayed to the court through Frans
Swele Molokome (“Molokome”), who su pposedly also heard this evidence at Grobler's
house in Cape Town. No formal statement was submitted by him at the time of
allegedly hearing Grobler's confession. Grobler later denied ever meeting Els and
having resided in Cape Town.
(e) Intimidation and surveillance

[71] The survivors' pursuit of truth was accompanied by incidents suggesting active
intimidation, including but not limited to:

71.1 The mysterious 1995 shooting at Neville Beling's home, where automatic
gunfire narrowly missed his cousin, and police later claimed the recovered projectile
was just "a piece of metal". This demonstrated the dangers faced by those seeking
answers.

71.2 Lyndene Page also recalled what she suspected was phone tapping in
2010, when she and Neville Beling noticed strange noises and echoes on their calls
before a meeting at Highgate.

[72] According to Lyndene and Neville, when they attempted to report their concerns
about phone tapping to the Cambridge Police Station, Colonel Steven du Rand (“Du
Rand”) refused to take a formal statement, citing fears for his own safety and family,
advising them to slip their statement under his office door after hours. Significantly,
neither in his statement nor his testimony did Du Rand deny that this happened. He
simply claimed that he could not remember. In my view, the version of the survivors
can safely be accepted over that of Du Rand.

(f) Encounters with informants and witnesses

[73] The investigation conducted by the survivors and the victims' families attracted
various a ccounts from informants, which, for the most part, amounted to a wild
goose chase.

[74] Lyndene and Neville indicated that Frederick Doug Petzer (Dirk) (“Petzer”) told
them that his brother, Sergeant Zieg Petzer, warned him that “it is going down tonight ”.
He claimed that his brother phoned him from a payphone inside the Highgate Hotel to
say “it has gone down, it has happened” minutes after the Highgate Massacre had
taken place.

[75] The present investigation officer, Captain Peterson, records that Pet zer claimed
that when he spoke with Lyndene and Neville, he was intoxicated. Petzer himself
denied saying this.

[76] Further uncertainty arose from a chance approach to the family by Edward Baymen
Lombard ("Lombard"), a former Rhodesian Army soldier, at Morgan’s Bay during a
private ceremony to scatter the ashes of Deon Wayne Harris. According to Lyndene,

Lombard claimed that he had been with Deon during the Highgate Massacre, had
pushed him down when the shooting started, and returned fire at the attacke rs. The
randomness of his sudden appearance at a private family event understandably raised
the family’s suspicions.

[77] Over time, other figures stepped forward with fragments of information and theories
that tended to complicate, rather than clarify.

[78] The families received an anonymous digital tip in 2012 from a source on MXit, an
online chat platform, who claimed to possess footage of the attack. All to no avail.
Neville disclosed this tip to the police, who obtained the necessary section 205
subpoena and executed a raid on the property where these tapes were allegedly held.
Unfortunately, there was nothing related to the Highgate Massacre on these tapes, and
they were mostly just pornography.

[79] Karl Weber testified about a former intelligenc e operative, Alan Douglas Elsdon
(“Elsdon”), who reached out to him. Karl recounted that Elsdon said he had served in
the police’s Crime Intelligence Service since 1973 and later worked as a private
investigator. However, Elsdon later testified that he had actually been a member of the
Security Branch. Elsdon volunteered theories about planning, authorship, and targeting
concerning the operation. In a subsequent call with Karl’s attorney, Paige Winfield
("Winfield") of Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr ("CDH"), he iden tified two men (one deceased) as
supposed suspects based on a source he called “Hennie” (later identified as Hendrick
Louw), who refused to reveal what he knew when approached by Winfield.

[80] In messages introduced from Annexure B to Karl’s affidavit, being screenshots of
his conversations with Elsdon, the latter dismissed suggestions that ballistic exhibits
were posted to Cape Town as “nonsense,” insisted Highgate (not Orange Grove) was

the intended target, and opined that the attack was “a bright ide a from someone higher
up” rehearsed in detail.

[81] Roland Parker’s ("Parker") evidence independently corroborates the pattern and
tenor of Elsdon’s approach. Parker testified that Elsdon contacted him via Facebook
Messenger on 30 January 2025, soon after footage of the inquest inspection in loco was
posted on Facebook. Elsdon demanded secrecy and expressly cautioned Parker not to
inform Neville, Dr. Edlmann, or the legal teams. Elsdon asked Parker to send him
reports on the daily inquest court proceedings and to confirm whether the “Hammer
Unit” had been mentioned. Elsdon passed on articles and an e -book (“My Cryptic Life”)
about the Hammer Unit to Parker and claimed that the unit was dangerous and still
active.

(g) Systemic, investigative, and institutional failures

[82] Retired Brigadier Clifford Marion (“Marion”), the private investigator for the families,
set out a litany of investigative lapses and blunders.

[83] Marion testified that “certain shortcomings amou nt to gross negligence on the part
of the responsible authorities,” notwithstanding the involvement of senior and
experienced police officers in the investigation. He summarised multiple lapses,
including:

83.1 The scene was not properly investigated,
83.1.1 No effort was made to lift fingerprints from the spent cartridges and
grenade levers,
83.1.2 Elimination prints were not taken;

83.2 Crucial evidence, such as the ballistic and fingerprint evidence, was lost.
83.3 Important statements linking identity photo parades were not completed;
83.4 The docket was dormant and seemingly missing for several years,
resulting in virtually no investigations during a period of more than 11
years from December 1998 to August 2010;
83.5 In addition, there were unexplained and lengthy investigative delays,
indicating that the investigations were conducted with little or no urgency.
83.6 In particular, these included several key aspects that were not
investigated:
83.6.1 the alleged Citizen Newspaper call on 3 May 1993, claiming that
APLA was responsible for the attack, was not traced;
83.6.2 the call allegedly made from the Highgate Hot el phone booth was
not traced;
83.6.3 the alleged getaway vehicle with the number plate starting with the
letters and number XB 3 was not traced;
83.6.4 fingerprints were not lifted from the AK -47 cartridges or the fly -off
levers of the grenades found on the crime scene.

[84] Marion indicated that suspects often leave trace prints on ammunition while loading
it, and such prints could have been matched against the AFIS system introduced in
2000-2001 or the Home Affairs ABIS database. However, there is no evidence
suggesting such items were tested for prints, and not a single officer on the scene
confirms or states this happened.

[85] Captain Peterson's characterisation of this failure as "a serious blunder" highlights
the magnitude of this neglect, partic ularly when contrasted with the elaborate fingerprint

elimination exercise that apparently followed the incident, involving 64 individuals whose
prints could not be matched against negligible or non-existent scene evidence.

[86] Several police officers w ho were involved in the crime scene investigation and
subsequent tasks, such as photo ID parades, did not make statements, including:

86.1 Warrant Officer Venkile, Sergeant Rutters, Warrant Officer Roos, and
Sergeant Els;
86.2 Sergeant Bossr, who attended the crime scene from 1 May 1993 to 2 May
1993, who only submitted an affidavit some 31 years later on 3 February
2025;
86.3 Sergeant Brandt, the explosives expert who attended the scene;
86.4 Sergeant Wayne Xavier Rutters, who conducted photo identifica tions with
various witnesses soon after the attack, testified that he normally would
have compiled a statement documenting the identifications as per
standard procedure. He could not recall whether he made a statement or
not, but admitted that the omission was "disturbing" given the high -profile
nature of a case involving five murders;
86.5 Warrant Officer David Henry Roos also conducted photo identification
parades, in which positive identifications were apparently made. He did
not depose to any statement in connection with his investigations. When
Roos testified, he claimed to have no recollection of his investigative
steps. The complete absence of any recollection by Roos of his
involvement in the investigation exemplifies the chaotic and shockingly
poorly documented nature of the initial investigation;
86.6 Dean George Venish was a Constable or Lance Sergeant in the Dog Unit
in 1993, and one of the first responders on the scene. He witnessed one
of the injured patrons refer to the attackers as “those bloo dy whites”. No

statement was taken from him until 2012, nearly 19 years after the
incident. Venish expressed surprise at this delay, stating, "I was surprised
that nobody was coming."

[87] Certain affidavits were missing from the docket, including that of:

87.1 Captain Schwartz, who attended the crime scene from 3 May 1993 to 12
May 1993; and
87.2 Lieutenant Colonel W J De Lange, a member of the Security Branch
whose affidavit, filed as A51, prompted the arrests of Xolile Ngxabane and
Dumisile Nontshokweni.

[88] Four warrants of arrest are missing from the docket.

[89] The docket is entirely silent on why Mtutuzeli Mama was arrested and charged on
29
April 1994 and the charges were withdrawn against him on 2 May 1994.

[90] All the ballistic evidence, including all cartridges (except for the projectile recovered
from Neville Beling), was apparently stolen from the Cape Town Post Office on 14/15
July 1995.

[91] Colonel Victor Jacobus Van der Merwe (“Van der Merwe”), who prepared the
ballistic report, expressed bewilderment that someone would target a package
containing spent cartridges with no commercial value. The loss of the cartridges
prevented them from ever being uploaded onto the Integrated Ballistics Identification

System ("IBIS"), which was introduced in 1997, thus permanently closing the possibility
of linking any recovered weapons to the massacre.

[92] According to Marion, in his experience, i t was never standard procedure to send
important exhibits by post. He asserted that it was standard procedure to protect the
integrity of the chain of custody by hand -delivering exhibits to the forensic science
laboratory.

[93] Marion concluded that:
“… this investigation was grossly substandard. But for these blunders, this
investigation may have solved this brutal crime, particularly if forensic evidence had
been properly collected, safeguarded, and tested. Such gross incompetence
inevitably gives rise to a deep suspicion on the part of the survivors, families, and
members of the public that the investigation was designed to fail. I fully understand
the sentiment.”

[94] Some of these lapses are dealt with in greater detail in the summary of evidence
that accompanies this judgment, marked Annexure ‘A’.

(h) The fingerprints debacle

[95] A consideration of the forensic examination of the Highgate Massacre crime scene
revealed serious failures in basic evidence preservation and collection, especially in
relation to fingerprints. These lapses fundamentally compromised the investigation from
its inception.

95.1 Constable Johannes Frederick van Deventer du Plessis (“Du Plessis”), the
crime scene photographer, arrived at the Highgate Hotel at approximately
22h40 on 1 May 1993. He was also a fingerprint expert, and confirmed
that prints should have been taken from critical pieces of evidence,
including the teargas canister and grenade, and teargas levers; however,
he did not know or could not recall whether that was done or not.

95.2 The fifth and current investigation officer, Captain Peterson, conceded that
a failure to lift prints would be a "terrible blunder," emphasising that
fingerprinting should have been a basic investigative step, particularly
given the gravity of a case involving five fatalities.

95.3 Captain Kelvin Cecil Swartbooi ("Swartbooi"), a SAPS fingerprint expert
who examined, during January 2025, archived fingerprint evidence from
the Highgate scene, acknowledged significant gaps in the original forensic
examination, including the failure to f ingerprint the 56 x AK -47 cartridges,
the grenade lever, and the teargas canister lever, stating that if he had
conducted the crime scene investigation, he would have fingerprinted
these items.

[96] The investigation diary entry at C6 dated 2 May 1993 sta ted that fingerprints were
lifted from the scene, yet by the start of the inquest, Captain Peterson found no records
or documentation confirming this, and when he contacted the LCRC office, they claimed
that a rainstorm had destroyed many records at the former Oxford Street premises.

[97] However, after a search for the missing fingerprint exhibits, which was started on
27 January 2025 through the LCRC archives, an envelope containing seven Foliens
from the scene of the Highgate Massacre was discovered on 30 January 2025. The

Folien had been so poorly stored, however, that it was completely unusable. That begs
the question as to how such crucial exhibits (but not others) could have been found after
a relatively short period of searching (approximately thre e days), and further as to how
such critical evidence could have been stored so ineptly as to render it worthless.

[98] The original LCRC docket containing critical information, such as photo logs and
evidence chain documents, has never been located. Du Plessis explained that the office
had moved three times since 1993, which, in my view, does not in any way provide a
justifiable explanation.
[99] The investigation diary entry at C6 dated 2 May 1993 confirmed that Lieutenant
Stassen, Sergeant Naudé, and Co nstable Du Plessis attended the scene to conduct a
forensic analysis. Du Plessis confirmed that his role was limited to photography while
Stassen and Naudé were responsible for actual fingerprint collection.

[100] Consequently, Stassen, the senior fingerp rint officer, became a crucial missing
link in understanding the forensic failures.

[101] Stassen's inability to confirm whether critical evidence was fingerprinted, despite
being the senior officer responsible for forensic investigation, exemplifies the systematic
breakdown in evidence collection and documentation. His admission that he gave
minimal instructions to his team and did not follow up on whether chemical fingerprinting
was subsequently conducted represents a fundamental abdication of superviso ry
responsibility.

[102] The absence of a proper command structure compounded these failures.
According to Stassen, Lieutenant -Colonel Knoetze, the LCRC commander, arrived at
the scene but immediately departed upon seeing him present. Inexplicably, a lieu tenant
was left to supervise a mass murder scene without oversight.

[103] This created a situation where, as Stassen explicitly admitted, "nobody" was
responsible for ensuring Sergeant Naude performed his work properly, with Naude
working "on his own tim e" despite Stassen outranking him as a lieutenant, as against
Naude's rank as sergeant. This reveals a complete breakdown in the chain of command
and quality control at one of the most serious crime scenes in East London’s history.

[104] The forensic inve stigation's credibility was further undermined by Stassen's
contradictory testimony about his activities during the seven hours at the scene. While
initially claiming in his YouTube post to have been "incredibly busy," he later admitted
under cross-examination to not conducting an initial scoping of the scene and spending
virtually all of his time "outside talking to colleagues". He claimed quite astoundingly that
his subordinates needed no supervision as they were experienced.

[105] A further investigatio n diary entry at C55, dated 27 May 1993, noted that
fingerprints and palmprints were taken from potential suspects and handed to LCRC,
with an elimination report pending. Yet, no such report exists in the docket.

[106] It is little wonder that Marion was moved to describe the crime scene and
subsequent investigation as a “disgrace”.

(i) Ballistics and explosives failures

[107] The bungling of the handling of the ballistics evidence eliminated any possibility of
linking the weapons used to their sources or to other crimes.

[108] As stated, Van der Merwe, the ballistics expert who analysed the crime scene
evidence, revealed that the original forensic docket containing all ballistic exhibits,
including 56 spent cartridges, bullets, reports, and covering letters, was apparently
stolen from the Cape Town Post Office in July 1995.

[109] This theft meant that the cartridges and their headstamps, which would have
identified the country of origin, manufacturer, and lot numbers of the ammunition, could
never be analysed. According to Van der Merwe, such evidence could have been used
to trace whether the ammunition came from domestic sour ces like Pretoria Metal
Pressings (“PMP”) or foreign suppliers.

[110] Van der Merwe determined that at least two AK -47 rifles were used in the attack,
with 19 spent cartridge cases matching one weapon and 28 matching a second, but, as
mentioned above, the theft of these exhibits meant they could never be uploaded onto
the IBIS system, thereby eliminating any possibility of future matches if the weapons
were recovered.

[111] The explosives evidence was similarly mishandled, with critical identification
opportunities lost. Charl Jurgens Naudé (“Naudé”), the ammunition expert called by the
families, identified the teargas grenade as locally manufactured by Swartklip Products
and primarily used by the police and selected army units, while the hand grenade leve r
was consistent with Soviet F1 or RDG series grenades.

[112] Despite these items possibly bearing fingerprints, Du Plessis confirmed that no
fingerprints were taken from either the teargas canister or the grenade metal levers.

[113] Van der Merwe's crime scene observations documented approximately 30 bullet
holes in the public bar area alone, with seven in the passage leading to the Ladies' Bar,
seven in the Open Arms Bar, and three fired from behind the bar counter, possibly fr om
civilian return fire. His analysis of the Ladies' Bar, where four victims died, noted the
complete absence of bullet marks on walls or ceilings, which he interpreted as indicating
the assailant's bullets found their targets with unusual accuracy and pro ficiency,
suggesting either semi -automatic fire or controlled bursts rather than the full -automatic
spray typical of untrained operators.

[114] Van der Merwe explained that AK -47 cartridges from Russian or Chinese origin
often include minimal markings, sometimes merely numbers such as "531," while South
African-manufactured ammunition from PMP could be distinguished by specific
characteristics. Upon examining photographs of the crime scene, he observed
unusually shiny cartridge cases that could possibly h ave indicated PMP manufacture,
but without the physical exhibits, these assessments remained speculative, and Van der
Merwe declined to make assumptions in this regard.

[115] The explosives evidence pointed to military or police sources. Naudé's expert
analysis determined that the CS teargas grenade was manufactured by Swartklip
Products (later absorbed into Rheinmetall Denel Munition) and distributed through SAP
central depots or military depots such as De Aar, Naboomspruit, or Jan Kempdorp for
controlled distribution to trained personnel.

[116] The hand grenade components, specifically the UZRGM fuse fly -off lever, were
identified by Naudé as Soviet -manufactured, typically smuggled into the country from
Soviet bloc states. Naudé's examination of blast damage at points X, Y, Z, and A1 in the
photographs of the scene, found that it was consistent with an RDG-5 grenade (which is
classified as an offensive grenade with more socalled "explosive power" having 100

classified as an offensive grenade with more socalled "explosive power" having 100
grams of TNT compared to an F1 grenade’s approxi mately 60 grams of TNT) rather

than an F1, based on the absence of large floor gouges and the specific carbonisation
pattern left by TNT.

(j) Other investigative lapses

[117] The investigation into the Highgate Massacre was characterised by a pattern of
negligence that extended far beyond the initial crime scene failures.

[118] Captain Peterson, who inherited the investigation in August 2021, testified that the
docket he received contained 76 statements, many of which were copies,
uncommissioned, or unsigned, with statements A2, A3, A4, A7, A8, A9, A10, A12, A13,
A15, A16, A17, A18, and A49 among those lacking proper commissioning.

[119] The investigation diary revealed a disturbing pattern of instructions having been
ignored and duties neglected, with multiple entries between June and August 1994
showing commanders instructing that an inquest docket be prepared, yet it was never
completed despite assurances that statements were being typed.

[120] The peculiar interventions of various “investigators” reveal a pattern of not just
gross incompetence but, it appears, deliberate misdirection. Elsdon testified that Els
had told him the SA PS prevented him from fully investigating the Highgate Massacre
and that a covert SADF group known as the Hammer Unit was responsible. Elsdon
provided Captain Peterson with the names of two alleged Hammer Unit members, the
brothers Marius and Fanie van Zyl , in February 2023, yet none of these so -called leads
proved to be fruitful.

[121] The investigation's treatment of APLA -related evidence reveals selective
blindness. Dumisani Ncamazana (“Ncamazana”), who was convicted for, inter alia, a
separate 1994 Hi ghgate attack, explicitly denied involvement in the 1993 Highgate
Massacre and rejected various claims that he had admitted responsibility as "not true."

[122] More significantly, Letlapa Mphahlele testified unequivocally that APLA was not
responsible for the May 1993 attack, listing multiple reasons why it was inconsistent
with APLA operations: attackers wore balaclavas (never used by APLA), used tear gas
for retreat (unprecedented in APLA operations), faces were painted (not typical), and
the weapons used were not consistent with APLA's arsenal at the time. He emphasised
that all APLA operations during his tenure were meticulously documented and archived,
but no records exist of the May 1993 Highgate attack despite extensive state raids on
these archives.

(k) Failure to hold a timely inquest

[123] One of the most troubling aspects that has emerged during the hearing is the
extraordinary delay of 32 years in establishing an inquest.

[124] Despite the legal requirement that an inquest be held whenever so meone dies
from unnatural causes and no criminal trial ensues, no inquest was convened in 1993 or
the years thereafter. Section 5(2) of the Inquests Act requires that a magistrate "shall
ensure that an inquest is held" when deaths occur from unnatural caus es without
prosecution.

[125] The investigation diary shows that Captain Ian Swarts (“Swarts”) repeatedly
instructed between June and August 1994 that an inquest docket be prepared, yet
these directives were systematically ignored without explanation.

[126] Captain Peterson confirmed that, despite the legal requirement, no inquest was
convened in 1993 or the years immediately following.

[127] When the docket was forwarded to the Attorney General's office between
November 1994 and January 1995, it was returned with no recommendations for further
investigation, effectively abandoning the case.

[128] This represents a cynical failure of the justice system. As a result, the burden of
seeking justice fell entirely on the traumatised survivors and bereaved f amilies, who
were forced to become their own investigators while struggling with severe physical
disabilities and psychological trauma.

[129] The families were subjected to what Dr. Edlmann characterised as repeated
cycles of false hope.

[130] The docket's transfer to the TRC created a hiatus in the investigation, with Captain
Peterson confirming that during this period, no police officer was actively working on the
case since the docket was apparently not in their possession.

[131] When Lieutenant Colonel Mahlangu queried in the investigation diary on 5 August
2014 whether there was any evidence, Nel's response simply noted it as a "CATS
enquiry" and TRC case without addressing the evidentiary issue.

[132] The 32-year delay, combined with the State's abdication of its investigative duties
and the burden placed on traumatised survivors to pursue their own justice, represents
not merely procedural failure but a fundamental breach of the constitutional promise of
dignity and justice for all citizens.

[133] I am constrained to say in the circumstances that the 32 -year delay in holding an
inquest, combined with the systematic failures documented here, actually approaches
the fundamental dereliction of a constitutional duty, rather than just mere neglect.

(l) Political interference and ‘closure’ of apartheid era cases

[134] This inquest has also touched on the broader context of why so many apartheid -
era atrocities, including the Highgate Massacre, were not pursued by prosecuting
authorities following the winding up of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘TRC’).

[135] A dvocate Mthunzi Mhaga ("Mhaga"), a Special Director and Head of the Legal
Affairs Division in the National Prosecuting Authority (‘NPA’), testified that between
2006 and 2009, he was based at the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) working on
the TRC cases. More particularly, he worked on the Highgate matter between 2006 and
2007.

[136] Mhaga confirmed that during these years, the NPA had no investigative support
and was unable to investigate the TRC cases, including the Highgate case.
Nonetheless, he attempted to carry out informal or preliminary investigations himself to
try and get the case off the ground, even though he possessed no investigative powers

and enjoyed none of the resources of the police. Unsurprisingly, he was unable to make
any progress.

[137] The families’ legal team placed on record that political interference in the work of
the NPA brought a halt to the investigation of the TRC cases, between 2003 and 2010,
when both the Directorate of Special Operations and the SAPS refused to in vestigate
the cases, even though they concerned the most serious crimes involving murders and
massacres.

[138] Indeed, the Court was informed that the families of the Highgate victims (along
with other victims of apartheid -era crimes) have recently initia ted litigation against the
South African Government, seeking constitutional damages and an inquiry into the
systemic suppression of these cases. Correspondence featuring in this litigation was put
up confirming that the NPA was denied investigative support during this period.

(m) Narratives

[139] Since nobody applied for amnesty for the Highgate Massacre, and no one with
real inside information has come forward, there are no identifiable individual suspects in
this matter.

[140] What is left are severa l narratives or theories that might serve to explain the
Highgate Massacre. However, there is no hard evidence to sustain any of the
narratives.
[141] Louise Flanagan, in her report “Attack on the Highgate Hotel: The Eastern Cape
context” (“the Flanagan Report”), notes:

"Highgate was not an armed robbery. There does not appear to be any evidence
that this attack targeted an individual over a personal grievance. This attack appears
to be political violence, carried out at a time when political violence was being used
to whip up support for certain groups, encourage fear, and encourage anger towards
other groups, during a crucial time of negotiations and transition."

[141] The Court had the benefit of hearing the expert evidence of Brigadier Marion, who
explored five possible narratives:

141.1 The APLA narrative.

141.1.1 The APLA narrative originated on the night of the massacre,
according to the Investigation Diary entry at 23:30 on 1 May 1993.
The press ran sketches nationwide with a R150 000.00 reward
authorised by Major General Huggett and Minister Hernus Kriel,
attributing the attack to APLA. Some 64 persons connected to
APLA and the ANC were questioned, with fingerprints and palm
prints checked. Several were arrested, and at least one (Mama)
was formally charged, though charges were later withdrawn.
141.1.2 Marion noted Flanagan's research showing the South African
Police (‘SAP’) raided PAC homes and offices nationwide on 25 May
1993, arresting 81 PAC members and seizing documents. Despite
these raids occurring weeks after Highgate, there did not appear to
be anything uncovered linking APLA to the Highgate Massacre.
Large numbers of PAC/APLA files seized during the 1995 SADF
raids in Umtata and Lesotho similarly revealed no Highgate
connection. APLA com mander Mphahlele commented on the
absence of evidence in these files.

141.1.3 Marion quoted Flanagan's critical observation: “If this attack was carried
out by an APLA unit, what happened to those involved? Why did
they not claim amnesty, as for similar attacks?" The standard APLA
practice involved geographically separate groups knowing of
operations. However, it is the operational unit and commanders
who would claim media responsibility.
141.1.4 Marion concluded that, in his view, the investigation pert aining to APLA
had been thoroughly conducted, with APLA command categorically
denying involvement. He noted APLA claimed responsibility for 36
of 64 attacks listed in Robert John Tyrrell’s (“ Tyrrell”) report. Thus,
suspects' particulars, fingerprints, and weapons from other attacks
should have been linked to this attack by now, at least by way of
the palm-prints and ballistic evidence. However, he acknowledged
that the possibility cannot be ruled out that renegade APLA
operatives committed the attack and ke pt quiet and did not apply
for amnesty, though this remains in the realm of conjecture or
speculation.

141.2 The Hammer Unit narrative.

141.2.1 This theory emerged during Els's private investigation in 2006 when he
told Neville Beling that a "Third Force" called the Hammer Unit was
involved. At a Kennaway Hotel meeting on 28 November 2006 in
East London with survivors and Mphahlele, Els stated that the
attackers were not APLA, listing multiple inconsistencies, namely:
(a) Attackers wore blac k/dark blue, used AK -47s, hand
grenades, and teargas, which APLA did not;

(b) APLA used R1s, R4s and R5s as they could not get AK -47
ammunition;
(c) Withdrawal under teargas was a first;
(d) Some attackers had black camouflage paint, suggesting they
were white;
(e) No vehicles were reported stolen/hijacked before the attack,
unlike typical APLA operations;
(f) Attackers showed greater training and shooting accuracy
than in APLA incidents;
(g) AK-47s were never linked ballistically before or after,
suggesting they were used specifically for that attack and
destroyed;
(h) Police received no intelligence reports on Highgate, unlike
other attacks, and
(i) No relevant documentation existed in t he seized APLA
files.

141.3 The Disgruntled Patrons narrative.

141.3.1 This narrative arose from multiple incidents on 1 May 1993, where black
patrons experienced discrimination at the Highgate.

(a) The bar lady served cigarettes to two black males around
10h00, but told them they were out of stock for beer. Marion
noted tha t it was highly unlikely that the Highgate would have
actually run out of beer.
(b) One of the persons at the hotel, Arnott, told a black male who
was using the public payphone that the phone was not a public
phone and that there was a public phone down t he road. The
black male ignored him and continued using the phone.
Eventually, he ordered them to leave the premises. They left the
premises and drove off in a blue and white Toyota or Mazda
bakkie with a white canopy in the direction of Summerpride.
141.3.2 Claassen furthermore observed two black men enter the Men's Bar at
11:25, with one grinning at him before they left after a hand gesture
from barman Gontshi.
141.3.3 Marion noted this narrative suggested aggrieved patrons may have
returned that night t o exact vengeance against the white patrons
and staff. This narrative, however, carries a low likelihood.

141.4 The Askari narrative.

141.4.1 Marion provided extensive detail on the Askari narrative, which
Flanagan's research suggested as particularly co mpelling. Askaris
were turned liberation movement members who underwent military
training outside South Africa, were arrested on return, and either
turned by the Security Branch's C1 unit or voluntarily became
informers. They were trained in the use of Eas tern Bloc weapons,
including AK-47 rifles, Tokarev and Makarov pistols, limpet mines,

Soviet F -1 hand grenades, and RDG -5 anti -personnel
fragmentation grenades - matching Highgate evidence.
141.4.2 The East London Askari unit was established in the late 1980s (likely
1987-1988) under Eugene de Kock's overall Vlakplaas command.
They initially rented a farm in the Summerpride area near the
Johnson & Johnson factory and possibly on the Thornycroft Road,
less than 5km from the Highgate Hotel, before moving to
Greenfields in mid -1992. The unit grew from about 10 members in
1989 to a larger group by April 1993.
141.4.3 Eugene De Kock's amnesty testimony confirmed that he supplied
Eastern Bloc weapons to Ea st London operatives under Captain
Willie de Lange's command, stating weapons were "for clandestine,
covert operations which would have led to the death or injury of the
enemy" and would "leave the impression that the Security Police
could not be connected ... it would point in the wrong direction."
Eugene De Kock testified he provided "four AK -47 assault rifles
with magazines and 16 hand grenades" to East London operatives.
141.4.4 Alfred Benjamin "Ben" Bambatha's affidavits to Minister Sydney
Mufamadi confirmed Askaris received "extensive firearms training"
at locations including Westbank Prison shooting range and
Mooiplaas Security Branch training area, with specialized Task
Force training. Bambatha referenced planting weapons, including
F1 hand grenades, at crime scenes. The unit's operations included
murders rather than arrests, planting weapons to justify killings,
executing alleged guerrillas following abduction, and effecting the
disappearance of targets intending to join exiled movements.
141.4.5 Crucially, the Askari units were closed down at the end of April 1993,
with Askaris paid out, just days before the Highgate attack. The

SAPS payout list (Exhibit "CRMC2") revealed significant
discrepancies: black Askaris received between R27 000.00 and
R476 000.00 (most around R150 000.00), while white supervising
officers received substantially more - P.J. Van Dyk (R796,525.73),
E.A. De Kock (R1,001,444.46), and J.S. Vermeulen
(R1,102,929.93). Marion noted that it is not known whether the
discrepancy was kn own to the Askaris, but as suggested by
Flanagan, the abrupt dismissal could have prompted some or a few
of the Askaris to attack the Highgate Hotel with weapons at their
disposal as an act of reprisal for their poor treatment.
141.4.6 Flanagan identified four crucial aspects: Askaris knew the Summerpride
area well enough to identify escape routes; they likely knew
Highgate was a police hangout where senior officers frequented;
they had police weapons training, including from special task force
trainers; a nd they had access to unaccounted -for weapons
provided by Eugene De Kock.
141.4.7 Captain Peterson's investigations traced and interviewed three Askaris:
Fokazi, Oliphant, and Twala, all of whom denied involvement
141.5 The False Flag narrative.

141.5.1 Marion contextualised this narrative within the fragile 1993 transition
period when the Transitional Executive Council announced
elections for 27 April 1994. He testified: political violence was often
used to try to sabotage the negotiation process, pola rise
communities, and erode trust. The Highgate Massacre might not be
an isolated and seemingly random attack but rather part of a
broader scheme orchestrated by those aiming to manipulate the
fragile political climate.

141.5.2 He detailed how false -flag operations are designed to appear as though
they were perpetrated by an entity other than the group actually
responsible, calculated to generate sympathy for the attacked
group and justify retaliatory operations. The TRC found the South
African state responsible for various false -flag operations, including
arranging Eastern bloc weapons caches to justify attacks on
Botswana (1988), bomb explosions at Joubert Park and J.G.
Strydom Hospital (1989), attacks on SAP Flying Squad
headquarters using AK -47s and RGD -5 grenades (1989), planting
arms at Khanya House and COSATU buildings, and various
bombings of railway stations and power plants.
141.5.3 The day after Highgate, both the ANC and the Democratic Party
suggested it was carried out by those wanting negotiat ions to fail.
ANC Border official Mcebisi Bata stated that some people in the
right wing are trying to whip up emotions, and some in the South
African security forces, who are trying to mobilise whites against
negotiations. Democratic Party MP Andre de Wet also said
something to the effect of: “I'm personally not convinced it's APLA...
As we move closer to an interim government and joint control of the
security forces, such attacks will continue and escalate".
141.5.4 Flanagan's research revealed a covert SADF/SAP group operated in the
Eastern Cape led by SADF officer Anton Nieuwoudt with access to
weapons from Eugene de Kock, suggesting renegade elements
might have carried out Highgate as a false -flag operation to
instigate right-wing backlash and derail democracy.

Summary of the evidence

[142] An in -depth account of the witnesses' testimonies appears more fully from the
summary of the evidence annexed to this judgment marked ‘A’, which must be
regarded as having been incorporated herein.

CONCLUSION

[143] Even though the Highgate attack counts among the most devastating incidents of
its nature at the time, we are nowhere closer to complete answers more than 30 years
later. The attack was meticulously planned and callously executed with the precision of
highly trained operatives. Its consequences were lethal, having virtually destroyed the
lives of the many affected parties who are left without any real redress. Its sheer
wickedness is beyond comprehension. It is disconcerting in the extreme and an utter
travesty if not a disgrace that so little effort has been made right from the inception to
properly deal with this matter.

[144] The many examples of bungling, lapses, failures, and neglect in dealing with the
matter are fully documented in this judgment. This includes improperly investigated
crime scenes, failure to lift fingerprints from cartridges and grenade levers, missing
elimination prints, lost ballistic and fingerprint evidence, incomplete statements linking
photo parades, dormancy of the docket f or over 11 years, and unexplained, lengthy
investigative delays showing a complete lack of urgency. This state of affairs is simply
shameful, and the main reason why this matter has seemingly landed in a dead -end. I
agree with Brigadier Marion that the inv estigation was grossly substandard and but for
these blunders, the investigation may have solved this brutal crime, particularly if
forensic evidence had been properly collected, safeguarded, and tested. This incredibly
gross incompetence inevitably gives rise to the suspicion that the investigation was
designed to fail. I should, however, hasten to add that this inquest is capable of being
reopened should the situation change or new information become available.

[145] In my view, the Highgate attack was m ore than likely a false flag operation, partly
intended to wrongly implicate APLA. However, the narrative that APLA was responsible
has been convincingly debunked in these proceedings, in particular by the evidence of
Mr Mphahlele, as well as the expert te stimony of Mr Robert Tyrrell, which can be
accepted without reservation. Added to this is the evidence that the faces of the
attackers were smeared black; the comment by one of the patrons referring to the
attackers as whites; the credible and detailed evi dence of Mr Karl Weber that one of the
attackers was wearing police issue boots; the accuracy of the attack; the lack of any
APLA operatives having applied for amnesty in respect of the incident; and the unusual
modus operandi of the attackers, such as the use of AK -47s, the inability to link the
spent AK -47 cartridges found on the crime scene to any other attack showing that
‘clean’ weapons were used, and the use of tear gas as a cover to withdraw from the
crime scene. The cumulative effect of all this mil itates against the involvement of APLA.
Furthermore, on all accounts, Karl Zimbiri, who purportedly took responsibility on behalf
of APLA for the Highgate attack, was a fictitious figure conjured up to perfect the false
implication of APLA in this despicable deed.

[146] The remaining narratives can be safely discounted, save that the involvement of
the Hammer Unit remains a possibility. It cannot presently be put higher than that. In my
considered view, the involvement of elements within the Apartheid security forces is
more probable than not.

[147] Being acutely aware that it was not possible to accomplish closure in this matter, I
proceed to make the undermentioned findings in terms of section 16(2) of the Inquests
Act.

FINDINGS

[148] In the result, I make the following findings:

(a) The identities of the deceased are –
(i) STANLEY HACKING;
(ii) DOUGLAS WILLIAM GATES;
(iii) ROYCE MICHAEL WHEELER;
(iv) DEON WAYNE HARRIS; and
(v) DERIC JOHN WHITFIELD.
(b) The cause of death of each one of the deceased is multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by an assault rifle(s).
(c) The date of death of each one of the deceased is 1 May 1993.
(d) The deaths were brought about by the offence of premeditated
Murder in that the deceased were wrongfully and intentionally shot
with an assault rifle(s). (I should add that the same applies to the
survivors). The identity of the individual perpetrators is unknown,
save that prima facie they were probably members of a renegade
covert group within the Apartheid security forces, seemingly intent

on derailing the political transition at the time, who staged the
attack, to falsely implicate APLA.
CLOSING REMARKS
[149] It remains for me to express sincere appreciation for the invaluable
assistance of both legal teams, as well as the investigating officer, Captain
Peterson, who all helped to make this very difficult task somewhat manageable.
Also, for the participation of all the witnesses, in particular, the survivors and
affected families. It is my earnest wish that you will find closure in the fullness of
time and that justic e will eventually prevail. Last but not least, to the court’s
support staff who perform an indispensable and often less conspicuous role. Not
forgetting the members of the Media who conscientiously reported on the
proceedings, thereby sharing the story of the Highgate Massacre with the nation.


__________________________
D.O. POTGIETER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT




APPEARANCES

Counsel for The State: Adv F Bosman, Adv D Govender, Adv J Coltman, Adv
N Mvandaba, Adv G Namba and Adv G Busakwe,
instructed by National Director of Public Prosecutions,
Makhanda

Counsel for Victim Families: Adv H Varney and Adv R Richards, instructed by
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc, Johannesburg


Dates of hearing: 27 January 2025 – 31 January 2025, 3 February 2025
– 7 February 2025, 24 March 2025 – 27 March 2025,
11 August 2025 – 13 August and 1 September 2025 –
4 September 2025

Date of delivery of judgment: 1 December 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)

Case No.: CC66/2024

In re: Inquest into the Highgate Hotel attack and the deaths of-

6. STANLEY HACKING
7. DOUGLAS WILLIAM GATES
8. ROYCE MICHAEL WHEELER
9. DEON WAYNE HARRIS
10. DERIC JOHN WHITFIELD



ANNEXURE A: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS............................................................................................. 3
OVERVIEW: ..................................................................................................................................................... 3
NEVILLE BELING: .............................................................................................................................................. 5
KARL ANDREW WEBER: ................................................................................................................................... 12
LYNDENE ANN PAGE: ....................................................................................................................................... 24
ROLAND RICHARD PARKER: ............................................................................................................................... 32
FREDERICK DOUG (DIRK) PETZER: ....................................................................................................................... 38
BERNICE WHITFIELD: ....................................................................................................................................... 43
DESIREE LEE SMIT-BRODERICK: .......................................................................................................................... 47
MARK SEBASTIAN BUSH: .................................................................................................................................. 50
STEVEN LEE GOOD: ......................................................................................................................................... 57
EDWARD BAYMEN LOMBARD: ............................................................................................................................ 61
B. CONTEXTUAL OR ANCILLARY EVIDENCE ............................................................................................... 67

OVERVIEW: ................................................................................................................................................... 67
DR. TESSA (THERESA) MARGARET EDLMANN: ....................................................................................................... 69
LETLAPA NGOATA MPHAHLELE: .......................................................................................................................... 82
DUMISANI NCAMAZANA:.................................................................................................................................. 96
ROBERT JOHN TYRRELL: ................................................................................................................................... 99
HERMANUS VAN DER WILT: ............................................................................................................................ 153
C. FORENSIC AND BALLISTIC EVIDENCE ................................................................................................... 109
OVERVIEW: ................................................................................................................................................. 109
JOHANNES FREDERICK VAN DEVENTER DU PLESSIS:................................................................................................ 158
COLONEL VICTOR JACOBUS VAN DER MERWE: ..................................................................................................... 177
CHARL JURGENS NAUDÉ: ................................................................................................................................ 201
D. INVESTIGATIVE EVIDENCE .................................................................................................................... 166
OVERVIEW: ................................................................................................................................................. 166

CAPTAIN VAUGHN WILLIAM PETERSON: ............................................................................................................. 169
KELVIN CECIL SWARTBOOI: .............................................................................................................................. 214
CHRISTIAAN MILTON BOTHA: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 218 SWELE FRANS
MOLOKOME: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 225
ALAN DOUGLAS ELSDON: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 233
COLONEL SIPHIWO RIPA: ................................................................................................................................ 242
DEAN GEORGE VENISH: ................................................................................................................................. 244
WAYNE XAVIER RUTTERS: ............................................................................................................................... 248
LIEUTENANT FRANSWA STASSEN: ...................................................................................................................... 251
WARRANT OFFICER DAVID HENRY ROOS: ........................................................................................................... 256
CAPTAIN STEPHANUS JOHANNES DU RAND: ........................................................................................................ 259
MTUNZI MHAGA: ......................................................................................................................................... 263
BRIGADIER CLIFFORD MARION: ........................................................................................................................ 268

A. The testimony of the private individuals
a. Accounts of the attack:
i. The inquest heard harrowing first -hand accounts from survivors
who were present at Highgate Hotel on the night of the Highgate
Massacre. Neville Beling (“ Beling”), for instance, who was
gravely injured in the attack, described the sudden eruption of
violence, the sound of automatic gunfire, an explosion, and the
overpowering cloud of tear gas that filled the bar, which caused
panic and disorientation.24
ii. Beling, in the Public/Men's Bar of th e Highgate Hotel, described
the scene as one of utter chaos and terror, with patrons
scrambling for cover amid choking fumes and flying bullets.
Beling’s testimony painted a vivid picture of a well -coordinated
assault: a rifle -wielding gunman, 25 his identity concealed by a
balaclava or face mask, 26 sweeping through the establishment
and firing indiscriminately yet with lethal precision.27
iii. Karl Andrew Weber (“ Weber”), in the Ladies' Bar of the
Highgate Hotel, described hearing shooting (or what he believed
were firecrackers at the time) in the Men's Bar,28 the lights going
out and seeing a balaclava wearing gunman in blue police boots
at the door to the Ladies' Bar who kept firing an AK-47 over and

24 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 26–39.
25 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 25, 37.
26 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 25.
27 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 26–28.
28 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, 30 January 2025, p. 7.

over again. 29 Leaving the smell of blood in his wake before
throwing in a teargas cannister.30
b. Lack of perpetrator identification:
i. Crucially, none of the survivors who testified were able to
identify any of the attackers by name or face, as the assailants
were masked and moved swiftly.
ii. However, survivors did note certain distinguishing features of
the attackers and the attack itself. It was noted that at least
some assailants wore dark uniforms or clothing. Beling
described a man in a brown jacket, 31 Weber described a man in
dark police boots, typically worn by the riot unit, 32 and
balaclavas, and that they withdrew under the cover of tear gas
after unleashing their gunfire.33
c. Impact on victims and family members:
i. The survivor testimonies also movingly conveyed the
devastating personal impact of the Highgate Massacre.
Lyndene Page (“ Page”), who lost her brother Deon Harris
(“Harris”) in the attack, testified to the lifelong grief and trauma
endured by the families. She described how decades have

29 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, 30 January 2025, pp. 7–9.
30 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, 30 January 2025, p. 9.
31 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 37.
32 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, 30 January 2025, p. 8.
33 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 37-38; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, 30 January 2025, pp. 8–9.

passed without answers or accountability, compounding their
sorrow with frustration.34
ii. For survivors like Beling, Roland Richard Parker (“ Parker”),
William Freddie Bailing (" William Bailing "), Keith David Bailig
('Keith Bailing"), and Weber, every day lived with the physical
pain of injuries and the emotional burden of that night is a
reminder of the injustice of an unresolved crime.
iii. Their voices underscored why uncovering the truth in this
inquest is not a mere academic exercise, but a deeply human
quest to restore dignity and closure for those who suffered most.
iv. These accounts set the stage for the evidentiary inquiry by
highlighting both what happened to the victims and what has not
happened since, namely, any form of justice or
acknowledgement of responsibility.
d. What follows is an account of the relevant witnesses in this regard.
Neville Beling:35
e. Beling, a survivor who sustained life-altering injuries during the attack,
provided his testimony on 29 January 2025. His evidence gave a
detailed, ground-level account of the assault as it unfolded in the Men's
Bar, documented the severe and lasting medical and psychological
trauma he has suffered, and outlined his extensive personal efforts to
uncover the truth in the face of alleged investigative failures. He
recounted the sudden appearance of the gunman, the experience of

34 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 67 –6, 88–89; Exhibit C – Families Bundle, Affidavit of Lyndene
Page, pp. 99–100.
35 Exhibit C, Statement of Neville Beling, pp. 1–18.

being shot multiple times, and the ensuing explosion a nd tear gas.
Beling’s testimony was also central to understanding the survivors'
subsequent quest for justice, detailing his role in forming the Highgate
United Group, his dealings with informants like Frederick Doug Petzer
(Dirk) (“Petzer”), the failed in vestigation by Captain Daryl Els (“ Els”),
and his deep suspicions regarding tampered evidence and a
compromised official inquiry.
f. Background and events leading to the Highgate Massacre:
i. Beling provided testimony regarding his life before the Highgate
Massacre. He described working at Da Gama Textiles from
August 1992 and how, thankfully, he signed his work medical
aid forms on 30 April 1993, with effect from 1 May 1993, the day
of the attack. 36 On that evening, after failed attempts to meet a
friend, he decided to go out with his cousin, Parker. They visited
several locations before settling on the Highgate Hotel, as it was
close to their homes.37
g. Attack and injuries:
i. Upon arriving at Highgate Hotel, they first entered the Ladies’
Bar, found it crowded, and moved to the Men’s Bar. 38 While
waiting for change after pur chasing drinks, Beling heard loud
footsteps and saw a man in a balaclava with a rifle rushing up
the stairs and entering the bar.39 Realising the imminent danger,

36 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 20.
37 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 21–23
38 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 24.
39 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 25–27.

he pushed his cousin to the f loor, and as he fell, he felt bullets
striking his body.40
ii. Beling was shot multiple times in his left arm, leg, and back. 41
As he lay on the ground, he heard continuous gunfire, followed
by a metallic object rolling towards him. He then heard the
sound of tear gas dispersing, which severely affected his
breathing.42 A grenade explosion followed, shaking the building
and plunging it into darkness.43 He described choking on a thick,
powdery tear gas that was unlike anything he had previously
experienced.44
iii. Despite severe injuries and difficulty breathing, Beling managed
to reach the bar counter, using his cousin's body for support,
and attempted to escape. 45 A bystander helped him, urging him
to stay down, but he insisted on finding a way out. Parker later
regained consciousness and, along with others, assisted in
carrying Beling outside to an ambulance.46
h. Medical treatment and aftermath:
i. Beling was transported to Frere Hospital, 47 where he was
initially misdiagnosed as having only a wounded arm. 48
However, after his aunt noticed excessive bleeding from his

40 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 26–27.
41 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 27.
42 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 28.
43 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 28-29. .
44 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 29.
45 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 29–30.
46 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 30–32.
47 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 35.
48 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 34.

back, doctors realised the severity of his injuries. 49 He
underwent emergency surgery and was informed by medical
personnel that he would likely require operations for the next 32
years.50 Over the years, he endured more than 15 major
surgeries, developed sepsis, and suffered multiple instances of
heart failure due to anaesthesia.51
ii. Beling also described the long -term impact on his life, stating
that he never worked again after the attack. He experienced
severe physical pain, morphine addiction, and deep
psychological trauma, expressing that he had been robbed of
his youth.52
i. The 1995 shooting incident:
i. In 1995, while receiving home care from a private nurse, Beling
was nearly shot again in what he suspected was a targeted
attack. Automatic gunfire was directed at his home, narrowly
missing his cousin. 53 The police investigated and recovered a
bullet projectile from a neighbo ur’s roof, but later informed his
father that the forensic tests identified it as "a piece of metal,"
ending the investigation.54
j. Initial investigations:

49 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 35–36.
50 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 35–36.
51 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 39-40.
52 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 39–41.
53 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 41–42.
54 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 42–43.

i. Beling recounted his early inte ractions with the SAPS and the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“ TRC”). Initially, he
believed the attack was conducted by the Azanian People’s
Liberation Army (“ APLA”), as it was widely reported in the
media and by police. 55 However, in 2005, during a mediation
with former APLA commander Letlapa Ngoata Mphahlele
(“Mphahlele”), he was told that the attack did not match APLA’s
operational style. 56 Mphahlele suggested the possibility of a
"third force" being involved.57
ii. Following this r evelation, Beling and other survivors formed the
Highgate United Group to seek further investigation. They
lobbied the National Prosecuting Authority (“ NPA”) for a
reopening of the case, which was eventually granted.58
k. Private investigation and allegations of a third force:
i. In 2007, former investigating officer Els, now a private
investigator, agreed to help Beling and his group. They raised
R5,000 to fund his investigation, which led him to Port Elizabeth
and Cape Town. 59 Els claimed to have discovered evidence
linking the attack to military -trained operatives, 60 under Colonel
Piet Hall (“Hall”).61 He also visited a suspected training site near
Addo Elephant Park, where structures mimicking Highgate Hotel
were allegedly used for training. However, after claiming he had

55 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 46.
56 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 45–46.
57 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 46.
58 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 49.
59 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 57.
60 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 58.
61 Els sent Beling an SMS saying that "Hall was a definite suspect"; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 68.

identified the perpetr ators, Els suddenly stopped
communicating, later stating that his laptop had been stolen,
erasing all evidence.62
ii. Further investigations led to an online exchange on the
messaging platform Mxit, where an anonymous individual
claimed to have seen video footage of the Highgate Massacre.63
A police search of his residence yielded a collection of
videotapes, though none contained f ootage of the attack. 64
Beling did, however, find it strange that the search warrant was
so limited and always wondered why his entire house was not
searched.65
iii. Another informant, Petzer, came forward in 2013, claiming that
he was there on the night of the Highgate Massacre with his
brother, Sergeant Zieg Petzer (“ Zieg”), Colonel Koegelenberg,
and John Alexander Henry Holloway (“Holloway”).66 He claimed
that his brother had warned him to leave the Highgate before
the attack, saying that "it is going down tonight ," suggesting
foreknowledge among security forces. 67 He mentioned seeing a
police Casper parked under the subway when he left the
Highgate.68 He also told them about a guy who frequented
Swarries in Milner Estates, East London, who carried a
briefcase - Petzer said this person had a handcuff on the

62 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 57–63.
63 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 74–75.
64 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 76.
65 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 76.
66 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 78.
67 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 79.
68 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 78.

briefcase and that it contained extensive information about
those involved in covert operations.69
iv. However, when approached by investigators in 2021, Petzer
denied any recollection, attributing his past statements to
intoxication.70 Beling found this difficult to believe as Petzer
appeared to be sober on the day that he disclosed this
information to him, although Beling believes he is a heavy
drinker. 71
l. Lost docket and bullet evidence:
i. Beling recounted how the Highgate Massacre case docket
allegedly went missing and was later discovered in a trash bin in
Johannesburg.72 He also raised concerns about the bullet
extracted from his hip, 73 which was initially deemed
unnecessary for evidence collection but later retrieved by
Captain Vaughn William Peterson (“ Captain Peterson”). Upon
examining it in court, Beling noted that distinctive grooves had
been filled in, raising questions about potential tampering.74
m. Concluding remarks:
i. Beling expressed deep frustration over the failure of law
enforcement and the justice system to properly investigate the
Highgate Massacre. He criticised the NPA’s lack of urgency and

69 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 79–80.
70 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 81.
71 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 81.
72 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 65.
73 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 83.
74 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, p. 103.

the fact that victims had to conduct their own investigati ons. He
reaffirmed his commitment to uncovering the truth, despite
repeated obstacles, intimidation, and deception over the past 30
years.75
Karl Andrew Weber:76
n. Weber began his testimony on 29 January 2025. His evidence
spanned a broad range of topics, beginning with his personal and
professional life prior to the Highgate Hotel Massacre and ex tending to
his harrowing experience during the attack, the extensive physical and
psychological consequences that followed, and the long -standing
failures by law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities to properly
investigate the incident. He offered a d etailed account of the events of
1 May 1993, the aftermath of his injuries (including the amputation of
his left arm), and his ongoing pursuit of justice, which has been marked
by alleged state obstruction, the disappearance of critical evidence,
and deeply troubling interactions with both SAPS and the NPA.
o. Background and life before the Highgate Massacre:
i. Weber testified regarding his life leading up to the Highgate
Massacre. At the time of the attack, he was employed as an
SPCA inspector in East Lon don, a position he had held for
approximately 13 years.77
ii. His duties included inspecting abattoirs, game farms, and
circuses, ensuring compliance with animal welfare laws,
and prosecuting cases of animal cruelty. His work required him

75 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 84–85.
76 Exhibit C, Statement of Karl Andrew Weber, pp. 46–54.
77 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 3–4.

to travel extensively across the Eastern Cape, including areas
such as Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Alice, Fort Beaufort, and
Kirkwood.78
iii. Beyond his professional responsibilities, Weber described
himself as leading an active and fulfilling life, regularly
participating in darts, snooker, soccer, and beach outings. He
lived on the premises of the SPCA and was accustomed to
being on standby duty every alternate week.79
p. Events leading up to the Highgate Massacre:
i. On the night of 1 May 1993, Weber was ta sked with picking up
his SPCA colleague, Douglas Gates, from the airport.
Accompanying him were two other colleagues, Meghan
Boucher ("Boucher") and Doreen Rossouw (“ Rossouw”). They
had coffee at the Dolfin Hotel in Nahoon, but after an
unpleasant experien ce with ants in the sugar, they decided to
leave.80
ii. As Weber was a regular patron of the Highgate Hotel, he
suggested stopping there before heading home. Upon arrival,
he parked a fe w meters from the entrance to the Ladies' Bar,
and the group walked up the stairs before turning into the left-
side bar.81
iii. The Ladies' Bar was full, so they found a small table against the
wall near the dining area. Weber went to the bar to order drinks.

78 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 3–5.
79 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 5.
80 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 5–6.
81 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 6–7.

As he returned, he heard a loud noise, initially resembling
firecrackers. Before he could process what was happening, the
lights went out.82
q. The Highgate Massacre:
i. When the lights dimmed, Weber saw a masked man standing at
the entrance to the Ladies Bar. The gunman was dressed in
dark clothing a nd blue canvas police -style boots, which Weber
immediately recognised as the type worn by riot unit officers. He
also noticed that the gunman was carrying an AK-47.83
ii. The attacker opened fire indiscriminately, sending bullets ripping
through the bar. Weber instinctively dropped to the floor, a
reaction honed from his military training.84
iii. While lying on the ground, he saw that Rossouw had been shot
in the leg. He crawled towards her and attempted to stem the
bleeding by pressing his elbow into the wound.85
iv. Moments later, Weber heard a metallic object rolling across the
floor. Initially believing it to be a grenade, he braced himself for
an explosion. Instead, tear gas was released, filling the room
with thick, choking fumes.86

82 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 7
83 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 8.
84 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 8–9.
85 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 9.
86 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 9.

v. Weber noted that the magazines appeared to be taped together,
allowing for a seamless reloading process.87
vi. The attack stopped abruptly, at which point Weber saw the
gunman fold the stock of his AK -47 over his shoulder and exit
the bar.88
vii. Weber made a formal statement to SAPS on 7 May 1993,
though he was unable to sign it, requiring his mother to sign on
his behalf.89
r. Medical treatment and long-term health consequences:
i. Weber confirmed that he was carried out on a canvas sail, as
there were no stretchers available. He was transported to Frere
Hospital, where he remained unconscious for several days.90
ii. Doctors discovered that his left arm had sustained severe
arterial and nerve damage, requiring amputation below the
elbow. The surgery occurred 72 hours after the attack, but
Weber did not immediately realise he had lost his arm.91
iii. Upon regaining full awareness, he suffered emotional
devastation, struggling to process the reality of his disability. His

87 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 9.
88 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 12; Bundle of Witness Affidavits pp. 1–4.
89 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 2.
90 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 16–17.
91 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 17–18.

right arm, though intact, retained only 40% functionality,
rendering him partially disabled.92
s. Financial and psychological consequences:
i. Weber’s career ended abruptly, leading to financial ruin. He lost
his job, home, car, and relationships, including with his
daughter.93
ii. The state initially denied him a disability grant, arguing that he
still had one functional arm and both legs. He only received a
R460-per-month grant after legal intervention.94
iii. He also suffered severe depression, social withdrawal, and
embarrassment due to his disability, requiring assistance with
basic tasks such as dressing and eating.95
t. Investigation and alternative theories:
i. Weber testified that the TRC initially attributed the attack to
APLA. However, Mphahlele later denied involvement, stating
that the attack did not match APLA’s tactics.96
ii. He and fellow survivors joined the Pan -Africanist Congress
(“PAC”) and received support from them during memorials,

92 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 18–19.
93 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 19.
94 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 19.
95 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 18–19.
96 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 22–24.

including personal security support, which SAPS failed to
provide.97
iii. Weber detailed his repeated efforts to engage with the NPA,
specifically through Advocate Mthunzi Mhaga (“ Mhaga”), whom
he and other survivors met in 2006. At the meeting, they
presented their concerns and requested that the case be
properly investigated. However, Mhaga refused to provide a
formal statement and indicated that he was fearful of being seen
publicly engaging with the victims. He allegedly told them that
he could not be seen on television discussing the matter, a
statement that left Weber feeling betrayed and abandoned by
the justice system.98
iv. In 2007, former SAPS officer Els was hired as a private
investigator. He initially claimed to have identified suspects
linked to a military -trained unit. However, after receiving R5,000
from survivors to continue his investigation, he abruptly stopped
communication.99
v. Weber also spoke with ex -intelligence officer Alan Elsdon
(“Elsdon”):
1. Weber testified that Elsdon had told him he joined the
South African Police in 1973 and had worked in the crime
intelligence service. Elsdon also claimed to have been
associated with Eugene de Kock, whom he referred to as
“the biggest liar.” He said he was originally from East

97 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 25.
98 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 25–26.
99 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 27–29.

London and had since left the police to work as a private
investigator.100
2. According to Weber’s January 2025 statement (Exhibit C,
page 53), Elsdon later met with W eber’s attorneys on 31
May 2024 , during which he identified two individuals he
believed to be suspects in the Highgate attack: Marius
van Zyl , who had since died, and Fani van Zyl . Weber
testified that Elsdon had never mentioned those names
to him personally.101
3. Elsdon also reportedly disclosed that his source was a
man named Hennie, later identified as Hendrick Louw ,
but when contacted by Weber’s attorneys, Louw refused
to reveal wha t he knew about the Highgate Massacre.
Weber confirmed that the name meant nothing to him.102
4. A Facebook Messenger exchange, 103 between Weber
and Elsdon was introduced. In the messages, Elsdon
dismissed a claim that ballistic exhibits related to the
attack had been sent via post to Cape Town as
“nonsense,” saying that police would typically have
transported such items by vehicle to Pretoria. Weber said
this surprised him and confirmed that Elsdon had raised
this point with him as well.104

100 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 29.
101 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 29–30.
102 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 30.
103 Exhibit C, Statement of Karl Andrew Weber, p. 67.
104 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 30–31.

5. Another exchange 105 discussed whether the Highgate
Hotel was in fact the intended target of the attack. While
some had speculated that the Orange Grove was the
actual target due to its orange colour, Elsdon disagreed,
stating it made no sense that such a major mistake could
have been made and was certain Highgate was the true
target. Weber agreed with this assessment and added
that if the APLA had been responsible, they likely would
have announced or claimed the attack.106
6. A further message dated 1 May 2021, 107 was read in
which Weber reflected on the anniversary of the attack
and questioned who might have ordered it. Elsdon
responded that it was “ obviously a bright idea from
someone higher up” who believed the attack would help
unify white South Africans against communism. He said
he had heard that the operation was rehearsed in detail,
including who would enter first and where.108
7. Weber told the court he was shocked at how much
Elsdon seemed to know about the attack and that the
planning had seemingly been known to some individuals
as far back as 2022 or earlier. Elsdon had sent Weber
what appeared to be a plan , showing the positioning of
the attacker: one on the left and another in the Ladies’
Bar.109

105 Exhibit C, p. 69.
106 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 31–32.
107 Exhibit C, p. 82.
108 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 32–33.
109 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 33.

8. According to Elsdon, the attackers had ensured that the
areas they fired into had no exits, while also planning
their own route to avoid being ambushed from inside the
hotel. Weber noted that Elsdon never disclosed the
source of this information, and while there was a
suggestion that vehicles could have been used, this
remained speculative.110
vi. Leads regarding former Hammer Unit member:
1. Weber recounted a conversation with a man in
Grahamstown who claimed to have been in the Hammer
Unit and offered to name three individuals linked to the
attack. Although initially reluctant to speak to authorities,
the man later agreed to meet with Captain Peterson.
Weber personally delivered CDs and attempted to
facilitate contact. He expressed anger that the NPA had
once instructed him, a victim, to investigate this
individual, an approach he found inappropriate and
unsafe.111
vii. Despite years of frustration, Weber remained determined to see
justice served. He reiterated his demand that SAPS and the
NPA reopen the investigation with full transparency and that all
available evidence be presented in court.112
u. Clarification on boots:

110 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 33.
111 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 34–37.
112 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4, Part 1, 30 January 2025, p. 38.

i. Weber testified that he recognised the boots because, whilst
with the SPCA, they worked with SAPS.
ii. He confirmed that the boots were flat and did not have a heel
and that they had a thin sole, which might have been made of
rubber.113
iii. A photograph of a pair of blue canvas boots was presented to
Weber for identification. These boots were described as ankle -
high, laced -up, and featuring a black rubber toe cap. Upon
examining the phot ograph, Weber immediately rejected it,
stating that the boots worn by the gunman did not match the
ones in the picture.114
iv. Weber provided a detailed description of the actual boots he
had seen on the attacker:
1. plain blue canvas material without a black rubber toe cap;
2. a dull, non-reflective finish, similar to a military tent fabric;
and
3. a flat sole without a distinct heel, which contrasted with
the boots in the photograph.115
v. Whereabouts of the bullet:
i. A bullet had been lodged in Weber’ s elbow, which was
surgically removed but never formally documented or tested.

113 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 40–41.
114 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 97; Exhibit H.
115 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 98–99.

ii. Weber testified that, after his amputation, he had inquired
whether he could keep the bullet as a personal item. However,
he was informed by hospital staff that it had to be handed over
to law enforcement for forensic analysis.116
iii. Despite this, Weber never received any feedback from
investigators about whether:
1. the bullet had been properly examined;
2. any ballistics tests had been conducted; and
3. the bullet was registered as evidence.117
iv. Later, when reviewing the case docket, Weber and his legal
representatives could not find any reference to the bullet,
leading to concerns that it had been deliberately removed from
the official record.
v. The only mention of the bullet came years later wh en an
unnamed source at the NPA informed Weber that it had
“disappeared”. This raised serious suspicions that evidence
tampering had taken place.
vi. However, a medical report from 1993 was introduced,
containing records from Dr N Comeley and Dr David Bowe s,
who had treated Weber. The report detailed:
1. The gunshot wound to Weber’s left elbow.

116 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 100.
117 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 102.

2. The decision to amputate due to arterial and nerve
damage.
3. The surgical procedure performed at Frere Hospital.118
vii. There was, however, no mention of the bullet being extracted or
handed over to law enforcement. This further reinforced the
theory that critical evidence had been deliberately erased.119
viii. Weber stated that he could not recall being treated by a Dr De
Tadt at Frere Hospital, although this doctor had completed a
medico-legal (J88) form and indicated that no bullets had been
removed. Weber explained that he was treated primarily by
orthopaedic surgeons, including Dr Kev in White, Dr Bowes, Dr
Keith Watt, and Dr Elderton. He noted that there were four
orthopaedic specialists involved in his treatment and did not
recognise Dr De Tadt’s name.120
ix. Weber confirmed that he was in a severely impaired mental and
physical state following the shooting and could not recall details
of his treatment at Frere Hospital, including when or by whom
the bullet was removed. He later transferred to Saint Dominic’s
Hospital for further treatment because the specialists were more
readily available there. He stated that the bullet had been
lodged in his elbow and believed that it may have been removed
during his arm amputation, though he could not be certain. He
recalled being told after the amputation that the bullet had been
removed and handed to the police, and thought this

118 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 105.
119 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 106–107.
120 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 31 January 2025, pp. 104–105.

conversation took place at Saint Dominic’s Hospital, although he
could not recall the date.121
x. The court was informed of a letter dated 28 June 1993 from
orthopaedic surgeon Dr David Bowes to Dr Kevin White at Frere
Hospital. The letter referred to an assessment done in theatre
on 1 May 1993, describing the nature of Weber’s inju ries and
the surgical procedure that followed, including the discovery of
severed nerves and arteries necessitating amputation.
However, the letter did not mention the removal of a bullet.122
Lyndene Ann Page:123
w. Page, the sister of the late victim Harris, testified on 30 January 2025.
Her evidence provided a deeply personal account of the impact of the
attack, both emotionally and psychologically, as she was nine months
pregnant at the time of her brother’s murder . Page became an active
member of the Highgate United Group (" HUG") and offered key
testimony on the investigation's failures, unexplored leads, and her
evolving view that the APLA was not responsible, ultimately pointing to
a covert paramilitary group as the likely perpetrators.
x. Personal connection to the Highgate Massacre:
i. Page testified that her brother, Harris, was one of the victims of
the Highgate Massacre. He was 26 years old at the time of his
murder. She described how now, following the deat hs of their
parents, she had become the last surviving immediate family
member. She felt a strong sense of duty to seek justice on her

121 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 31 January 2025, pp. 105–107.
122 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 1, 30 January 2025, pp. 108–109.
123 Exhibit, Statement of Lyndene Ann Page, pp. 90–101.

brother’s behalf and joined HUG, a collective of survivors and
family members dedicated to uncovering the truth.124
ii. At the time of Harris’ s murder, she was nine months pregnant
and expected to give birth to her son on 13 May, the same day
as her brother’s birthday. She described how their close
relationship made the loss even more devastating. She recalled
a humorous yet poignant memory wher e her morning sickness
would make Harris physically ill in sympathy, and how he was
excited for the birth of her child.125
y. Learning about the Highgate Massacre:
i. She explained that she first heard about the attack when her
father was asked to collect his car from the Highgate Hotel.
Later, her mother called to inform them that there had been an
attack. They watched the news footage, seeing bodies being
carried out of the hotel, a traumat ic experience she vividly
remembered.126
z. Emotional and psychological impact:
i. Page described the devastating emotional toll the incident took
on her and her family. The timing of her child’s birth, just days
after her brother’s funeral, created conflicting emotions -
happiness for the birth of her son but immense guilt over feeling
joy amid tragedy. She never fully allowed herself to mourn her

124 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 65–66.
125 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 66.
126 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 66–67.

brother’s death due to the immediate responsibilities of
motherhood.127
ii. Her mother struggled deeply with the loss, even creating a
shrine for Harris at one point. She was relentless in demanding
answers from the police, but authorities took over two years just
to release an autopsy report, which ultimately confirmed that
Harris died instantly from a single gunshot wound to the
chest.128
iii. Her parents’ grief affected their relationship with their
grandchild, as they felt guilty for loving the baby, fearing she
was replacing Harris.129
aa. Alleged explosive devices at Highgate:
i. Page referenced her January 2025 statement, 130 where she
described reports of an explosive device found outside the
hotel on the night of the attack. She cited the testimony of
Ricardo Van der Nest (“ Van der Nest ”), an ambulance driver,
who confirmed that emergency services were ordered to move
away due to an impending controlled detonation. The suspicious
device was later found under Harris's car.131

127 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 67–68.
128 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 68.
129 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 69.
130 Exhibit C, Statement of Lyndene Page, p. 93.
131 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 69–71.

ii. Van der Nest’s statement, which was submitted, confirmed that
police:132
1. Evacuated vehicles, including Harris's car, before
detonating the device.
2. Instructed emergency personnel to m ove to a safe
distance before the controlled detonation.
3. Indicated that the device may have been deliberately
placed to target survivors or first responders
iii. This revelation raised suspicions that the attack was far more
sophisticated than previousl y believed, suggesting pre -planning
and coordination beyond a random terror attack.
bb. Suspicious encounter with Eric Taylor (“ Taylor”) and alleged phone
tapping:
i. Page recalled an incident during 2010, on an evening before a
meeting at the Highgate the following day, where she and
Beling noticed strange noises and echoes on their phone calls,
raising concerns that their lines were being tapped. 133
ii. While waiting outside the meeting venue t he following day, they
observed a car repeatedly driving past. The driver was later
identified as Taylor. His behaviour was suspicious, as he

132 Exhibit D, Statement of Ricardo van der Nest, pp. 62–66.
133 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 71–72.

claimed he was meeting an informant, but the nature of his
involvement in the Highgate Massacre remained unclear.134
iii. When they attempted to report their concerns to Cambridge
Police Station, the officer they spoke to, Colonel Stephanus
Johannes Du Rand (“ du Rand ”), refused to take a formal
statement, citing fears for his own safety and family. He advised
them to slip their statement under his office door after hours.
They complied, but no follow-up ever occurred.135
cc. The failed investigation by Els:
i. Page detailed her interactions with Els, the investigator they had
financially supported, believing he would uncover the truth. They
provided him with R5,000 to meet informants and follow leads,
but he eventually disappe ared and made excuses for why he
could not provide information. He later claimed his laptop was
stolen, raising further suspicions that he had misled them.136
ii. Page confirmed t hat this made her very suspicious of Els and
that she felt misled and generally let down.137
dd. Weber’s contact with Elsdon:
i. Page confirmed that she was informed by Weber that he was in
contact with Elsdon at some point.138

134 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 71–73.
135 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 73–74.
136 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 75 –78; See the testimony of Beling for further details in this
regard; Exhibit G: Original handwritten note to Christiaan Milton Botha, who received the cheque for Daryl Els to do the
investigations of R5 000, the handwritten note was signed by Christiaan Milton Botha.
137 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 78–80.

ee. Theories about the attackers:
i. Initially, Page believed the APLA was respon sible for the attack,
as the official narrative suggested, but after the meeting in
which Mphahlele stated that they were not responsible, her view
completely shifted.139
ii. After investigating the modus operandi, weapons used, and
testimonies, she became convinced that the Hammer Unit, a
covert paramilitary group, was responsible.
ff. The suspicious encounter with Edward Baymen Lombard (“Lombard”):
i. On 31 May 1993, while scattering her brother’s ashes in
Morgan’s Bay, Page and her family were approached by one
Lombard, a former Rhodesian Army soldier.140
ii. Lombard claimed to have been with Harris at the Highgate Hotel
bar that night, pushed him down when the shooting started, and
fired back at the attackers.141
iii. His coincidental appearance at their private ceremony and
his detailed knowledge of the attack raised suspicions.142
iv. She confirmed that she never heard from him again after this
interaction.143

138 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 79 –80; See the testimony of Weber for further details in this
regard.
139 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 84 ; See the testimony of Mr. Letlapa Mphalele for further details
in this regard.
140 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 81.
141 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 81–82.
142 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 83.

gg. Interaction with Petzer:
i. Page testified about her interacti on with Petzer, the man who
claimed to know about the Highgate Massacre. The meeting,
which took place in the parking lot behind Denrays near the
Spar in Cambridge, East London, was arranged through Beling,
who had been in communication with Petzer before the
encounter.144
ii. Page explained that she was nervous but determined to attend
the meeting. Petzer arrived and sat on his haunches next to her
in the car, where he proceeded to share a series of shocking
claims.145
iii. Petzer stated that on the night of the Highgate Massacre, his
brother, Zieg, had been present at the scene. He claimed that
his brother warned him in ad vance and stated that "it is going
down tonight", so he should leave.
iv. Upon hearing this, Petzer left the area, driving off separately
from another man named Koegelenberg. Petzer further revealed
that when he arrived home, his brother phoned him from a
payphone inside Highgate Hotel, telling him that “it has gone
down, it has happened”.
v. This conversation suggested direct foreknowledge of the attack
by members of law enforcement or other organised units.146

143 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 82–83.
144 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 83–85.
145 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 84.
146 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 84–85.

vi. He also told them about a guy who used to carry a briefcase
around, and he said he had a handcuff on the briefcase, which
had all the information on who they called fingers.147
vii. During the conversation, Petzer mentioned several individuals
he claimed were involved/present:
1. Zieg – His brother, allegedly at the scene.
2. Koegelenberg – A man who left with him before the
attack.
3. Holloway – Another individual who was reportedly
present. 148
viii. Page and Beling were taken aback by the level of detail
provided, and this testimony added to their growing suspicion
that the attack was not solely carried out by APLA but may have
involved other forces.149
ix. Later, when approached by Captain Peterson, Petze r denied
remembering any of these details, claiming that he was
intoxicated and that it was the drinks talking.
x. This contradiction cast doubt on his reliability, but Page
remained convinced that his initial statement was truthful, given
how detailed and specific his recollection had been.150

147 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p 85.
148 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p 84–85.
149 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 85–86.
150 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 86.

hh. Meeting with Captain Peterson:
i. On 13 May 2022, which coincided with what would have been
Harris's birthday, Page had a critical meeting with Captain
Peterson, the investigating officer assigned to the case.151
ii. Upon entering Captain Peterson’s office, the first statement he
made to her was that he was 99% sure that it was APLA, but
she immediately rejected this assertion.
iii. During the meeting, Captain Peterson asked whether she and
other survivors had ever see n the case files, to which they
replied, "no". She testified that upon review, discrepancies and
a lack of understanding of what had actually occurred became
apparent.152
ii. Conclusion:
i. Page emphasised the lasting trauma, fear, and the failure of
justice over 30 years.
ii. She confirmed that this inquest represents a crucial opportunity
for justice and closure.153
Roland Richard Parker:154
jj. Parker, a civilian survivor of the Highgate Hotel attack, gave testimony
on 4 February 2025. His testimony provided a first -hand account of the

151 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 87.
152 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, p. 88.
153 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 4 Part 2, 30 January 2025, pp. 88–90.
154 Exhibit B, Statement of Roland Richard Parker, pp. 91–93.

events of 1 May 1993, offering valuable insight into the sequence of
events inside the hotel and the aftermath o f the attack. Parker was
present in the men’s bar at the time of the attack and was
accompanied by his cousin, Beling, who sustained serious injuries.
kk. Account of events on the night of the Highgate Massacre:
i. Parker testified that on the night in que stion, he and his cousin
arrived at the Highgate Hotel. They entered the Men's bar
(referred to as the "open bar" or "men's bar") around 22h00,
where Parker had just started drinking a beer. He estimated
they had been there for 10 to 15 minutes before the attack
began.155
ii. Parker recalled that he had been seated at the bar, with Beling
on his right, both facing generally away from the entrance. He
saw an intoxicated man earlier but no ted that the real attacker
entered shortly after, wearing a balaclava and wielding what
appeared to be an automatic rifle, possibly an R4 or similar.
Parker, a former soldier, recognised it as such. Regarding the
attacker's race, Parker stated, he could no t say white or black,
because “it could have been black like me (paint)".156
iii. As gunfire erupted, Beling pulled Parker down. Parker's feet
were hooked onto the barstool, preventing him from falling
easily. He lost consciousness for an undetermined period. Upon
regaining consciousness, he found the bar filled with smoke or
mist that caused intense burning in his eyes. He recalled seeing

155 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 84–85.
156 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 86–87.

something lying on the floor nearby before running out through
the same entrance the attacker had used.157
iv. Outside, Parker saw an individual shooting in the direction of the
Dawn area. Alarmed, he hid and then returned after hearing his
cousin call for help. He found Beling inside, struggling. Keith
Balling later kicked down one of the internal doors to assist.
Parker and two unknown baref oot men (later identified as Mark
and Steven Bush) helped carry Beling out of the bar using a
canvas. The first police van arrived, but the officers refused to
enter due to the presence of teargas. The same occurred with
the ambulance crew. Parker and the others had to drag Beling
out closer to the door for assistance.158
v. Parker noted that the bar doors were double doors, all of which
had been open when he entered and remained open th roughout
the incident. He used these to re -enter and exit multiple times.
He also recalled that one of the internal wooden doors leading
into the “vergaderingsaal” (meeting hall) had to be kicked open
by Keith to access Beling, and these had small glass panes.159
ll. Impact and psychological trauma:
i. Parker testified about the lasting psychological impact of the
attack. He described persistent trauma, anxiety, and
hypervigilance, inclu ding altered behaviours when entering
public places. He noted that he remains fearful of firearms and
suffers from nightmares. He had previously sought

157 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 86–88.
158 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 88–97.
159 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 92–94.

psychological assistance but discontinued treatment due to
adverse effects from medication and a desire to stay mentally
alert. He spent two weeks at St Mark's psychiatric facility
following a breakdown after a trauma -healing trip to Cape
Town.160
ii. He also expressed feelings of guilt, particularly in relation to his
father and the decision to go out drinking with his cousin on the
night of the Highgate Massacre. He described the deep support
he had received from his family and from Beling's family.161
mm. Reflections on justice delayed:
i. Parker reflected on the delay in the inquest, stating that he was
hurt it had taken 32 years for the survivors and families to be
heard.162 He emphasised the mental toll this delay had taken,
noting the ongoing stress and lack of closure. He thanked the
Court for the opportunity to testify and share his account.163
nn. Introduction of digital exhibits and context of contact:164
i. Parker confirmed that the first contact from Elsdon occurred on
30 January 2025, shortly after a video of the Highgate Hotel
inspection in loco was posted on Facebook. Parker believed his
tagging in that video post led to Elsdon finding and contacting
him via Facebook Messenger. The initial message from Elsdon
requested absolute confidentiality and warned Par ker not to

160 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 98–101.
161 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 101–102.
162 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, p. 102.
163 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 102–103.
164 Exhibit Q, Exhibit R.

inform anyone, specifically naming Belling, Dr. Tessa (Theresa)
Edlmann (“ Dr Edlmann ”), or members of the legal teams.
Parker described feeling fearful and alarmed by the secrecy and
the fact that Elsdon had managed to trace him so quickly.165
oo. WhatsApp communications and alleged attempts to influence
testimony:
i. Following the initial Facebook message, Elsdon asked Parker to
connect with him via WhatsApp. Elsdon encouraged Parker to
relay daily court proceedings to him and enquired whether
Captain Peterson had mentioned the Hammer Unit in his
testimony. Parker interpreted t hese requests as attempts to
manipulate or obtain information, likening it to being asked to
"snitch." Parker reiterated that he did not know Elsdon, nor did
he ever disclose to him that he was scheduled to testify at the
inquest.166
ii. Elsdon also shared a lengthy article from Algoa FM, which
speculated that the 1993 Highgate Hotel shooting may have
involved the Hammer Unit. Parker confirmed that Elsdon
appeared fixated on this theory and stated that Elsdon’s tone
was increasingly insistent, and at times aggressive or alarming.
When Elsdon referred to the Hammer Unit as dangerous and
still active, Parker perceived this as a veiled threat.167
pp. Theories shared by Elsdon and email communications:

165 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 18–19.
166 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 22–23.
167 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 25–36.

i. Elsdon proposed several theories to Parker, including that the
victims of the Highgate shooting were possibly targeted and that
the Hammer Unit had been involved. He refer enced historical
incidents, such as an alleged 1967 military aircraft explosion off
Keizer’s Beach, and forwarded an article to Parker titled “The
Hammer Unit and the Goniwe Murders.” 168 The email included
an attached e-book, "My Cryptic Life" (MCL), allegedly authored
under the pseudonym Doland Els Alanby. Parker denied
knowing Elsdon or this alias and did not read the e-books.169
ii. Parker testified that the overall effect of the messages left him
feeling fearful and threatened. 170 He descr ibed how Elsdon
repeatedly tried to draw him into speculative discussions about
the shooting and the potential involvement of state forces,
including urging him to identify whether the deceased were
specific targets.
iii. To verify the sender's identity, Parker used the app Truecaller,
which identified the number as belonging to Elsdon.171
iv. Parker further noted that despite the persistent and invasive
tone of Elsdon’s communication, Par ker never disclosed to
Elsdon that he was due to give evidence at the inquest.172
qq. Physical and psychological effects of the incident:

168 Exhibit S.
169 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 27–31.
170 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 32–36.
171 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, p. 37.
172 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 37–38.

i. In a brief follow-up line of questioning, Ms Bosman, on behalf of
the state, returned to the effects of the 1993 incident. Parker
revealed that he had long suffered respiratory issues, which he
only recently began to associate with the effects of a stun
grenade used during the attack. He described a decline in his
athletic performance post -incident, eventual heart failure in
2010, and lung scarring diagnosed in follow-up medical imaging.
Parker mentioned a pending consultation with Dr Kettles, where
he inte nded to explore the possible link between the hand
grenade explosion and the damage to his lungs.173
ii. Parker also shared that he had struggled with self -harming
behaviours, including scratching himself until he bled, a
symptom he attributed to the psychological aftermath of the
Highgate Massacre. He underwent psychiatric treatment and
has since ceased those behaviours. He recalled the trauma of
being in the hospital post -shooting and witnessing the grief of
families asking him if he had seen their loved ones.174
Frederick Doug (Dirk) Petzer:175
rr. Petzer testified on 26 March 2025, pro viding evidence primarily
concerning his late brother, Zieg, who was a police officer present
inside the Men’s Bar during the attack. Petzer himself was at the hotel
shortly before the massacre and testified to suspicious circumstances,
including a nearby police Casspir and the pub doors being unusually
open. The core of his evidence involved his 2013 contact with survivor
Beling, initiated to share his brother's belief that APLA was not

173 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 39–41.
174 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 8, Part 1, 5 February 2025, pp. 41–43.
175 Witness Testimony; Exhibit C, Affidavit of Neville Beling, pp. 1–18.

responsible for the attack, as the gunman allegedly wore camouflage
face paint. During his testimony, Petzer disavowed a typed statement
attributed to him, raised suspicions that his brother was pressured to
alter his official statements, and was confronted with a significant
timeline discrepancy, as his contact with Beling occurred nearly seven
years after his brother's death.
ss. Introduction and background:
i. Petzer testified under oath, confirming his full name as Doug
Frederick Petzer.176
ii. He denied making the typed statement dated 18 April 2023
attributed to him, stating he had never seen it before and that
the signature on it was not his.177
iii. Petzer confirmed he was present at the Highgate Hotel before
the attack took place on 1 May 1993, arriving before his brother
Zieg, who was a police officer. He recalled sitting with Zieg
briefly before leaving the pub and identified some other
individuals present, inc luding Charles Boddington, Herman
Koegelenberg, and a railway supervisor known as Mr. Gold or
Dold.178
iv. Petzer observed that when he arrived at the Highgate Hotel, the
doors were open. He claim ed to be a frequent drinker at the

176 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, the testimony of Frederick Doug Petzer, pp. 2–20.
177 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, p. 4.
178 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 5–6.

Highgate Hotel and noted that he had never seen the doors to
the pub open before.179
v. He also noted a police Casspir vehicle parked near the subway,
which he understood to be conducting random checks in the
lead-up to the elections. He stated that the police were the only
ones with a green Casspir in town and confirmed that his
brother expl ained the vehicle's presence as part of routine
operations.180
tt. Account of the Highgate Massacre and the immediate aftermath:
i. In his statement, which he claims was not signed by him, Petze r
recalled that he received the call from Zieg he immediately
travelled back to the Highgate Hotel. However, during his
testimony, Petzer recounted how he learned of the attack from
his brother by phone after arriving home. Zieg was upset and
reported that they had been attacked. Petzer saw Zieg the
following morning when he came off duty and showed Petzer
his torn pants where a bullet had passed through without
injuring him.181
ii. He described Z ieg’s experience during the attack: sitting at the
men’s bar, thinking the shooter was Petzer, who was returning,
being shot at and falling off his chair, and ducking into the toilet
where the attacker tried to shoot him, but the gun jammed. Zieg
helped the barman Alfred, who was also shot, and ducked into

179 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 10–11.
180 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 10–12.
181 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 7–8.

the toilet for safety while the attacker was still firing inside the
pub.182
uu. Statements and investigations:
i. Petzer asserted that he never gave any formal statement to the
police about the incident, and that when his brother made
statements, he never discussed the content with him. He also
questioned the authenticity of several handwritten statements
attributed t o his brother, saying that the handwriting and
signatures did not appear to be those of Zieg.183
ii. He expressed suspicion that his brother had been asked to
change his statement and that some original statements might
have been removed or destroyed.184
iii. Petzer emphasised that his brother was upset at being asked to
change statements but never confided in him about the
details.185
vv. Contact with Beling:
i. Petzer confirmed making contact with Beling via Facebook in
May 2013, initially unsure of the exact timing but later
acknowledging it occurred years after his broth er died in 2006.
He explained he wanted to share information with Beling about
what he and his brother knew, particularly their belief that APLA
was not responsible for the attack. During this period, Petzer

182 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 8–10.
183 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 12–15.
184 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 62–65.
185 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 62–65.

shared his brother's account that the attacker h ad camouflage
paint or "Black is Beautiful" on their face, which led Zieg to
doubt APLA's involvement since he believed APLA members
would not need to disguise themselves in this way.186
ii. During cross -examination, a significant timeline discrepancy
emerged. Petzer initially appeared uncertain about when his
brother died, suggesting it might have been around 2012.
However, when presented with official documentation from the
Department of Home A ffairs, it was established that Zieg died
on 23 December 2006 - nearly seven years before Petzer's
Facebook contact with Beling in May 2013. This timeline is
crucial because Petzer had initially suggested he contacted
Beling to share information while his brother was still alive and
not receiving feedback from investigators. When confronted with
this discrepancy, Petzer acknowledged he "did not know the
time" and agreed the death certificate must be correct. This
means all information Petzer shared with Bel ing in 2013 was
based on conversations with his brother that had occurred at
least seven years earlier.187
iii. When challenged about whether he had made boastful claims
or exaggerated his knowl edge to Beling, Petzer firmly denied
any bragging, stating it would be "very bad" to brag about an
incident where people were killed and wounded. He rejected
three scenarios presented to him: that he was drunk when
speaking to Beling, that he was bragging about information he
claimed to possess, or that he was now unable to confirm
information due to threats. Petzer maintained he was sober

186 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 16–20.
187 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 25–26.

during his conversations with Beling and insisted any apparent
inconsistencies in his Facebook messages were due to bei ng
"twisted" rather than deliberate exaggeration. He emphasised
he only wanted to exchange information with Beling, not make
false claims.188
ww. Final remarks:
i. Petzer commented on the prolon ged delays and apparent
inefficiencies within the official investigation.
ii. Petzer testified that "in 20 years, nothing happened. Nothing
happened. Nothing happened" and that the police were "barking
up the wrong tree" by focusing on APLA. He expressed
frustration that his brother Zieg never received feedback about
the investigation and was never properly questioned about
crucial details like the attacker's appearance, despite being the
only witness who saw the gunman up close in the toilet. Petzer
emphasised that Zieg had told him the attacker had camouflage
paint or "Black is Beautiful" on their face, a detail that led them
both to doubt APLA's involvement, yet this critical information
appeared to have been ignored or omitted from the
investigation.189
Bernice Whitfield:190
xx. Bernice Whitfield (“Whitfield”) was called to testify on the afternoon of
4 February 2025. Her evidence provided deeply personal insight into

188 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 92–94
189 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 61–62.
190 Exhibit C, Statement of Bernice Whitfield, pp.175–187.

the human impact of the tragedy, highlighting the psychological and
economic hardship she and her family endured in the aftermath.
yy. Deric John Whitfield (“Deric Whitfield”) was 42 years old at the time of
his death, while Bernice was 45. She described him as a very outgoing
person and an avid Border fisherman who enjoyed the outdoors. The
family would often leave home at 5 o'clock on weekends t o go to the
beach, where Deric Whitfield would participate in fishing competitions
while the family enjoyed the seaside together. This active, nature -
loving lifestyle was abruptly ended by the tragedy.191
zz. Notification of the shooting and initial confusion:
i. Whitfield testified that she was first informed of the shooting
indirectly and confusingly. Her mother received several stra nge
calls from a woman who later identified herself as a bar lady at
the Highgate Hotel. The caller inquired about her mother’s age,
then abruptly ended the call. On the third call, she said that
Deric Whitfield had been shot and wanted to see his wife.
Concerned, Whitfield, her mother, and her daughter drove to
Frere Hospital, where they encountered blood in the foyer and
loud screaming.
ii. Although she initially believed Deric Whitfield was still alive, a
nurse took her into a private room and confirmed that her
husband had died. The nurse’s closing of the door, Whitfield
explained, signalled to her that the news would be
devastating.192

191 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 107–108.
192 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 108–110.

iii. Whitfield testified that she never received official information
about her husband's injuries or the circumstances of his death.
She learned only through word of mouth that he had b een shot
and had five bullet wounds in his chest. No police or officials
ever provided her with formal details about what happened to
him that night.193
iv. The circumstances of the notifi cation raised troubling questions
for Whitfield. She found it particularly strange that the bar lady
had obtained her mother's landline telephone number, as
nobody at the Highgate knew her mother or their home number.
She questioned how, in his injured sta te, Deric could have
remembered and communicated her mother's telephone
number to make such a request. These unexplained details
added to her sense that something was amiss about the official
narrative.194
aaa. Mysterious circumstances and missing personal effects
i. Whitfield raised concerns about unresolved questions regarding
her husband's final moments. She was told Deric had attempted
to crawl from the bar to his car after being s hot multiple times,
but she found this implausible.195
ii. When she was called to collect his vehicle from the Highgate
Hotel the next day, police officers told her they would escort her
just in case she got shot. This strange warning deeply unsettled
her, raising questions about why she might be in danger simply

193 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, p. 109.
194 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 109–110.
195 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 112–113.

collecting her husband's car. Despite this supposed threat, there
were no visible bloodstains on the pavement or near the c ar
where Deric Whitfield had allegedly died. Additionally, Deric
Whitfield's wallet and car keys were never returned to her.
Despite inquiries, neither the police nor hospital officials could
explain their disappearance. After she drove away with the
police escort of three or four officers, she never heard from the
police again. Whitfield found the entire situation deeply
suspicious and troubling.196
bbb. Economic and emotional impact
i. Deric Whitfield’s death left Whitfield in a deeply financially
precarious position. She was left without money or food to
support her three children, aged approximately 11, 19, and 20 at
the time. Immediate support came from the Red Cross and
extended family, but the longer -term burden was heavy. She
described how her family's entire lifestyle changed.
ii. The trauma was compounded ten months late r when her 20 -
year-old daughter, Chantelle, was killed in a hit -and-run
incident. The police never pursued the case meaningfully, and
she never received justice in either instance. This accumulation
of grief and the absence of accountability contributed to a
prolonged sense of disillusionment with state institutions.197
ccc. Interaction with Truth and Reconciliation processes and APLA
Officials

196 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 111–112.
197 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 113–115.

i. Whitfield stated that she participated in the TRC process but
found it ineffective. She described it as a " waste of time " and
expressed frustration at the lack of accountability. She was also
part of a group that met with former APLA Commander
Mphahlele. According to her, Mphahlele denied APLA 's
responsibility for the attack, claiming their training focused only
on the maintenance and cleaning of weapons. She challenged
this claim, arguing that the precision of the attack, evident from
the bullet marks on walls and equipment, suggested
involvement by professionally trained operatives.198
ii. She also recalled an interaction with Mhaga from the
Department of Justice during a healing event in Cape Town.
Mhaga had previously promised the survivors answers but failed
to provide them. When questioned, he allegedly responded with
something to the likes of I don’t want to be killed, and I don’t
want my face on TV, which further eroded her trust in the
process. Disillusioned, Whitfi eld walked out of the group
engagement and did not participate in further sessions.199
ddd. Faith, forgiveness, and closure
i. Whitfield ended her testimony on a powerful and emotional
note. She stated that she had chosen to forgive the
perpetrators. Citing her Christian faith, she quoted scripture
encouraging forgiveness and expressed a deep belief that
justice, if not delivered by human systems, would be realised

198 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 115–116.
199 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 117–118.

through divine intervention. She urged fellow survivors to also
forgive, so they could be set free and reclaim their peace.200
Desiree Lee Smit-Broderick:201
eee. Introduction
i. Desiree Lee Broderick (née Smith) (“ Broderick”) testified as an
eyewitness who observed two individuals walking past her
home on Voortrekker Road immediately after the Highgate Hotel
attack on 1 May 1993. Her testimony provided evidence
regarding the appearance and behaviour of possible
perpetrators fleeing the scene.
fff. Broderick’s observations
i. Broderick resided at 1[…] V[...] Road, Highgate, at the time of
the incident. She was at home with her parents and a visiting
friend on the evening of 1 May 1993. Her house was situated on
the corner of He ath and Voortrekker Roads, with an open field
separating her residence from the Highgate Hotel. 202
ii. Just after 10 p.m., while watching movies after her parents had
retired to bed, Broderick heard a loud bang followed by what
sounded like gunshots. After a brief quiet period, she heard
gunshots again. The interval between the first and second
series of shots was short, less than five minutes by her
estimation. 203

200 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 119–120.
201 Exhibit B, Statement of Desiree Lee Broderick, pp. 111–112
202 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 49–50, 71–72.
203 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 51–52.

iii. After switching off the interior lights to improve visibility,
Broderick looked through her window and observed two men
walking fast on Voortrekker Road, on the opposite side of the
street from h er house. The distance from her window to where
the men were walking was approximately 10 –12 metres. The
street lights were functioning, providing adequate visibility
despite the late hour.204
ggg. Description of the Individuals
i. Broderick provided detailed descriptions of the two men:
1. The person walking in front wore dark clothing (blackish
colour top and trousers);
2. The person behind wore a whitish shirt with dark
trousers;
3. One individual was carrying a large firearm over his
shoulder, using what appeared to be a sling;
4. She observed one person pulling something off his face,
which she believed was a balaclava;
5. Both men were of normal build, not hefty or overweight,
estimated at 80-90 kilograms, and
6. She identified both individuals as Black men, noting she
could see the skin colour on the arms of the one wearing
the white shirt.
ii. Broderick described the fo otwear as appearing to be safety
shoes or boots with steel tips, dark in colour (black or brown),

204 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 52–54, 73.

though she could not see the upper portions due to the trousers
covering them. When shown a photograph of boots (Exhibit H),
she indicated they could have bee n similar to what she
observed.205
hhh. Movement:
i. Initially, Broderick's statement from 2 May 1993 indicated the
men were running ("hulle het gehardloop"), meaning they were
running.
ii. However, during her testimony, she stated that they were
walking at a fast pace rather than running. She described it a s a
brisk walk, not like people trying to escape from something.
iii. This clarification was significant given that the Court noted her
original statement was made the morning after the incident,
when memories would have been fresh.206
iii. Duration of observation and police response:
i. Broderick observed the two men for approximately 10 -15
seconds as they passed her window. She did not see them
enter any vehicle.
ii. Police sirens and vehicles only arrived several minutes after the
men had passed, coming from the direction of the subway under
the railway line.
iii. At the time she observed the two individuals, the area was silent
with no police presence or other vehicles.207

205 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 62–63, 79.
206 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 75–76.
207 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 74, 80–81.

jjj. Inability to Identify
i. Broderick confirmed she would not be able to identify the
individuals if brought before her, as she could not recall their
facial features.
ii. She also stated she could not definitively say whether their
faces were painted or smeared black, though she was certain
they were Black men based on visible skin colour.208

Mark Sebastian Bush:209
kkk. Mark Sebastian Bush (“ Bush”) testified on 1 September 2025 as
one of the first two civilians to arrive at the hotel. Drawing on his
military experience, he recounted hearing the distinctive sound of AK -
47 fire and smelling teargas from a nearby braai before running to the
scene with Steven Good. His testimony provided a harrowing account
of the "absolute carnage" inside both bars. He described providing first
aid to severely injured victims, including Beling and Weber, and
detailed the "shocking" failure of the first ambulance crew t o assist, as
they refused to enter without gas masks. Bush also described a
confrontation with a police officer who tried to remove him from the
scene while he was rendering aid. He provided expert observation that
the 56 shell casings found corresponded t o two professionally loaded
(under-filled) magazines, indicating the attackers were trained. He
confirmed police never interviewed him about the incident.
lll. Introduction:

208 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 59 & 79.
209 Exhibit AAA, Statement of Mark Sebastian Bush.

i. Bush testified as an eyewitness who, along with Steven Lee
Good (“Good”), was t he first to arrive at the Highgate Hotel on
the night of 1 May 1993. His evidence addressed his
observations at the scene, the assistance he provided to
victims, and his interactions with emergency services and police
officers who responded to the attack.
mmm. Background and recognition of the Highgate Massacre:
i. Bush was 27 years old at the time of the incident, employed as
an electrician by the East London Municipality.
ii. He had served in the army and had been deployed to Angola.
He resided at 3 M[...] Road, East London.
iii. On 1 May 1993 at approximately 16h00, he attended a braai
with Wendy Bush and Steven Good at their neighbour's house,
George and Cynthia Moore, at 5 M[...] Road, East London.210
iv. Around 22h00, whilst still at the Braai, Bush heard loud noises.
Wendy Bush remarked that it sounded like a car backfiring and
noted a funny smell in the air, a sking what was in the braai that
was making her tear up.
v. Bush initially thought the Highgate Hotel was on fire due to the
amount of smoke, but given his military training, he immediately
recognised the distinctive sound of AK -47 fire, having received
extensive training on these weapons.

210 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 42–43.

vi. He also recognised there was teargas in the air. Wendy and the
children went inside while Bush and Steven Good ran towards
the Highgate Hotel to see what had happened.211
vii. He testified that after leaving his neighbour’s house, he
proceeded towards the Highgate Hotel.212
viii. Using the map, he explained the location: his house was on the
right-hand corner of Maya Road, and the neighbour’s house
was on the left -hand corner between numbers 3 and 5. Facing
Baldwin Road towards Maya Road, he pointed out number 3
Maya Road, where George Moore’s house is marked, and
identified the Highgate with the kn ife-and-fork symbol. From
there, he crossed diagonally over the field by the shortest route
and arrived at the front entrance and car park of the hotel.213
ix. He confirmed that he could not remember seeing anyone fleeing
from the Highgate.214
nnn. Arrival at the scene and assistance to victims:
i. Bush confirmed that when they arrived at Highgate (as the first
to arrive), they saw a man shooting up the street. He had a
revolver in his hand, remarking that "they" had gotten away and
shooting randomly towards the direction that "they" must have
run off in.215

211 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44.
212 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44
213 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 48–50.
214 Transcript of Proceedings, 1 September 2025, p. 50
215 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44.

ii. Bush and Good encountered a man who was shot in his back at
the entrance of the Public/Men’s Bar who needed help and
asked the ambulance crew whether they were going to help
him, as by that time, some first responders had arrived, but they
did nothing at all.
iii. The ambulance crew that arrived refused to enter the scene
because they did not have gas masks for the teargas.
iv. Bush and Good managed to drag out the man that they found at
the entrance, demanded a stretcher, and started helping the
victims themselves, but when they asked for further equipment,
the ambulance crew refused, and they proceeded to re -enter
without any protective gear. 216
v. They found Neville Beiling and managed to get him out of the
bar with the help of the fire crew who had arrived on the
scene.217
vi. Upon entering the Ladies' Bar, Bush described that he
immediately saw multiple deceased and injured victims and that
the scene was absolute carnage. He found Rousseau heavily
bleeding from her leg. He also found Weber, whom he knew
through Boucher.
vii. Weber was injured and heavily bleeding. Bush assisted him by
applying pressure to his wounds with his bare hands. Weber
was bewildered and delirious, asking for his clothes to be

216 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44.
217 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44, 52.

removed, which Bush thought was because of the teargas and
loss of blood.
viii. Steven went to search for more survivors and helped Boucher,
who had been shot in the leg, out of the Ladies' Bar.218
ooo. Police officer interaction
i. Bush confirmed that a police officer arrived on the scene,
entered the Ladies' Bar, and demanded that Bush and Good
vacate the scene, but they refused to leave, saying that as soon
as someone else was prepared to come in and help the injured,
they would go, an d until then, they would not stop helping
people.
ii. Bush testified that because he could not recall “plain” clothing,
he believes that the police officer was in uniform.
iii. The firefighters eventually relieved Bush and Good and came
into the bars to assist.
iv. As they walked out of the Ladies Bar, Bush shouted at the
police officer who had asked them to leave, as he was acting
terribly towards the victims and clearly did not know what he
was doing.
v. Bush stated that one of the first things they are taught, an d this
is a universal principle, is to save lives first.219
ppp. Departure from the scene and the following day

218 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 44–45, 52
219 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 45,

i. Bush and Good left the Highgate Hotel and returned home
covered in blood without their shirts.
ii. Although he could not recall exactly what happened to their
shirts, he believes that they used them to help stop the bleeding
of the wounded or as a face mask for the teargas for some of
the survivors. 220
iii. On the way to and from the Highgate Hotel, Bush does not
recall seeing anyone fleeing the scene.221
qqq. Lack of a police interview
i. Despite being one of the first persons on the scene, Bush and
Good were never contacted by the police or any other officials
to provide a statement. They were, however, interviewed by the
Daily Dispatch newspaper a few days later.222
ii. The next day, Good was deeply distressed, and Bush took him
to the hospital to see the victims as he felt it would help
reassure him that they were receiving care.223
rrr. Media article inaccuracies
i. A copy of the Daily Dispatch article dated 10 May 1993 was
annexed to Bush's statement. Bush confirmed that he had never
seen the article until Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr (‘CDH’) attorneys
provided him with a copy.

220 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 45
221 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, p. 46
222 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 46, 56–57 .
223 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 55.

ii. He identified several factual inaccuracies in the article: it
incorrectly stated they saw a police patrol vehicle rushing
towards the Highgate and that they travelled to the Highgate by
car when they walked; Bush never saw anyone administ ering
bandages to the injured man they pulled from the Public/Men’s
Bar nor did he correct how bandages were being applied; he
never saw a police man run into either of the bars and then run
out and be sick; he never saw the riot unit arrive, only the one
policeman referenced; and no young girl was attending to
Weber in the Ladies' Bar as Bush assisted Weber himself.224
sss. Impact and relocation
i. The trauma of the event deeply affected Bush and his family.
Within three weeks after the incident, they sold their house and
moved to the United Kingdom because he and Wendy were
concerned about their safety.
ii. Bush stated that to this day, one of the most disturbing parts
about the Highgate Massacre was the disregard for preservation
of life displayed by the first responders on the scene.225
ttt. Reconnection with survivors
i. On 20 August 2025, Bush reconnected with survivors Beling
and Weber via social media. Through them, Good, Wendy, and

224 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 46–47
225 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 46

he were put in touch with CDH, the attorneys representing the
survivors and families of the victims.226
uuu. Closing remarks
i. Bush was astounded when requested to leave the scene. He
emphasised that the primary function is to preserve life, and the
lack of consideration for the injured parties was the most
shocking part. He stated it was not forthcoming, and he was not
impressed with the ambulance service or police, though the fire
unit was better.227
ii. The families expressed gratitude for Bush and Good's heroic
acts and placed this on record.228
iii. Finally, Bush made an observation based on his military
experience: 56 shell casings were found, which equals exactly
56 rounds. As someone trained in AK -47 and R4 rifles, he knew
that soldiers are taught never to overfill a magazine to prevent
jamming. This adds up to exactly two 30 -round magazines
loaded with 28 rounds each. He stated this would confirm that
the assailants, without a doubt, received training.229
Steven Lee Good:230
vvv. Good testified on 1 September 2025, providing crucial
corroboration for Mark Bush’s evidence, as the two men were together

226 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 46
227 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 56–57
228 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 57
229 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 58-59
230 Exhibit BBB, Statement of Steven Lee Good.

when they responded to the attack. Good, who was 17 at the time,
confirmed their joint actions: hearing the gunfire and smelling tear gas,
running to the hotel, providing aid to victims in both bars, and
observing a man firing a pistol outside. He gave a forceful account of
his confrontation with an obstructive police officer whom he criticised
for failing to help. Good confirmed that h e was never contacted by
police for a statement, noted the lasting trauma of the event, which led
to his PTSD diagnosis, and expressed his anger at the failure of
emergency services, stating his belief that more lives could have been
saved.
www. Introduction and background
i. Good testified as an eyewitness who accompanied Bush to the
Highgate Hotel on the night of 1 May 1993. He provided
evidence about his observations and the assistance he
rendered to victims.
ii. Good was a 17 -year-old student at the tim e, residing at 3 M[...]
Road, East London. On 1 May 1993 at approximately 16h00, he
attended a braai with Mark Bush and Wendy Bush at their
neighbour's house, George and Cynthia Moore, at 5 M[...] Road,
East London.231
iii. During his court testimony, Good confirmed the details in Bush's
affidavit and mentioned that he suffers from PTSD.232
xxx. Response to the attack and arrival

231 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 65
232 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 66

i. Good accompanied Mark Bush to the Highgate Hotel after they
heard gunshots and smelled tear gas in the air. He was with
Bush throughout the time they spent at the hotel. To avoid
repetition, his statement confirms the accuracy of Bush's
description of events.233
ii. He stated that he can only remember a guy with a pistol coming
out and assumed it was one of the guys chasing after the
perpetrators.234
yyy. Interaction with a police officer
i. Good confirmed that after he entered the hotel with Bu sh to
assist injured patrons, a police officer arrived and demanded
that they leave, as they were not involved. They refused to
leave since nobody else was helping the injured and stated they
would only go when medics or police started helping.
ii. Good t hen confronted the officer because of his obstructive
attitude and his lack of action at the scene. He was horrified that
no officials were helping the injured, and he expressed how
wrong he felt this was.235
zzz. Lack of an official statement
i. Despite being one of the first persons on the scene, no officer
took their contact details, nor were they contacted by the police
or any other officials to provide a statement.

233 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 66
234 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 67
235 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 65–66, 68–69

ii. Good was int erviewed by the Daily Dispatch newspaper a few
days after the Highgate Massacre. He notes there are several
factual inaccuracies contained in the article, as pointed out by
Bush in his affidavit. 236
aaaa. Impact and relocation
i. The trauma of the event deeply affected Good and his family.
Within a few weeks after the incident, they sold their house and
moved to the United Kingdom. 237
bbbb. Assessment of emergency response
i. Good was very frustrated and angry with the lack of response
from the police and medics on the scene. He stated they
displayed no courage that night. He believes that more lives
could have been saved with proper emergency action.238
cccc. Military service context
i. Good has served in the UK Defence Force, so he is no s tranger
to conflict and violence, but states that nothing comes close to
what he saw and felt that night. 239
dddd. Concluding remarks

236 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, p 66; Exhibit BBB, Statement of Steven Lee Good, para. 7; Exhibit AAA, Statement of Mark
Sebastian Bush, para. 2.
237 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 66
238 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 66.
239 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 66

i. The court placed on record an ac knowledgement of what Good
did that evening, paying homage to how he saved lives and
thanking him for standing up to the police officer.240
Edward Baymen Lombard:241
eeee. Lombard testified regarding his direct involvement as an armed
patron during the Highgate Hotel Massacre on 1 May 1993. His
evidence detailed the sequence of the attack from his perspective i n
the Ladies' Bar, his immediate reaction based on his Rhodesian
military experience, his multiple engagements returning fire against the
assailants using his personal .38 revolver, his observations of the
attackers' appearance and perceived level of train ing, the immediate
aftermath including checking on victim Harris, and his interactions with
the first police officer on the scene. He also recounted seeing a
potential getaway vehicle and his subsequent coincidental meeting
with the Harris family.
ffff. Introduction:
i. Lombard testified via video link from the United Kingdom
regarding his experience as a patron at the Highgate Hotel on
the night of the massacre, 1 May 1993. On the night, he was
armed with a .38 Special Rossi revolver and engaged th e
attackers during the incident.242
ii. His testimony covered the sequence of events as he perceived
them, his actions in returning fire, descriptions of the assailants,
and his interactions immed iately following the attack. 243 He

240 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 69–70
241 Exhibit B pp 323 -332 Statement of Edward Baymen Lombard.
242 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 4.
243 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 5.

confirmed the signature on a handwritten stateme nt (Exhibit B
pages 327 -332) was his, although the handwriting was not. 244
He noted minor inaccuracies in the statement provided to him.
gggg. Arrival and events leading to the Highgate Massacre:
i. Lombard arrived at the Highgate Hotel around 8:45 PM to 9:00
PM on 1 May 1993, having come from visiting his wife and
newborn son at the hospital.245 It was his first time at the hotel.
ii. He was in the Ladies' Bar, speaking with Harris near the bar
counter, preparing to leave around 10:15 PM, when the attack
began.246
hhhh. The attack and engagement with assailants:
i. Lombard heard automatic gunfire behind him 247 and,
recognising the sound from his seven years of military
experience (Rhodesian army), immediately dived over the bar
counter, pulling the bar lady down with h im for cover. 248 He
clarified that he did not push Harris down 249. He shouted for
everyone to get down.

244 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p 5.
245 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 8.
246 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 9.
247 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 3–4.
248 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 4
249 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 21.

ii. While taking cover, he heard an explosion (which he believed
came from the Public Bar/snooker room area) and drew his .38
Rossi revolver from his moon-bag.250
iii. When the initial burst of gunfire stopped (believing the attacker
had emptied his magazine) 251, he stood up. He saw a black
male in the doorway, about 3 -5 meters away, wearing a g rey
balaclava (revealing only eyes and nose), a grey jersey, and
trousers tucked into army boots, holding an AK -47 at his
hip.252 He perceived the assailant as black from the visible part
of his f ace, but acknowledged it could have been someone in
disguise.253
iv. As the assailant turned towards him, Lombard fired
approximately four or five shots. 254 He believes the last three
shots hit the attacker, possibly in a bulletproof/flak jacket, as
there was no blood. 255 The attacker spun around and ran out of
the main entrance.256
v. Lombard reloaded, grabbed the phone, dialled the police, and
passed it to the bar lady. 257 While near the wash -bay area, a
second attacker, similarly dressed with a balaclava and AK -47,

250 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 4, 34
251 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp 9–10
252 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 4,
253 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 11.
254 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 5.
255 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 10, 22–23.
256 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 5.
257 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p, 11.

appeared from the passage (possibly from the restaurant bar
area).258
vi. He fired five shots at this second attacker, who was about 2.5 -3
meters away. 259 The attacker attempted to shoot back, his AK -
47 firing upwards into the wall/reception area as Lombard's
shots hit him (he believed four out of five hit), causing him to
spin and run off. 260 One bullet lodged in the doorframe. 261 He
perceived this attacker as black.262
vii. Lombard reloaded again and moved to the hotel entrance. 263 He
saw a figure (believed to be the second assailant) standing in
the car park about 15 meters away, armed with an AK -47,
seemingly waiting for people to exit the Public Bar. 264 He
stepped out and fired five shots at this person, who then "took
off".265
viii. He corrected his written statement (paragraphs 9 -10),
confirming that all the shooting involving the assailants
occurred before the police arrived.266
iiii. Immediate aftermath:

258 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 32.
259 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 11-12.
260 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 11, 33.
261 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 11, 24, 33.
262 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 13
263 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 12.
264 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 12
265 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 12.
266 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 16.

i. After the third engagement, Lombard saw a white couple arrive
in a car. He warned them of the attack, and they reversed
away.267 He did not recall seeing Mark Bush or Steven Good.
ii. He went back inside the Ladies' Bar. 268 He checked on Harris,
who was crouched against the bar. Upon touching his shoulder,
Harris collapsed, and Lombard realised he was dead, seeing a
chest wound.269 He noted a woman nearby who was shot in the
leg.
iii. He heard a police vehicle arrive (estimating 10 -15 minutes after
the assailants left) and ran out. 270 He informed the officer that it
was a terrorist attack, not just a shooting, and used the police
radio to call for ambulances and more backup. 271 More police
and ambulances arrived subsequently.272
iv. He observed the first responders (police and ambulance)
arriving appro ximately 15 -20 minutes after the attack and
assessed their response as "quite quick" and "very good" in
attending to the injured. 273 He recalled instructing someone to
apply pressure or a tourniquet to an injured woman's leg.274
jjjj. Getaway vehicle and assailants' direction:

267 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 6.
268 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 6.
269 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 6, 21, 28.
270 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 16.
271 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 7, 14, 25.
272 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 14.
273 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 30 - 31.
274 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 30.

i. Before the police arrived, Lombard saw a small, possibly
Mazda, four -door car speeding away up the road to the right
(facing away from the hotel). 275 He could not see the occupants
due to the darkness.
ii. He believed the assailants got into this car, as they had run off
in the same direction (to the right). 276 He informed the police of
this direction and the car. 277 He may have fired shots at the
departing car, but could not be certain.278
kkkk. Assailants' description and perceived training:
i. All assailan ts he encountered wore similar grey clothing,
balaclavas, and army boots, and carried AK -47s.279 He believed
they wore bulletproof/flak jackets because his body shots did
not seem to incapacitate them and left no blood.280
ii. Based on his military experience, he assessed the attackers as
"highly trained," more so than "terrorists" he had encountered
during his service.281
llll. Post-incident interactions:
i. Lombard confirmed his firearm, the .38 Special Rossi, was
never requested by the police for ballistic testing following the

275 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 16, 27.
276 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 17.
277 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 17, 18.
278 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, p. 27.
279 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 4, 12.
280 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 10, 22.
281 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 18-19.

incident, nor did they request further interviews. 282 He provided
the police with his spent cartridges.
ii. He recounted a coincidental meeting with the family of the late
Harris in Morgan Bay the weekend after the shooting, where
they were scattering Deon's ashes. 283 He confirmed the
conversation with Page about the events was largely accurate,
except for the detail about pushing Deon down.
iii. He confirmed the person he spoke with was Harris, and the
name "Nigel" in his statement was incorrect, likely a mistake
made when the statement was compiled from media
interviews.284

B. Contextual or ancillary evidence

1.2 This section provides the critical contextual and ancillary evidence
gathered in the decades following the Highgate Massacre. It moves
beyond the night of the attack to chronicle the survivors' long pursuit of
justice, the systemic failures of state institutions, and the expert evidence
that systematically refutes the long -held official narrative. The testimony
collectively dismantles the attribution of the 1993 massacre to APLA and
explores alternative theories, including the possibility of a state -aligned
"third-force" operation.

282 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 33, 34.
283 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 19, 29.
284 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 20, 3 September 2025, pp. 6, 28.

1.3 The narrative of the survivors' struggle is primarily detailed through the
testimony of Dr. Edlmann, who was instrumental in organizing the
Highgate survivors and families. She recounted the group's formation in
2006 after learning that APLA had not authorized the attack, their formal
request to the NPA for a new inquest, and the subsequent cycle of hope
and disillusionment. Dr. Edlmann described the initial positive
engagement with the NPA, which devolved into frustration ove r broken
promises for updates, and the ambiguous, ultimately fruitless,
investigation by private investigator Els. Her testimony also highlighted
the severe, lasting psycho -social trauma and hardship endured by
survivors and their families due to decades of institutional neglect.
1.4 The central theme of this evidence is the comprehensive refutation of
APLA’s responsibility for the 1993 attack. This was established through
three key witnesses. First, Mphahlele, the former APLA Director of
Operations, provided a direct and authoritative denial. He systematically
detailed why the attack was uncharacteristic of APLA, citing critical
inconsistencies in the modus operandi: the use of balaclavas, face paint,
the unprecedented use of tear gas, and the use of AK -47s, which APLA
was phasing out. He confirmed the attack's complete absence from
APLA's operational archives and dismissed the "Karl Zimbiri" media
claims as propaganda. Second, Ncamazana, an APLA member
convicted for the separate 1994 Highgate grenade attac k, explicitly
denied any knowledge of or involvement in the 1993 massacre.
1.5 Finally, Tyrrell, an expert researcher, provided an independent statistical
analysis of APLA's operational patterns. His report concluded it
was unlikely APLA was responsible. His analysis confirmed that the use
of tear gas was unprecedented in all 64 APLA incidents studied and that
the complete absence of a claim of responsibility was a fundamental

the complete absence of a claim of responsibility was a fundamental
departure from APLA's 80% claim rate for similar attacks.

1.6 With the official narrative challenged, the evidence also explored
alternative theories. Dr. Edlmann introduced leads pointing toward covert
state-aligned groups, including rumours of a "Vlakplaas 2" in the
area and research showing large financial payouts to Askari members
just before the attack.
1.7 The testimony of Van Der Wilt, a former Hammer Unit member, was
also heard. He firmly denied any Hammer Unit involvement and instead
offered a conflicting, second-hand APLA theory involving child soldiers, a
claim unsupported by other evidence.
Dr. Tessa (Theresa) Margaret Edlmann:285
1.8 Dr. Edlmann, an academic and founder of the Spirals Trust reconciliation
initiative, testified on 31 January 2025. Her evidence provided the crucial
narrative of the survivors' decades -long struggle for justice, which she
helped coordinate. She detailed her involvement beginning in 2005,
prompted by the revelation that APLA had not authorised the attack. Dr.
Edlmann organised the first -ever gathering of survivors in 2006 and
spearheaded their formal 2006 memorandum to the NPA requesting a
new inquest. Her testimony chronicled the subsequent cycle of hope and
disillusionment, detailing the NPA's failed promise s, the elusive
investigation by Els, and the systemic failures of the TRC, which had
conflated the 1993 massacre with another attack. She also presented
key contextual evidence challenging the APLA narrative, including third -
force theories, research on Ask ari payouts, and a powerful account of
the severe, lasting psycho -social and medical hardships endured by the
survivors and their families.
1.9 Professional experience, academic background, and role in civil society:

285 Exhibit C, Statement of Dr. Tessa Margaret Edlmann, p. 112.

1.9.1 Dr. Edlmann extensively detailed her professional career. Initially a teacher, she
later became peripherally involved with the TRC.
1.9.2 Subsequently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, she founded the Spirals Trust,
a grassroots initiative aimed at conti nuing the TRC's reconciliation work at a
community level. The Trust began as a narrative -based storytelling initiative at the
Anglican seminary, College of Transfiguration, in Makhanda. It focused on
reconciling conflicting stories from the Apartheid era a nd presented at the United
Nations as a model for peace education.286
1.9.3 Despite this early success, the Spirals Trust struggled significantly with funding,
particularly given its location in the Eastern Cape, ultimately leading to its closure in
2008. Its programs were handed over to other organisations. Following this, Dr.
Edlmann completed a PhD in History and Psychology, focusing on the psycho -social
impacts of conscription into the SADF. S he continued her career extensively in
academia, NGOs, and as a freelance worker.287
1.10 The origins of her involvement with Highgate survivors:
1.10.1 Dr. Edlmann’s involvement with Highgate survi vors and their families began in
2005, after Beling engaged in mediation with Mphahlele, facilitated by Ginn Fourie.
This mediation revealed critical information that APLA had not authorised the
Highgate attack, contradicting the accepted narrative.
1.10.2 Recognising the significance, Professor David Edwards of Rhodes University
suggested that the Spirals Trust, led by Dr. Edlmann, coordinate efforts to reconnect

286 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 3–4.
287 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 4.

survivors and families, document their experiences, and advocate for renewed
investigations.288
1.11 Formation of Highgate survivors’ network and request for an inquest:
1.11.1 In September 2006, Dr. Edlmann organised the first -ever gathering of Highgate
survivors and family members at the Kennaway Hotel, their first meeting in 13 years.
This highly emotional meeting exposed deep anger, bitterness, and confusion
among survivors, who had been misled into believing definitively that APLA was
responsible. The lack of arrests or accounta bility intensified their resentment toward
law enforcement and judicial systems.289
1.11.2 As a result of this pivotal gathering, survivors collectively resolved to formally
request the NPA to re open the investigation and conduct an inquest. They
specifically demanded transparency, regular quarterly updates, and group
communication from authorities. This marked a crucial move toward potential justice
after years of misinformation and silence.290
1.12 Formal request to the NPA:
1.12.1 On 11 December 2006, Dr. Edlmann sent a memorandum to Mhaga at the NPA.
This memo formally requested a renewed investigation into the Highgate Massacre,
specifically seeking clarity on the motivation, organisation, and identities of the
perpetrators. It further demanded transparency through regular updates, at least
quarterly, and insisted that the group always be approached collectively, facilitated
by the S pirals Trust for communication purposes. The memorandum underscored
the sensitivity of the case, asking that the investigation be handled confidentially.291

288 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 5–6.
289 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 7–9.
290 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 9–10.
291 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 11–13.

1.12.2 Signatories included survivors and family representatives-
(a) Charles Bodington;
(b) Weber;
(c) Bernice Whitfield;
(d) Parker;
(e) Fran Wheeler; and
(f) Beling.
1.12.3 Additionally, Dr. Edlmann noted support from survivors who were not physically
present at the initial meeting but had expressed telephonic support:
(a) Ian Hacking, son of Stanley Hacking (deceased victim);
(b) Neville Harris, father of Deon Harris (deceased victim);
(c) Doreen Rosseau (injured survivor); and
(d) Keith Baling (survivor), brother of Billy Baling (injured
survivor).
1.12.4 Efforts to trace the family of deceased victim Douglas Gates and injured survivor
Nkosinathi Alfred Gontshi (“ Gontshi”) had not yet suc ceeded, prompting a request
for assistance from the NPA.292


292 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 12.

1.13 Initial response and meetings with the NPA:
1.13.1 The response from the NPA, specifically from Mhaga, was initially positive. In
February 2007, Mhaga met with the Highgate survivors at the University of Fort
Hare’s Psychological Support Centre, assuring them that investigations would
recommence earnestly. He communicated a commitment to interviewing various
individuals and pursuing leads with determination. However, Mhaga declined an
invitation to attend a planned memorial service at the Highgate Hotel on 1 May 2007,
presumably due to discomfort with potential media attention.293
1.14 Memorial service and media coverage:
1.14.1 On 1 May 2007, survivors held a memorial service at the Highgate Hotel,
unveiling a plaque in memory of the deceased and af fected. This event attracted
substantial media attention, notably from a Carte Blanche documentary crew.
Despite the NPA’s reluctance to participate, the survivors viewed this event as an
important symbolic act toward recognition and healing.294
1.15 Role of Els and declining momentum:
1.15.1 During this period, Els, formerly medically boarded from the Scorpions and acting
as a private investigator, became closely involved. Although initially suppor tive, Els
gradually became elusive and challenging to contact. He was seen as conducting
investigative work on behalf of the NPA, but the exact nature of his role remained
ambiguous. The survivors' specific request for quarterly updates was not honoured,
leading to feelings of frustration and abandonment.295
1.15.2 Dr. Edlmann recounted the increasing perception among survivors that the NPA
viewed their provided information as inconclusive, with diminishing interest and

293 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 14.
294 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 14.
295 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 14–15.

communication from authorities as a result. A particularly discouraging episode was
a funded trip to Cape Town undertaken by survivors at Els's suggestion, which
ultimately yielded no significant developments, further deepening th eir sense of
despair.296
1.16 Personal reflections and emotional impact:
1.16.1 Dr. Edlmann reflected emotionally on the severe personal and collective impact
these developments had on survivor s and herself. The initial high hopes from the
memorial service and apparent NPA commitment gave way to disillusionment and
feelings of being misled.
1.16.2 She spoke candidly of questioning her role, fearing she might unintentionally
offer false hope to survivors. Despite this, she continually encouraged survivors like
Beling not to give up, believing firmly that justice would eventually prevail.297
1.17 Further interactions and developments:
1.17.1 Between 2007 and later developments involving Benjamin Nel (“ Nel”), the
situation was described as increasingly bleak, characterised by sporadic information
and false hopes. Survivors persisted in trying to gather details independently, facing
repeated dismissals from authorities who claimed their leads lacked sufficient
evidence. Nel, whom she briefly met, similarly dismissed their efforts as
inconsequential, reinforcing their frustration.298
1.17.2 Dr. Edlmann also recounted specific incidents like a 2012 raid organised by
Botha based on information from Petzer, which also resulted in no concrete

296 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 15–16.
297 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 16–18.
298 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 18–19.

outcomes, deepening survivors' feelings of repeated disappointment and
abandonment by the justice system.299
1.18 Support for Beling
1.18.1 Dr. Edlmann detailed extensive personal support for Beling, whose health had
severely deteriorated over the years. She described facilitating his me dical
treatments, surgeries, and accommodations during his health crises, highlighting
Beling’s immense courage and resilience despite overwhelming physical and
emotional trauma.300
1.19 Broader reflections on justice and reconciliation
1.19.1 Dr. Edlmann expressed the profound emotional and ethical impact of her
involvement, underscoring that her motivation stemmed from a lifelong commitment
to truth, justice, and reconciliation in South Africa.
1.19.2 She reflected passionately on the importance of holding space and speaking for
those who could not, highlighting that her role was only a small part of a much larger
struggle. She strongly emphasised the significance of courage and truth in the
pursuit of justice, despite risks and obstacles encountered during the investigative
process.301
1.20 Criticism of the TRC:
1.20.1 Dr. Edlmann voiced disappointment regarding certain systemic failures of the
TRC. Specifically, she highlighted errors in the TRC’s documentation of the Highgate
Massacre, noting it was incorrectly conflated with a separate 1994 grenade attack,
causing significant oversight and neglect of the Highgate Massacre.

299 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 19.
300 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 20–21.
301 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 22.

1.20.2 She emphasised that such inaccuracies perpetuated misinformation, significantly
hampering the survivors' and families' quest for truth and justice.302
1.21 Information shared by Beling and witness reports:
1.21.1 Further elaborating, Dr. Edlmann provided details on witness reports shared by
Beling, including sightings of a Honda Balade vehicle near Horseshoe Valley,
burned out without a record of being reported stolen.
1.21.2 This mysterious detail became significant, particularly given persistent rumours of
a farm in Horseshoe Valley known as "Vlakplaas 2" suspected to be associated with
clandestine operations and possibly linked to the Highgate Massacre.303
1.22 Research by Louise Flanagan (“Flanagan”) and Askaris in East London:
1.22.1 Dr. Edlmann referenced important investigati ve contributions by journalist
Flanagan, who provided documentation concerning a unit of Askaris (former
liberation fighters turned informants) operating in East London. Significantly,
Flanagan's research included a list of substantial financial payouts ma de to
individuals linked to Vlakplaas just before the attack, specifically on 30 April 1993.304
1.22.2 This timing raised questions about the possibility of the Highgate attack being
related to fru stration or orders following these severance payments. Names on this
list notably included notorious figures such as Eugene de Kock.305
1.23 Theories regarding APLA involvement and inconsistencies:

302 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 23–24
303 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 24–25.
304 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 25.
305 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 25–27.

1.23.1 Dr. Edlmann detailed multiple inconsistencies challenging the narrative of APLA’s
responsibility for the Highgate attack:
(a) Attackers wore balaclavas, unusual for APLA members,
who typically intended to be identified as part of their
political statement.
(b) The attackers used AK -47s, weapons reportedly
inaccessible to APLA due to ammunition scarcity.
(c) Uncharacteristic precision in the attackers' shooting
suggested professional military training rather than the
often untrained or poorly trained APLA operatives.
(d) The use of tear gas grenades, highly unusual for APLA
attacks.
(e) Absence of legitimate c laims of responsibility or records of
the Highgate attack in APLA archives.
(f) No amnesty applications or convictions related to the
Highgate Massacre, unlike other known APLA incidents.
1.24 Potential motivation behind the Highgate Massacre:
1.24.1 Further detailing potential motivations, Dr. Edlmann highlighted theories
suggesting that the Highgate Massacre aimed at provoking violence and unrest
among right-wing groups, specifically the AWB.
1.24.2 It was posited that the intention might have been to de stabilise the ongoing
CODESA negotiations critical to South Africa’s transition to democracy. Notably, Dr.
Edlmann referenced inflammatory rhetoric by AWB leader Eugène Terblanche

around the time of the Highgate Massacre, potentially fitting into a broader agenda
of inciting conflict and undermining peaceful negotiations.306
1.25 Ongoing challenges and further personal reflections:
1.25.1 Dr. Edlmann emphasised the severe ongoing obstacles experienced by survivors
and family members throughout her two decades of involvement with the Highgate
Massacre case.
1.25.2 She detailed persistent difficulties in maintaining consistent communication with
authorities, especially the NPA. Specifically, she recalled a dismissive interaction
with Advocate Christopher McAdam (“ Advocate McAdam ”) of the NPA, who
displayed reluctance and irritation when approached directly regarding the
investigation, reflecting broader institutional indifference and resistance.307
1.26 Severe personal hardships of survivors:
1.26.1 Dr. Edlmann provided extensive accounts of the profound physical,
psychological, and emotional hardships faced by survivors:
(a) Rossouw endured severe chronic pain from injuries
sustained during the attack until her death.308
(b) Gontshi faced severe economic hardship, unemployment,
and social isolation following his injuries and eventual job
loss at the Highgate Hotel.309

306 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 31–32.
307 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 34.
308 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 32.
309 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 32–33.

(c) Beling’s family experienced significant health impacts,
including his father suffering multiple strokes, exacerbated
by trauma, leaving him severely impaired until his death.
Beling’s mother, Zilla Beling, provided extensive caregiving
for Beling until her death fr om cancer, a condition Dr.
Edlmann attributed partly to prolonged stress and
trauma.310
(d) Thora Christopher, Weber’s partner and primary caregiver,
similarly succumbed to cancer, illustrating the severe
indirect consequences suffered by caregivers.311
1.26.2 Dr. Edlmann detailed the emotional toll on survivors’ extended family members,
underscoring the extensive, ongoing ripple effects of trauma and systemic
neglect.312
1.27 Criticism of investigative and institutional failures:
1.27.1 Dr. Edlmann strongly criticised investigative processes, noting repeated
frustrations with intermittent and superficial investigations conducted by authorities,
including Nel and Captain Peterson.313
1.27.2 She recounted persistent issues, including inadequate record -keeping, poor
docket management, and an overwhelming sense of investigative apathy, which
collectively hindered progress toward achieving justice and accountability.314
1.28 Reflections on justice delayed:

310 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 33–34.
311 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 34.
312 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 34–35.
313 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 35.
314 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 35–36.

1.28.1 Expressing profound disappointment, Dr. Edlmann stated that the delay of over
three decades in securing justice for Highgate survivors exemplifies broader
systemic failures within South Africa’s transitional justice mechanisms.
1.28.2 She characterised the prolonged neglect as a "travesty of justice," underscoring
the inadequacy of institutional responses over the years. Despite this, she
expressed gratitude for the current dignified handling of the case by the present
Court, legal representatives, and NPA officials, recognising the importance of this
belated recognition and respect for survivors.315
1.29 Memorialisation and preservation of records:
1.29.1 Dr. Edlmann discussed the creation of a memorial plaque at the Highgate Hotel,
initially installed to honour the victims and survivors, and later removed due to
renovations. She advocated for creatin g a dedicated archive at the Amatole
Museum, housing all related documentation, memorabilia, and survivor testimonies
for future generations. She also emphasised the need for a dedicated financial
support fund to address the ongoing medical and personal ne eds of survivors,
particularly Beling and Weber, ensuring their long-term welfare and dignity.316
1.30 Closing remarks:
1.30.1 In her final reflections, Dr. Edlmann expressed gratitude to the C ourt and legal
teams for their respectful and dignified handling of proceedings.317
1.30.2 She reiterated her commitment to truth, reconciliation, and justice, emphasising
that the significance of the current inquest extends far beyond the Highgate case,

315 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 36–37.
316 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 37–38.
317 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, p. 36.

addressing larger questions about transitional justice, institutional accountability, and
the need for collective healing in societal reconciliation efforts.318
Letlapa Ngoata Mphahlele:319
1.31 Introduction:
1.31.1 Mphahlele testified that h e was born on 8 December 1960 in Rosenkrantz, a
village in Limpopo, following the Northern Sotho tradition where the firstborn is
delivered at the maternal village.320
1.31.2 He described his ed ucation, attending four schools: Mutle Primary School, the
first community-built school in the then Transvaal, Rosenkrantz Primary, Matsubane
Senior Primary, and Manemkube Senior Secondary, which he left while still
attending.321
1.31.3 Mphahlele testified that he is a prolific writer with six published books, including
Child of the Soil: My Life as a Freedom Fighter (2002), Mantlalele, The Flood is
Coming (2006), Shining th e Searchlight Inwards (2013), South Africa: A Republic
Gone Bananas (2014), Nxae (2022), a poetry book, and Mafofora (2023). He
mentioned a forthcoming seventh book in African languages to be launched in June
2025.322
1.31.4 He explained that Child of the Soil was nominated for the Alan Paton Nonfiction
Literary Award and was a bestseller in the Kwela Books catalogue. He also
referenced his involvement in five historical documentary films relatin g to South

318 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 5, 31 January 2025, pp. 38–39.
319 Exhibit D, Statement of Letlapa Ngoata Mphalele, p. 6.
320 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 28–29.
321 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 30.
322 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 30–33.

Africa’s struggle, except for Gratitude, which was filmed in Ibiza and unrelated to
South African history.323
1.32 Political and military roles:
1.32.1 Mphahlele testified that he ser ved as the sixth president of the PAC from 2006
until succeeded by Mzwanele Nyhontso. He noted a period when three individuals
claimed to be PAC president during internal turmoil, but he identified himself as the
sixth, after founding president Mangaliso Sobukwe.324
1.32.2 He testified that he was the director of operations of the APLA from 1991, after
first serving on the high command, the third tier below the central committee and
military commission. His role in logistics included infiltrating arms and personnel into
South Africa and exfiltrating trainees abroad.325
1.32.3 He also served as a member of South Africa’s National Assembly from 2009 to
2013 and co -founded the Lyndi Fourie Foundation, established through a
relationship with Ginn Fourie, whose daughter had died under his command. The
foundation’s mission was one of reconciliation and forgiveness, which continued
informally after the foundation dissolved, including international visits such as to
India.326
1.32.4 Mphahlele testified about his role in commu nity development, such as supporting
the establishment of the Siviwe Buso Secondary School in Mthatha, which evolved
from helping children in an informal settlement with school supplies to a fully
developed school, for which he received an award from the MEC of Education.327

323 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 32–33.
324 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 34.
325 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 34–35.
326 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 35–36.
327 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 36–37.

1.33 Early political involvement and exile:
1.33.1 Mphahlele testified that his political awakening began with a deep questioning of
justice and God, eventually leading him t o politics during apartheid. He cited the
1976 Soweto uprisings as a pivotal trigger, despite being away in the mountains at
the time.
1.33.2 Feeling compelled to join the struggle, he and others formed an underground
group called the Union of Self Study (“USS”) to support the movement, but the group
was quickly disbanded by the school principal. Consequently, in 1978, he decided to
leave South Africa to engage in the anti -apartheid struggle abroad and to empower
himself politically, as he had no formal political training at the time.328
1.33.3 He chose Botswana as his first destination because it was safer than alternatives
such as Soweto and Transkei, and he travelled there legally with a passport,
avoiding dangerous border crossings guarded by soldiers. Mphahlele also recounted
how he forged a letter from his school principal excusin g his absence, which was
crucial for passing roadblocks controlled by the special branch police.329
1.34 Joining political movements in exile:
1.34.1 Upon arrival in Botswana, Mphahlele testifie d that he was detained briefly and
pressured by police to join a political party. Initially, he joined the ANC but quickly left
after meeting members of the South African Youth Revolutionary Council
(“SAYRCO”), a splinter group.
1.34.2 He eventually became non-aligned in exile before joining the PAC after a period
marked by violent conflict within exile camps, including killings of diplomats and
cadres.

328 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 38–39.
329 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 39–41.

1.34.3 He identified Tanzania as the base where he received military training, followed
by further trai ning in Guinea, West Africa. Mphahlele also engaged in “bush
journalism,” producing camp newspapers like Itumbi and later becoming its editor.330
1.35 Role in APLA and logistics:
1.35.1 Mphahlele testified that he was appointed to the APLA high command and
served primarily in the logistics department beginning in 1985. His responsibilities
included infiltrating arms into South Africa and exfiltrating personnel for training. He
clarified that, whi le he worked in logistics, operational lines often overlapped with
political commissariat functions.331
1.35.2 He explained that Libya, under Marshall Tito, was a major supporter providing
training and arms, alongside Tanzania and Guinea. Yugoslavia was the principal
supplier of the Scorpion submachine gun, which became associated with APLA.
China was not considere d the main benefactor, contrary to some beliefs. Tanzania
was regarded as the most supportive African state, with Guinea and Libya
following.332
1.36 Detentions in Zimbabwe and Botswana:
1.36.1 Mphahlele testified that he was arrested twice in Zimbabwe during an emergency
period after entering from Botswana, detained for about three weeks without charges
before being released. In Botswana, he was arrested after infiltrating a group of five
operatives, following which there was a gunfire incident at the border, where one
operative was injured, three were arrested, and one escaped.
1.36.2 Mphahlele was charged with possession of arms of war, but no arms were found
on him. He served over three years of a five-year sentence before being released

330 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 41–43.
331 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 43–44.
332 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 44.

following Nelson Mandela’s release, when political prisoners, including PAC and
ANC members, were freed.333
1.37 Appointment as Deputy Chief Political Commissioner and return to South
Africa:
1.37.1 While in prison, Mphahlele testified he was appointed Deputy Chief Political
Commissioner of APLA, a paradoxical situation given his incarceration. Upon return
to South Africa, his first activity was visiting APLA units concentrated mostly in urban
centres, despite PAC’s original philosophy advocating rural-focused armed struggle.
1.37.2 He found that many operatives in the cities were struggling with starvation and
resorted to robbery for survival, leading him to establish a specialised repossession
unit (“Beauty Salon”) to curb criminality within APLA ranks.334
1.38 APLA operational strategies and target selection:
1.38.1 Mphahlele testified that APLA’s primary objective was to fight the aparthe id
regime, and attacks on civilians were never the main focus. He noted a problematic
double standard where violence against black South Africans was not labelled as
attacks on civilians, but when white civilians were targeted, they were described as
such. Initially, APLA’s urban operations targeted police and military personnel, but
after state attacks on black civilians at night vigils, taxis, and buses, APLA adopted a
tit-for-tat strategy to make white civilians "taste their own medicine."
1.38.2 He recalled how internal disagreements in the APLA high command about
attacking civilians led to modifying orders so that civilian targets would always be
accompanied by “hard targets” such as army units or police stations. He gave
examples of operations a t Queenstown, King William’s Town Golf Club, St James

333 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 44–47.
334 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 47–48

Church, and Heidelberg Tavern, explaining that these were part of planned
operations consistent with this strategy. The Heidelberg Tavern attack involved
coordinated assaults on police and army units al ongside civilian targets, although
the state only publicized the civilian aspect.335
1.39 Highgate Hotel attacks:
1.39.1 Mphahlele distinguished between two Highgate Hotel attacks: one in May 19 93
that resulted in deaths and injuries (the Highgate Massacre), and another in March
1994 involving a grenade attack causing no injuries. He testified that APLA accepted
responsibility for the second attack but denied involvement in the first.
1.39.2 Upon learning of the May 1993 attack, the Highgate Massacre, Mphahlele initially
felt envy and suspicion, believing it was the act of another guerrilla group since the
operation was uncharacteristic of APLA. He listed multiple reasons why the May
1993 attack w as un -APLA-like: attackers wore balaclavas (never used by APLA),
there was no hijacked getaway vehicle (APLA typically hijacked vehicles and
abandoned them with keys left inside), tear gas was used (unprecedented in APLA
operations), faces were painted (al so not typical), and AK -47 rifles were used,
although APLA had largely phased these out due to their unreliability.
1.39.3 He explained that the AK-47s supplied from Tanzania were sabotaged, leading to
APLA switching to R4 and R5 rifles. APLA weapons were reused across different
operations, which was not consistent with ballistics from the Highgate attack
weapons, indicating these were not APLA arms. Additionally, Mphahlele emphasised
that all APLA operations during his tenure as Director of Operations were
meticulously documented and archived, but no records exist of the May 1993
Highgate attack, despite extensive raids on these archives by the state. This lack of

335 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 48–50.

documentation strongly supported his conclusion that APLA was not responsible for
the May 1993 attack.336
1.40 The “Karl Zimbiri” claim and media narrative:
1.40.1 Mphahlele addressed claims by a man named Karl Zimbiri, who purportedly took
responsibility for APLA attacks, including the Highgate incident. He testified that Karl
Zimbiri was a largely unknown, possibly fictitious figure tolerated by APLA but not
formally recognised. Zimbiri was known to make contradictory public statements and
condemn PAC leadership, leading to distrust within APLA ranks.
1.40.2 Mphahlele suspected that the State used the name Karl Zimbiri as propaganda to
both undermine and inflate APLA’s image. He noted that despite being publicised,
Karl Zimbiri was never listed on any wanted or official documents, furth er
questioning his authenticity.337
1.41 Claims of responsibility and Use of operative names:
1.41.1 Mphahlele explained that APLA typically claimed responsibility for operations
through interme diaries using pseudonyms, with names like "Mama Rupelo" and
"Ropa," rather than direct claims by the organization. Media reports often linked Karl
Zimbiri’s statements to APLA, despite the dubious nature of his claims. He noted
that APLA’s control over pub lic messaging was limited compared to the State’s
access to media, with the latter often portraying APLA unfavourably or selectively.338
1.41.2 Mphahlele recounted that many APLA members had images published with
rewards for their arrest, yet no such official records existed for Karl Zimbiri. He

336 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 50–56.
337 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 59–61.
338 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 60.

described this as part of the complex information war between APLA and the
apartheid regime.339
1.42 Seizure and Status of APLA records and documentation:
1.42.1 Mphahlele testified that the South African Police Service (SAPS) and/or National
Intelligence seized the original APLA operatio nal records and archives from Mthatha
and Maseru in 1994 and 1995. He confirmed that these documents were never
returned and that their exact seizure dates are unknown. The seized records
included not only written documents but also homemade weapons and ta ctical
materials such as spikes made from long nails tied to PVC pipes used as road
traps.340
1.42.2 He emphasised that the bulk of the archives were kept in Maseru, Lesotho
(originals) with cop ies in Mthatha. These raids resulted in significant losses of
historical APLA documentation, which affected not only investigations but also the
prosecution and amnesty applications related to APLA members.341
1.42.3 Mphahlele stated that, outside of the seized archives, no further APLA
operational docume ntation exists except individual memories and recollections of
former operatives.342
1.43 Modus operandi and operational security:
1.43.1 Mphahlele explained the modus operandi of APLA units, which operated in small,
often single-person units for security reasons. This structure was necessary due to
limitations in resources and to avoid compromising the entire organisation if one
member was captured.

339 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 59–61.
340 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 73–74.
341 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 85–86.
342 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 85–86.

1.43.2 He described a culture of operational s ecrecy where even senior leaders like
himself were sometimes unaware of specific actions until after they occurred. For
example, he recounted an incident where police were attacked on the same street
where he lived, but he only learned about it later at a shopping mall.343
1.43.3 This compartmentalisation was critical for the safety of all involved and the
effectiveness of the struggle. After an operation, confirmation would be relayed
internally to validate it as an APLA action, but no comprehensive knowledge was
shared beforehand to maintain security.344
1.44 Use of weapons and tactical evolution:
1.44.1 Regarding weapons, Mphahlele clarified that APLA gradually phased out the AK -
47 rifles during the early 1990s due to difficulties in procuring magazines and the
poor condition of weapons smuggled in from Tanzania, many of which were
sabotaged. However, AK-47s were still used when available.
1.44.2 He clarified that while AK -47s were "no longer being commonly used, " they were
still employed when available and functional. APLA units operated with mixed and
inconsistent weaponry depending on what was accessible; some fighters carried AK-
47s, others had R1 rifles, and some were armed only with pangas when firearms
were insufficient. He emphasised that APLA was "not a standing army with unlimited
support of arms," and this resource constraint meant they could not afford to discard
functional AK -47s even after beginning to acquire R4 and R5 rifles. The gradual
phasing out was driven by practical challenges: difficulty procuring compatible
magazines, ammunition that was not interchangeable with other weapons, and the

343 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 72–73.
344 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 73–74.

general unreliability of Eastern-made weapons that had often been sabotaged during
the long smuggling routes from Tanzania.345
1.44.3 Mphahlele also addressed the use of explosives, hand grenades, and o ther
homemade weapons, noting their inclusion in APLA operations and archives. He
referenced a detailed analysis of APLA attacks showing that AK -47s were rarely
used after February 1992, especially in attacks on non -farm civilian targets, with the
bulk of attacks using other weapons.346
1.45 Highgate Hotel and military presence:
1.45.1 When questioned about whether police or military personnel frequented the
Highgate Hotel, Mphahlele stated that his knowledge was limited to his visits to the
hotel with survivors and family members of victims after the attacks. He had no
awareness of specific military or police presence at the hotel prior to the incidents.
1.45.2 He affirmed with certainty that none o f the individuals under his command were
responsible for the May 1993 Highgate Massacre, though he acknowledged the
theoretical possibility of rogue elements operating independently, which he strongly
denied in relation to his tenure as Director of Operations.347
1.46 Clarification on document seizure and continuing investigation:
1.46.1 Mphahlele confirmed that the seized archives were held by SAPS or National
Intelligence and that, despite efforts, the documents have not been returned. He
committed to trying to ascertain the exact dates of seizure despite the death of the
librarian responsible for the archives.

345 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 77–78.
346 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 87.
347 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 78–79.

1.46.2 He stressed the importance of these documents to ongoing investigations,
especially in light of unresolved cases such as the Northcrest Massacre, and urged
that any recovered material be shared to assist the truth-seeking process.348
1.47 Dumisani Ncamazana (“Ncamazana”) and cessation of hostilities:
1.47.1 Mphahlele addressed the involvement of Ncamazana, clarifying that while
Ncamazana was not on official APLA recor ds, he believed he was acting under
instructions from senior commanders. Mphahlele took responsibility to support
Ncamazana during his legal defence due to this belief.
1.47.2 He explained that official cessation of hostilities was ordered around April 199 4,
but communication challenges meant that some operations continued thereafter.
Ncamazana was implicated in a 1994 attack on the Highgate Hotel, which APLA
accepted responsibility for, but the timing was after the ceasefire order.
1.47.3 Mphahlele noted t hat Ncamazana’s belief in the legitimacy of his actions was
sincere, but that not all operations were uniformly controlled within APLA, reflecting
internal divisions and complexities.349
1.48 Analysis of weapons used in attacks:
1.48.1 Mphahlele reiterated that while AK -47s were used in some attacks, like the
Yellowwoods Hotel (March 1993), they were generally phased out due to logistical
issues. He emphasised the diversity of weaponry used acr oss units and the lack of
uniformity in armaments.
1.49 Philosophical reflection and concerns about justice:

348 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 80.
349 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 78.

1.49.1 Before concluding, Mphahlele shared a philosophical reflection by Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, highlighting the burden and complexity borne by victi ms and
perpetrators alike.350
1.49.2 He expressed concern about whether the current inquiry genuinely pursues
justice or merely goes through procedural motions, pointing to unresolved
disappearances and deaths of many former struggle activists under suspicious
circumstances.351
1.49.3 Mphahlele stressed the importance of comprehensive investigation and justice,
especially for families still seeking answers decades later. He lamented the long
delays and apparent cover -ups that contin ue to frustrate truth and reconciliation
efforts.352
Dumisani Ncamazana:353
1.1 Background and political affiliation:
1.1.1 Ncamazana confirmed his identity and took the oath to tell the truth before the
court. He stated that he had no objection to taking the oath and was willing to testify
fully and truthfully.354
1.1.2 Ncamazana testified that he was born on 13 January 1976 and resided at 1 […]
M[...] Street, Cambridge Location, East London. He confirmed his affiliation with the
APLA, the military wing of the PAC, and stated that he operated mainly in the

350 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 88–89.
351 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 89–92.
352 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 91–92.
353 Exhibit D, Statement regarding interview with suspect: Dumisani Ncamazana – 15 January 2014 (written on o fficial SAPS3M
form), pp. 42–43.
354 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 101–102

Mdantsane b ranch under Commander Nxolile Ncabane, also known as Jimmy
Jones. He spent time in Butterworth and Gcuwa in 1992.355
1.2 Arrests and charges:
1.2.1 Ncamazana recounted his arrest in 1994 for incide nts related to the Bahá’í Faith
and the Highgate Hotel attack. He was incarcerated at Westbank and St. Alban
Prisons during proceedings related to his escape from Muldersdrift Correctional
Facility in 1999.
1.2.2 He explained that he was serving an effect ive sentence of 51 years for multiple
charges, including the Highgate 1994 and Bahá’í incidents. He was re -arrested at
different intervals after the escape, with his last arrest around late 1999 at NU13 in
Mdantsane.356
1.3 Denial of involvement in the 1993 Highgate Massacre:
1.3.1 Ncamazana denied involvement in the Highgate Massacre of 1 May 1993. He
stated he only became aware of that incident through media coverage.
1.3.2 He rejected allegations, including a statement by Dlaki Melvin Vani (" Vani") that
he admitted responsibility for planning and executing the attack, calling it
“improbable” and “not true”, specifically rejecting that he disclosed this to Vani.357
1.4 Weapons training and operations:
1.4.1 He confirmed receiving training in the use of firearms, including AK -47 rifles, but
stated the primary focus was on R4 and R5 rifles. Ncamazana rated his proficiency
with the AK-47 between six and seven out of ten but admitted never using an AK -47

355 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, p. 105.
356 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 106–107.
357 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, p. 109.

in actual operations. He testified that APLA members were trained in guerrilla
tactics, emphasising planning and executing attacks efficiently.
1.4.2 When asked whether operations targeted white civilians and military or police
targets alike, Ncamazana replied that it was not his role to choose which race, his
actions were based on orders from leadership , with no autonomy to decide targets
independently.358
1.5 Command and unit operations:
1.5.1 Ncamazana confirmed that orders were always given from the APLA leadership
and that no operation was ca rried out without approval. He knew of the figure Karl
Zimbiri (widely confirmed as a fictional character) but stated he never met him
personally. He conceded that smaller APLA units operated discreetly and
information about operations was tightly held to maintain security.
1.5.2 He accepted that some operations might have been opportunistic but maintained
that the Highgate Hotel attack in 1994 was planned as a target within their
mandate.359
1.6 Response to amnesty application evidence:
1.6.1 During cross -examination, Ncamazana responded to the amnesty application
evidence, agreeing that certain attacks, including the Bahá’í Faith Centre attack and
subsequent events, involved opportunistic actions following a planned attack. He
strongly disputed that the Highgate Hotel attack was opportunistic, affirming it was a
planned operation.
1.6.2 He described reconnaissance as a key part of operation preparation, involving
teams assessing the target, escape routes, and security before execution.360

358 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, p. 116.
359 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, p. 135.

Robert John Tyrrell:361
1.7 Introduction:
1.7.1 Robert John Tyrrell (“ Tyrrell”) appeared as an expert witness on behalf of the
families and survivors of the Highgate Massacre. As Senior Program Officer for
Research at the Foundation for Human Rights, Tyrrell was commissioned to conduct
a comprehensive analysis examining whether the 1993 Highgate Massacre matched
the modus operandi of confirmed APLA operations during the 1991-1994 period.
1.7.2 His testimony, which mostly related to his research report, provided crucial
statistical and analytical evidence challenging the long -held attribution of the
massacre to APLA, offering instead a data -driven assessment that pointed to
significant inconsistencies with known APLA tactics and operations.
1.8 Professional Background and Expertise:
1.8.1 Tyrrell holds a Bachelor of Social Science in Public Policy from the University of
KwaZulu-Natal (2006), which included both qualitative and quantitative research
methodology traini ng, and a Master's degree in Social Science from the same
institution (2008), focusing on qualitative and textual analysis. He served as a
research associate at the SAHRC from November 2014 onwards and has been
employed at the Foundation for Human Rights s ince October 2016, where he was
appointed Senior Programme Officer for Research in the year of his testimony.362
1.8.2 His professional expertise centres on documenting human rights violations, with
particular emphasis on the two years preceding his testimony on gender -based
violence and femicide. He co -authored two national GBV reports utilising surveys to
analyse prevalence, conviction rates, and perpetrator profiles, with sample sizes of
2,030 and 5,423 respondents, respectively. His speciality lies in designing,

360 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 13, 26 March 2025, pp. 121–122.
361 Exhibit HH, Statement/Report of Robert John Tyrrell.
362 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 7

conducting, and analysing large -scale research on human rights violations,
translating complex human rights data into meaningful findings.363
1.9 Methodology and Analytical Approach:
1.9.1 Tyrrell's analysis began with identifying incidents temporally linked to the 1993
Highgate Massacre within the 1991 -1994 period that had any documented
connection to APLA. This initial dataset drew from TRC documents, the Kriel
statement, and the Flanagan Chronology, yielding 64 incidents where APLA was
alleged to have been involved. From these, 36 incidents were confi rmed as genuine
APLA attacks based on their appearance in TRC amnesty applications or
hearings.364
1.9.2 The research team distinguished between primary sources (TRC hearings and
associated docu mentation) and secondary sources (the Kriel statement from the
apartheid-era Minister of Law and Order and media reports), prioritising TRC
documentation as the most reliable source due to concerns about potential bias in
apartheid-era government statements and media reports influenced by the State.365
1.9.3 Four key data points were ultimately selected for analysis:
(a) number of perpetrators,
(b) target selection,
(c) claiming of responsibility, and
(d) weapon types.

363 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 8–9.
364 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 9–11.
365 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 11.

1.9.4 These were chosen based on both their investigative importance and the
availability of reliable data across the incident set.366
1.10 Key Findings on APLA Attack Patterns:
1.10.1 Geographic and Temporal Distribution:
(a) Tyrrell's analysis revealed that the Eastern Cape was the
primary focus of confirmed APLA activity du ring the period
under review, with 12 confirmed attacks: six in 1992, three
in 1993, and three in 1994. While APLA was active
elsewhere, the Eastern Cape represented its main
operational area. Notably, there was a dramatic drop -off in
total alleged incidents from 18 in 1992 to only three each in
1993 and 1994 in the Eastern Cape, though this pattern
was less pronounced in confirmed incidents.367
1.10.2 Target selection patterns:
(a) The analysis cat egorised civilian attacks into three distinct
types based on tactical considerations: attacks on farms
(typically isolated, often involving petrol bombs at night),
attacks on civilians in transit (ambushes of moving
vehicles), and attacks on civilians in s tationary urban
locations. This categorisation was crucial because different
target types required fundamentally different tactical
approaches and weapons.368
(b) Of the 19 incidents similar to the Highgate Massacre
(attacks on civilians in non -farm stationary locations), 15

366 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 14–16.
367 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 22.
368 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 15–16.

were confirmed through the TRC process, representing an
80% claim rate. This high rate of claiming responsibility for
similar attacks made the absence of any claim for the
Highgate Massacre particularly anomalous.369
1.10.3 Perpetrator numbers:
(a) The vast majority of confirmed APLA attacks involved
between one to four perpetrators, with three or four being
most common (61% of confirmed cases). The Highgate
Massacre, involving at least two identified perpetrators, fell
within this range, making the number of attackers
consistent with APLA patterns, though this single point of
consistency was insufficient to establish attribution.370
1.11 Critical Inconsistencies with APLA Operations:
1.11.1 Weapon selection anomalies:
(a) Tyrrell's analysis revealed that R4 and R5 rifles were the
predominant weapons in confirmed APLA attacks (36% of
cases), with pistols/revolvers used 20% of the time. AK-47s
were used in only 10% of confirmed cases. Crucially, from
1992 onwards, there were no confirmed instances of APLA
using AK-47s against civilian targets of the type attacked at
Highgate in the Eastern Cape. The two instances where
AK-47s were confirmed u sed in this timeframe were
against police officers in 1992 and civilians in a school bus
in Johannesburg in March 1993 - fundamentally different
target types.371

369 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 23.
370 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 24–26.
371 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 26–28.

(b) The use of tear gas at the Highgate Massacre represented
an unprecedented tactical element. In all 64 incidents
examined, both confirmed and unconfirmed, there was not
a single instance of APLA using tear gas. Tyrrell
emphasised that introducing an unfamiliar weapon during a
high-stakes attack would be extremely unlikely for guerrilla
fighters, as it would require prior training and practice that
would have manifested in other operations.372
1.12 Absence of responsibility claims:
1.12.1 APLA claimed responsibility for 36 of the 64 attacks in the dataset, including
many involving multiple casualties. For attacks on similar targets (civilians in non -
farm stationary locations), the claim rate was 80% (15 of 19 incidents). Tyr rell noted
that TRC testimonies showed APLA members were not reluctant to admit
responsibility for civilian attacks, with individuals coming forward to claim
involvement in church massacres and similar incidents.
1.12.2 The complete absence of any claim f or the Highgate Massacre, either
immediately after the attack or during the TRC process, represented a fundamental
departure from APLA's established pattern.373
1.13 Limitations and academic rigour:
1.13.1 Tyrrell demonstrated academic integrity by openly acknowledging several
limitations in his research. He noted the reliance on TRC testimony assumed
truthfulness of perpetrators who came forward, acknowledged that incidents where
perpetrators did not approach the TRC could not be confirmed, and recognised that
critical details were often missing from historical records, constraining the analysis to
four data points rather than the broader range initially envisioned.374

372 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 28–29.
373 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 32–33.
374 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 18–20.

1.13.2 Despite these limitations, Tyrrell expressed strong confidence in the methodology
and findings, emphasising that acknow ledging limitations while working within them
represented sound research practice.375
1.14 Expert conclusion:
1.14.1 Tyrrell concluded that, based on the comprehensive analysis, it was unlikely th at
the Highgate Massacre fit the modus operandi of either confirmed or unconfirmed
APLA attacks. While acknowledging similarities in target choice and perpetrator
numbers, he found these substantially outweighed by the anomalous choice of
weapons (AK-47s and tear gas) and the failure to claim responsibility.376
1.14.2 His testimony established that the Highgate Massacre deviated from APLA
patterns in multiple critical aspects: the use of AK -47s when APLA had largely
transitioned to R4/R5 rifles for such operations, the unprecedented use of tear gas in
any APLA operation, and the absence of any claim of responsibility despite APLA's
consistent pattern of claiming similar attacks. The convergence o f these anomalies
led to his professional opinion that APLA was unlikely to have been responsible for
the 1993 Highgate Massacre.377
1.15 Further:
1.15.1 Tyrrell maintained his position while acknowledging that new information could
potentially affect statistical conclusions. When presented with claims that AK -47s
were used in the Yellowwoods attack, he indicated this would need verification
through TRC rec ords and, if confirmed, would require statistical recalculation to
determine if it represented a significant shift in the analysis.378
1.15.2 Regarding a phone claim of responsibility by one "Ka rl Zimbiri," Tyrrell noted this
came from the Kriel statement rather than confirmed TRC documentation and thus

375 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 20.
376 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 31–35.
377 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 34–35.
378 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 39–40

would not meet his criteria for a confirmed claim. He emphasised the distinction
between allegations and confirmed incidents throughout his methodology.379
Hermanus Van Der Wilt:380
1.16 Introduction:
1.16.1 Van Der Wilt, a 66-year-old pensioner residing at Galway Caravan Park in
Gonubie, testified regarding conversations with Karl Weber about the Highgate
Massacre and information he received from colleagues about alleged APLA
involvement. Van Der Wilt had previously served a s a member of the Hammer Unit's
Border division and worked in refrigeration for the Transkei Government during the
relevant period. He put up theories about the possible perpetrators and contradicted
claims that he had implicated the Hammer Unit in the Highgate Massacre.
1.17 Background and work history:
1.17.1 Van Der Wilt worked at the Graham Hotel in Grahamstown around 2020, where
he interacted with Weber, who serviced the hotel's security cameras. During the time
of the 1993 Highgate Massacre, he was li ving in Mthatha in the Enkululenkweni
ministerial complex, working in refrigeration for the Transkei Government under
General Bantu Holomisa. He had previously undergone Hammer Unit training at
Kareedouw in the early to mid -1990s as part of his military se rvice obligations,
completing a month -long survival course where only 12 of approximately 700
participants succeeded.381
1.18 Hammer Unit involvement and training:
1.18.1 Van Der Wilt c onfirmed he was part of the Hammer Unit's Border division under
the Kaffrarian Rifles. He underwent training at Kareedouw conducted by ex -
Rhodesian instructors under SADF auspices. The training was extremely rigorous,

379 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 36–37.
380 Exhibit PP, Statement of Hermanus van der Wilt.
381 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 20–22 & 44–45.

with Van Der Wilt stating he participa ted primarily to prove himself after being
assaulted by a captain who called him a racial slur due to his African stepmother.
After completing the month -long training, he effectively severed ties with the unit
when he went into "exile" in the Transkei to a void further military service. He
emphasized that he never participated in any Hammer Unit operations.382
1.19 Information about APLA involvement:
1.19.1 Van Der Wilt testified that hi s colleague Maqanda told him that APLA was
responsible for the Highgate Massacre. According to Maqanda, APLA leader Mbselo
had organised the attack, training fighters on the outskirts of Port St Johns.
Maqanda specifically stated that the attack was carrie d out by child soldiers: twin
brothers who had bragged about their involvement at an initiation ceremony. Van
Der Wilt initially recalled the twins' names as Samora and Machel, but when
presented with documentation during his testimony, it was established that the twins
were actually named Samora and Sadat Mpendulo, who were killed in an SADF raid
on an Mthatha home on 8 October 1993. Van Der Wilt also mentioned that he had
spoken with someone named Rixitri, whom he identified as one of Mbselo's
subordinates, about these matters.383
1.20 Interactions with Weber:
1.20.1 Van Der Wilt denied Weber's claims that he had suggested Hammer Unit
involvement in the Highgate Massacre. He testif ied that when Weber mentioned
"third force" theories, he explicitly told Weber it was not the Hammer Unit because
he had been part of that unit. Instead, Van Der Wilt provided Weber with the names
Samora and Machel as the alleged APLA perpetrators. He also gave Weber names
of Hammer Unit members (Hansie De Villiers, Keith Kyle, and Reggie Bernard)

382 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 20–24 & 44–45.
383 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 6–7, 12–17 & 47–48.

specifically so Weber could verify that the unit was not involved. Van Der Wilt
characterised any claim that he implicated the Hammer Unit as "a fabrication".384
1.21 Discovery of weapons at ministerial complex:
1.21.1 Van Der Wilt described discovering multiple R4 or R5 rifles with camouflage
spray paint in the boot of a car belonging to the Tr anskei Ombudsman at the
ministerial complex. Following this discovery, he was shot at in his home, with a
bullet passing through his hair. He believed this attack was connected to what he
had seen. General Holomisa subsequently provided protection, assembl ing soldiers
and APLA members to warn them against harming Van Der Wilt. Despite the
apparent danger and his role as an informant for security handler Chris De Klerk,
Van Der Wilt never reported the weapons discovery to authorities, citing self -
protection.385
1.22 Information provided to authorities:
1.22.1 Van Der Wilt served as an informant to Chris De Klerk of state secur ity,
voluntarily providing information about APLA activities after attacks like St James
Church. He passed on the names Samora and Machel to De Klerk as the alleged
Highgate perpetrators based on information from Maqanda. However, he
acknowledged never pro viding formal statements to the police about the incident.
His knowledge was entirely second -hand, based on what colleagues told him rather
than direct observation or involvement.386

C. Forensic and ballistic evidence

1.23 Crime scene and ballistics:

384 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 10-12 & 18–19.
385 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 29-32.
386 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 25–26 & 35–36.

1.23.1 The inquest was presented with forensic evidence from the crime scene (much of
it drawn from the original 1993 police docket, as far as it could be reconstructed).
This evidence con firms that the attackers used military-grade weaponry and
munitions, and the spent cartridge cases recovered at the scene were determined to
be from 7.62x39mm rounds, the ammunition used in AK-47 assault rifles.387
1.23.2 Ballistic analysis indicated that at least two AK -47 rifles were employed, and
possibly a handgun or other firearm as well. In addition, remnants of a tear -gas
grenade and canister/hand grenade were found; a device identified as manufactured
by Swartklip (a South African ordnance manufacturer) was recovered, consistent
with tear-gas use.388
1.23.3 Notably, a lever from a Soviet-designed UZRGM fuse (used in F1 or RDG-5 hand
grenades) was reportedly found on the scene.389
1.24 Indicators of an unusual modus operandi:
1.24.1 The forensic testimony highlighted several anomalies about the weapons and
tactics:
(a) First, while AK -47 rifles were used at High gate, testimony
from experts and historical records show that APLA
insurgents were phasing out AK-47s during that period due
to ammunition procurement difficulties and reliability
issues. APLA units typically relied on R4/R5 assault rifles
or other firearm s stolen locally, though AK -47s were still
used when available. The presence of AK -47s at Highgate
raises questions, given the operational challenges APLA
faced with these weapons.

387 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 92; Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 31–33.
388 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 101; Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 68–70.
389 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 71–72.

(b) Second, the use of tear gas in an attack on civilian targets
was unpr ecedented in known APLA operations. 390 Els, a
former police investigator, noted that the Highgate
attackers’ tactic of withdrawing under the cover of tear gas
was “a first” in the political violence of that era. This tactic
is more consistent with formal military or police training
than with the smash-and-grab style of APLA strikes.391
(c) Third, forensic ballistics could not link the recovered AK -47
cartridge cases to any other attacks before or after the
Highgate Massacre.392
1.24.2 In other words, the rifles used at Highgate appear to have been unique “clean”
weapons: they were never used in any prior known incident and were likely disposed
of immediately after.
1.24.3 By contrast, genuine APLA cells often reused the same weapo ns in multiple
operations, creating ballistic links between different incidents, as confirmed by
Mphahlele's testimony regarding APLA's operational practices.393
1.25 Cause of death and injury:
1.25.1 Medical and post-mortem evidence was uncontested:
(a) The five deceased victims died from multiple gunshot
wounds, and the pattern of injuries was consistent with
high-velocity rifle fire at relatively close range. 394

390 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 52
391 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 6–12
392 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 107
393 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 53.

(b) The nature of wounds (many victims were struck in vital
areas) corresponds with the testimony that the gunmen
were unusually accurate.395
1.25.2 Indeed, evidence showed that the attackers exhibited far greater marksmanship
than seen in other contemporaneous attacks attributed to APLA, where gunmen
often sprayed bullets wildly. The precision of the shooting at Highgate, hitting several
victims fatally in a short span, was another point raised in evidence as being atypical
if one assumed inexperienced fighters were responsible.396
Johannes Frederick van Deventer du Plessis:397
1.26 Johannes Frederick van Deventer du Plessis (“ du Plessis ”), a retired
SAPS Captain and crime scene photographer, testified on 3 February
2025. He served as the designated SAPS forensic photographer on duty
during the Highgate Massacre and was among the first officers to
document the scene on 1 May 1993. Du Plessis provided detailed insight
into his photographic methodology, the reconstruction of events using
witness Lombard, and his role in drafting the original sketch plan. This
marked his first appearance in court regarding the incident, 32 years
after the event.
1.27 Professional background and role at the time of the Highgate Massacre:
1.27.1 Du Plessis confirmed that he deposed to an affidavit in connection with the
Highgate Hotel incident, dated 16 June 1993. 398 He began his service in the SAP
fingerprint department at the Local Criminal Record Centre (“ LCRC”) in East London

394 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 86–89
395 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 10.
396 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 8–10.
397 Exhibit J, Statement of Johannes Frederick van Deventer du Plessis.
398 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 5–6.

on 22 August 1988, later establishing a fully fledged office in Port Alfred in 1999, and
serving in Middleburg and Gra aff-Reinet, where he rose to the rank of Captain and
Commander before retiring on 31 December 2021.399
1.27.2 Du Plessis undertook multiple courses in crime scene and fingerprint
photography. He was a member of international forensic organisations, including the
Canadian Identification Society (joined on 28 June 2014), the International
Association for Identification (since 27 September 2013), and the International Crime
Scene Investigators Association (since 6 June 2014). He confirmed that his
memberships lapsed upon cancellation on 31 December 2020.400
1.27.3 At the time of the Highgate Hotel incident, Du Plessis held the rank
of Constable and was stationed at the fingerprint department in East London. He
described training at the time as poor and largely reliant on peer mentorship and
personal experience due to technological limitations.401
1.28 SAP operational structure and Du Plessis' role on 1 May 1993:
1.28.1 He outlined that the LCRC was divided into three main teams: fingerprint experts,
photographers, and videographers. Each team member would be assigned on -call
duty weekly. Du Plessis was assigned as the photographer and draftsman for the
week beginning 1 May 1993. He was called by radio control at 22h20 and arrived at
Highgate Hotel at approximately 22h40 –22h45, starting photography at 23h00.402
1.28.2 He clarified that, as a forensic photographer, his role was to capture the evidence
but not engage in investigation or analysis. All original documents were kept at the
LCRC in a dedicated file, a copy of which was forwarded to the investigating officer.

399 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 6.
400 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 6–7.
401 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 7–8.
402 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 9, 11.

However, due to multiple relocations of the office and water damage to the office, he
was unsure if the original documentation remained intact.403
1.28.3 Du Plessis also confirmed that he had never previously been called to testify in
relation to the Highgate matter, and that this was his first appearance despite having
been the forensic photographer at the scene. He expressed surprise at the 32 -year
delay, stating it was the first time in his career he had experienced suc h a long
period between an incident and testifying.404
1.29 Initial observations and photographic sequence:405
1.29.1 Upon arrival, Du Plessis conducted a walkthro ugh with the first officer at the
scene to understand the sequence of events and plan his photography. He
reiterated that SAPS photography training emphasised taking a wide -angle image
followed by a close -up for each evidentiary object. 406 He prepared an album of the
photographs he had taken.
1.29.2 Photo 1: Shows the front entrance of the Highgate Hotel, including the sign 407
1.29.3 Photo 2: Close-up of the same entrance.408
1.29.4 Photo 3: Shows a police officer pointing at a spent cartr idge marked “A” at the
entrance.409
1.29.5 Photos 4–5: Document another cartridge at the bar entrance, marked “C”.410

403 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 9–10.
404 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 10.
405 Exhibit K – Photographs.
406 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 12.
407 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 12–13.
408 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 12–13.
409 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 13.

1.29.6 Photos 6 to 15 captured deceased persons inside the Ladies’ Bar, photographed
as found. Du Plessis could not identify any of the individuals.411
1.30 Witness re-enactments and positioning inside the Ladies’ Bar:
1.30.1 Photos 16 to 18 depict a staged re -enactment by Lombard, who was a witness
present during the incident. Du Plessis explained that SAP protocol at the time did
not permit them to name civilians or officers in official photo keys or plans;
individuals were r eferenced generically as "witness" or "police officer" in line with
training and procedural norms.412
1.30.2 Photo 16 shows Lombard seated in the exact position he claimed to have
occupied before the shooting began. This position was located just inside the bar
entrance, on the right -hand side, behind a door that swung inward into the bar
area.413
1.30.3 Du Plessis clarified that, based on the configuration visible in the photographs,
these were double doors that opened inward and remained open during the course
of his photography. The door would have obscured Lombar d from view to someone
entering the bar, as he was positioned behind it.414
1.30.4 Photo 17 captures the re -enactment of Lombard’s movement, specifically, the
manner in which he leapt over the bar counter during the incident.415
1.30.5 Photo 18 shows Lombard crouched behind the bar counter, in possession of his
own revolver. Du Plessis identified it as likely a .38 Special “stump nose”, or possibly
a .32 or .22 calibre revolver based on visual observation.416

410 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 13–14.
411 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 14.
412 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 14–15.
413 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 15–17.
414 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 16–17.
415 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 18.

1.30.6 Photo 19 was taken from Lombard’s perspective behind the bar counter,
illustrating the line of sight he would have had toward the doorway. Du Plessis took
the photograph by positioning the camera above Lombard’s head. The marker “K”
was placed on his head to indicate the location from which the perspective was
documented.417
1.30.7 Throughout this sequence, Du Plessis confirmed he relied on Lombard’s
recollection to recreate these movements. Lombard’s position and actions were
accepted for evidentiary demonstration and had not been in dispute at the time.418
1.31 Shooter’s perspective and entrances to the bar:
1.31.1 Photo 20 was taken from the passageway outside the Ladies' Bar, showing the
shooter’s line of sight as reconstructed by Lombard. Du Plessis stood outside the
swinging doors and captured the interior of the bar from the entrance, reconstructing
Lombard’s claim that he would have seen the attacker from that vantage point.419
1.31.2 Du Plessis confirmed that the image was taken from the passageway looking into
the Ladies’ Bar, with one door le ading into the bar and another into a storeroom or
staff area. He could not recall whether the storeroom door had been open or shut at
the time of the shooting.420
1.31.3 Photo 21 depicts a staff-only entrance that leads behind the bar counter. This
image is crucial for understanding how the bar area was accessed by staff members
and distinguishes the public entrance from internal access.421

416 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 18–19.
417 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 19–20.
418 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 18.
419 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 20–21.
420 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 46.
421 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 21–22.

1.31.4 Photo 22 was taken from the inside of the building looking outward, depicting
Lombard (again acting as demonstrator) standing at point “M” and reconstructing the
direction he allegedly observed the attackers fleeing toward. The photo thus
complements Photo 20 by providing the reverse viewpoint and further spatial
orientation.422
1.32 Outer perimeter, Public Bar area, and additional ballistic evidence
1.32.1 Photos 23–24 depict the outer perimeter of the Highgate Hotel, taken from the
vantage point where Lombard stood (point “M”) as shown in Photo 22. In Photo 23,
Du Plessis documented the street view to the left, revealing the entrance toward
Highgate under th e subway bridge, consistent with Lombard’s statement on the
direction from which the attackers approached. Photo 24 shows the right -hand side
of the same view, along Voortrekker Road, which runs in front of the hotel and into
the Dawn area.423
1.32.2 Photos 25–26 were photographed inside the reception area, though Du Plessis
could not recall the exact context of these images. He later confirmed that these
areas relate to point B in the key, identified in the sketch plan as the reception.
These photos may illustr ate trajectory -related or structural aspects, although no
clear exhibit was marked therein.424
1.32.3 Photos 27–29 shift to the hallway leading to the ladies’ toilets, where Du Plessis
photographed projectiles discovered in the vicinity. These are not to be confused
with spent cartridges; the distinction is significant, as projectiles can offer trajectory
and origin information. Photo 29 provides a close -up of a projectile at point N,

422 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 22–23.
423 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 22–23.
424 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 24.

confirming a ballistic element near the toilet corridor, a location away from the main
bar areas, suggesting multiple trajectories or possible crossfire zones.425
1.33 Structural layout and additional evidence collection:
1.33.1 Du Plessis proceeded to photograph areas within and adjacent to the Ladies’
Bar, concentrating on potential ballistic evidence and spatial layout.
1.33.2 Photo 30 depicts the interior structural layout between the Ladies’ Bar and a
hallway leading to auxiliary rooms. Du Plessis testified that these images were
meant to contextualise the building’s layout and support the creation of the sketch
plan later submitted.426
1.33.3 Photo 31 shows a spent cartridge found near a doorway between the bar and a
side passage. Du Plessis noted the presence of this cartridge implied movement
through this area, although he emphasised that he was not qualified to interpret
trajectories.427
1.33.4 Photos 32 –34 were taken of window panes and the surrounding frames. He
explained that these photos were requested by the investigators to examine
possible entry or exit points for bullets. One pane appeared to have a small circular
crack, possibly from a projectile. Du Plessis could not confirm whether any tests had
been conducted to trace trajectories through these panes.428
1.33.5 Photos 35–36 detail blood pooling and drag marks along the interior corridor near
the bar area. Du Plessis testified these were photographed as f ound. He took both
wide-angle and close -up images of these stains as per SAPS protocol. The

425 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 24.
426 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 24.
427 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 23–25.
428 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 25.

photographs were marked with identifiers that aligned with the sketch plan point
“E”.429
1.33.6 Photos 37 –38 show another set of spent cartridges, located further inside the
venue near what appeared to be a staff cloakroom. Du Plessis noted that these
images revealed a clear dispersal pattern of cartridges across several rooms,
suggesting shots were fired in multiple areas.430
1.33.7 Du Plessis clarified that Photo 36 showed the safety lever of a grenade lying in
situ, while Photo 37 showed the same object flipped over to reveal any serial
markings. He indicated that, due to proximity to the teargas canister, the lever likely
belonged to the teargas grenade, not the lethal grenade. He reiterated that while not
an explosives expert, he had experience with such objects. 431
1.33.8 Upon being questioned as to whether finger prints were taken from the teargas
canister and hand grenade lever, Du Plessis stated that, from what he could recall,
no such fingerprints were taken, and he confirmed that it should have been done.432
1.34 Sketch plan and numbered key:433
1.34.1 Du Plessis confirmed that, in addition to his photography, he was the draftsman
responsible for preparing the official sketch plan of the crime scene. He used this
plan du ring his testimony to help orient the court regarding the location of the
evidence depicted in the photographs.434
1.35 Grenade damage and serving hatch evidence:

429 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 25–26.
430 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 26.
431 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 47.
432 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 70.
433 Exhibit K – Sketch Plan.
434 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 8, 9, 24, 48–49.

1.35.1 Du Plessis explained that Photos 48 and 49 showed a hole in a tile, marked Point
U, possibly caused by a projectile. Although he could not conclusively confirm
whether it was a bullet hole, he photographed it because it was out of the ordinary
and may have been caused during the attack. There was no projectile lodged in the
tile when it was found.435
1.35.2 While he did not claim it was a bullet hole, he acknowledged that the reason it
was photographed was that it appeared unusual. He did not find a projectile lodged
inside and could not determine what caused it. 436
1.35.3 He also struggled to remember where in the building the tile had been found, but
was aided by referencing the sketch plan, which placed Point U in a side room
adjacent to the Public Bar and storeroom. Based on the shape of t he damage, Du
Plessis speculated the hole looked more like an exit shot, suggesting the projectile
may have travelled from the Public Bar through the wall, rather than from the outside
in.437
1.35.4 Photo 50 showed a mark left by a grenade on the wooden bar counter,
specifically the serving hatch that opens to the snooker room. Du Plessis confirmed
that he believed this mark was made when the teargas canister landed on the
surface, although he could not definitively state that the powder present came from
the canister itself. He noted that no other white powder was visible elsewhere at the
scene.438
1.35.5 In revisiting Ph oto 50, Du Plessis noted a white powdery residue on the bar’s
serving hatch (between the bar and snooker room). He could not confirm its source
but acknowledged witness testimony about airborne powder that caused breathing

435 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 31.
436 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 48.
437 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 48–50.
438 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 31.

issues, suggesting it might be co nnected to the teargas grenade. Notably, he had
not seen similar powder anywhere else on the scene.439
1.35.6 Du Plessis confirmed that Photo 50 captured a close -up of a serving
hatch located between the Public Bar and the adjoining room identified as the
snooker room. The image appeared to show a significant amount of white powder
residue on the wooden counter. W hile Du Plessis could not definitively identify the
substance, he noted that it might be linked to the teargas grenade found in the
vicinity. However, he did not observe this powder elsewhere at the scene and was
cautious not to speculate further.440
1.35.7 He confirmed that these marks were consistent with the detonation of a grenade,
and that the damage included impacts to wooden surfaces and floor tiles. Some of
these points were highlighted by police officers during the initial walkthrough. Photos
56 and 57 showed spent cartridges and metallic projectiles collected from the
snooker room floor.441
1.36 Snooker room and shrapnel markings:
1.36.1 Photos 51 to 57 documented the interior of the snooker room, where two large
snooker tables were located. Du Plessis identified several areas marked X, Y, Z, and
A1, which were determined to be shrapnel damage and projectiles embedded in or
around the benches and flooring, likely caused by a hand grenade. He also noted
Photo 52, which showed an impact mark beneath a bench, and Photo 53, a close -up
of the same point.442
1.36.2 Du Plessis clarified that the damage visible at points X, Y, Z, and A1 was
consistent with an explosive detonation and emphasised that this was not the result

439 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 50.
440 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 50–51.
441 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 32–33.
442 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 51–52.

of bullet impact but likely due to fragmentation from a grenade, based on the pattern
and type of surface damage. These identifications were based on his professional
experience and not on formal explosive ordnance disposal (“EOD”) training.443
1.36.3 He confirmed that these marks were consistent with the detonation of a grenade,
and that the damage included impacts to wooden surfaces and floor tiles. Some of
these points were highlighted by police officers during the initial walkthrough. Photos
56 and 57 showed spen t cartridges and metallic projectiles collected from the
snooker room floor.444
1.36.4 Du Plessis described Photos 58 to 61 as having been taken outside the Highgate
Hotel, showing markings and possible impact points along the tarred roadway and
sidewalk. Using the sketch plan, he explained that Photo 58 was taken from the
eastern end of the building, facing toward the subway bridge, and Photo 59 faced
westward, down Voortrekker Road.445
1.36.5 He indicated that markings labelled A2 and A3 had been flagged as potentially
caused by bullet strikes and were photographed to allow analysis, although he could
not confirm whether any projectiles were recovered from those points, as he did not
personally investigate beyond surface-level collection.446
1.37 Collected cartridges:
1.37.1 Photo 102, the final photograph in the bundle, displayed all the spent cartridges
collected by Du Plessis. They were arranged atop labelled envelopes, each
reflecting the location from which the item had been collected. Some envelopes held

443 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 33.
444 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 32–33.
445 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 33–34.
446 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 52–53.

a single cartridge, while others held multiple items, including one pill container used
as a substitute when standard materials ran out.447
1.37.2 Du Plessis estimated the number of cartridges to be approximately 30, though he
initially stated 35. Upon closer inspection, and with Court assistance, it was
determined that the total was 30. The envelopes included location sketches and
notes to ensure tr aceability. He clarified that all exhibits were handed over to the
investigating officer, along with a chain -of-custody record, and that this information
should have been stored in his original LCRC file.448
1.37.3 The Court was referred to a statement by Colonel Victor Jacobus Van der Merwe
(“Colonel Van der Merwe ”),449 which recorded the receipt of 56 spent 7.62x39mm
cartridges. This contrasted with the 30 cartridges photographed by Du Plessis in
Photo 102. Du Plessis explained that his team only collected evidence available
during the initial scene investigation, and any additional cartridges recovered later by
detectives would not have been included in his record but would be sent together to
the ballistics unit.450
1.37.4 When asked whether a forma l record existed identifying the specific locations
where all 56 cartridges had been found, Du Plessis responded that such a document
would likely reside with the investigating officer. He emphasised that each cartridge
collected by him was carefully marke d, sketched, and handed over, but the broader
integration of additional exhibits fell outside his control. It remained unclear whether
such a consolidated exhibit log existed in the docket.451
1.38 Chain of custody and docket procedures:

447 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 34–35.
448 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 34–35.
449 Exhibit D, Statement of Jacobus van der Merwe, pp. 72–78.
450 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 56–57.

450 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 56–57.
451 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 56–57.

1.38.1 Du Plessis confirmed that all physical evidence was handed over to the
investigating officer and was not retained by the LCRC. A chain of custody
statement was generated at the time and included i n the original forensic docket.
However, he stated that the original file may have been water -damaged due to poor
storage during several relocations of the LCRC offices. The location of this file
remains unknown.452
1.38.2 Du Plessis confirmed that each cartridge collected on the night of the incident
was marked and stored individually. As per standard SAP procedure, each cartridge
was placed into an envelope bearing a sketch or photograph of the recovery site and
details of the collector. This process was done to maintain an unbroken chain of
custody. He clarified that some envelopes depicted in Photo 102 had images of the
bar counter and written annotations, indicating where and by whom the cartridges
were retrieved. 453
1.39 Hierarchy and personnel involvement at the scene:
1.39.1 Du Plessis elaborated on the internal structure of the LCRC. At the time, the
LCRC team worked in weekly rotations: one person for photography, one for
fingerprints, and one for video. Du Plessis was on photographic duty during the
week of the incident and confirmed that he did not lift fingerprints himself that night.
454
1.39.2 When asked who his immediate superiors were, he explained that the LCRC duty
officer would typically attend l arge crime scenes like this one. He recalled that
Lieutenant Franswa Stassen (“Stassen”), a senior fingerprint officer, was most likely
present along with Sergeant Naudé, though he could not definitively confirm this. He

452 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 35.
453 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 54.
454 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 60–63.

noted that while he remembered calling the videographer out, he could not recall the
names of all individuals on scene due to the passage of time. 455
1.39.3 He confirmed that he did not lift any fingerprints himself, nor did he overlap with
that function during the Highgate Massacre investigation.456
1.40 Responsibility for fingerprints and documentation:
1.40.1 Du Ples sis clarified that Stassen would have been in charge of all fingerprint -
related operations and that, at the time, Stassen had a reputation for exceptional
expertise in fingerprint analysis. Du Plessis worked under him but emphasised that
Stassen was not th e top commander, naming Ruben Botha or Coenie Knoetse as
the likely commanders overseeing the entire LCRC operation during that period. 457
1.40.2 When asked who his immediate superiors wer e, du Plessis explained that
Stassen, the senior fingerprint officer, was "most likely" present along with Sergeant
Naudé, though he could not definitively confirm this. This uncertainty about whether
Stassen, who would have been responsible for all finger print-related operations at
the scene, was even present exemplifies the confusion surrounding basic
investigative protocols. The investigation diary entry at C6 dated 2 May 1993
suggested that Stassen, 458 Sergeant Naudé and du Plessis r eturned to conduct
fingerprint work, yet du Plessis clarified that his role was limited to additional
photography while Stassen and Sergeant Naudé were supposedly responsible for
actual fingerprint collection.459
1.40.3 The LCRC team functioned in overlapping groups, but there was no formal
separation into departmental silos like photography or fingerprinting; rather,

455 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 60–61.
456 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 36
457 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 62.
458 Exhibit E, p. C6.
459 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 60–61, 66.

individuals rotated between roles based on the call -out schedule. On 1 May 1993,
Du Plessis acted as both photographer and sketch plan draftsman, confirming again
that his role did not include fingerprinting on that night. 460
1.41 Clarification on fingerprint involvement and elimination exercises:
1.41.1 In response to cross-examination, Du Plessis confirmed that although he was not
the person who lifted fingerprints, he was qualified to do so. When asked whether
any suspects’ prints had been eliminated based on comparison with prints found at
the scene, he deferred to the fingerprint unit and stated that he had no direct
involvement in that aspect of the case. 461
1.41.2 He acknowledged having seen the investigation diary entries referring to
fingerprint elimination, particularly references to Stassen, Sergeant Naudé
(deceased), and himself. He clarified that the entry at C6, which stated that Stassen,
Sergeant Naudé, and du Plessis revisited the scene for fingerprinting, was partially
misleading. While it might suggest that he participated in fingerprint collection, his
actual role during that second visit was to take additional photographs, not lift
fingerprints.462
1.42 Photographic evidence: F1 and F2 (external photographs from media)463
1.42.1 When shown Photographs F1 and F2 (external to Exhibit K), Du Plessis could
not positively identify any individuals in F1, and only tentatively suggested that the
man in the centre of F2 might be Warrant Officer Lionel Ristow. He confirmed that
he could not be sure.464

460 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 62–63.
461 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 63–67.
462 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 38–39.
463 Exhibit F1, F2.
464 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 40–41.

1.42.2 He was also asked about a bomb disposal vehicle and a riot police vehicle visible
in F2. Du Plessis confirmed that such vehicles likely belonged to the explosives unit
and Tactical Response Team (“ TRT”). Their presence was logical, given the use of
grenades during the attack. He confirmed that while the bomb unit would have
prepared a report, he had not seen it, and its absence from the docket was noted.465
1.43 Absence of original LCRC docket and possible archive locations:
1.43.1 Du Plessis again addressed the missing LCRC docket, explaining that the
original file would have been stored at the office archive, but the office had moved
three times since 1993 (from Fleet Street to Oxford Street to Cambridge), and he
had no idea where the docket is now. 466 He could not confirm the file’s current
whereabouts but stated that it should contain critical i nformation like photo logs and
evidence chain documents.467
1.43.2 The Court directed that Captain Peterson attempt to locate the original LCRC file
and bomb unit report.468
1.44 SAP21 and reference to B2 diary entry
1.44.1 The legal team raised an entry from the investigation diary (C30), which refers to
a “local criminal record centre FP report filed as per B2 .” Du Plessis confirmed that,
while in rare cases fingerprint reports were filed into the docket, this was not the
norm. Generally, the investigating officer would obtain reports from the SAP
fingerprint database, but in high-profile cases, such as this one, the officer may have
specifically requested a hard copy of the fingerprint report to be filed in the docket.469

465 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 41–42.
466 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 43.
467 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 43.
468 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 43–44.
469 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 65–66.

1.44.2 Du Plessis stated he could no longer recall what an SAP21 report specific ally
entailed, noting that modern systems like the Crime Information Management
System (“ CIMS”) had since replaced that format. Nonetheless, Brigadier Marion,
referenced by counsel, indicated that SAP21 reports were the formal fingerprint
reports used for matching and elimination exercises in 1993.470
1.45 Clarification on involvement in fingerprint analysis:
1.45.1 Du Plessis was asked about his name appearing in an entry dated 2 May 1993 at
07h00 in the Investigation Diary,471 which stated that “Stassen, Sergeant Naudé, and
RST du Plessis” returned to the scene to conduct fingerprint work.
1.45.2 He clarified that while the entry included his name under the general fingerprint
team, his actual role on that return visit was for photography, as confirmed in the
sentence “verdere fotos is gen eem” (more photos were taken). Stassen and Naudé
were responsible for the fingerprint work.472
1.45.3 Although Du Plessis could not immediately recall what SAP21 referred to, it was
later clarified through reference to Brigadier Marion that SAP21 was the code for the
formal fingerprint report used in 1993. These reports were generated using case
numbers and logged under the Crime Register (“ CR”). While nowadays fingerprint
reporting is manag ed digitally through CIMS, in 1993, such reports may have been
manually issued and sometimes included in the docket upon request by the
investigating officer.473
1.46 Fingerprint elimination:

470 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 67–68.
471 Exhibit E, Investigation diary p. C6.
472 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 67.
473 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 66–67.

1.46.1 The process of elimination, comparing fingerprints from the scene with known
suspects, was described by Du Plessis. He confirmed that, if a suspect’s fingerprints
did not match, they would be eliminated. If there was a match, they would be
identified as a person of interest. However, Du Plessis stated he was not involved in
that aspect of the investigation.474
1.46.2 A new document titled “ List of Operatives Linked to ANC or APLA Investigated,
Questioned, and Fingerprinted” was given to Du Plessis for review. 475 It listed 64
individuals whose fingerprints were either compared or eliminated. While he
acknowledged the procedure of elimination, Du Plessis reiterated that he did not
personally conduct those comparisons in this case.476
1.47 Handling of spent cartridges and fingerprint potential:
1.47.1 When asked wh ether the spent cartridges collected at the scene were
fingerprinted, Du Plessis stated that he did not know, as this would fall under the
fingerprint expert’s domain.477
1.47.2 However, he affirmed that cartridges and grenade components should ideally be
tested for fingerprints, as suspects often leave trace prints on ammunition while
loading it. This would also apply to the teargas canister and grenade safety levers
found on site.478
1.48 Introduction and use of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(“AFIS”)

474 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 68–69.
475 Exhibit L.
476 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 69–70.
477 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 70.
478 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 70.

1.48.1 Du Plessis confirmed that the AFIS, a digital database of fingerprints, was only
introduced in the early 2000s, around 2000–2001.479
1.48.2 Before AFIS, SAPS relied on manual methods, including visual co mparison of
physical fingerprint cards. AFIS significantly improved accuracy and speed, allowing
for automated scanning and comparison with a national fingerprint database.480
1.49 Possibility of retrospective AFIS use:
1.49.1 Du Plessis acknowledged that had Stassen retained prints from the Highgate
Hotel crime scene, they could have been re-run through AFIS once the system came
online. He could not confirm if this had been done, but be lieved that, knowing
Stassen’s professionalism, it was likely he would have done so. Du Plessis also
noted that he was unsure whether Stassen was still with SAPS when AFIS
launched, and thus could not confirm a post hoc comparison.481
1.50 Home Affairs Fingerprint Database (“ HANIS”) and Automated Biometric
Identification System (“ABIS”):
1.50.1 It was mentioned that HANIS has now been upgraded to ABIS
1.50.2 Du Plessis stated that SAPS does not normally have access to the Home Affairs
database, but that interdepartmental cooperation can occur in serious cases.
Counsel cited Home Affairs’ own website, which confirms that SAPS can match
prints against ABIS for s ecurity purposes. Du Plessis agreed that this could provide
valuable leads if suspects were not on SAPS databases but existed on national ID
systems.482

479 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 71.
480 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 71–72.
481 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, p. 73.
482 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 76–77.

1.51 Reflections on being called to testify 33 years later:
1.51.1 Du Plessis expressed surprise that it had taken 32 years for him to be called to
testify. He stated that , typically, crime scene investigators are subpoenaed within
months of an incident, especially in murder cases, to pr esent photographic or
physical evidence in court. He noted that, in his experience, such an extreme delay
was unprecedented.483
Colonel Victor Jacobus Van der Merwe:484
1.52 Colonel Van der Merwe, a seasoned SAPS ballistics expert with over 37
years of experience, testified regarding his forensic involvement in the
Highgate Massacre. As the official responsible for the ballistic analysis in
the case, he provided expert insight into the types of firearms used, the
number of shots fired, and the condition and handling of ballistic
evidence. His testimony also revealed serious evidentiary losses,
including the theft of the original forensic docket, which significantly
hindered subsequent investigative and identification efforts.
1.53 Professional background and experience:
1.53.1 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed he has been serving in the police force for 37
years. He began his career in the ballistics section in 1988 and remained there
throughout his career, qualifying as a ballistics expert.485
1.53.2 He clarified that ballistic experts do not collect exhibits from crime scenes but
rather act as support to investigating officers and the LCRC. Their role is to analyse

483 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 1, 3 February 2025, pp. 38–39.
484 Exhibit N, Statement of Colonel Victor Jacobus Van der Merwe, pp. 79–80.
485 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 79–80.

exhibits once received from the scene, typically via the forensic lab's case reception
or admin. 486
1.54 Overview of relevant incident and prior cases:
1.54.1 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed he was involved in investigations of the
Yellowwoods Hotel and King Williams Town Go lf Club massacres. At the time of the
Highgate Massacre (1 May 1993), he held the rank of Warrant Officer. He was
tasked with the ballistics analysis relating to the Highgate Hotel matter and compiled
a report dated 5 November 1993, marked as Exhibit D in the proceedings. 487
1.55 Ballistics expertise and training:
1.55.1 Colonel Van der Merwe provided a summary of his qualifications, which entail:
(a) Completion of three years of in-service training in ballistics.
(b) Expertise in the microscopic individualisation of firearms,
cartridge cases, bullets, and toolmarks.
(c) Training in restoring obliterated serial numbers, and
internal, intermediate, external, and terminal ballistics.
(d) Expertise in crime scene reconstruction and physical
match techniques, including matching horns, teeth, and
hides in poaching cases.

486 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 80.
487 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 81.

(e) Completion of international courses. Courses on bloodstain
pattern analysis and crime scene reconstruction as
presented by experts from the USA. 488
(f) He stated that he regularly test ified in South African courts
and in the courts of neighbouring states. 489
1.56 Career overview and qualifications:
1.56.1 Colonel Van Der Merwe detailed the scope of his three -year in-service training
programme, which included:
(a) Microscopic individualisation of firearms, ammunition,
spent bullets, and cartridge cases;
(b) Tool and tool mark identification;
(c) Restoration of obliterated serial numbers;
(d) Internal, intermediate, external, and terminal ballistics;
(e) Forensic ammunition reloading;
(f) Wound ballistics and projectile-target interaction;
(g) Physical matching techniques, including poaching -related
investigations (e.g., rhino horn reconstruction);
(h) Crime scene photography and documentation.490

488 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 82–84.
489 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 84.

1.57 His international certifications included:
1.57.1 A Diploma in Forensic Criminalistics (Ballistics) from the Forensic Science
Society in the UK (1995);
1.57.2 An Advanced Certificate in Forensic Criminalistics (Ballistics) from UNISA (1998);
1.57.3 Completion of a Professional Hunters Course; and
1.57.4 Training in Crime Scene Reconstruction and Bloodstain Pattern Analysis unde r
US-based specialists Michael Maloney and John Hodel.491
1.58 Highgate crime Scene and initial observations:
1.58.1 On 3 and 4 May 1993, Colonel Van Der Merwe visited the Highgate Massacre
crime scene at the request of Captain Ian Swarts (“ Swarts”). By the time of his
arrival, the scene had already been cleaned, and his objective was to examine bullet
holes and ballistic markings rather than collect evidence.492
1.58.2 He reported:
(a) No bullet holes in the entrance portal of the hotel;
(b) Seven bullet holes in the passage leading to the Ladies’
Bar and the Open Arms Bar were likely fired from the main
entrance area;
(c) No bullet holes in the Ladies’ Bar or the kitchen area of the
Open Arms Bar;

490 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 82–84.
491 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 84–85.
492 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 85.

(d) One bullet hole through the wooden panel near t he door
frame leading into the Open Arms Bar;
(e) Seven bullet holes in the Open Arms Bar, apparently fired
from the direction of the entrance;
(f) Three bullet holes fired from behind the bar counter,
possibly from a civilian returning fire; and
(g) A sin gle .38 Special bullet embedded in the hotel’s
entrance frame, possibly fired from inside the kitchen
toward the outside.493
1.58.3 He observed 30 bullet holes in the Public Bar area, most of which had been fired
through the bar counter from the direction of the entrance.494
1.58.4 He further confirmed that none of the deceased had wounds from handgun fire,
only rifle bullets, ruling out speculation that a civilian handgun caused any
fatalities.495
1.59 Receipt and marking of ballistics exhibits:
1.59.1 Colonel Van der Merwe testified that on 14 June 1993, he received from the
Ballistic Administration Unit a packet containing nine fired .38 Special calibre
cartridge cases. 496 These were mar ked with the lab number 16020/93 and
designated as DD1 to DD9. He explained that markings such as “DD” often
corresponded to identifiers provided by the person who collected the exhibit, either

493 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 86–88.
494 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 88.
495 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 89.
496 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 90.

the LCRC or investigating officer, and were typically referenc ed in their photo
albums or covering letters.497
1.59.2 He also received one fired bullet, which he marked as .38357, indicating it could
have come from either a .38 Special or .357 Magnum revolver. This differentiation is
based on the cartridge case length, as both calibres use the same bullets.498
1.59.3 Furthermore, 56 fired 7.62×39mm calibre cartridge cases, standard ammunition
for AK -47 rifles, were submitted under multiple sub -markings (AA1 –AA3, CC1 –
CC13, E–J, N–S, K1–K4, L1–L15, and BB1 –BB9), all tied to the same lab number
16020/93.499
1.59.4 In addition, 17 fired 7.62×39mm bullets were received (A –D, N, BB10 –BB18) as
well as three post -mortem recovered bullets marked DR327 , DR328, and DR330.
These were linked to the deceased individuals from the Highgate Massacre.500
1.60 Examination of clothing and other exhibits:
1.60.1 Colonel Van der Merwe also received clothing for ballistic examination. This
included blue denim trousers, a striped t -shirt, long -sleeved shirts, windbreakers,
and other garments. Each item was individually labelled (A –J) and examined for
gunpowder residu e or signs of close -range fire. He stated that this analysis was
necessary because several bullet holes passed through clothing.501
1.60.2 Other envelopes marked K –S were handed to othe r forensic specialists (e.g.,
Captain Rass, Lieutenant Julie Allen, and Lieutenant Colonel Johan Claassen) for

497 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 90.
498 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 91.
499 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 92.
500 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 93–94.
501 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 95–96.

further analysis, including chemical tests on clothing and possible bloodstain
examination.502
1.61 Ballistics analysis and firearm matching:
1.61.1 Colonel Van der Merwe described the results of his analysis of various bullets
and cartridge cases:
(a) Two separate AK -47 rifles were determined to have been
used based on microscopic comparison of cartridge cases.
(b) 19 cartridge cases matched one AK-47.
(c) 28 cartridge cases matched a second AK-47.503
(d) Four bullets matched the first AK -47, and seven (including
one recovered from Weber) matched the second AK-47.504
1.61.2 Eight bullets could not be conclusively li nked to any firearm due to deformation,
which damaged the necessary microscopic markings.505
1.61.3 He stressed that the damage likely occurred when bullets struck secondary
surfaces, such as walls or bones, which would obliterate the identifying marks
needed for firearm linkage.
1.62 5.56mm Bullet hole discovery:
1.62.1 Colonel Van der Merwe testified about the discovery of a 5.56mm calibre bullet
hole in a ceiling panel. He clarified that this calibre, used in R4 or R5 military rifles,506

502 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 96–97.
503 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 101.
504 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 101–102.
505 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 103.

is smaller than the 7.62mm AK-47 bullets. Physical tests on similar panels confirmed
that an AK-47 round would not fit the 5.56mm hole.507
1.62.2 This could suggest that a third firearm, likely a 5.56mm calibre military weapon,
was fired at the scene, although only one shot was linked to this calibre. 508
Alternatively, this may have been a hole left from a previous incident.
1.63 Confirmation of AK-47 working condition:
1.63.1 One of the submitted AK -47 rifles (with folding stock) was confirmed to be in full
working order and capable of automatic fire.
1.63.2 However, it was not linked to any of the recovered cartridge cases or bullets and
thus was excluded from being one of the two used in the Highgate Massacre.509
1.64 Exclusion of other incidents:
1.64.1 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that none of the Highgate Hotel ballistics
exhibits matched exhibits from the Komga (Cas 55/05/93) or Yellowwoods Hotel
cases.
1.64.2 This confirms that these were unrelated incidents, at least from a ballistics
perspective.510
1.65 Firing distance and trajectory observations:

506 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 105.
507 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 99–100.
508 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 98–100.
509 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 107.
510 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 107.

1.65.1 His tests showed no partially burned gunpowder on clothing or panels, meaning
the shots were not fired from close range . The 5.56mm bullet trajectory was upward,
from inside the building toward the ceiling.511
1.66 Role of ballistics experts at crime scenes:
1.66.1 Colonel Van der Merwe clarified that ball istics experts are typically called to
scenes only upon request, either for reconstructions or where specialist input is
needed. He was specifically requested by Swarts to attend the Highgate Hotel crime
scene.512
1.67 Colonel Van der Merwe’s crime scene role and ballistics analysis
protocols:
1.67.1 Colonel Van der Merwe reiterated that ballistic experts only attend crime scenes
on request and are not standard members of the initial i nvestigative team. LCRC
manages the scene, collects exhibits, and compiles photo albums. Ballistics is
treated as a specialised, complementary unit. Colonel Van der Merwe described his
role as providing technical input on bullet trajectories and impacts wh en requested
by either investigating officers or prosecutors at a later stage in the investigation.513
1.67.2 He further elaborated that their input is often requested during scene
reconstructions or when new questions arise from photo albums or physical exhibits,
particularly when analysing entry and exit wounds or determining shooting
distances.514
1.68 On-Site observations and limitations:

511 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 108.
512 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 109–110.
513 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 110–111.
514 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 110.

1.68.1 At the scene, he observed approximately 30 bullet holes in the Public Bar area.
However, he could not determine their calibre without more specific con text or
physical evidence. He explained that materials (e.g., wood, brick, plaster) affect how
bullet holes appear and make calibre determination difficult without intact bullets or
test results.515
1.69 Observations on bullet holes and calibre determination challenges:
1.69.1 Colonel Van der Merwe explained the limitations of determining bullet calibre
based purely on holes in surfaces such as brick, wood, or metal. For example:
(a) Brick walls: Bullets tend to shatter the plaster, making it
difficult to determine calibre.516
(b) Wood: The material closes in after a bullet penetrates,
often giving a misleading impression of calibre.517
(c) Metal panels: Bullet velocity plays a key role as faster
bullets create smaller, neater holes, while slower ones may
deform and create larger exit holes.518
1.69.2 He stressed that without controlled testing or comparison with a suspected
weapon, accurate calibre identification from impact points is unreliable.519
1.70 Structure and function of the Forensic Science Laborato ry Docket
System (“FSLDS”)

515 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 110–111.
516 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 111.
517 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 111.
518 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 111.
519 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 111.

1.70.1 Colonel Van der Merwe clarified that the Forensic Science Laboratory
(“FSL”) maintains its own independent dockets, separate from the main police case
files. These dockets contain:
(a) All covering letters;
(b) Internal reports;
(c) Ballistic exhibits such as cartridge cases and bullets.
1.70.2 He explained that once analysts conclude their wor k, the docket is archived,
unless further entries or re-examinations are required later.520
1.70.3 When asked how the system works today versus in the 1990s, he highlighted the
shift from physical postage to electronic systems such as ICDMS, which enables
scanning, tracking, and digital access by investigating officers. In contrast, during the
early 1990s, most dockets and exhibits were posted via the Post Office, including
sensitive items such as firearms and cartridge cases.521
1.71 Filing challenges and loss of the Highgate Massacre docket:
1.71.1 Colonel Van der Merwe disclosed that the original docket for the Highg ate Hotel
incident, which he compiled, had been lost or stolen in the post. He was unaware of
the loss until very recently, during preparations for his testimony at the inquest.
1.71.2 He explained that the docket was likely sent to Cape Town, possibly for
comparison with other cases such as the St James Church or Heidelberg Tavern

520 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 112.
521 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 112–113.

attacks. At that time, it would have been sent through physical post, complete with
cartridge cases, bullets, reports, and covering letters.522
1.71.3 While no firearms were included in the posted docket, Colonel Van der Merwe
confirmed that exhibits were usually collected either by investigating officers or
colleagues such a s Colonel Hattingh. Today, biometric systems are used to sign
exhibits in and out of storage at the FSL, improving traceability.523
1.72 Scale of ballistics casework and record keeping:
1.72.1 To illustrate the scale and complexity of FSL operations, Colonel Van der Merwe
cited internal statistics:
(a) Over 1.8 million ballistic cases have been handled to date.
(b) The broader FSL system, including biology, chemistry, and
other sections, has processed over 8.8 million cases.
1.72.2 He emphasised the logistical difficulty of archiving such large volumes, noting
that nothing is destroyed, and every case must be permanently filed.524
1.73 Internal docket System and lost documents:
1.73.1 Colonel Van der Merwe explained that the forensic lab maintained its own docket
system, separate from investigative police dockets. His lab number for this case was
16020/93, and he referenced INS127, 525 which denoted entry 1 of the forensic
record. Exhibits were once routinely shipped via post, even in high -profile cases.
Colonel Van der Merwe testified that his original docket, containing reports and

522 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 113–114.
523 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 114–115.
524 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 116.
525 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 115.

exhibits, had been posted to Cape Town but was later reported stolen, likely during
transit. A police case was opened at the time.526
1.74 Observations on the peculiarity of the theft:
1.74.1 Colonel Van der Merwe expressed puzzlement over why someone would steal
the FSL docket, given that:
(a) Its contents (spent cartridges, bullets, and paperwork) had
no commercial value.527
(b) It would be difficult to locate such a package intentionally
within a large postal facility. 528
1.74.2 It was noted that the theft could only have been successful if the perpetra tor had
specific knowledge of the docket’s location, which was considered highly unlikely. 529
1.75 Receipt and documentation of exhibits:
1.75.1 Colonel Van der Merwe explained that he may have received the packet of
bullets referred to in paragraph 5 of his report either:
(a) By post (most likely at the time); or
(b) Directly from the forensic admin section.
1.75.2 He also explained that the pack et seal would typically be made of wax and carry
a unique number tied to the issuing police station, which would be physically cut and
kept for documentation purposes. 530

526 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 112–119.
527 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 120.
528 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 120–122.
529 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 121–122.

1.76 Knowledge of explosives and police forms:
1.76.1 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed he did not receive formal training in
explosives, although he had limited informal exposure.531
1.76.2 He explained the SAP21 as a general -purpose official police communication
form, used for matters like submitting leave requests, and not specifically for
fingerprints.532
1.76.3 He confirmed he was unfamiliar with the SAP 21, a form possibly used for
fingerprinting.533
1.77 Fingerprint Evidence:
1.77.1 Colonel Van der Merwe did not know whether fingerprints were lifted at the
Highgate scene.534
1.78 The recovered bullet from Beling:
1.78.1 Reference was made to Exhibit 1, the bullet removed from Beling’s body. Colonel
Van der Merwe identified it as a 7.62mm projectile, specifically from an AK -47, and
clarified that although such bullets a re often colloquially referred to as “7.62x39”, the
“39” denotes the cartridge case length and not the bullet itself. While several
firearms use 7.62mm bullets, the features of this one were consistent with the AK -47

530 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 122.
531 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 123.
532 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, pp. 123–124.
533 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 124.
534 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 6, Part 2, 3 February 2025, p. 124.

family. He observed that it bore markin gs from interaction with the firearm’s barrel
grooves, confirming it had been fired.535
1.78.2 Colonel Van der Merwe explained the metallurgical composition of Russian -
manufactured AK-47 bullets. They often use mild steel with copper or green lacquer
coatings to prevent corrosion. These coatings are vulnerable to damage, especially
from environmental exposure or body fluids, as in this case. As a result, the bullet’s
corroded state rendered microscopic comparison unfeasible. Despite having been
examined under a microscope, both by Colonel Van der Merwe and his colleague
Yolandie Schoeman, no usable striation marks remained. He likened the impact of
bodily fluids and improper storage on the b ullet to the rapid rusting of untreated
metal, thereby explaining the loss of evidentiary value.536
1.78.3 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that the bullet could not be compared to any
firearm, nor could it be matched with other bullets or cartridge cases. He also
mentioned a simple but reliable method often used in lab testing the bullet with a
magnet, as steel -based bullets (common in Russian or Chinese munitions) are
magnetic, unlike those made from brass or copper alloys. 537
1.79 Discussion of ballistic proficiency and crime scene observations:
1.79.1 During questioning about the Ladies' Bar, where four victims died, Colonel Van
der Merwe noted the absence of bullet marks on walls or ceilings. He interpreted this
to mean the assailant’s bullets found their targets, indicating a high degree of
accuracy and proficiency. He contrasted the muzzle velocity of the AK -47 (700–750
m/s) with that of the R4 or R5 rifles (around 880 –900 m/s), noting that the AK -47 is
more likely to retain spent bullets at the scene due to lower exit velocity.538

535 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 1–3.
536 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 3–6.
537 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 6.

537 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 6.
538 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 8–10.

1.79.2 Colonel Van der Merwe detailed the firing modes of the AK -47, explaining that
full-automatic mode discharges 600 rounds per minute, ten per second, making
accuracy difficult. The fact that no missed shots were apparent implied the weapon
was likely fired in semi -automatic mode or controlled bursts, again pointing to the
shooter’s tactical control.539
1.80 Ambiguities in crime scene terminology:
1.80.1 There was some confusion over references in Colonel Van der Merwe’s affidavit
to the "Open Arms Bar." When asked to clarify whether he meant the Ladies' Bar,
Colonel Van der Merwe admitted he could no longer recall precisely and had been
relying on second -hand information at the time. The lack of access to his original
docket limited his ability to verify such details. It was later proposed that the “Open
Arms Bar” might have been a colloquial name for the "Nuwe Dames Kroeg," whic h
further illustrated the difficulties in reconstructing the scene decades later.540
1.81 Absence of contact wounds and handgun injuries:
1.81.1 Colonel Van der Merwe elaborated on the absence of contact wounds among the
victims, explaining that close -range shots typically produce distinct signs such as
tearing or blackening of fabric from partially burnt propellant. Neither post -mortem
reports nor clothing examinations showed such indica tors, suggesting that the shots
were fired from a distance of at least one metre.541
1.81.2 On the question of handguns, particularly a .38 Special, Colonel Van der Merwe
noted its different ballistic characteristics: a larger diameter (approximately 9.6mm)
and lower velocity compared to the AK -47’s 7.62mm. He found no evidence among

539 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 9–10.
540 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 14–16.
541 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 14–16.

the injuries consistent with handgun wounds, confirming that no shots were likely
fired from such weapons.542
1.82 Cartridge and bullet recovery: analytical limitations:
1.82.1 Colonel Van der Merwe reviewed the contents of paragraph 5 in his affidavit,
which listed exhibits he had analysed. He referenced a photograph (Photo 102)
showing envelopes of collected cartridg es and bullets, noting the peculiar clustering
of some cartridges. However, lacking his original docket and accompanying
documentation, he was unable to confirm the specific locations from which the
cartridges had been recovered. He emphasised that this in formation would typically
be recorded in covering letters from investigating officers or LCRC staff and would
have enabled precise spatial analysis of the shooting.543
1.82.2 Colonel Van der Merwe explained that he had arrived at the crime scene days
after the incident, by which time LCRC staff and others had already combed the
area. As such, no spent cartridges remained on the ground, and the only ballistic
evidence he found was a .38 bu llet embedded in a doorframe. He addressed a
discrepancy in the number of cartridges recovered - his report recorded 56
cartridges, whereas a photograph reflected only about 30. He speculated that
additional cartridges might have been found after the initi al sweep, a common
occurrence when different officials contribute to evidence recovery at staggered
times.544
1.82.3 Drawing from memory, Colonel Van der Merwe roughly calculated the tot al
number of bullet marks (from paragraphs 3.2 to 3.9 of his affidavit) to be around 45.
Adding the bullets recovered from post -mortem examinations and one marked
Weber, he arrived at approximately 49 projectiles accounted for, closely aligning with

542 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 16–17.
543 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 17–19.
544 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 19–20.

the 56 cartridge cases. He concluded that 6 –7 spent cartridges remained
unexplained, a not -so-uncommon outcome given the fluid and sometimes chaotic
nature of early -stage crime scene management. 545 However, he did not know that
this was less common with AK -47 cartridge cases, which are bigger, and that it
might have been common for one or two to go missing, but it was strange for five to
six to go missing.546
1.83 Microscopic analysis and linkage of firearms:
1.83.1 Turning to paragraph 8 of his affidavit, Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that an
AK-47 was handed to him on 12 August 1993 for testing. This firearm, identified by
its 7.62x39mm calibre and folding butt, lacked a magazine and was submitted by
Captain MA Kruger. The weapon was tested and found to be unrelated to any
cartridges or bullets recovered from the Highgate scene. Furthermore, comparisons
with exhibits from othe r cases, Komga (Cas 29713/03) and East London (Cas
691/08/03), also yielded no positive matches.547
1.83.2 Colonel Van der Merwe clarified that while he made those specific comparisons
at the request of investigating officers, he had not compared the AK -47 with every
firearm on the SAPS database. He explained that in 1997, SAPS introduced an IBIS,
which could syst ematically match exhibits across the country. Unfortunately, the
Highgate material predated the system, and earlier exhibits were not backloaded
onto IBIS. Moreover, the original cartridges from the Highgate scene had since been
lost, allegedly stolen during postal transfer in July 1995.548
1.84 Challenges in tracing firearms and technological limitations:

545 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 20–22.
546 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 22.
547 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 24–27.
548 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 26–30.

1.84.1 Colonel Van der Merwe elaborated that the IBIS system, while powerful, only
included exhibits entered from 1997 onward. No retroactive upload of older cases
was conducted. Therefore, even if the AK -47s used at Highgate were recovered
years later and uploaded to the IBIS database, they would not link to the Highgate
cartridges unless those were also on the system.
1.84.2 Unfortunately, the theft of those exhibits eliminated that possibility. He reiterated
that SAPS ballistics staff do not engage in firearm ownership tracing, which would
typically require a SAPS 521F enquiry with th e firearms registry. However, AK -47s,
being mostly illegal and unlicensed in South Africa, are unlikely to appear in any
such registry.549
1.85 Cartridge identification and the loss of headstamp evidence:
1.85.1 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that spent cartridges normally carry identifying
headstamps on their bases, typically indicating manufacturer, calibre, and production
lot. He explained that AK -47 cartridges from Russian or Chinese origin often include
minimal markings, sometimes merely numbers such as "531", and not the calibre.
These identifiers help distinguish between manufacturers, such as Pretoria Metal
Pressings (“ PMP”), Russian, or Chinese sources. In this case, however, tha t
valuable data was lost with the disappearance of the original cartridge exhibits.550
1.85.2 Colonel Van der Merwe also discussed how the absence of these cartridges now
precludes the p ossibility of uploading them to the IBIS system. If they had been
available, their inclusion in the database would have meant that any future recovery
of the Highgate AK -47s could be definitively linked through ballistic signature

549 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 29–31.
550 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 41–42.

matching. This inability to verify cartridge origin through base markings or to trace
them using IBIS represents a significant evidentiary loss.551
1.86 Further loss of evidentiary value due to degradation:
1.86.1 Returning to the bullet recovered from Beling, Colonel Van der Merwe used it to
demonstrate the impact of corrosion on ballistic comparison. He reiterated that the
microscopic striation marks, used to identify the specific barrel that fired a bullet, ha d
been completely eroded, likely due to prolonged exposure to bodily fluids. Under the
microscope, the bullet’s surface resembled a cratered landscape, with no linear
marks suitable for comparison. Thus, despite initial optimism, this bullet could not be
matched to any weapon.552
1.86.2 Colonel Van der Merwe added that bullets can only be matched with their
cartridges in rare instances. In this case, he could not confirm that the bullets
analysed came from the same firearms responsible for the cartridge cases.
Nonetheless, he considered it a safe as sumption that the two groups of bullets,
corresponding to two AK-47s, matched the two sets of cartridge cases. Since bullets
cannot exist independently at a scene (unless fired from a revolver), the presence of
two bullet groups aligned with the evidence of two firing weapons.553
1.87 Theft of exhibits and suspicion of tampering:
1.87.1 Colonel Van der Merwe addressed the disappearance of cartridge exhibits. He
confirmed that these had allegedly been posted to Pretoria in July 1995 but were
reported stolen in transit. He expressed concern that, given their lack of resale
value, the only p lausible motive for their theft was to destroy crucial forensic
evidence. Colonel Van der Merwe acknowledged that if true, this would indicate an

551 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 33–34.
552 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 51–55.
553 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 35.

internal leak, as someone would have needed to identify the specific package within
the postal system. While hoping such a breach did not occur, he did not rule it out.554
1.87.2 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that some exhibits had, in fact, been hand -
delivered in other instances, particularly in high -profile cases, highlighting the
inconsistency in handling procedures. He stated that if the cartridge cases had been
retained, they could have been added to the IBIS system, and a future match might
still have been possible.555
1.88 Loss of metadata and forensic tracing opportunities:
1.88.1 Colonel Van der Merwe explained that the headstamps on cartridge bases not
only identify the country of origin but also enable forensic expe rts to trace lot
numbers and manufacturers. This is especially critical when distinguishing between
domestic (e.g., PMP) and foreign (e.g., Russian or Chinese) ammunition. In some
special operations, PMP produced unmarked ammunition to ensure deniability, and
such rounds have occasionally appeared in crime scenes. He acknowledged that
one of the Highgate cartridges appeared unusually shiny in photographs, which may
indicate non-standard or even locally produced ammunition.556
1.88.2 Had the full set of exhibits been preserved, he explained, experts could have
studied the headstamps under magnification to determine origin, lot number, and
possible links to the then SAP, SADF, or foreign sou rces. The theft of the items thus
represents not only the loss of ballistic comparison opportunities but also the loss of
metadata critical for tracing the supply chain of the weapons and ammunition
used.557

554 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 40–41.
555 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 38–39.
556 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 46–47.
557 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 43–44.

1.88.3 Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that his ballistic analysis indicated the use of
two AK -47s during the massacre. The total number of spent cartridges (56) and
bullets recovered and matched (approx. 49) were broadly consistent, and the
ballistic signatures showed that two separate weapons had been fired. He stated
categorically that no evidence linked a handgun to any of the injuries or damage. He
also confirmed that, despite initial indications, the bullet recovered from Beling could
not be used for comparison purposes due to advanced corrosion.558
1.88.4 Colonel Van der Merwe also addressed the evidentiary dead -end created by the
theft of the Highgate cartridges, underscoring that spent cartridges have no resale
value and would only have been targeted for the purpose of destroying or
obstructing evidence. H e suggested this implied the possibility of an internal leak
within SAPS or the forensic chain of custody, a concern that troubled both the
witness and the Court.559
1.88.5 Colonel Van d er Merwe then described how cartridge headstamps, markings
found on the base of spent rounds, typically include information such as batch
number, year of manufacture, and country of origin. He confirmed that certain
special forces munitions, particularly t hose manufactured by PMP, were deliberately
unmarked to obscure provenance. This practice, although not widely known to the
public, was not unusual for covert operations.560
1.88.6 Had t he Highgate cartridges been preserved, he affirmed, experts could have
analysed the headstamps to distinguish between imported and domestically
produced ammunition, such as differentiating Russian or Chinese AK -47 rounds
from PMP variants. He examined photographs of the crime scene (particularly Photo
102) and noted a range of bullet casing appearances, including some unusually

558 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 4-5, 41–44.
559 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 40–41.

559 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 40–41.
560 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 46–47.

shiny examples that may have indicated PMP manufacture. However, without the
physical exhibits, these assessments remained speculative.561
1.88.7 Upon viewing a 9mm cartridge for headstamp identification, Colonel Van der
Merwe used it to explain how even a magnet test could help distinguish between
copper-washed mil d steel (typically foreign) and solid copper cartridges (typically
PMP). He noted that some of the Highgate bullets, including the one removed from
Beling, displayed copper -washed steel properties, further suggesting Russian or
Chinese origin.562
1.88.8 Colonel Van der Merwe clarified the process of how microscopic striation marks,
used for bullet-to-barrel comparison, are eroded through corrosion. He explained the
mechanics of how the co pper coating of AK -47 bullets is stripped as they pass
through rifling grooves in the barrel: this area, critical for comparison, is particularly
vulnerable to degradation. In the case of Beling’s bullet, the region had become so
pitted that no striations remained, making meaningful comparison impossible.563
1.88.9 He elaborated on why the bullet could not be compared even under optimal
laboratory conditions and reaffirmed that its eviden tiary value had been permanently
compromised. Moreover, he explained that IBIS can still process damaged bullets if
certain rear regions remain intact, thanks to improvements in acquisition technology.
But in this case, even those critical rear portions ha d been too corroded to yield
useful data.564
1.88.10 Finally, Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that the original Highgate
docket had gone missing and that he had not had access to it since relocating to
Port Elizabeth in 1996.

561 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 49–51.
562 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 51–52.
563 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 52–55.
564 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 55–56.

1.89 Final clarifications and acknowledgements of evidence limitations:
1.89.1 Colonel Van der Merwe reiterated that after he was transferred from Pretoria to
Port Elizabeth in 1996, he was informed that the Highgate docket had been stolen.
This theft was not k nown to him at the time and only came to light later when he
attempted to access the file for reference. It was further confirmed that the docket in
question, which included vital notes and source material, had not yet been located
by the investigating officer, Captain Peterson.565
1.89.2 Colonel Van der Merwe also confirmed that the bullets he had analysed were
compared against those recovered in the Yellowwoods Hotel attack. While he could
not recall full details, he believed both AK -47 and 5.56mm ammunition had been
used in that incident.
1.90 Discussion on special forces ammunition and police ammunition
practices:
1.90.1 Colonel Van der Merwe acknowledged that special forces in South Afri ca had
occasionally used ammunition produced by PMP that bore no headstamp markings.
This unmarked ammunition was purposefully designed to limit traceability in covert
operations. When asked whether such ammunition, if identified during analysis,
would have raised concerns, Colonel expressed hesitation, explaining that even in
ordinary police operations, a wide variety of ammunition types could be found in a
single officer’s magazine.
1.90.2 He described this as a widespread problem: police officers often c arried mixed
batches of military surplus and civilian ammunition. He also remarked that current
crime scene submissions showed an increase in AK -47 and 5.56mm rounds of
recent manufacture, largely from Russian and Chinese sources. Therefore, the

565 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 57.

presence o f diverse ammunition types, even in police hands, was not necessarily
suspicious from a forensic perspective.566
Charl Jurgens Naudé:567
1.91 Charl Jurgens Naudé's (“ Naudé”) testimony, which drew upon his more
than 40 years of experience in the South African Defence Force
(“SADF”) and South African National Defence Force (“ SANDF”),
provided valuable insight into the origins and characteristics of specific
explosive items and t eargas grenades recovered from the Highgate
Hotel crime scene.568
1.92 Professional background and expertise:
1.92.1 Naudé confirmed his authorship of a report submitted as Ex hibit O. His
curriculum details his qualifications and experience, including his tenure as Officer
Commanding at the Department of Defence Ammunition Depot and School of
Ammunition. He was also a bomb disposal specialist and contributed to the
development of SAPS bomb disposal unit standards. He held senior staff officer
responsibilities within the Directorate of Army Logistics and was involved in
ammunition testing, design, licensing, and disposal. Notably, he led a three -month
clearance operation in Maputo following a munitions depot explosion in 2007.569
1.93 Examination of teargas grenade evidence:
1.93.1 Naudé was asked to provide expert comment on items recovered from the crime
scene, including a spent teargas grenade visible in photograph 40 of the police
album. He identified characteristic burn marks consistent with CS gas grenades,

566 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 46–47, 58–59
567 Exhibit O, Report of Charl Jurgens Naudé.
568 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 62–66; Exhibit O.
569 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 62–65.

likening the giraffe -like burn pattern to those seen on grenades used in riot control
testing. He al so pointed out a fly -off lever (depicted in Figure 2 of his report), which
typically separates from the grenade upon detonation. Naudé explained that some
striker mechanisms bore printed lot numbers which could aid in traceability if
retained.570
1.93.2 According to Naudé, these CS grenades were manufactured by Swartklip
Products in Mitchells Plain, Cape Town. The factory, formerly known as the Ronden
Fireworks Factory, was later absorbe d into Rheinmetall Denel Munition. He noted
that such grenades were primarily supplied to the SAP/SAPS and selected SADF
units, as well as the police forces of the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana,
Venda, and Ciskei).571
1.94 Distribution and control of ammunition:
1.94.1 Once manufactured, the grenades would be sent to SAP central depots or
military depots such as De Aar, Naboomspruit, or Jan Kempdorp for controlled
distribution. Naudé affirmed that the items were intended for riot control and were
only issued to trained personnel familiar with their use and associated safet y
measures, including gas mask deployment.572
1.95 Analysis of hand grenade fragments and crater evidence:
1.95.1 When he was referred to photographic figures from the police photo album
(Figures 4 and 5, derived from Photos 37 and 38), which depicted a fly -off lever
consistent with the UZRGM fuse, Naudé explained that this type of striker
mechanism was used in Sovie t F1 or RDG series hand grenades, both anti -
personnel fragmentation grenades. He noted that South Africa never manufactured
these weapons; they were typically smuggled into the country from Soviet bloc

570 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 66–68.
571 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, pp. 68–70.
572 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 1, 4 February 2025, p. 69–70

states such as Russia, China, and Czechoslovakia for u se by so-called “terrorists” at
the time.573
1.95.2 Naudé described the markings used on the fly -off lever for identification and
displayed graphical representations in his report showi ng the grenade types: the
RDG-5 (a smooth, offensive grenade), the F1 (a “pineapple”-style defensive grenade
similar to the British Number 36), and the UZRGM fuse. He explained that the F1
was pre -fragmented to create deadly shrapnel, while the RDG -5 had a higher
explosive content (100g TNT compared to the F1’s 60g) and was designed for
offensive use, causing internal trauma such as lung damage rather than extensive
fragmentation.574
1.95.3 Naudé confirmed that no safety pin had been recovered from the scene and
offered possible explanations, such as it remaining on the attacker’s finger or being
removed before entry. He described the arming mechanism and delay times, noting
that timing varied depending on the fuse type (0 –13 seconds).575 Naudé concluded
that it would have been difficult for the shooter to have difficult for one person to
have to let the gun off the sling and then remove the safety pin from the grenade. 576
Accordingly, his view was that if there was one attacker who was both shooting and
throwing the grenade, then he would have exp ected him to throw the grenade
first.577 The acceptable evidence, however, is to the effect that the shooting
preceded the deployment of the teargas.
1.95.4 Naudé then examined Photos 52 an d 53 (Figures 9 and 10), which depicted a
blast crater. He concluded that the damage likely originated from an RDG -5
grenade, not the F1, due to the absence of large floor gouges and the specific
carbonisation pattern left by TNT. He cautioned that a defin itive conclusion would

573 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 71–72.
574 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 72–74, 77–78.
575 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 73–75.

575 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 73–75.
576 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, p. 74.
577 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, p. 75.

require a controlled comparison test, but his analysis suggested the RDG -5 was the
more probable source.578
1.96 Evaluation of blast effects and ammunition provenance:
1.96.1 Naudé compared shrapnel dispersion patterns expected from F1 and RDG -5
grenades. He observed that damage was visible o n the side and rear walls but not
on the ceiling, which was inconsistent with the expected omnidirectional blast of the
F1. This supported the conclusion that an RDG-5 was used.579
1.96.2 Naudé also discussed South African -manufactured AK-47 ammunition produced
by PMP, confirming that such rounds lacked headstamps to conceal their origin for
covert operations. While Czechoslovakia also produced brass cases, PMPs were
intended for Special Forces and were distinct in their unmarked appearance. This
echoed testimony from Colonel Van der Merwe.580
1.96.3 Naudé clarified that he lacked knowledge of political matters, such a s alleged
weapon transfers from Transkei to APLA. He reiterated that his domain was
technical and focused on ammunition characteristics, not geopolitical affiliations.581

D. Investigative evidence

1.97 Contemporaneous investigations (1993–1994):
1.97.1 The inquest benefited from testimony and statements by officers involved in the
initial investigation, as well as experts who reviewed the case file. Captain Peterson

578 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 75–77.
579 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 77–79.
580 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 79–80.
581 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7, Part 2, 4 February 2025, pp. 80–82.

testified regarding the numerous challenges and irregularities that plagued the
investigation from the start.582
1.97.2 He acknowledged under cros s-examination that vital evidence had been lost or
overlooked over the years. For instance, crime scene exhibits such as fingerprints
lifted from the scene and even spent cartridges collected were reported missing from
police custody.583
1.98 Third-Force allegations: 584
1.98.1 Testimony was also given about the broader political context in which the
Highgate Massacre occurred. The early 1990s in South Africa, during the
negotiations to end apartheid, saw surges of violence that many believed were
fomented by a hidden hand or “third -force” (elements of the state security apparatus
acting secretly to derail the transition).
1.98.2 In fact, a former member of the joint police and military task team that was
investigating political violence at the time, Els, has long maintained that he is “99%
sure” the Highgate attack involved apartheid-era security force operatives.
1.98.3 Els (n ow with the Directorate of Special Operations) met with survivors and
PAC/APLA representatives in 2006, and both he and Mphahlele, who was APLA’s
Director of Operations in 1993, agreed that APLA did not carry out this attack.
1.98.4 Their discussions, which were recounted in the evidence, revealed a remarkable
consensus across old battle lines: the Highgate Massacre bore the hallmarks of a
“false flag” operation by a third party, likely elements within the apartheid security
forces, possibly using proxy agents.

582 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 31–101
583 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 79–84
584 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 6–12.

1.99 Historical context: APLA and the Third-Force: 585
1.99.1 Mphahlele’s input to this inquest is particularly noteworthy. As the APLA
commander at the time, he testified that APLA had no unit operating in East London
that night and no record of this attack in its archives.
1.99.2 He confirmed that APLA generally took responsibility for its military actions, even
operations that were controversial, yet in this case, no bona fide APLA cadre ever
claimed Highgate.
1.99.3 It was established that a claim of responsibility was made a few days later by
persons unknown, ostensibly on behalf of “APLA”, but both Mphahl ele and Els
pointed out that this was suspiciously inconsistent with APLA’s usual practice of
immediate claims and could have been disinformation.
1.99.4 Mphahlele further testified that, in his view, the Highgate Massacre exposed the
apartheid state’s complicity in the murder of its own citizens.586
1.100 Askari theory:
1.100.1 Additional evidence supporting the third -force theory included
documentation about Askaris and covert units operati ng in the Eastern Cape in the
early ’90s. Askaris were former liberation fighters “turned” to work for the Security
Police. It was revealed that an Askari unit was based in East London, only minutes
away from the Highgate Hotel, for years during the conflict.587

585 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 50–56.
586 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 88–92.
587 Exhibit C, Statement of Dr. Tessa Margaret Edlmann, pp. 104–106.

1.100.2 Strikingly, this Askari base (part of the Security Branch’s covert
operations) was officially closed down on 30 April 1993, literally one day before the
Highgate Massacre.588
1.100.3 This timing was noted in the evidence as a disturbing coincidence: one
inference is that elements of that unit, facing disbandment, might have executed the
operation as an act of revenge.
1.101 Summary of contextual evidence:
1.101.1 In sum, and as will become apparent, the historical and investigative
evidence laid before the Court indicates that the Highgate Massacre did not occur in
a vacuum. It was part of, and must be understoo d in, the context of a highly volatile
political climate in which elements of the apartheid state were known to be
orchestrating violence to undermine negotiations.
Captain Vaughn William Peterson:589
1.102 Background and role in the SAPS:
1.102.1 Captain Peterson confirmed under oath that he joined the South African
Police in 1987. He began basic training in early 1988 and was deployed to the Brits
Police Station in the North West province, initially serving as a cell guard for high -
profile detaine es. Thereafter, he transferred briefly to the Investigation and Inquiry
Unit, then moved to the Dog Unit, later becoming an explosives dog handler.590
1.102.2 In 1993, Captain Peterson was transferred to the Kidd’s Beach Mobile Unit
in the East London area, where he served as commander until the unit’s closure in
1995. He then became the commander of Kidd’s Beach Detectives. In 2000, he was

588 Exhibit C, Statement of Dr. Tessa Margaret Edlmann, pp. 104–106.
589 Exhibit D, Statement of Vaughn William Peterson, pp. 55–56; Exhibit E, Investigation Diary, C2.
590 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 30–32.

promoted to the rank of Captain and transferred to Buff alo Flats Detectives in East
London, where he commanded the unit for 12 years. During that time, he completed
the Detective Commander’s Course in Graaff-Reinet in 2002.
1.102.3 Following a serious car accident in 2012, he was transferred to the Cluster
Detective Office as a coordinator, where his role included monitoring serious crimes,
attending crime scenes, overseeing investigative processes, and attending court
proceedings. After resigning due to a heart attack in 2019, he rejoined the service in
April 2021 and began working on TRC -related investigations under the Directorate
for Priority Crime Investigations (“DPCI”).591
1.103 Assignment to the Highgate Massacre investigation:
1.103.1 Captain Peterson received the Highgate Massacre investigation file in
August 2021 from the national office. He registered the matter under a new inquiry
number: Eastern Cape Provincial Inquiry 408/2021. The docket comprised three
files: the original case docket in a lever -arch file, and two additional files containing
various copies of the docket and statements gathered by previous investigators.592
1.103.2 Upon receipt, Captain Peterson reviewed the docket and noted there were
76 statements, many of which were copies, un -commissioned, or unsigned.
Statements A2, A3, A4, A7, A8, A9, A10, A12, A13, A15, A16, A17, A18, and A49
were among those un-commissioned, and some furthermore lacked signatures.593
1.103.3 To address the deficiencies, he attempted to contact the deponents.
However, many statements lacked ID numbers and full addresses. Although he
employed tracing methods and sought assistance from colleagues and the Buffalo

591 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 31–32.
592 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 33–34.
593 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 35.

City authorities, many witnesses could not be located or were found to be deceased.
He obtained death certificates where applicable.594
1.104 Investigation efforts and contextual understanding:
1.104.1 As part of the DPCI, Captain Peterson explained that he works within the
Crimes Against the State (“ CATS”) component, alongside units focused on
organised crime, commercial crime, serious corruption, and others. 595 While he was
unable to speak with the original investigating officers, Els and Bossr, he consulted
with Nel telephonically.596 Nel confirmed the investigation had reached a point where
no suspects or organisations could definitively be linked to the attack.597
1.104.2 Captain Peterson stated that both Nel and earlier investigators had noted
similarities between the Highgate Massacre and other attacks at the Yellowwood
Hotel, King William’s Town Golf Club, and the Baha’i Church Massacres. He clarified
that those incidents had been linked to specific individuals who applied for amnesty
through the TRC, 598 unlike the Highgate incident, which remains unresolved.
1.105 Leads, suspects, and family contributions:
1.105.1 No suspects have been positively identified in relation to the Highgate
Massacre. Peterson testified that while one individual, Mtutuzeli Mama (“ Mama”),
was arrested in 1994, the charges were withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. No
further arrests have taken place. 599
1.105.2 During engagements with the victims’ families and their legal
representatives, Captain Peterson received various leads. O ne was a name passed

594 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 36–37.
595 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 37.
596 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 38.
597 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 38.
598 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 39–41.
599 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 40.

to him by Weber, which led him to Pretoria. However, the individual ultimately
refused to meet and denied any relevant knowledge. Another lead concerned a
Facebook comment by Petzer, which mentioned the possibility of a third -force
involvement. When interviewed, Petzer admitted to making the comments while
highly intoxicated and recanted them.600
1.105.3 Captain Peterson clarified that Petzer was not a witness to the massacre;
it was his late brother, Zieg, who had been present at the Highgate Hotel playing
pool on the night of the attack. 601
1.106 Mention of the book "Die Lang Generaal":
1.106.1 During discussions with the families, reference was made to a book titled
Die Lang Generaal , authored by Elsdon, which dealt with the activities of Gerhard
van der Westhuizen, alleged commander of the so -called "Hammer Squad." It was
suggested that this group may have been involved in covert operations during
apartheid. 602
1.106.2 Captain Peterson met with Elsdon at the Stellenbosch Police Station in
2022 to discuss these allegations. While they explored theories regarding third -force
involvement, Captain Peterson emphasised that no concrete evidence was
presented during the meeting that could link specific individuals or organisations to
the Highgate Massacre.603
1.107 The role and structure of commando units:
1.107.1 Captain Peterson testified that there were two commando units active
during the period under investigation: one for the East London area and another for

600 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 42–45.
601 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 42–45.
602 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 45–49.
603 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 47–49.

the Port Elizabeth region. He referred to the Port Elizabeth group as being
associated with what was known colloquially as the "Hammer Squad."604
1.107.2 Captain Peterson stated that he spoke with Colonel Van der Merwe, who
had served as the commander of the commandoes from 1978 to 1998, which
included the time of the Highgate Massacre. Colonel Van der Merwe confirmed that
they operated in the Port Elizabeth area but denied that a Hammer Squad was
formally established. He attributed the Hammer Squad label to a different group.605
1.107.3 Colonel Van der Merwe described the commandoes' function as
supportive, assisting both the army and the police in the Eastern Province, including
areas such as Kirkwood, Grahamstown, and the surroundings of Port Elizabeth.606
1.108 Composition and function of commandoes:
1.108.1 In response to the Court’s questions, Captain Peterson clarified that the
commandoes were comprised of civilians, functioni ng similarly to police reservists.
During the relevant period, individuals who completed their military training were
required to serve in regional commandos as part of their reserve duty. These
reservists could be called upon annually or bi -annually for u p to a month to six
weeks to perform military service duties. Captain Peterson confirmed this was
standard practice in those years.607
1.109 Efforts to investigate the Hammer Unit:
1.109.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that he interviewed Colonel Van der Merwe
regarding the Hammer Squad and that Nel may also have been involved in such

604 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 49.
605 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 50.
606 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 50–51.
607 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 51–52.

interviews. He did not recall whether any other individuals wer e interviewed
regarding the Hammer Squad.608
1.110 Information regarding a potential witness in Grahamstown:
1.110.1 Captain Peterson testified that Weber had identified a potential witness in
Grahamstown. While attempting to arrange a meeting, Weber informed him that the
witness might not speak freely in his presence.609
1.110.2 The initial meeting was postponed due to Peterson’s work com mitments,
and further attempts failed as Weber became unavailable.
1.110.3 Captain Peterson asked Weber to send the witness's address, and
although they had a discussion, nothing concrete resulted from the follow-up.610
1.111 Recovery and handling of a projectile:
1.111.1 Captain Peterson recounted that during a visit to Beling’ s house with
Weber, Beling revealed he had a projectile removed from his hip around 2010.
Beling stated he had previously informed Nel of its existence. Captain Peterson
requested the projectile for ballistic testing, which Beling handed over.611
1.111.2 Captain Peterson delivered it to the Port Elizabeth Ballistics Unit, but due
to the COVID -19 pandemic and staffing shifts, the projectile was initially misfiled
under a different case number an d reported missing. This caused concern for
Beling, who found it suspicious.612

608 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 50.
609 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 54.
610 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 54–55.
611 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 54–55.
612 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 56–57.

1.111.3 However, after Captain Peterson followed up with Colonel Van der Merwe,
the projectile was located still sealed in its bag, and ballistics tests were
completed.613
1.111.4 Due to corrosion, only the calibre could be determined. The corrosion
likely resulted from poor storage in a plastic bag, although the fact that the projectile
had remained in Beling’s body for years may also have contributed.614
1.112 Suspicions regarding the AWB and the Orange Grove Hotel:
1.112.1 Captain Peterson testified that during a conversation with Beling and
Weber, the possibility of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (“ AWB”) being involved
in the attack was raised. They noted that an AWB meeting was held the night of the
attack at the Orange Grove Hotel, located across the river from Highgate.615
1.112.2 Captain Peterson inv estigated and contacted the AWB’s new leader, Mr
Rouge (“Rouge”), in 2022. Rouge declined to meet Captain Peterson and referred
him to legal representatives whose details he never provided. Rouge denied any
AWB involvement or knowledge of the meeting. Neve rtheless, Peterson’s
investigation confirmed that such a meeting took place.616
1.112.3 He speculated that the Orange Grove Hotel may have been the intended
target for the attack, and suggested the possibility of a mistaken target, given orange
exterior colour of the Highgate Hotel at the time which may have caused confusion,
though this theory was speculative and not supported by direct evidence.617
1.113 Attempt to interview Ncamazana:

613 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 57.
614 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 58–59.
615 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 58–59.
616 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 59–60.
617 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 59–61.

1.113.1 Captain Peterson attempted to interview Ncamazana, who had been
convicted for involvement in the Da Gama attack and linked to APLA. Ncamazana
refused to speak to Peterson, allegedly stating he did not talk to white men. 618
Captain Peterson believed that Ncamazana might have knowledge about APLA’s
involvement or lack thereof in the Highgate Massacre. Captain Peterson noted that
Nel had previously interviewed Ncamazana in 2016 but was also unsuccessful in
obtaining information.619
1.113.2 Ncamazana, who is currently incarcerate d in Mdantsane Prison, had
applied for amnesty regarding the 1994 grenade incident but not the 1993 Highgate
Massacre.620
1.114 Alleged Vlakplaas presence in East London:
1.114.1 Captain Peterson testified that a farm near the Highgate Hotel had been
locally referred to as "Vlakplaas 2." It was used as accommodation and a base of
operations by security forces, though its official name was different. He confirmed
the farm existed but had not been used for many years. While he could not trace the
current owner, Peterson understood that the government had acquired it after the
apartheid era.621
1.115 Explanation of 'C10' in the docket:
1.115.1 Captain Peterson explained that 'C10' refers to page 10 in the
investigation diary section of the police docket, which logs actions, statements, and

618 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 61–62.
619 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 61–62.
620 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 62–63.
621 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 63–64.

findings by the investigating officer. It is part of the C -clip or C -section of the
docket.622 He had obtained relevant information at C10 of the diary.
1.116 Arrest and release of Mama:
1.116.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that Mr Mtutuzeli Ntura Mama (“ Mama”) had
been arrested after three witnesses identified him in a photo ID parade. However,
the matter was later withdrawn due to insufficient evidence.623
1.116.2 Hair and blood samples were taken f rom Mama, but DNA testing revealed
no match, and he was not linked to the relevant blood group.624
1.117 List of deceased witnesses:
1.117.1 Captain Peterson confirmed the deaths of several witnesses, including
Swarts, Wilton and Nessie Jameson, Maxwell Nkeli, Patricia Vogl (“ Vogl”), Zieg,
Gontshi, Vernon Baatjie, Rossouw, Holloway, Carol Ann Gower, Lieutenant -Colonel
Delanya, and Els.625
1.118 Confirmation of scene photographs and building alterations:
1.118.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that the photographs shown to him were
indeed of the Highgate Hotel and noted that the venue stil l existed but had
undergone minor alterations, such as wall removal and door adjustments.626
1.118.2 The orange colour described earlier referred to sections around windows
and the building's upper exterior, which had since been repainted multiple times.627

622 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 65–66.
623 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 65.
624 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 65–66.
625 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 67–68.
626 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27-01-2025, p. 68.

1.119 Concerns over the quality of the initial investigation:
1.119.1 Captain Peterson took over the investigation in August 2021 and review ed
the existing police docket. He expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the earlier
investigation, especially the state of the statements, some of which were not signed
or commissioned. He felt that more thorough investigative steps could have been
taken, particularly regarding crime scene analysis.628
1.119.2 However, he acknowledged the difficulty of judging prior efforts without
having been involved at the time.629
1.120 History of investigating officers:
1.120.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that Bossr was in charge of the investigation
from 1–2 May 1993, as recorded in entries C1 to C13 of the investigation diary.630
1.120.2 He confirmed that Bossr is deceased and that he never discussed the
case with him. Captain Peterson noted that he knew Bossr from previous work but
not in relation to this case . Swarts then took over from 3 –12 May 1993, as reflected
in entries C13 to C43. Captain Peterson did not know Swarts personally.631
1.120.3 Thereafter, Els held the docket from 13 May 1994 to 5 December 1998
(entries C43 to C153). Els is also deceased. Captain Peterson knew Els from prior
work engagements, both when Els was a police officer and later when he acted as a
private investigator. C aptain Peterson noted that Els had previously investigated a
murder in Buffalo Flats in 2004 and was aware of his role in private investigations

627 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 68.
628 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 70–71.
629 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 70–71.
630 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 71.
631 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 71–72 .

but was unaware that Els continued working on the Highgate case after leaving the
force.632
1.121 The transfer of the docket to the TRC and subsequent gaps in the
investigation diary:
1.121.1 Captain Peterson acknowledged that the docket had been transferred to
the TRC and that this likely caused a hiat us in the investigation. He confirmed that
during this period, no police officer was actively working on the case since the
docket was not in their possession.633
1.121.2 The entry in the investig ation diary simply notes that the docket was with
the TRC. Captain Peterson speculated that TRC investigators handled it during that
time.634
1.122 Nel’s Involvement and missing investigation diary:
1.122.1 Captain Peterson testified that Nel likely began working on the case in
August 2010, not 2014 as initially assumed. Nel’s investigation was registered as an
inquiry in August 2010, supported by a statement from Beling dated 16 November
2010.635
1.122.2 It appeared that Nel must have kept a separate diary which was initially
not available. However, during the course of the proceedings, Nel's diary was found
on Friday, 22 August 2025. There appears to be nothing of relevance contained in
the investigations that were conducted.

632 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 72–74.
633 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 74.
634 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 75–76.
635 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 76–77.

1.122.3 Captain Peterson confirmed that Nel received the docket from Advocate
Christopher McAdam of the NPA's Priority Crimes Unit. Captain Peterson never saw
the diary maintained by Nel. He confirmed that he, too, kept a separate file and
digital entries in addition to the physical investigation diary.636
1.123 Fingerprint records and alleged blunder:
1.123.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that an entry at C6 of the investigation diary
dated 2 May 1993 stated that fingerprints were lifted from the scene. However, he
found no records or documentation confirming t his. He contacted the LCRC office,
who reported that a rainstorm had destroyed many records at their former Oxford
Street premises.637
1.123.2 Captain Peterson called this a serious blunder, especially given the gravity
of the case. He could not confirm whether the prints were never taken or were taken
and then lost, but he emphasised that fingerprinting should have been a basic
investigative step. The absence of these records raises serious concer ns, and
although Captain Peterson hesitated to allege that something suspicious must have
taken place, he acknowledged the gravity of the omission.638
1.124 Possibility of fingerprint tampering or negligence:
1.124.1 Captain Peterson agreed that it was highly unusual for fingerprint records
to be missing in a case of this magnitude. A further diary entry at C55, dated 27 May
1993, noted that fingerprints and palmprints were taken from potential suspects and
handed to LCRC, with an elimination report pending.639

636 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 76–77.
637 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 79.
638 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 79–82.
639 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 87–88.

1.124.2 Captain Peterson confirmed that this suggested that comparison prints
existed, making the absence of those records e ven more troubling. While he
acknowledged that the victims and public might suspect a cover -up, he refrained
from making such an assertion himself. However, he did concede that negligence, at
the very least, played a role and did not exclude the possibilit y of more sinister
motives.640
1.125 Other forensic evidence and missing statements:
1.125.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that blood samples had been taken at the
scene and from victims, but no c onclusive matches were made to any suspect. He
also addressed the absence of several statements, including that of Swarts, which
should have been A1 in the docket. The original docket lacked this and several other
documents (A50 –A55), likely due to years o f duplication and transfers, especially
during the TRC process.641
1.125.2 Captain Peterson reported th ese omissions to the NPA. Despite some
recovered documents, such as the affidavit of Michael George Kramer (A2), others
remained missing, which he acknowledged as problematic given their potential
significance.642
1.126 Warrants of arrest and unexecuted documents:
1.126.1 Captain Peterson noted that warrants of arrest were issued for Lungisa
Ntintile (“ Ntintile”), Thembelani Xundu (“ Xundu”), Xolile Ngxabane (“Ngxabane”),
and Dumisile Nontshokweni (“Nontshokweni”) (entries C61–C63), but there was no
indication that they were ever executed.643

640 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 88–91.
641 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 95–97.
642 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, p. 97.
643 Exhibit E p61-63.

1.126.2 These were also among the missing items in the docket (A51 –A53).
Captain Peterson confirme d not having any personal involvement with these
warrants and was unaware of their outcomes.644
1.127 Other police officers and conclusion of proceedings:
1.127.1 Captain Peterson mentioned th at he had no direct dealings with Captain
Wayne Xavier Rutters (“ Rutters”) and Warrant Officer Henry Roos (“ Roos”) in
relation to this matter, although he knew them professionally. The court adjourned
until the following day. A video and in loco inspection of the Highgate Hotel scene
were planned for the next session.645
1.128 Review of Missing Statements and Documentation:
1.128.1 Captain Peterson resumed his testimony regarding various gaps in the
investigation docket. He confirmed that he was unable to locate a statement by
Rutters, despite entries in the diary suggesting that Sergeant Ritter had interviewed
witnesses René Naudé a nd Bruce Murray Arnott (“ Arnott”) and shown them
identikits.646
1.128.2 Captain Peterson could not confirm whether Rutters had ever produced a
formal statement and noted that the docket did not con tain one. Similarly, he was
unaware of any statement from Roos, who had allegedly also received suspect
identifications. Peterson confirmed that Rutters was still alive and that Roos,
believed to be retired, had not been seen by him in years. Peterson unde rtook to
follow up on the availability of both individuals.647

644 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 99–100.
645 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 1, 27 January 2025, pp. 100–101.
646 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, p. 8.
647 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 8–11.

1.128.3 Peterson addressed questions surrounding the affidavit of Lieutenant
Colonel WJ De Lange (“ De Lange”), which was referenced in the docket as being
filed under number A51. He stated that he had never found this affidavit in the
docket and had also reported this absence in a memorandum to the Director of
Public Prosecutions.
1.128.4 He explained that the referenced warrants (ent ries C61-C63) pertained to
another matter unrelated to the Highgate Hotel incident, and that it was common
practice at the time for unrelated entries to be duplicated across various dockets.
Captain Peterson confirmed that the individuals listed under thos e warrants had no
discernible link to the Highgate Massacre.648
1.129 Clarification on missing statements and witnesses:
1.129.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that he could not locate a statement from
Rutters, nor could he confirm whether Roos had made a statement. However, he
indicated that Rutters was still alive and believed Roos had recently retired. Captain
Peterson agreed to follow up to verify their status and determine if either had made
any statements.
1.129.2 He noted that Rutters had reportedly taken statements from René Naudé
and Arnott and showed them identikits, but no corroborating statement by Rutters
was found. He also could not locate a statement from De Lange, despite its listin g in
the docket at entry C63, 649 and numbered A51. Captain Peterson clarified again that
warrants referred to in the entry had nothing to do with the Highgate Hotel incident
but were related to other cases, which was common practice at the time.650
1.130 The APLA Files and absent references to Highgate Massacre:

648 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 12–13.
649 Exhibit E.
650 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 8–12.

1.130.1 When asked about the so -called "APLA files" located in the docket under
A23 and A24, Captain Peterson described these as records of known APLA
operatives, their numbers, crime s, training locations, and internal debriefings from
various operations. He found references to numerous APLA -related attacks,
including Yellowwood, Bahá'í Church, Heidelberg, and Queenstown.651
1.130.2 However, while these files referenced incidents such as the Yellowwood,
Bahai Church, and Queenstown attacks, there was no reference to the Highgate
Massacre. Captain Peterson admitted that this omission struck him as odd,
particularly given the patterns o f soft target attacks by APLA documented elsewhere
and the detailed nature of the files.652
1.131 Other missing documents and observations:
1.131.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that he could not locate the statement of
Peter Henning, who was referenced in C18 of the investigation diary as having
phoned in a tip about recognising an individual from a newspaper photograph - he
reportedly called the Berlin Tea Room after identifying someone from a ne wspaper
photo. He confirmed that he did not find any corresponding affidavit.
1.131.2 He also could not find identikits or related photo documents referenced at
entries B8, B9, and B12. Peterson indicated that photos of Mama and Ntintili existed
but was unaware of any other photo sets.
1.131.3 Furthermore, he confirmed no inquest docket was ever prepared for the
Highgate Massacre despite repeated entries in the docket by commanding officers,
particularly Swarts, instructing that such a docket be prepared. Peterson attributed

651 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 13–14.
652 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 13–14.

this failure to neglect by the investigating officers and a broader breakdown in the
chain of command.653
1.131.4 Despite multiple written directives between June and August 1994 to
begin preparing the inquest docket, including instructions to type witness
statements, the docket was never finalised or submitted. 654
1.131.5 Captain Peterson elaborated on the proces ses that should have been
followed by commanders and investigators regarding the inquest. He described
standard procedures involving brought -forward registers, regular docket reviews,
and the preparation and submission of statements.
1.131.6 He reviewed v arious entries between June and August 1994 (C129 to
C134), (entries in the investigation diary referring to inquest preparations initiated by
Swarts and later followed up by Els). These entries repeatedly showed instructions
to prepare the inquest and rep lies noting it would be done, yet it was never
completed. He found this inexplicable, especially as statements were reportedly
being typed, a process that should not have taken as long as claimed.655
1.131.7 Captain Peterson characterised this as a clear neglect of duty and found it
deeply concerning, especially considering the impact on victims' families and the
decades-long delay in holding a formal inquest.656
1.132 Interaction with the NPA and inquest failure:
1.132.1 Further diary entries revealed that the docket had been forwarded to the
Attorney General's office between No vember 1994 and January 1995. Captain

653 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 15–17.
654 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 15–16
655 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 19–25.
656 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 17–25.

Peterson confirmed that the Attorney General (AG) reviewed the docket, but there
were no recorded instructions or follow-up investigations.
1.132.2 A note from 24 November 1994 indicated the AG’s interest in perusing the
docket, followed by a return entry on 26 January 1995 noting that the AG had
reviewed the file but made no recommendations for further investigation.657
1.132.3 He reiterated his view that this failure to act compounded the investigative
shortcomings and contributed to the prolonged delay in holding an inquest.658
1.132.4 Captain Peterson speculated that the docket might have been su bmitted
alongside unrelated cases (such as Cambridge CR473/03/94 and Fort Jackson
CR42/03/94), further contributing to confusion. These matters were undergoing trial
preparations. Nonetheless, he agreed with the assessment that the Highgate matter
was not appropriately prioritised, either by investigators or prosecutorial authorities
at the time.659
1.133 Missing exhibits and unexecuted warrants of arrest:
1.133.1 Addressing exhibit logs from th e crime scene, Peterson acknowledged a
lack of inventory corresponding to items submitted to SAP13 registers by Sergeant
van Rooyen and Sergeant Wade. He also confirmed that there were no statements
from either officer to clarify what those exhibits were.
1.133.2 He also reiterated that he could not confirm the existence or execution of
warrants for Ntintile, Xundu, Ngxabane, and Nontshokweni or others mentioned in
C61 and C63, nor their links to the Highgate Massacre. He acknowledged that while
some individuals we re linked to other cases, there was no clear connection to the
Highgate Massacre.

657 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, p. 26.
658 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 26–27.
659 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 28–29.

1.133.3 Only Mama had been arrested in connection with the Highgate
Massacre.660
1.134 Absence of forensic evidence:
1.134.1 Captain Peterson referred to early investigation notes (C6 and C10),
which mentioned fingerprint collection and the announcement of a R150,000 reward
for information related to Ntintile and Xundu. While Peterson initially could not recall
the reward, he la ter remembered seeing a fax about it and promised to search for
the document. He confirmed that while there were similarities in modus operandi
between Highgate and other APLA -linked attacks, such as Yellowwood Hotel and
King William’s Town, there was no direct link established.661
1.135 Missed witness opportunities and record system failures:
1.135.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that he had failed to meet a potential witness
in Grahamstown despite intentions to do so alongside Weber. He also elaborated on
the transition from manual to electronic record systems, noting that the Highgate
case was not transferred to the CAS system until 2010. This lapse complicated
access and tracking of the case. He confirmed that this oversight, like many others
in the case, raised questions about whether it was due to neglect or a lack of
prioritisation.662
1.136 Evidence loss and absence of forensic linkages:
1.136.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that cartridges recovered from the crime
scene had been lost in 1995 during transport via registered mail to the Cape Town
Post Office. A case was opened (Caledon Square CR1163/07/95), but nothing was
recovered. He agreed that the absence of forensic evidence, fingerprints, cartridges,

660 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 30–33.
661 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 34–36.
662 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 36–39.

or blood evidence severely hampered the case. The only surviving physical
evidence was the projectile removed from Beling.663
1.137 Interview with Petzer and potential misinformation:
1.137.1 Peterson confirmed that he interviewed Petzer after Beling shared
messages suggesting Petzer had prior knowledge of the Highgate Massacre. Petzer
denied having said this, citing heav y drinking as a reason he may have written such
things without recalling them. Peterson said he eventually took a statement from
Petzer reflecting that denial.664
1.138 Intervention by the NPA and withheld interview with former Brigadier:
1.138.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that during September 2021, he had been
investigating a potential lead involving a well -connected elderly man in Pretoria,
reportedly a former brigadier called Brigadier Jac B uchner, who has extensive
knowledge of third-force and APLA activities during apartheid.
1.138.2 He told Beling that he had intended to interview the man. However, on the
way to the meeting, he received a call from the NPA and was instructed to report
instead to their head office. There, he met with three people, including a person
named Madeleine, identified as Madeleine Fullard (“ Fullard”) from the Missing
Persons Task Team.
1.138.3 Fullard allegedly refused to permit Captain Peterson to interview the
brigadier, although no explanation was given. Peterson confirmed that while he had
not been officially blocked, he had not received any assistance or access to the man
and remained without the name or address, which was held by Fullard.

663 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 49–52.
664 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 53–56.

1.138.4 He stressed the importance of the interview, given the man’s reputed
knowledge of APLA, ANC, and third -force dynamics, and expressed frustration that
the investigation was being hindered.665
1.139 Request for Court intervention to secure an interview:
1.139.1 It was requested that the Court should assist in ensuring that the
investigating officer is permitted to interview the retired br igadier, especially since
the Missing Persons Task Team does not have legal authority to prevent a police
investigator from pursuing a lead. It was emphasised that if the man holds
information relevant to the Highgate Massacre, it would be essential for th e Court to
hear it before the close of the inquest.666
1.139.2 Captain Peterson agreed, reiterating that the man reportedly had deep
knowledge of liberation forces and covert operations. He str essed that any insights
he could provide might be crucial. However, he confirmed that he remained reliant
on Fullard for the man’s contact details and had yet to receive them, despite multiple
efforts.
1.139.3 The Court sought clarity on the identity and confirmed that Captain
Peterson only knew the man’s rank and surname, not his full details or location.667
1.140 Follow-Up on access to key witness and the role of Fullard:
1.140.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that he had attempted to gain access to a
high-ranking witness in Pretoria who might have had valuable information about the
Highgate Massacre. He explained that the initiative originated when Captain Dastile,
involved in an unrelated investigation, mentioned an upcoming visit to interview a
general who could potentially assist.

665 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 57–59.
666 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 59–60.
667 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 2, 28 January 2025, pp. 60–61.

1.140.2 Peterson expressed his interest in speaking with this general regarding
the H ighgate Massacre. Arrangements were made for Peterson to join Captain
Dastile and Warrant Officer Bobby on the trip to Pretoria.
1.140.3 Peterson stated that before the trip, they were instructed to first meet with
Fullard, who was believed to possess the contact details of the general. He
emphasised that they could not set up an appointment with the witness beforehand
due to not having the necessary address.
1.140.4 Once in Pretoria, they met with Fullard at the offices of the NPA and the
Missing Persons Task Team. Several individuals were present, although Captain
Peterson could not recall all their names. He described the meeting as informal and
open, such that anyone nearby could have overheard their conversation. During the
meeting, they were informed that the interview with the general would not
proceed.668
1.141 The fate of the original docket and timeline of submissions:
1.141.1 Captain Peterson confirmed that the investigation docket was passed
through various hands over the years. He stated that after affidavits were prepared
for the inquest, the docket was submitted in 1997. He could not definitively confirm
whether the origina l docket was sent to the TRC, but based on entries in the
investigation diary (particularly in section C), he inferred that the original likely
remained behind, as these entries continued through 1998 in original handwriting.669
1.141.2 He surmised that perhaps a copy had been sent to the TRC or the High
Court.670

668 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 3–5.
669 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 7–8.
670 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 8–9.

1.141.3 Captain Peterson was shown pages C151 to C153 of Exhibit E and
confirmed that the original handwritten entries suggested the main docket had not
been removed from SAPS custody. He was unable to confirm who had handled the
TRC file or when the docket was returned from the TRC. Regarding the departure of
Els from SAPS to b ecome a private investigator, Captain Peterson stated that he
had the date on record but could not recall it at the hearing. He estimated it was
sometime between 1998 and 2000.671
1.142 Uncertainty over inquest directive and procedural authority:
1.142.1 Captain Peterson was asked whether a formal directive had ever been
issued to initiate an inquest into the Highgate Massacre. He recalled that at the time,
such a directive would typically have b een required from a magistrate’s court rather
than the attorney general. However, he could not confirm whether such a directive
had in fact been issued.672
1.143 Review of investigation diary entries and TRC classification:
1.143.1 Captain Peterson was directed to a note at the bottom of page C153 by
Lieutenant Colonel Mahlangu, which queried whether there was any evidence in the
investigation. On page C154, a response from Nel simply noted the e ntry and
referred to the matter as a "CATS enquiry" (Crimes Against the State), further
describing it as a TRC case. Peterson confirmed that Nel did not explicitly respond
to the question of whether there was any evidence in the docket. The remaining
points from Lieutenant Colonel Mahlangu were merely acknowledged without
elaboration.673
1.143.2 Captain Peterson confirmed that Lieutenant Colonel Mahlangu had likely
received the docket for inspec tion and instructed that the matter be finalised with a

671 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 8–10.
672 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 9–10.
673 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 10–13.

brought-forward date. Nel registered the case as a TRC matter but did not engage
further on evidentiary content.674
1.144 Context of subsequent investigations:
1.144.1 Captain Peterson testified regarding the ongoing investigations linked to
the matter before the court. He confirmed attending a meeting with counsel where
specific requests were made about the Askari unit, a local unit involve d in the
investigation.675
1.144.2 Other leads from family representatives were also forwarded to him and
the prosecuting authority’s legal team. Captain Peterson explained that there were
challenges with receiving feedback due to limitations imposed on communication
with legal representatives of families and victims.676
1.144.3 These instruction s reportedly came from their commander and were
consistent with prior directives dating back to 2021 involving communication
protocols with retired officers from the human rights department.677
1.145 Restrictions on communication and investigation process:
1.145.1 Captain Peterson described a specific instruction prohibiting investigating
officers from communicating directly with victims’ attorneys or family members. All
communication had to be ro uted exclusively through the appointed State
advocates.678

674 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 3, 29 January 2025, pp. 12–13
675 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 3.
676 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 4.
677 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 4–6.
678 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 4.

1.145.2 This restriction caused some frustration because it limited direct contact
with complainants and potentially hindered the flow of i nformation essential to the
investigation.
1.145.3 Captain Peterson expressed commitment to the investigation despite
these restrictions but acknowledged the difficulty of working under such conditions,
especially when divided between multiple investigati ons, including other unrelated
matters.679
1.146 Issues of security and suspicious incidents:
1.146.1 Peterson detailed an incident in Cape Town where he and his team felt
they were being followed , which he reported to Colonel Ripa. Additionally, another
event involved visiting a witness, Petzer, whose nervousness and being forewarned
of Peterson’s visit suggested possible leaks or surveillance affecting the
investigation.680
1.146.2 Peterson noted these suspicious activities raised concerns about the
security of the investigative process and the safety of witnesses.681
1.147 Challenges with leaks and internal communication:
1.147.1 Peterson confirmed that any leaks regarding his schedule and
investigation could not have come from the families or their legal representatives, as
none had access to such details. Instead, he suspected in ternal leaks within the
police or the investigation office itself.

679 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 5–9.
680 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, p. 6.
681 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 6–7.

1.147.2 This was supported by the fact that only select individuals within his office
knew his movements, and there was a need to safeguard the investigation from
such breaches.682
1.148 Coordination with legal representatives and authorities:
1.148.1 Peterson indicated that up to a recent date, he had been working closely
and transparently with legal representatives on both side s of the case, keeping them
updated on progress and developments.
1.148.2 However, the instruction to cease direct communications came suddenly
and was unclear in origin or rationale.
1.148.3 This created obstacles in conducting a smooth investigation and raised
concerns about the overall cooperation expected in such matters.683
1.149 The distinction between instructions and communication:
1.149.1 Peterson explained that the instruction received should not be confused
with prohibiting the exchange of information or suggestions between complainants,
their attorneys, and the investigators.
1.149.2 Rather, it concerned formal instructions on how feedback and directives
were to be relayed, specifically through State advocates.
1.149.3 He emphasized the need for the court to clarify and potentially rescind any
instruction that unduly restricts the investigation or victim liaison responsibilities of
police officers, to avoid victimisation or discrimination of officers doing their duties.684

682 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 10–12.
683 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 5–6.
684 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 19–20.

1.150 Specific Case Issues: Identity Confusion:
1.150.1 Peterson narrated an incident involving confusion over witness identity,
where two individuals, including Ncamazana, were involved.
1.150.2 Ncamazana appeared before the court, but the person Peterson had
initially interviewed, who had refused to talk to him, was different.
1.150.3 This confusion caused complications and required additional verification.
Peterson confirmed he followed up to c onfirm the correct identity of the person who
appeared in court, which was indeed the intended witness.685
1.151 Subsequent evidence/feedback on further evidence:
1.151.1 Captain Peterson returned to provide further evidence on 11 August 2025
regarding investigative efforts undertaken during the adjournment period.
1.151.2 His testimony focused on attempts to trace and interview former Askari
unit members stationed in East London, following up on witness leads, and the
continuing challenges in locating key individuals who might shed light on the
Highgate Massacre.
1.152 Investigation into Former Askari Unit Members:
1.152.1 Tracing Efforts and Results:
(a) Captain Peterson testified that he had received a list of 84
former Askaris, from which 13 names were identified as
having been placed at the East London unit. His extensive
investigation efforts yielded limited results due to incorrect

685 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 11, 24 March 2025, pp. 15–17.

or missing identification numbers and duplicate service
numbers within the system.686
(b) Of the 13 East London Askari members identified, Captain
Peterson was only able to successfully trace and interview
three individuals:
MS Fukazi - traced and statement obtained two weeks
before his testimony;
MP Oliphant - traced in Vereeniging and stateme nt
obtained;
WG Twala - traced and interviewed, though he maintained
he was stationed at Vlakplaas, not East London.
(c) Several others were confirmed deceased, including XVN
Busani and MM Sonchancha. Captain Peterson discovered
anomalies in the records, n oting that MT Nkombhela and
MM Sonchancha appeared to be using the same
identification number and service number, suggesting
either identity confusion or deliberate obfuscation.687
1.152.2 Investigative Rationale:
(a) Captain Peterson explained the significance of pursuing
the Askari leads, stating that a scenario had been sketched
whereby former Askaris might have been involved in the
attack due to receiving their retrenchment packa ges on 1
May 1993, the very day of the massacre. The theory
suggested they might have been upset about being
summarily dismissed after years of doing the dirty work for

686 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 46–47.
687 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 46–47.

the apartheid regime, with few benefits and prospects.
They may also have been upset by the differential amounts
allocated to different members, with some receiving
substantially smaller payouts than the white officers.688
1.153 Key Witness Accounts:
1.153.1 MP Oliphant:
(a) Captain Peterson confirmed that MP Oliphant
acknowledged being a former APLA member who later
became an Askari. However, Oliphant proved difficult
during the interview, insisting on consulting with the APLA
veteran hierarchy before signing any statement. He
claimed to have left the Askari unit in 1991, yet had
received a cheque on the relevant date, providing
contradictory explanations about the payment being sent to
Sanlam. Captain Peterson noted that Oliphant would "go
around in circles the whole time" during questioning.689
(b) Following his interview with Captain Peterson, Oliphant
made contact with Mphahlele, confirming his former APLA
membership and raising questions about his potential
knowledge of the attack.690
1.153.2 MS Fukazi:
(a) Captain Peterson recommended Fukazi as the more
credible witness, describing him as "straightforward" in his
responses about what occurred and the workings of the

688 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 51–52.
689 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 53–54.
690 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 53.

unit. Fukazi confirmed that all Askaris received their
cheques at Vlakplaas, corroborating Twala's account.691
1.153.3 WG Twala:
(a) Twala maintained he was never stationed in East London
but at Vlakplaas in Pretoria, only visiting East London
occasionally for specific operations. He c onfirmed that all
Askaris received cheques (not cash) at Vlakplaas in 1993.
When presented with the revenge attack theory, Twala
expressed scepticism, stating he did not understand why
Askaris would attack the hotel, as everyone had received
their cheques.
(b) However, he acknowledged that while members were
unhappy with their payouts, they could not voice
disapproval due to fear of Eugene de Kock. Significantly,
he noted that one of his former Askari colleagues was
involved in the Bahai Church attack, mak ing it difficult to
definitively rule out Askari involvement.692
1.154 Follow-up on Outstanding Witness Leads:
1.154.1 Hermanus Van der Wilt (“Van der Wilt”)-
(a) Captain Peterson reported persistent difficulties in securing
an interview with Van der Wilt, identified by Weber as
potentially having information about the attack. Despite
multiple attempts to meet on Friday and Saturday before
his testimony, Van der Wil t repeatedly claimed
unavailability. Peterson arranged for Gonubie detectives to

691 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 54–55.
692 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 54–56.

collect Van der Wilt and bring him to the police station for
an interview scheduled for that afternoon at 15:00.693
1.154.2 Bruce Arnold-
(a) Captain Peterson successfully traced Bruce Murray Arnold
("Arnold"), who had been present at the Highgate Hotel
during the attack, to Frere Hospital. However, Arnold was
in the intensive care unit's oncology ward with termina l
cancer affecting his entire body, including his brain.
Medical staff refused Peterson access due to Arnold's
critical condition, with little hope for recovery.694
1.154.3 Bayman Lombard-
(a) International efforts to locate Bayman Lombard in England
continued through Interpol channels. Colonel Naidoo, who
initially assisted, had fallen ill and was replaced by Wimpie
Nel. Despite ongoing communication with counterparts in
England, no substantive feedback had been received.
Arrangements for a potential virtual meeting were being
prepared pending the location of Lombard.695
1.154.4 Other Missing Witnesses:
(a) Peterson reported being unable to locate-
The Smith brothers, who were present during the attack;
The two women who worked at the Guild Theatre; and

693 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 48–49.
694 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 49–50.
695 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 57–58.

Three individuals who were telephoned on the night of the
attack were suspected of possible involvement.
(b) The investigation employed various tracing methods,
including hospital notifications and traffic department
driver's licence searches, with limited success.696
1.155 Status of Key Investigators:
1.155.1 Nel:
(a) Captain Peterson confirmed that Nel, who had previously
led the investigation, was now on pension and "extremely
sick with cancer." Despite multiple attempts at telephonic
contact and messages through Nel' s former commander,
no response had been received. Nel's former commander
confirmed he was "not doing well at all, and physically he's
not in a good place."697
1.156 Systemic Challenges Identified:
1.156.1 Captain Peterson's testimony revealed several systemic obstacles
hampering the investigation:
(a) Record-keeping failures: Duplicate service numbers,
incorrect identification numbers, and missing records
prevented tracing of key witnesses;
(b) Witness availability: Key witnesses were either deceased,
critically ill, or deliberately evasive;

696 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, pp. 49–51.
697 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 11 August 2025, p. 51.

(c) International coordination delays: Interpol processes for
locating overseas witnesses remained slow and uncertain;
and
(d) Historical document gaps: The absence of proper
identification records for Askaris suggested either poor
administration or deliberate obfuscation.
1.157 Recommendations for Further Action:
1.157.1 Captain Peterson indicated his intention to:
(a) Continue attempts to secure cooperation from MP Oliphant
and MS Fukazi for court testimony;
(b) Persist with the interview of Van der Wilt through local
detective assistance;
(c) Maintain contact with Interpol regarding Bayman
Lombard's location; and
1.158 Issue subpoenas if necessary to compel witness attendance. Further
subsequent evidence / further feedback on evidence:
1.158.1 On 1 September 2025, Captain Peterson provided com prehensive
testimony regarding the ongoing investigative efforts into the Highgate Massacre
since the previous sitting of the inquest.
1.158.2 His evidence addressed multiple critical areas:
(a) The investigation into former Askari unit members who
may have been involved in the attack;
(b) The status of various witness subpoenas and attempts to
secure testimony;

(c) The discovery of previously missing investigation
documentation; and
(d) The systematic challenges that continue to hamper the
investigation more than three decades after the Massacre.
1.159 Investigation into former Askari unit members:
1.159.1 Captain Peterson testified extensively about his investigation into former
members of the Askari unit.
1.159.2 Of the Askari members identified, Ca ptain Peterson was only able to
successfully trace and interview three individuals: Fokazi, who was traced and
provided a statement two weeks before the testimony; Oliphant, who was traced in
Vereeniging and eventually provided a statement after considerab le resistance; and
Twala, who was traced and interviewed, though he maintained he was stationed at
Vlakplaas in Pretoria rather than East London.698
1.159.3 The Askari members essentially deni ed awareness of and involvement in
the Highgate massacre.
1.160 Twala:699
1.160.1 As stated, Twala maintained that he was never based in East London.
1.160.2 He furthermore stated that he was shot in his left leg and lost his leg below
the hip, though when questioned about the circumstances surrounding this shooting
incident, Peterson n oted that "he was quite all over the place whilst being
questioned" and "never explained" the circumstances.

698 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 4–11.
699 Exhibit VV, Statement of Wilson Goodman Twala.

1.160.3 When asked whether Twala was questioned as to whether he lost his leg
in a Vlakplaas operation, Captain Peterson could not recall whether this was
asked/answered.
1.160.4 Twala made it explicitly clear that there was a group of individuals working
with Eugene de Kock, and if anyone queried anything, including the retrenchment
cheque amounts, they would not see the light of day the next day - a chilling
indication of the climate of fear within the unit.700
1.160.5 Twala required two statements to be taken, as he was unhappy with the
first version. The revision involved removing refe rences to Vusani, another Askari
who was killed in what Twala claimed was related to another matter in Mthatha.
Twala felt this had nothing to do with Highgate and wanted it removed from his
statement, though the fact that Vusani was deployed in East Londo n and the
shooting incident occurred in the Transkei raised questions about potential
connections.
1.160.6 Significantly, he noted that Vusani (as mentioned above) was involved in
the Bahai Church attack, making it difficult to definitively rule out Askar i involvement
in similar operations.701
1.161 Fokazi:702
1.161.1 Fokazi confirmed he was transferred to a farm in East London, which he
described as being located just past the Johnson & Johnson factory, approximately
4-5 kilometres from the Highgate Hotel. This proximity is significant as those
travelling to and from t he farm would have regularly passed by the Highgate Hotel,
giving unit members familiarity with the location. He was based at this facility until
1993/4, with his primary task being to identify Freedom Fighters and turn them into
informants or assets. The farm had no formal name.

700 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 23.
701 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 18–23.
702 Exhibit WW, Statement of Mvimbi Susan Fokazi.

1.161.2 Fokazi mentioned that Sergeant Fourie confirmed there was no specific
designation/name for the farm.
1.161.3 During the consideration of Fokazi's statement, a connection emerged
regarding De Lange:
(a) Fokazi identified De Lange as having been in the Security
Branch at the time.
(b) Importantly, De Lange was in the photo that was presented
in court to witnesses on various occasions in an attempt to
identify the individuals appearing in it.703
(c) Captain Peterson confirmed that an investigation diary
entry dated 14 June 1993 indicated that a statement was
received from De Lange. However, despite this entry, the
actual statement could not be located. 704 He stated that it
was among the documents/statements that were lost and
that they were unable to trace, as previously mentioned in
his testimony.705
1.161.4 Fokazi's statement also mentioned other handlers, includi ng Grant Fourie
(“Fourie”) and Kenny Koopman (“ Koopman”), with Captain Peterson confirming he
had obtained a statement from Fourie and was attempting to locate Koopman, who
was believed to be in the area.
1.161.5 Fokazi described being called to Pretoria Vlakplaas and informed that the
unit was closing, though he could not confirm the exact date or whether this was
before or after the Highgate Massacre.

703 Exhibit F1 and F2.
704 Investigation diary, C63.
705 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 25.

1.161.6 He also could not confirm details about the Highgate Massacre itself or
whether police officers frequented the establishment.
1.161.7 Most significantly, he revealed that individuals from the unit were involved
in attacks after the unit's official closure, with such members being arrested for
involvement in, for instance, the Bahai Church incident and the Heidelberg attack.
1.161.8 Despite this admission of unit members' involvement in attacks on soft
targets where civilians were killed, Fokazi paradoxically claimed that they would not
have attacked the Highgate as they were tasked with ensuring a peaceful transition.
1.161.9 Captain Peterson noted the irony of this statement, given Fokazi's other
admissions about unit members' involvement in civilian attacks.706
1.162 Oliphant:707
1.162.1 Oliphant's statement revealed he was stationed in East London and was
arrested in Soutpansberg. Captain Pete rson understood Oliphant was still part of
APLA at the time of his arrest, representing someone who had transitioned from a
liberation movement to a security force asset.
1.162.2 During 1992, Oliphant was involved in a shooting incident for which he
was found guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced to 5 years in prison, though the
sentence was suspended and never served. Captain Peterson could not confirm the
specific nature of this incident or in what capacity Oliphant was acting at the time.708
1.162.3 Koopman and Lieutenant Cobus Smith (“ Smith”) were also mentioned by
Oliphant, in respect of which Captain Peterson confirmed that he found Smith and
that he would be approached.

706 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 30–31.
707 Exhibit YY, Statement of Petrus Mokankamane Olifanti.
708 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 12, 29–30.

1.162.4 Oliphant refused to come to court, with even the NPA office's attempts
through Advocate Coltman failing to secure his attendance.709
1.163 Discovery of Nel's investigation diary:
1.163.1 Captain Peterson reported a significant breakthrough in locating Nel's
investigation diary, 710 which had been missing from the docket. After extensive
searching, making numerous phone calls to contacts in Pretoria, and "scratching
around" various archives, the diary was finally located.711
1.163.2 The diary contained two distinct parts: investi gations conducted during the
COVID period (marked C1 to C9) and the second part, which was when the
investigator opened a new file (marked C1 to C60).
1.163.3 Despite the diary containing many entries regarding Nel's discussions with
Els about Els' steps during his investigation, Captain Peterson noted an omission:
there were no notes about Els telling Nel about any structure in the Eastern Cape or
other critical information Els claimed to have communicated.712
1.164 Investigation into Arnott713
1.164.1 Captain Peterson's own statement was read into the record, in respect of
his investigation into Arnott, who was present at the Highgate Ho tel on the night of
the attack but fortuitously left before the Massacre occurred.
1.164.2 According to Peterson's investigation, Arnott arrived back at the scene as
Lombard was shooting at the attackers, placing him as a witness to the immediate
aftermath.714

709 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 3–4.
710 Exhibits ZZ, ZZ2, Investigation Diary of Benjamin Nel.
711 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 11.
712 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 12.
713 Exhibit XX, Statement of Captain Vaughn William Peterson.
714 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 16.

1.165 Status of subpoenas and witness availability:
1.165.1 Captain Peterson provided updates on attempts to secure witness
testimony through subpoenas. He confirmed that subpoenas had been issued to the
former Askaris, though the investigation team could only make contact with them on
the Friday before the hearing (29 August 2025).
1.165.2 He clarified that because they were only recently issued, warrants of
arrest could not be executed in these circumstances, limiting the court's ability to
compel testimony.
1.165.3 Fokazi was contacted on Friday and Saturday (29 & 28 August 2025), with
Saturday being the last time they spoke before Fokazi ceased all communication,
even on the morning of the testimony.
1.165.4 When the NPA office, through Advocate Coltman, attempted to contact
Oliphant, he explicitly refused to come to court.715
1.166 Outstanding investigative matters
1.166.1 Captain Peterson detailed numerous outstanding investigative matters
that remained unresolved:
(a) Dave Toych was conf irmed to be in East London, and
although Captain Peterson approached the Moth Club, he
indicated that he would approach Toych too;
(b) Wayne Bezuidenhoudt's details were being compiled for
follow-up and would be provided;
(c) The national archives had been checked for APLA files, but
nothing relevant was found. Captain Peterson explained
that photos and names had been extracted from national

715 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 3–4.

archives regarding what was described as the Askaris'
"terrorist album," though this yielded only a couple of
photographs with numbers on the back, far less than the
comprehensive identification resource described by other
witnesses.
(d) Former General Jac Buchner's description of the album,
which contained four photos of individuals from the
investigation diary with nu mbers on the front of the page
and names at the back of the page, did not match what
was actually found in the archives. 716
(e) The Yellowwoods case number was still being pursued as
it might provide comparative evidence.717
(f) International Efforts to Locate Lombard
Captain Peterson reported on ongoing international eff orts
to locate Lombard in England through Interpol
channels.
Despite ongoing communication with counterparts in
England, no substantive feedback had been received
regarding Lombard's location or availability to testify.
Although he confirmed that members from Interpol were
assisting well, no confirmation on testifying had yet
been received.718

716 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 3–4.
717 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, p. 32.
718 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 18, 1 September 2025, pp. 33, 37.

Kelvin Cecil Swartbooi:719
1.167 Background and expertise
1.167.1 Kelvin Cecil Swartbooi (“ Swartbooi”) testified that he is a Captain in the
South African Police Service with 34 years of service. He currently works at East
London LC RC as a fingerprint expert, crime scene investigator, and forensic field
worker. He received fingerprint expert status on 7 April 2000 after completing
extensive training, including courses in forensic fingerprints, advanced AFIS, and
digital photography. He holds a bachelor's degree in forensic investigation from
UNISA (2018). He emphasised the challenges faced during the investigation,
notably the delay between the incident and the commencement of the official
investigation, which hampered the collection and preservation of evidence.720
1.167.2 Swartbooi emphasised that he was not involved in the original 1993
Highgate Hotel investigation. At that time, he was working at Fleet Street Police
Station and had no connection to the case. He was only asked to examine the
fingerprint evidence on 27 January 2025, the first day of the inquest.721
1.168 Discovery and analysis of preserved fingerprint evidence
1.168.1 On 27 January 2025, Colonel de Moy requested that Swartbooi search the
archives for fingerprint exhibits with IR number 212/0/1993. He located a
deteriorated fluorine envelope containing seven pieces of black folien used for
fingerprint lifting. The envelope was marked "Highgate Hotel" with Sergeant Naude
listed as the fingerprint expert.722

719 Exhibit X, Statement of Kelvin Cecil Swartbooi.
720 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 28–29.
721 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 30–31, 73–74.
722 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 31–32.

1.168.2 Upon examination, Swartbooi discovered that while the folien pieces were
intact, the actual fingerprints had disappeared from the folien surface. He explained
that the aluminium powder used in 1993 had degraded over time, and the
fingerprints were "sucked into the fluorine and not visible to the naked eye
anymore”.723
1.168.3 Inside the envelope, Swartbooi found photographic prints taken of the
original fingerprints in 1993. These photographs, created by using darkroom
techniques, showed palm prints despite significant deterioration. From these, he
identified four usable palm prints that could be scanned into AFIS.724
1.169 AFIS analysis and results
1.169.1 Swartbooi scanned the four recovered palm prints into the AFIS. He
explained that AFIS contains fingerprints of all convicted persons and recent
arrestees dating back to before 2000. The system ran searches against its entire
database.725
1.169.2 Unfortunately, no matches were found for any of the palm prints.
Swartbooi confirmed that these prints remain in the system as "unsolved latents"
and would generate an alert if matching prints are ever entered into AFIS in the
future.726
1.169.3 He examined elimination prints taken from Mama, who was arrested in
connection with the case in 1993. After thorough manual comparison and verification

723 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 33, 37.
724 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 38–39.
725 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 40-42, 48–49.
726 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 49-51, 56–57.

by Captain van Heerden, Swartbooi confirmed that Mama's prints did not match any
of the recovered palm prints.727
1.170 Expert opinion on investigation shortcomings
1.170.1 Under cross -examination, Swartbooi was asked about the quality of the
fingerprint investigation. While defen ding Sergeant Naude as "one of the best"
investigators, he acknowledged significant gaps in the forensic examination.728
1.170.2 Regarding the 56 AK -47 cartridges recovered at the scene, Swartbo oi
agreed they should have been examined for fingerprints. When pressed for his
professional opinion, he stated that if he had done the crime scene, he would have
fingerprinted it. He noted that at least some cartridges could have been tested while
preserving others for ballistics analysis.729
1.170.3 Swartbooi similarly agreed that the grenade lever and the tear gas
canister lever should have been fingerprinted. He acknowledged that sweaty hands
in heightened emotional states often leave good prints on such surfaces. When
asked directly if this was a blunder, he confirmed: "I would have fingerprinted it."730
1.170.4 He explained that standard procedure requires taking eliminati on prints
from all persons present at a crime scene, including survivors and staff. No evidence
exists that such prints were taken from Highgate Hotel patrons or staff, which
Swartbooi acknowledged was a significant investigative gap.731
1.171 Commentary on investigation documentation

727 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 52–55, 113–114.
728 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 70–71.
729 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 97–104.
730 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 105 -108. Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 118 –
120.
731 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 58, 60–61, 92–93.

1.171.1 Swartbooi reviewed social media posts by Stassen, who supervised the
original crime scene investigation. While declining to comment extensively,
Swartbooi stated he was "shocked" by some of Stassen's statements defending the
investigation, given the clear gaps in fingerprint collection.732
1.171.2 When shown a list of approximately 64 persons of interest mentioned in
the investigation diary, which is Exhibit "L", Swartbooi noted that only Mama's
elimination prints were found in the archives. He could not explain why other
elimination records were missing, but suggested they may have bee n destroyed
after no matches were found, as was sometimes the practice.733
Christiaan Milton Botha:734
1.172 Christiaan Milton Botha (“ Botha”) testified on 6 February 2025. His
evidence, led by Advocate Govender on behalf of the State, covered
both his background as a former police reservist and private investigator,
and his indirect involvement in investigating the 1993 Highgate Hotel
attack alongside the late Els.
1.173 Professional background and relationship with Els
1.173.1 Botha provided a detailed professional history, including his registration
with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (‘PSIRA’) and numerous high-
profile investigations. He met Els around 2005 through a mutual acquaintance. Els
had previously served in the SAPS Murder and Robbery Unit and the Scorpions and
claimed to have been unlawfully dismissed from the latter. Botha explained that he
asked Els to assist in investigations due to his expertise. Although Botha did not

732 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 105–108.
733 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 114–116, 119–120.
734 Exhibit T, Statement of Christiaan Milton Botha.

personally open a file on the Highgate matter, he was aware of and occasionally
assisted Els and Molokome in related inquiries.735
1.174 Allegations regarding Third-Force and Hammer Unit:
1.174.1 Botha testified that Els told him he had been part of a national task team
investigating various APLA -related attacks, including the Highgate Hotel shooting.
According to Els, the atta ck at Highgate did not fit the modus operandi of APLA and
was likely carried out by a covert group within the SADF, namely the Hammer Unit.
Botha recalled that Els found the attackers’ tactics too professional to be the work of
APLA. Elements such as preci sion shooting, the use of tear gas for retreat, and the
attackers’ appearance were inconsistent with previous APLA operations.736
1.175 Investigative activities and interactions with victims:
1.175.1 Botha recounted visits and investigations carried out with Els, including
meeting victims such as Beling. They later collaborated with Carte Blanche for a
documentary segment on the Highgate Massacre. During the filming, Els allegedly
identified Gerhard Lotz, a former Security Branch officer implicated in other
apartheid-era crimes, conducting surveillance. This sighting reinforced Els’ suspicion
of state involvement.737
1.175.2 Botha stated that Els became increasingly consumed with proving that the
SADF Hammer Unit was responsible for the attack. Although no direct mandate had
been given by victims or fa milies, Els pursued leads passionately. One of these
included the alleged confession by a former Hammer Unit member to Molokome and
Els in Cape Town in 2009. The informant, later identified by Molokome as

735 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 1–5.
736 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 6–12.
737 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 13–14.

Grobbelaar, reportedly admitted to participating in the attack and named Colonel
Piet Hall as the commanding officer who issued the order.738
1.176 Contested evidence and inconsistencies
1.176.1 Botha conceded that most of his testimony was hearsay and based on Els’
accounts. He was not present during key moments, including the Cape Town
meeting or the alleged discussion with Colonel Hall in Port Elizabeth. Notably, Botha
initially believed no formal meeting had occurred, but this conflicted with Molokome’s
affidavit, which described a planned and executed meeting. Botha acknowledged the
discrepancy and attributed his uncertainty to the passage of time and his limited
involvement.739
1.177 Third-Force theory and alleged cover-ups:
1.177.1 Botha reiterated that Els believed the Highgate Massacre was meant to
derail CODESA negotiations and was orchestrated by elements within the state
security apparatus. He referenced sig htings of SADF -issued grenades and teargas,
though he conceded under questioning that this evidence was speculative and
contradicted by expert testimony. Botha admitted that his claims lacked
corroborating documentation and were based on conversations with Els.740
1.178 Reflection on Els' Conduct and Unanswered Questions:
1.178.1 The consistency of Els’ commitment was questioned, especially given
evidence that he delayed preparing an inq uest docket while still in the SAPS. Botha
found this difficult to reconcile with the diligent investigator he had known,
suggesting that perhaps Els experienced a change of heart after leaving the service.

738 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 41–43.
739 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 47–50.
740 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 30–32.

Botha admitted that he never saw the full extent of Els' documentation and could not
confirm whether a report had been submitted to the NPA.741
1.179 Other investigative efforts:
1.179.1 Botha recalled participating in a police -assisted search for alleged footage
of the Highgate attack. No such footage was found. He also stated that Els and
Molokome never shared photographic evidence of a supposed mock -up of the
Highgate Hotel used for training by the Hammer Unit, which he found stran ge. Botha
concluded that while he believed Els acted with genuine intent, many of the claims
remain uncorroborated.742
1.179.2 Botha resumed his testimony on 6 February 2025, continuing from where
proceedings had paused earlier that day. His evidence during this session focused
on the conduct and credibility of his former colleague, Els, the procedural handling of
investigative material, and interactions with various individuals purportedly
connected to the Highgate Massacre investigation.
1.180 Concerns regarding the legality of the search warrant and the recovered
tapes:
1.180.1 Botha confirmed that a search warrant had been obtained with th e
assistance of Warrant Officer Potgieter, who also participated in the search.
However, Warrant Officer Potgieter was not an investigator on the relevant docket,
nor did he speak to the primary source, Beling, before applying for the warrant.
Botha acknowledged the concern that, typically, only the investigating officer should
apply for a search warrant based on firsthand knowledge and an affidavit to a
magistrate. Botha admitted that current standards are more stringent than those at

741 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 35–36.
742 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 54–55.

the time and stated t hat the tapes recovered, mostly pornographic, held no
evidentiary value.743
1.181 Strained business relationship with Els and alleged misconduct:
1.181.1 Botha detailed a personal and p rofessional breakdown between himself
and Els. He testified that Els had taken money from a client behind his back, which
constituted a breach of trust and led to the dissolution of their business relationship.
When questioned about Els’ disappearance afte r supposedly obtaining suspect
names, Botha agreed that this behaviour was suspicious and inconsistent with
someone pursuing justice. He admitted being unaware of Els avoiding the family and
that Els primarily communicated with the family, not Botha.744
1.182 Scepticism about Els’s credibility and handling of evidence:
1.182.1 It was put to Botha that Els was not a reliable individual, especially given
his contradictory accounts to diff erent parties, failure to follow through on
commitments, and unexplained disappearance. Botha ultimately agreed, stating that
in hindsight, Els’s conduct, including the possible manipulation of information,
undermined his credibility.
1.182.2 He further st ated that while he had once looked up to Els, he now
understood that Els might have given false hope and failed to deliver substantiated
information.745
1.183 On the alleged statement by Els and its missing status:
1.183.1 Botha confirmed that a draft statement typed on his laptop and attributed
to Els, which referenced third -force involvement, was never signed or

743 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 56–59.
744 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 61–64.
745 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 66–68.

commissioned. He could not recall commissioning the document, despite his name
and the date appearing on it. When confronted with the possibility that Els never
submitted this statement to the SAPS, Botha acknowledged this was likely. He
emphasised that such a document, given its implications, should have been directed
to and filed with the SAPS.746
1.184 Discussion on missing case file and Els’s investigative duties:
1.184.1 Botha testified that he had no knowledge of what happened to any
physical file Els ma y have compiled. He stated that Els was supposed to handle
such documentation and that any submission to the police was Els’s responsibility.
Botha also confirmed that he had served a lawyer’s letter on Els after the latter
solicited money from clients wit hout authorisation, further indicating the breakdown
of trust between them.747
1.185 Questions by the Court and clarification on amnesty and affiliation:
1.185.1 In response to question s from the Court, Botha confirmed that he had
been a reservist and commissioner of oaths during 2007, the date that appears on
the alleged statement by Els. However, he insisted that he had no recollection of
commissioning the document.748
1.185.2 Advocate Govender noted that no such signed statement exists in the
docket and concluded that Els likely never followed through with submitting it.749
1.186 Evaluation of the Hammer Unit theory and use of secondary sources:

746 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 68–76.
747 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 72–74.
748 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 74–75.
749 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 74–76.

1.186.1 Botha admitted that his belief in Hammer Unit involvement was based
largely on what Els told him and on articles like the one by Sam Sole. He conceded
that Sole’s article did not mention the Highgate Massacre. Botha also repeated
unverified claims, such as sightings of former Security Branch officer Gerhard Lotz,
to support the theory. He accepted that his knowledge was second -hand and that he
had no direct evidence.750
1.187 Clarification on explosives and arms access:
1.187.1 Earlier evidence regarding the hand grenade used in the Highgate
Massacre was clarified, and it was stated that even though it was of Soviet origin,
the SADF and security forces had access to Soviet -made weapons for covert
operations. He cited TRC records and arms cache incidents to support this
assertion.751
1.188 Final reflections:
1.188.1 Botha ultimately conceded that while he had previously believed in the
leads provided by Els, the inconsistencies, failure to follow through, and absence of
tangible evidence rendered those claims unreliable.
1.188.2 He acknowledged the importance of not raising false hope and the need
for proper evidentiary standards when dealing with such serious allegations.752
Swele Frans Molokome:753
1.189 Molokome testified on 6 February 2025. His evidence primarily
concerned his involvement in the private investigations conducted by Els

750 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 64, 85–87.
751 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 82–84.
752 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 1, 6 February 2025, pp. 84–88.
753 Exhibit D, Statement of Swele Frans Molokome, pp. 9–10.

into the Highgate Massacre and the alleged information obtained from a
man named Wayne Grobbelaar, who claimed to have be en involved in
the attack as a member of the Hammer Unit.
1.190 Initial Contact with Wayne Grobbelaar (“ Grobbelaar”) and First Meeting
in East London
1.190.1 According to Molokome, Els informed him that they would be meeting a
man with information about th e Highgate Hotel attack. Molokome accompanied Els
to a Wimpy restaurant in Gonubie, East London, where they met Grobbelaar.
Molokome stated that Grobbelaar claimed to have driven the vehicle used during the
attack and identified himself as a member of the Hammer Unit.
1.190.2 Grobbelaar further alleged that the order to attack the Highgate Hotel had
been given by Hall and named several other individuals as participants, including
Major General CP van der Westhuizen, Andries Struwig, Carel Komme, Captain FP
du Preez, Sergeant Major MD Gomm, and Gideon van der Merwe.754
1.191 Second encounter with Grobbelaar in Cape Town:
1.191.1 Following the East London meeting, Molokome and Els travelled to Cape
Town approximately a week after they visited Port Elizabeth.
1.191.2 They met Grobbelaar at his home, where he allegedly repeated the same
claims made during their initial meeting. After a brief conversation, the group shared
a braai, and no further substantive discussion or documentation was produced.755
1.191.3 Prior to their Cape Town visit, Molokome and Els went t o Port Elizabeth to
follow up on Grobbelaar’s claims. They obtained contact details for Hall through the

754 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 95–104; Exhibit D, Statement of Swele Frans Molokome, pp. 9–
10.
755 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 117–118.

SADF offices near the harbour and arranged a meeting. Hansie Meyer (“ Meyer”), a
then-serving police officer with the SAPS gang unit, accompanied them. The
meeting took place at a bar frequented by former military personnel.
1.191.4 Molokome stated that he remained at a distance of about 8 –10 metres as
an observer while Els and Meyer engaged Hall. He testified that when Els presented
a photo album contai ning images from the Highgate crime scene, Hall abruptly
ended the meeting and left with his bodyguards. Molokome interpreted this
behaviour as avoidance or discomfort on Hall's part.756
1.192 Handling of investigative material and lack of follow-through:
1.192.1 Molokome confirmed that Els had kept a file and notes relating to the
Highgate Massacre investigation, including Molokome's own pocketbook, but he did
not know what became of these materials. He did not personally file or submit any
documents to Botha, their employer at the time, and could not confirm whether Els
ever did so.
1.192.2 Molokome also acknowledged tha t Grobbelaar never submitted an
affidavit nor agreed to testify, merely stating he would "think about it." Despite the
severity of Grobbelaar’s allegations, no formal statement was ever produced or
submitted to the SAPS.757
1.193 Lack of communication with Christiaan Milton Botha and omission in
affidavit:
1.193.1 Molokome admitted that critical details of the Port Elizabeth meeting,
including Hall's alleged reaction to the crime scene photographs, were omitted from
his affidavit provided to Nel in 2012. He attributed this omission to memory lapse

756 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 109–114.
757 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 105–108.

and the passage of time. He also acknowledged that Els had been responsible for
reporting to Botha and that h e was not privy to what, if anything, had been relayed
about the Hall meeting.758
1.193.2 Molokome’s testimony highlighted several concerns regarding the
unverified and informal natur e of the investigative work conducted by Els. His
evidence, underscored the absence of formal documentation, corroborating
evidence, or clear investigative procedure.
1.194 Meeting with Grobbelaar:
1.194.1 Molokome confirmed that he had accompanied Els on trips to East
London, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town, where they met a man identifying himself
as Grobbelaar.
1.194.2 Molokome recognised a photograph of Grobbelaar taken in 2011 as the
person they had met. Despite Grobbelaar later denying any interaction with
Molokome, the latter remained confident in his identification.759
1.195 Failure to obtain statements and to follow up:
1.195.1 Molokome recalled that Grobbelaar initially indicat ed he would consider
providing a statement to the SAPS but ultimately never committed to doing so. Els
had told Molokome he would follow up, but to Molokome's knowledge, no further
contact was made.
1.195.2 Although Els had stated he would take a formal s tatement from Molokome
to corroborate their discussions with Grobbelaar, this never occurred. The only
statement Molokome gave was in 2012, upon request by Nel.760

758 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 2, 6 February 2025, pp. 114–116.
759 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 120–124.

1.196 Alleged training structure:
1.196.1 Molokome stated that he had never personally seen the alleged training
structure resembling the Highgate Hotel, which Els reportedly saw. He was aware of
its existence only through Els, who never indicated when or by whom he was sho wn
the structure.
1.196.2 He confirmed that this information was not documented or photographed
by Els and that no such evidence had been made available. Molokome agreed this
was irregular for an experienced investigator.761
1.197 Professional background and internal communication:
1.197.1 Molokome reiterated that he had worked with Botha as an investigator and
had prior experience as an undercover agent for murder and robbery units.
1.197.2 He confirmed the importance of documenting findings and was surprised
that Botha was unaware of the training structure, suggesting poor internal
communication between investigators.762
1.198 Denial of Beling’s account:
1.198.1 Molokome denied ever visiting an open field or receiving details from an
unnamed individual regarding instructions for the Highgate operation , contrary to the
account given by Beling.
1.198.2 He also stated that Els would occasionally travel alone but had no
recollection of any such incident occurring during their Port Elizabeth mission.763

760 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 124–127.
761 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 128–134.
762 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 132–134.

1.199 Lack of communication with families:
1.199.1 Molokome admitted that while he expected Els to follow up and draft a
report, he had never seen such a document and could not explain the lack of
communication between Els and the families. 764
1.199.2 He acknowledged the importance of transparency and regretted the
missed opportunity to clarify what had been uncovered.765
1.200 Allegations against high-ranking officials:
1.200.1 Molokome confirmed that Grobbelaar named several individuals
purportedly involved in the Highgate Massacre, including Hall and Major General
Joffel van der Westhuizen.
1.200.2 He accepted that the participation of such high -ranking officers was
unusual and expressed surprise upon learning that some had left the Eastern Cape
command before the attack.
1.200.3 Despite Hall’s statement denying any knowledge of Els or Molokome, the
latter insisted that it was indeed Hall whom he had met at the E astern Province
Command bar.766
1.201 Role of Hansie Meyer and post-Cape Town contact:
1.201.1 Molokome explained that he and Els had been accompanied by SAPS
member Meyer during their visit to meet Hall. Meyer’s presence was requested by
Els for additional support.

763 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 135–139.
764 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 140–142.
765 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, p. 141.
766 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 143–145.

1.201.2 When asked why Els may have broken off contact with the families
following the Cape Town trip, Molokome denied any knowledge of intimidation or
external threats and described Els as a determined individual who would not have
been easily dissuaded.767
1.202 Lack of follow-up on Highgate leads:
1.202.1 Despite continuing to work with Botha after the Cape Town mission,
Molokome did not recall further discussion of the Highgate Massacre investigation.
He acknowledged that the failure to properly document and repo rt findings
significantly undermined the credibility of the investigation.
1.202.2 In response to the Court’s questions, Molokome reiterated that Grobbelaar
had said the individuals named were involved in the Highgate Massacre, but he
could not confirm their exact roles.768
1.203 Failure to compile reports:
1.203.1 During re -examination by Advocate Govender, Molokome confirmed that
while it was standard practice to draft reports with Botha after investigations, no such
report was compiled regarding the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth trips.
1.203.2 He never saw a report and relied solely on Els’s word that one had been
drafted. Molokome was ultimately excused from the witness stand.769

767 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 146–147.
768 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 147–149.
769 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 149–151.

Alan Douglas Elsdon:770
1.204 Elsdon’s evidence focused on his relationship with Els, the allegations of
a cover -up surrounding the Highga te Massacre investigation, and his
concerns regarding the SAPS and NPA.
1.205 Background and relationship with Els:
1.205.1 Elsdon testified that he joined the South African Police in East London in
1973 and served in various roles over two decades, including detective, drug squad
member, and as an investigator in the Security Branch from 1977. He was also
trained as a cryptographer and had access to highly classified information from the
SADF and the Bureau of State Security (“BOSS”). After resigning from the SAPS, he
pursued private investigations and authored a book titled The Tall Assassin , which
investigated unsolved political murders in South Africa.771
1.205.2 He explained that he befriended former Els in 2014, when both were
working on separate murder investigations, including the Inge Lotz, Jessica
Wheeler, and Victoria Stadler cases. During this collaboration, Els confided in him
about his frustrations around the Highgate Massacre case. According to Elsdon, Els
claimed he had been prevented by SAPS superiors from fully investigating the
massacre and alleged that a covert SADF group known as the Hammer Unit was
responsible. Els had reportedly identified th is group as operating under the Eastern
Province Command in Port Elizabeth and told Elsdon that attempts to investigate it
had been met with hostility from within the SAPS.772
1.206 Claims of a cover-up and SAPS/NPA inaction:

770 Exhibit U, Statement of Alan Douglas Elsdon.
771 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 152–154.
772 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 152–157.

1.206.1 Elsdon testified that Els became increasingly disillusioned by the
resistance he faced and eventually resigned from the SAPS. He asserted that Els
believed a cover -up had occurred regarding the true perpet rators of the Highgate
Massacre. 773
1.206.2 Elsdon supported this view, expressing strong criticism of the SAPS and
the NPA for their lack of action and transparency. He claimed that important exhibits
and statements had disappeared and that an inquest should have been held shortly
after the incident, but was delayed for decades.774
1.206.3 He also alleged that a systemic alliance between the SAPS and NPA in
the Western Cape had contributed to the mishandling of multiple high -profile
investigations, denying victims justice. He urged that these institutions be held
accountable and emphasised the need for ethical reform.775
1.207 Interaction with Captain Peterson and the Hammer Unit:
1.207.1 Elsdon testified that on 21 February 2023, Captain Peterson of the Hawks
contacted him about the Highgate Massacre investigation, indicating that the NPA
had instructed him to investigate. They met two days later at the SAP S offices in
Stellenbosch, where Elsdon shared the information he had received from Els. He
also provided Peterson with the names of two individuals reportedly linked to the
Hammer Unit. Peterson assured him the leads would be pursued. However, upon
following up later, Elsdon learned that no interviews had been conducted.776
1.207.2 He testified that he independently spoke to one former member of the
Hammer Unit, who confirmed the exis tence of the unit and stated, "once a Hammer,
always a Hammer," but denied any knowledge of the Highgate Massacre. This

773 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 156–157.
774 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 158–160.
775 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 157–160.
776 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 157–158.

individual further claimed that such an attack was not in line with the Hammer Unit’s
modus operandi.777
1.207.3 Elsdon found the lack of action from Peterson troubling, citing it as another
example of institutional reluctance to investigate state-linked suspects.778
1.208 Challenges to Els’s credibility:
1.208.1 Elsdon acknowledged that his knowledge of the Highgate Massacre
investigation was entirely second -hand, based on what Els had told him. He
conceded that he had no firsthand knowledge or documentary evidence to support
the claim that Els had investigated th e Hammer Unit while still a police officer. In
fact, Elsdon was unaware that Els only came to know of the Hammer Unit after
joining private investigator Botha’s firm.779
1.208.2 It was pointed out to Elsdon that the official investigation diary contained
no record of Els requesting permission to investigate the Hammer Unit or
encountering resistance from his superiors. He further questioned why Els never
submitted the docket for an inq uest, despite being instructed to do so over a period
of two years. Elsdon admitted this was surprising and agreed that such delays were
inappropriate and undermined Els’s credibility as an investigator.780
1.209 Attempt to follow up and confidential contact with victims:
1.209.1 Elsdon testified that once he learned the inquest was underway, he
contacted survivor Parker to confirm whether Captain Peterson had mentioned the
Hammer Unit. He asked Parker to keep their conversations confidential, fearing that
broader disclosure might hinder his inquiries. Elsdon admitted that he shared his

777 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 158–159.
778 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 152–159.
779 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 159–163.
780 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 163–170.

affidavit with Parker and also shared theories regarding the nature of the Highgate
Massacre.781
1.209.2 Among these, he conve yed a theory, allegedly relayed to him by a former
Hammer Unit member, that the massacre might have been a targeted operation
disguised by multiple killings.782
1.209.3 He speculated that one politically left -leaning person might have been the
real target, with other casualties meant to obscure the motive.783
1.209.4 Elsdon’s decision to share theories and docume nts with a potential
witness outside of the legal process, without notifying legal representatives, was
challenged, arguing that such actions were improper and irregular. Elsdon defended
his actions as personal outreach and claimed his intentions were not malicious.784
1.210 Conclusions and acknowledged limitations:
1.210.1 In conclusion, Elsdon accepted that he had no firsthand evidence
identifying those responsible for the massacre o r confirming the Hammer Unit’s
involvement. His testimony was based primarily on hearsay from Els and his own
suspicions arising from perceived institutional failings.785
1.210.2 He expressed frustration over the disappearance of evidence and lack of
follow-through by the SAPS and NPA and reiterated his belief that the inquest
presented an opportunity to uncover the truth. He acknowledged the limitations of

781 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 174–176.
782 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 180–181.
783 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 181–182.
784 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 170–185.
785 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 185–186.

his role and regretted a ny perception that his communications had undermined the
legal process.786
1.211 Clarification of meeting with Captain Peterson:
1.211.1 Elsdon confirmed that in February 2023, he met with Captain Peterson,
the current investigating officer. Elsdon claimed that he had provided Peterson with
useful leads, specifically mentioning two brothers allegedly involved in the Highgate
massacre and the name of a deceased former Hammer Unit member , Wayne
Richardson. However, Peterson later stated in his affidavit that Elsdon had not
supplied any concrete names, which Elsdon disputed. Elsdon explained that he had
asked Peterson to consult a list of Hammer Unit members and locate the brothers
based on their shared surname, arguing that this would be sufficient to identify them.
He insisted that his hesitation to give the names outright was due to security
concerns and personal distrust of SAPS and the NPA, especially based on prior
experiences in the Western Cape.787
1.211.2 Elsdon eventually admitted that he had, in prior interactions, revealed the
names of the brothers to the attorneys representing the families, which were later
confirmed as Marius and Fanie van Zyl. One of the brothers is now deceased. He
stated his willingness to provide the name of the surviving brother and additional
leads to Captain Peterson in a closed session.788
1.212 Communications with Parker and concerns raised:
1.212.1 The Court addressed Elsdon's WhatsApp communications with survivor
Parker. Elsdon admitted reaching out to Parker to verify whether Captain Peterson
had mentioned the Hammer Unit or i nterviewed the two brothers. He confirmed that
he sent Parker two of his published books and a report from 1994 that speculated on

786 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 9, Part 3, 6 February 2025, pp. 185–188.
787 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 5–11.
788 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 11–14.

the Hammer Unit’s involvement in the Cradock Four murders. Elsdon acknowledged
that this contact occurred before he realised he might testify and that he had
promised to send Parker his affidavit, but refrained once he understood the
implications of becoming a witness.789
1.212.2 He admitted that the timing of some of his messages preceded the
development of his "single -target theory," which emerged only after a meeting on 2
February 2025 with an ex -Hammer Unit member in East London. Despite the
messages referencing sensitive leads, Elsdon maintained that his motive was to
determine whether his leads were pursued, not to interfere with Parker's testimony.
Concerns were raised about the irregularity and potential risk of his communications
with a potential witness.790
1.213 Elsdon’s File and unverified leads:
1.213.1 Elsdon confirmed the existence of a personal investigative file at home
containing names and information about individuals possibly linked to the massacre.
He undertook to share with Captain Peterson this file and the names, including his
National Intelligence (“ NI”) source and a woman romantically linked to one of the
Van Zyl brothers.
1.213.2 He also mentioned a 1994 article connecting the Hammer Unit to the
Cradock Four, which he had forwarded to Parker without independently verifying its
accuracy. Advocate Govende r warned that unverified information, particularly with
serious implications, should not be disseminated casually, especially to potential
witnesses.791
1.214 Elsdon’s relationship with Els and recollections of the Security Branch:

789 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 14–18.
790 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 18–24.
791 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 28–30.

1.214.1 Elsdon reiterated his long -standing friendship with Els, who had confided
his belief that a cover -up surrounded the Highgate Massacre investigation. Elsdon
conceded, however, that he had never directly assist ed Els in investigating the case
and that Els had left the police before learning of the Hammer Unit. Elsdon also
admitted that some of his assumptions were based on hearsay and not verified by
official documentation.792
1.214.2 He spoke at length about his own background in the Security Branch and
experiences with covert operations. He detailed his writing on unresolved political
murders in South Africa and confirmed being targeted with a "mid night warning shot"
in 1993 while working on his book The Tall Assassin. Elsdon testified that the failure
to investigate the Highgate Massacre promptly reflected institutional failures and
echoed the long-standing grievances of the victims’ families.793
1.215 Concerns of cover-up and further information:
1.215.1 Elsdon mentioned that the Van Zyl brothers had been linked to the
Highgate Massacre by a trusted NI source who urged him not to probe further due to
safety concerns. He also referenced a now -deceased acquaintance, Jock
Richardson, whose brother, Wayne, was allegedly a Hammer Unit member.
1.215.2 According to Elsdon, Jock Richardson feared reprisals from his brother
and asked him to kee p the information confidential. With both men deceased,
Elsdon agreed to share the relevant information with authorities. He also noted
claims about a possible training replica of the Highgate Hotel at a military base,
allegedly built for practice by the H ammer Unit, but acknowledged that these stories
remain unverified.794
1.216 Photographic identification and other leads:

792 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 35–40.
793 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 35–37.
794 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 44–49.

1.216.1 Elsdon was shown two photographs (marked Exhibits F1 and F2) of
security personnel outside the Highgate Hotel the morning after the Massacre. He
identified two individuals as members of the Security Branch, including Glenn
Schooling.
1.216.2 He requested s maller copies of the photos to consult with contacts who
might identify additional individuals depicted. Elsdon also referenced a private
communication in which he had attempted to meet a woman connected to one of the
brothers but failed to locate her. He promised to provide her contact details to the
investigators.795
1.217 Historical allegations of abuse and final interactions:
1.217.1 Elsdon was referred to a 1982 affidavit from trade unioni st Sisa Njikelane
in the Neil Aggett inquest, which alleged that Elsdon, along with Sergeants Fourie
and Els, had beaten him in a John Vorster Square cell. Elsdon acknowledged the
accuracy of the statement.796
Colonel Siphiwo Ripa:
1.218 Introduction role of Colonel Ripa:
1.218.1 Colonel Siphiwo Ripa (“Colonel Ripa”), Commander for Crime Against the
State within the DPCI, testified on the investigative process of the H ighgate
Massacre inquest. He explained the unique nature of inquests as judicial
investigations without prosecution, where the investigation evolves as new
information emerges.797
1.219 Investigative structure and TRC cases:

795 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 57–60.
796 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 10, 7 February 2025, pp. 65–72.
797 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 1–3.

1.219.1 Colonel Ripa described the structure of the Crime Against the State unit
(CATS) within DPCI, noting an increase in manpower from three to eight
investigators since 2019 to handle TRC -related cases, including the Highgate
Massacre case. He emphasised collaboration with the Foundation for Human Rights
and the NPA, noting that prosecutions require close cooperation with the NPA to
build solid cases.798
1.219.2 He explained that Captain Peterson is ful ly supported in his duties,
including travel and field investigations, often with an assigned partner for security
and procedural reasons during interviews and investigations.799
1.220 Communication issues raised and clarifications:
1.220.1 The Court raised concerns about previous reports of communication
difficulties between Captain Peterson and the legal teams representing the families
and survivors. Colonel Ripa acknowledged these concerns but d escribed the need
for communications to go through prosecutors to maintain clear channels and avoid
misunderstandings, stressing there was no intention to hinder information flow.800
1.220.2 He gave the assurance that no communication restrictions exist that would
hamper the investigative process, affirming that Captain Peterson remains fully
accessible and cooperative within the existing communication protocols.801
1.221 Evidence of communication challenges and resolution:
1.221.1 Recent difficulties in contacting Captain Peterson during the recess were
recounted, including unanswered calls and delayed res ponses. He stressed that the

798 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 7–9.
799 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 8–9.
800 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 10–12.
801 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 11–13.

imposed communication via NPA and not directly with the legal teams was
unprecedented, inefficient, and obstructive to the investigation.802
1.221.2 Colonel Ripa concurred that direct communication with prosecutors should
be standard but acknowledged the importance of smooth communication and the
involvement of all stakeholders. He suggested meetings to resolve
misunderstandings and emphasised the importance of everyo ne being copied into
relevant communications for transparency.803
1.221.3 Colonel Ripa committed to ensuring that Captain Peterson’s work on the
inquest is prioritised.804
1.222 Working relationship with prosecutors and next steps:
1.222.1 Colonel Ripa highlighted the critical role of prosecutors in guiding the
investigation and stressed that requests and communications should be route d
through them to maintain investigative integrity. Advocate Govender, also present,
confirmed that recent meetings with Captain Peterson have clarified outstanding
issues and mapped a way forward for the investigation.805
1.222.2 Colonel Ripa assured the Court that the Highgate Massacre investigation
is a priority, and any other work would be set aside to focus on this matter.806
Dean George Venish:807
1.223 Introduction:

802 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 14–16.
803 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 16–19.
804 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, pp. 19–22.
805 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, p. 24.
806 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 12, 25 March 2025, p. 24.
807 Exhibit D, Statement of Dean George Venish, pp. 15–18.

1.223.1 Dean George Venish (“ Venish”), a retired warrant officer in the South
African Police Service, testified regarding his presence at the Highgate Hotel on the
night of 1 May 1993 as one of the first police officers to arrive at the scene.
1.223.2 His testimony provided crucial evidence about the immediate aftermath of
the attack and witness observations that contradicted the initial APLA attribution
narrative.
1.224 Professional Background and Service History:
1.224.1 Venish testified that he joined the police service on 30 December 198 7
and retired at the end of June 2024 as a warrant officer.
1.224.2 At the time of the Highgate Massacre, he held the rank of either constable
or lance sergeant and had been a police officer for approximately 5-6 years.
1.224.3 He had been a dog handler since 1989, working in the dog unit based at
Westbank Greenfield.808
1.225 Response to the Massacre:
1.225.1 On the night of 1 May 1993, Venish was on duty with Sergeant Mike
Lombard, filling up with petrol at Cambridge Police Station, when they received news
of the attack.
1.225.2 They were going off duty at the time, aro und 21h30 to 22h00. Upon
hearing about the incident, they immediately proceeded to the Highgate Hotel with
their patrol vehicle and dogs, with Lombard driving.809
1.226 Arrival at the Crime Scene:
1.226.1 Venish described arriving at the scene "coming in hot," driving very fast
and exceeding the speed limit. As they came under the bridge approaching the

808 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 3–4.
809 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, p. 5.

Highgate, the area was filled with smoke and teargas that made his eyes burn
immediately.
1.226.2 Due to their speed and the poor visibility from the smoke, Lombard hit the
central pavement ("middel mannetjie") separating the hotel from the road, causing
their vehicle to skid up onto the pavement and come down. Sand buildup prevented
damage to the vehicle.810
1.227 Critical Observations at the Scene:
1.227.1 Upon jumping out of the vehicle, Venish ran to the Highgate Hotel
entrance steps, where he observed two men who ap peared to have been in a fight.
Both men were bloody, with torn clothing, and were lying on the steps, one higher up
than the other. Importantly, the man at the top of the steps made a statement that
would prove significant: he shouted "these bloody white oaks" or "guys" or
something similar.811
1.227.2 Venish was about to enter the building when Lombard shouted at him not
to go inside, warning about contamination of the crime scene . Other police vehicles
arrived within seconds, and senior members took over the scene. Venish and
Sergeant Mike Lombard were then relegated to patrolling the surrounding area.812
1.227.3 After being pulled back from the immediate scene, Venish used his dog to
search the train lines and surrounding areas on a long puppy line, though they found
no visible signs, tracks, or evidence. They patrolled the area, including up towards
the Summer Pride area, before going off duty the same night.813
1.228 Delayed statement and investigation failures:

810 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 5–6 & 11–13.
811 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 7–8 & 27–28.
812 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 7–8.
813 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 14–15.

1.228.1 Remarkably, Venish was never asked for a statement about the incident
until 1 March 2012, nearly 19 years after the event, when Nel approached him.
1.228.2 He expressed surprise that nobody had come to take his statement
earlier, stating, "I was surprised that nobody was coming."814
1.228.3 Venish confirmed that he communicated what the injured man had said
about "bloody whites" to other officers at the scene, including Lombard and other
policemen standing around them. Despite this being potentially crucial evidence
suggesting the attackers were white, no follow-up was conducted with him about this
observation.815
1.229 Sergeant Mike Lombard:
1.229.1 When asked about his partner that night, Venish testified that Sergeant
Mike Lombard was still alive but in poor condition, consuming excessive amounts of
alcohol daily. He described Sergeant Mike Lombard as starting his mornings by
brushing his teeth with brandy and assessed him as mentally incapable of testifying.
Venish had attempted to engage with Sergeant Mike Lombard about the incident in
2012 but found him unable to have a coherent conversation.816
1.230 Record-keeping and scene presence:
1.230.1 Despite being one of the first officers at the scene, Venish believed there
should have been a record of his and Sergeant Mike Lombard's presence. He
testified that Sergeant Mike Lombard, a s the senior sergeant, would have been
required to report to a senior officer at the scene and request permission to leave,
which was standard protocol. However, no such record appears to have been
maintained.817

814 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, p. 16.
815 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, p. 27 & pp. 43–44.
816 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 20–21.
817 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 40–42.

Wayne Xavier Rutters:818
1.231 Introduction:
1.231.1 Rutters, a retired SAPS Captain with 35 years of service, testified
regarding his limited role in the Highgate Massacre investigation.
1.231.2 As a detective sergeant in 1993, he was part of the investigative team
under Major Ian Swarts (“Swarts”) but had no direct involvement at the crime scene.
1.231.3 His testimony primarily concerned photo identification procedures he
conducted with witnesses in the immediate aftermath of the attack and highlighted
critical gaps in documentation that should have been maintained.
1.232 Professional Background and Career Progression:
1.232.1 Rutters testified that he joined the SAP in 1986, initially stationed at the
riot unit in East London. In 1991, he transferred to the Unrest and Violent Crimes
Unit, dealing with taxi violence, necklace murders, and other violent crimes.
1.232.2 He moved to the organised crime unit in 1999, investigating stock theft
and narcotics syndicates.
1.232.3 In 2008, when various units amalgamated, he became part of the Hawks,
where he remained until his retirement in 2021
1.232.4 At the time of the Highgate incident in 1993, he held the rank of sergeant
and worked as an investigative member of the Unrest and Violent Crimes Unit.819
1.233 Role in the Highgate Investigation:
1.233.1 Rutters testified that he was part of a team investigating multiple serious
crimes across the Eastern Cape, including the King William's Town Golf Club and

818 Exhibit MM, Statement of Wayne Xavier Rutters.
819 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 60–61 & 68.

Yellowwood Hotel attacks. The team worked under the command of the late Swarts,
with daily t askings to obtain statements from identified witnesses or follow up on
information received. He emphasised that he was never in charge of the
investigation but occasionally had dockets booked out to him when Els was on leave
or ill, purely for control purposes to prevent case dockets from being lost.820
1.233.2 Rutters confirmed he did not attend the crime scene on the night of the
attack. His first visit to the Highgate Hotel occurred after the scene had been
cleaned and forensics had completed their work.821
1.234 Photo Identification Procedures:
1.234.1 Rutters conducted several photo identification procedures with witnesses
in the days immediately following the attack, though he had no specific recollection
of these events, given the passage of over 30 years. The witnesses included:
(a) Arnott on 2 May 1993, who ide ntified a person from photo
album A, photograph number 6, as someone he had seen
in the hotel foyer on the night of the attack;
(b) Aileen Clark on 3 May 1993, who identified photograph
number 1 from album A;
(c) René Naude on 3 May 1993, who identified photographs 1
and 10 from album A; and
(d) Parker on 2 May 1993, who was unable to identify anyone
due to his traumatised state as a survivor.
1.234.2 Rutters accepted the accuracy of these witness statements when
presented with them during testimony, but could not independently recall the specific
identifications.822

820 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 63–65.
821 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, p. 65.

1.235 Missing Documentation:
1.235.1 A critical issue emerged regarding the absence of Rutte rs' statement
documenting these photo identification procedures. Under normal procedure, an
officer conducting photo IDs would compile a statement detailing who was identified
and where in the photo albums the identifications could be found. Rutters testif ied
that, on the probabilities, he would have made such a statement and submitted it to
the investigating officer, as was standard practice. He expressed concern that this
statement was nowhere to be found in the investigation docket, particularly given th e
high-profile nature of the case involving five murders and multiple serious injuries.823
1.235.2 Rutters clarified that any diary entry regarding his statement would have
been made by the inv estigating officer (Sergeant Els), not by himself. The absence
of both the statement and any diary entry recording its submission raised troubling
questions about the investigation's record -keeping. When asked if he found this
disturbing, Rutters simply answered "Yes."824
1.236 Investigation diary references:
1.236.1 The investigation diary contained references to Rutters' involvement,
including an entry dated 10 July 1993, noting that he had vi sited Welkom to conduct
a photo identification with arrested suspected APLA members detained in
connection with the Wesselsbron robbery.
1.236.2 The diary indicated he was working with Swarts on the continuing APLA
investigation. However, Rutters could no t recall specifics about this visit or whether
the detained person was Brian Sibanda, as mentioned in the diary.825

822 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 69–72.
823 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 73–75.
824 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 74–76.
825 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 15, 12 August 2025, pp. 64-67 & 72–73.

Lieutenant Franswa Stassen:826
1.237 Introduction:
1.237.1 Stassen served as a lieutenant and second -in-command at the LCRC in
East London at the time of the Highgate Massacre. As the duty officer on the night of
1 May 1993, he was responsible for coordinating the forensic team at the crime
scene.
1.237.2 His testimony addressed the forensic procedures employed at the scene,
particularly regarding fingerprint collection, and revealed significant gaps in the
investigation's documentation and follow-up procedures.
1.238 Professional Background and Qualifications:
1.238.1 Stassen began his police service in December 1975, initially working at
the criminal record centre in Pretoria before transferring to the LCRC in Port
Elizabeth. After briefly leaving the force in 1994, he rejoined a year later in Cape
Town, where he assis ted with training in Kimberley and Mmabatho. In 1992, he
completed an officers' course and began working at the LCRC in East London as
second-in-command. He eventually retired in 2001 at the rank of lieutenant -
colonel.827
1.238.2 Stassen described himself on his LinkedIn profile as having "vast
experience in investigation of fraud concerning social grants and financial
misconduct" and as a "Fingerprint Expert" who had been "working with f ingerprints
and includes testifying as expert in courts all over South Africa for the past 30
years."828
1.239 Response to the Highgate Hotel Incident:

826 Exhibit NN, Statement of Lieutenant Franswa Stassen.
827 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 87–88.
828 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 106.

1.239.1 On the evening of 1 May 1993, Stassen was on duty as the weekly duty
officer when he received a call from radio control to attend the incident at the
Highgate Hotel. He could not recall exactly when he arrived, but he found his team
members already present: Colin Charles (videographer ), Sergeant Naude
(fingerprint expert), and du Plessis (photographer).829
1.239.2 Upon arrival, Stassen encountered what he described as "chaos" with
police officers throughout the scene , injured persons on stretchers, and
approximately five deceased individuals in the bar area. He immediately spoke to a
brigadier (either Bergh or Swart) and requested that the scene be secured and
cleared of unnecessary personnel so the forensic team could conduct their work.830
1.240 Forensic Procedures and Supervision:
1.240.1 Stassen testified tha t his role was primarily coordinating the scene rather
than conducting hands-on forensic work. He gave minimal specific instructions to his
team, stating that Sergeant Naude was an experienced expert who "knew what they
had to do" and required little direc tion. Stassen only specifically instructed Naude to
examine the entrance ways to the bars for fingerprints.831
1.240.2 When questioned about whether fingerprints were taken from critical
evidence such as the grenade lever, teargas canister, and spent cartridges, Stassen
claimed these items required chemical processing at the office rather than standard
aluminium powder used at scenes. However, he could not confirm whether this
chemical processing was ever conducted.832
1.241 Contradictions and Gaps in Evidence:
1.241.1 Stassen's testimony revealed several concerning aspects of the
investigation:

829 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 89–90.
830 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, p. 91.
831 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 92–93.
832 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, pp. 120–121.

(a) He claimed to have spent approximately seven hours at
the scene, being "incredibly busy," yet later admitted he
spent much of the time outside talking to colleagues and
waiting for his team members to request assistance.833
(b) Despite being the senior officer responsible for the forensic
investigation, Stassen could not confirm whether critical
evidence, such as 56 AK -47 cartridges, grenade levers, or
the teargas canister, was ever fingerprinted. He repeatedl y
stated he would need to see the physical exhibits to
determine if chemical processing had been applied.834
(c) Stassen confirmed that no fingerprint expert affidavit or
SAP21 form ex isted in the investigation diary, though he
disputed whether such documentation was required.835
(d) Stassen repeatedly corrected himself regar ding his rank,
initially stating he was a captain before correcting to
lieutenant, demonstrating confusion about basic facts of his
involvement.836
(e) When pressed about who should ensure Naude performed
his work properly, Stassen stated "Nobody" and that
Naude worked "on his own time" despite Stassen
outranking him.837
(f) Stassen w as completely unaware of the elimination
process whereby fingerprints from the scene should have

833 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 131.
834 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, pp. 131–133.
835 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 109.
836 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 91–92; Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, pp. 112–113.
837 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, pp. 121–122.

been compared with potential suspects, despite being
second-in-command.838
1.242 The Missing LCRC Docket:
1.242.1 A significant revelation was that the LCRC's forensic docket for the
Highgate massacre could not be located despite searches conducted in 2025.
1.242.2 Stassen insisted that in his 21 years as a fingerprint expert, his office had
"never lost a docket" and expressed disbelief that it could not be found. He
suggested the docket must still exist somewhere in the archives and claimed he
could find it if given access to the office.839
1.242.3 Despite the magnitude of the incident, Stassen could not definitively
remember whether his commander was Brigadier Bergh or Brigadier Swart.840
1.243 Social Media Commentary:
1.243.1 Stassen had posted on YouTube defending the LCRC's work on the case,
stating: "Fingerprints were lifted at the scene and even suspects have been
identified by the serious violent crimes un it via Els. I believe that they have all been
given indemnity." However, when questioned, he could not identify these suspects or
provide any evidence that fingerprints had led to identifications. He also suggested
in his post that missing documentation ha d "either been destroyed or sold by
someone."841
1.243.2 Evidence showed he edited his post; an original version (Exhibit Z) and an
edited version (Exhibit Z1) were presented to the court.842

838 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 139.
839 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 135.
840 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, p. 92.
841 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 97–99; Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025, p. 147.
842 Exhibit Z & Z1.

1.243.3 He initially denied editing the post, but then admitted he "may have" tried
to delete a previous version. He also suggested in his post that missing
documentation had "either been destroyed or sold by someone."843
Warrant Officer David Henry Roos: 844
1.244 Introduction:
1.244.1 Roos, a veteran police officer with over 40 years of service in various
investigative units, testified regarding allegations of his involvement in the Highgate
Hotel massacre inve stigation. Despite claims that he participated in taking affidavits
and conducting photo identification parades at the scene, Roos categorically denied
any presence at the Highgate Hotel on the night of the attack or afterwards.
1.244.2 His testimony addr essed documentary evidence suggesting his
involvement while maintaining that he has no recollection of participating in the
investigation.
1.245 Professional History and Career Progression:
1.245.1 Roos joined the South African Police Force in 1980, initially serving in the
uniform investigation unit until 1986 before transferring to the detective branch at
Fleet Street Police Station. He completed detective training around 1990 and was a
warrant off icer at the time of the Highgate massacre in May 1993. Following the
attack, he was among several young detectives called to assist with investigations
due to a shortage of investigating officers.
1.245.2 His career progressed through various units, inclu ding the unrest and
violent crime unit (1993 -1994), the Kroon Commission of Enquiry in Umtata (1995),
the organised crime investigation unit in East London (from 1995), and eventually to
crime intelligence offices, where he served until retirement in 2021.845

843 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 16 Part 1, 12 August 2025, pp. 97–99; Day 16 Part 2, 12 August 2025,110–111 & p. 147.
844 Exhibit QQ, Statement of Warrant Officer David Henry Roos.
845 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 51–52

1.246 Denial of Scene Attendance:
1.246.1 Roos definitively denied attending the Highgate Hotel crime scene on the
night of 1 May 1993 or at any time afterwards. When asked if he could deny claims
that he was present and assisted in taking affidavits, he stated he would "definitely
be able to deny that because I was definitely not at that scene."
1.246.2 He emphasised that while he may have assisted with the investigation in
some capacity, g iven the volume of cases at the time, he was never physically
present at the hotel.846
1.247 Photo Identification Parade Documentation:
1.247.1 When presented with an investigation diary entry from Els indicating that
an ID kit and photo album had been handed to "Detective Warrant Officer Roos" for
showing to witnesses, Roos stated he had no recollection of this task.
1.247.2 The entry specified that the materials were to be shown to witnesses who
might identify a black female seen in the public bar on the day of the attack, as well
as witnesses from the Queenstown attack.
1.247.3 Despite his name appearing in the official documentation, Roos
maintained he could not recall conducting any such identification procedures.847
1.248 Statement of Charles Johannes Claassen (“Claassen”):
1.248.1 Roos was shown a statement from Claassen dated 12 May 1993, which
bore Roos's name as the commissioner of the statement. The statement detailed
how Claassen had conducted a photo identification with Roos on 12 May 1993,
during which he identified individuals he had seen at the hotel before the attack.

846 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, p. 53.
847 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 54–55.

1.248.2 Despite his name and apparent handwriting appearing on the document
as the person who took the statement at 15:10 on 12 May 1993, Roos stated he
could not recall taking this statement or conducting the identification parade.
1.248.3 He acknowledged it was his handwriting but maintained he had no
memory of these events.848
1.249 Missing Documentation and Procedural Gaps:
1.249.1 When questioned about standard procedures, Roos confirmed that if he
had conducted a photo identification parade where a witness made an identification,
he would normally have created his own statement documenting the procedure and
results. The absence of suc h a statement in the docket was acknowledged as
unusual.
1.249.2 Roos could not explain why no statement from him existed if he had
indeed conducted the identification parade as documented. He agreed this
represented an apparent omission from normal inves tigative procedures, but could
not account for it, given his lack of memory of the events.849
1.250 Acknowledgement of Possible Involvement:
1.250.1 While maintaining he had no specific recolle ction, Roos accepted that,
given there were no other Warrant Officer Roos working on the matter at that time,
the probabilities suggested he had carried out these investigative tasks. He
explained that during that period, investigating officers would assig n specific tasks to
available detectives to assist with overwhelming caseloads. As a junior detective, he
would have been given discrete tasks like conducting photo identifications without
being the main carrier of the investigation.

848 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 56–57 & 59–60.
849 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 58–59.

1.250.2 He emphasised his role would have been limited to helping established
investigators like Rutters or Els.850
Captain Stephanus Johannes Du Rand: 851
1.251 Introduction:
1.251.1 Du Rand, a 56 -year-old SAPS officer serving as a designated firearm
officer, testified regarding allegations that he instructed Highgate survivors to submit
written statements by sliding them under his office door due to fear for his safety. Du
Rand, who has served in the police force since December 1986, categorically denied
any recollection of such interactions with survivors Beling or Page, despite their
detailed testimony about meeting him at Cambridge Police Station between 2007
and 2010.
1.252 Professional Background and Career Development:
1.252.1 Du Rand joined the police force in December 1986, working initially at the
dog unit for 13 years before transitioning to organised crime investigations. Since
2002, he has been part of the firearm, liquor, a nd second-hand goods component at
Cambridge Police Station, specifically handling IBIS testing of firearms and all
firearm-related work.
1.252.2 He was promoted to captain in 1997 and has remained at that rank. At the
time of the Highgate incident in May 1993, he held the rank of warrant officer and
was stationed at the East London Dog Unit at Woodbrook as a dog handler and shift
commander. He had no involvement in the original Highgate investigation and was
not present at the scene.852
1.253 Denial of Witness Interactions:

850 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 57–59.
851 Exhibit RR, Statement of Captain Stephanus Johannes Du Rand.
852 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 67–68.

1.253.1 Captain Peterson had approached Du Rand in March 2025 regarding
claims by Beling that Du Rand had information about the Highgate killings and had
instructed someone t o write information on paper and push it under his office door
due to fear for his life and his family. Du Rand testified he had no recollection
whatsoever of this interaction or any such facts that could help the matter. He
emphasised that he deals with t oo many people and traumatic incidents to
remember specific interactions.853
1.254 Response to Specific Allegations:
1.254.1 When confronted with Beling's statement that Du Rand had been inform ed
about seeing Taylor at the Highgate Hotel and had responded that he did not want to
get involved, instructing them to write a statement and slide it under his door, Du
Rand maintained he had no memory of these events.
1.254.2 He stated it was the first time he had heard the name Taylor. Similarly,
when presented with Page's testimony that Du Rand had asked them to make a
statement about Eric Taylor and suspected phone tapping, expressing fear for his
family, and requesting they slip the statement under his door after 5 PM, Du Rand's
response remained consistent: he did not recall any such interaction.854
1.255 Office Location and Procedural Irregularities
1.255.1 Du Rand explained that between 2007 and 2010, his office location at
Cambridge Police Station changed. In 2007, his office was in the main passage
behind a security gate leading to the roof. The office where papers could
theoretically be pushed underneath the door was the licensing office, where four or
five people worked. From 2008 to 2010, his office was in a restricted area that was
totally blocked off with strongrooms, making after-hours access impossible.

853 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 66–67.
854 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 74–76.

1.255.2 He confirmed that asking someone, particularly a complainant, to make a
statement and leave it under a door was not a procedure he would follow, as
statements are normally taken on the spot or referred to someone else if
sensitive.855
1.256 Lack of Denial but No Recollection
1.256.1 Significantly, while Du Rand repeatedly stated he had no recollection of
the alleged interactions, he did not categorically deny that they had o ccurred. When
pressed about whether he was denying that the events happened, he stated he was
not saying it did not happen; he just does not remember, and that he cannot add on
to something he just does not remember.
1.256.2 “If I physically do something, I have a memory, but passing things on and
that, it is too much. It is too long time back. It just blurs." This acknowledgement that
the events might have occurred despite his lack of memory added complexity to his
testimony.856
1.257 Knowledge of Highgate Personnel and Prior Connections
1.257.1 Du Rand confirmed he knew Harris's family through bowling connections
between their parents and knew Page by sight. Regarding the dog unit's involvement
on the night of the Highgate attack, he stated he had no recollection of colleagues
Venish and Lombard being called to the scene, though he did not dispute their
testimony that they responded to the emergency call.
1.257.2 He explained that such emergency responses would typically come
through the 10111 emergency line rather than from a unit commander. He
acknowledged that dog unit personnel would have been used for explosive detection
work at the scene rather than tracking.857

855 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 68–69 & 76.
856 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, p. 77.
857 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 17, 13 August 2025, pp. 71–72 & 78–80.

Mtunzi Mhaga:858
1.258 Mhaga testified regarding his involve ment with the Highgate Hotel
Massacre case during his tenure at the NPA Priority Crimes Litigation
Unit (“ PCLU”) between 2006 and 2009. His evidence covered the
preliminary inquiries he conducted due to the lack of dedicated
investigative capacity at the t ime, his interactions with victims' families
and potential leads (including alleged APLA members), his conclusion
that there was insufficient evidence to proceed, and his response to
allegations made by witnesses during the inquest concerning his conduct
and communications. He also addressed the broader context of the
NPA's struggle to secure investigative support for TRC -related cases
during that period.
1.259 Professional background:
1.259.1 Mhaga holds B.Proc and LLB degrees from the University of Transk ei
(now Walter Sisulu University), awarded in 1996 and 1998. He was admitted as an
Advocate on 17 October 2002.
1.259.2 Between 1999 and 2009, he worked as a Public Prosecutor, State
Advocate, and Senior State Advocate within the NPA, based initially in Mt hatha and
later at the National Office in Pretoria.
1.259.3 While in Mthatha, he successfully prosecuted a TRC -related case
involving former Transkei security police, which led to his secondment to the PCLU
in 2006 to focus on other TRC cases.859

858 Exhibit HHH, Statement of Mtunzi Mhaga.
859 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 15–17.

1.259.4 At the PCLU (2006 -2009), he handled several TRC -related matters,
including the Highgate Hotel attack file. 860 He also spent time in private practice as
an advocate with the Pretoria Bar.
1.259.5 He is currently a Special Director of Public Prosecutions, Head of the
Legal Affairs Division in the NPA861, and also assists as the National Spokesperson.
1.260 Involvement with the Highgate Case (2006-2009):
1.260.1 Mhaga was allocated the Highgate file upon joining the PCLU in 2006. 862
At that time, the PCLU lacked a dedicated investigative capacity. The file contained
TRC transcripts and newspaper clippings, but not the official case docket, which was
missing during that period.863
1.260.2 Due to the lack of investigators, Advocate Anton Ackerman SC (then head
of PCLU) instructed prosecutors like Mhaga to conduct preliminary inquiries on TRC
cases to gather information for potential future full investigations by SAPS.864
1.260.3 Mhaga initiated contact with surviving victims and families, arranging
meetings at Fort Hare University, East London campus. 865 He aimed to introduce
himself and gather any potentially useful information. He believes he met with them
twice: once for introductions and again to present the outcome of his inquiries. 866 He
stated he provided his contact details at the first meeting.

860 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 15–16.
861 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 15.
862 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 16–17.
863 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 17, 23.
864 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 17.
865 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 18.
866 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 18, 27.

1.260.4 He followed up on information suggesting PAC/APLA claimed
responsibility (though later denied). 867 He met wit h alleged APLA commanders
Mtutuzeli Ntura Mama and "Jim Jones" in East London in 2006. They denied APLA's
involvement and offered no assistance.868
1.260.5 Advised by Adv Ackerman SC, he also interviewed Ncamazana
(implicated in a separate King William's Town attack) at a prison in East
London.869 Ncamazana was initially reluctant to speak i n Adv Ackerman's presence,
but later denied knowledge of APLA involvement in the Highgate attack when
speaking to Mhaga alone.870
1.260.6 Mhaga concluded from his inquiries that there was no evidence linking
anyone to the attack at that time. 871 He compiled a written report outlining these
findings, which he presented to the victims and families at the second meeting.872 He
believes this meeting was recorded on video by filmmaker Mark Kaplan.873 He stated
the families appreci ated his efforts and were satisfied he had followed up on
available leads.874
1.260.7 He testified that the file he worked on, containing his notes and report,
could not be located when he tried to find it before the inquest, despite searching the
storerooms.875
1.261 Response to allegations from the inquest transcript:

867 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 28.
868 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 18–19.
869 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 25.
870 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 19.
871 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 19, 25–26.
872 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 19–20.
873 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 40.
874 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 20, 40.
875 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 26–27, 38–39.

1.261.1 Mhaga denied allegations that victims reached out to him first, stating he
initiated contact based on details in the file.876
1.261.2 He strongly denied stating he was "scared" or intimid ated.877 He cited his
successful prosecution of former security police as evidence that he did not fear
handling TRC cases. He asserted there was no reason to be scared as there were
no suspects under investigation in the Highgate matter at that time.
1.261.3 He clarified his refusal to be interviewed on camera by Mark Kaplan was
due to NPA media policy at the time, as he was not the designated spokesperson,
and not due to fear. 878 He believes the victims may have misinterpreted his
adherence to policy as fear.879
1.261.4 Regarding Daryl Els (former investigating officer turned private
investigator), Mhaga recalled possibly meeting him with the families but denied
instructing him or relying on him for investigation work, stating it would have been
improper and unethical. 880 He acknowledged giving Els a hearing as he seemed to
be knowledgeable and was with the group.881
1.262 Lack of investigative support
1.262.1 Mhaga confirmed the PCLU and NPA lacked internal investigative
capacity during his tenure there (2006 -2009).882 Preliminary inquiries were

876 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 21.
877 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 21–22.
878 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 43–44.
879 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 44.
880 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 45–46.
881 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 46, 51–52.
882 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 52–53.

undertaken because dedicated police investigators for TRC cases were
unavailable.883
1.262.2 He acknowledged awareness (gained later through litigation) of attempts
by senior NPA official s (like Adv Ackerman SC) between 2003 and subsequent
years to secure investigative support from both the Directorate of Special Operations
(“DSO”) (Scorpions) and SAPS, which were largely unsuccessful.884
1.262.3 He agreed that the lack of investigative support from SAPS/DSO was a
reason why the Highgate case, among other TRC matters, was not properly
investigated during that period.885
1.262.4 He stated he informed the victims/families during the first meeting that he
was a prosecutor conducting inquiries due to the lack of investigative capacity within
the NPA.886
Brigadier Clifford Marion:887
1.263 Brigadier Clifford Marion (“ Marion”) provided expert analysis based on
his 47 years of policing experience and his role as an investigator for the
FHR tasked with assessing the Highgate Massacre investigation on
behalf of the victims' families. His evidence offered a comprehensive
critique of the official investigation spanning three decades, highlighting
systemic failures, gross negligence by specific officers (including
Stassen and investigating officer Els), critical procedural violations such
as the failure to lift fingerprints from key evidence and obtain necessary
witness statements, the inexplicable loss or disappearance of ballistic

883 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, p. 23.
884 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 31–32.
885 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 32.
886 Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 34–35.
887 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion.

evidence and crucial case documents (including affidavits and arrest
warrants), and extended periods of docket dormancy. Marion also
analysed various narratives surrounding the attack (APLA, Hammer Unit,
disgruntled patrons, Askari unit, false flag operation), contextualising
them within the political climate of the early 1990s and assessing the
investigative steps taken, ultimately concluding that the inve stigation was
"grossly substandard" and designed to fail, leaving no clear suspects
identified despite numerous potential leads being ignored.
1.264 Introduction:
1.264.1 Marion is a retired South African Police Service Brigadier with 47 years of
policing experience, currently serving as an investigator for the FHR, charged with
investigating serious apartheid -era crimes, including murder, torture, deaths in
detention, kidnapping, and disappearances.
1.265 History of the docket and extraordinary delays:
1.265.1 Marion's meticulous analysis of the investigation diary 888 revealed a
pattern of extraordinary delays, negligence, and periods of complete dormancy
spanning three decades. The docket passed through five investigation officers with
minimal progress:
(a) Bossr served as the first Investigation Officer from 1 May to
2 May 1993. Despite being the initial investigator at the
scene, Bossr failed to submit a statement at the time, only
providing an affidavit 31 years later on 3 February 2025,

888 Exhibit E.

which Marion characterised as having little to no
evidentiary value given the time lapse.889
(b) Captain I.R. Schwartz took over as second Investigation
Officer from 3 May to 12 May 1993. Critically, Schwartz
issued the first instruction to prepare the docket for inquest
proceedings on 13 June 1994, which was completely
ignored. He issued subsequent instructions along with Hall,
with the last instruction dated 29 July 1996. Despite these
multiple directives, no inquest was held for 30 years.
Marion testified that in cases of death from unnatural
causes, an inquest would normally be established within
months, making this delay "complete negligence and
disregard of instruction" with "absolutely no justification".890
(c) Els served as the third investigating officer from 12 May
1993 to 5 December 1998. The docket was held in
abeyance from 15 April 1996 to 10 June 1997, ostensibly
due to TRC Human Rights Violation Hearings. No
investigations were conducted from 12 May 1997 t o
December 1997, while Els retained the docket, apparently
off sick from 19 August 1996 until May 1997.891
(d) The most alarming period was the complete disappearance
of the docket from December 1998. According to Exhibit

889 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 10.1, 47 -49; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp.12, 37–39.

890 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 10.2, 10.4; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, pp.
12–13.
891 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 10.3, 10.5; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
p. 12.

"E," it seemingly resurfaced at DPCI Pretoria on 7 August
2014, though Nel's investigation diary (recently provided on
26 August 2025) indicates he commenc ed investigation on
30 August 2010. This represents over 11 years where "no
police work was done on this case," a period Marion
described as demonstrating the docket was "dormant for
12 years".892
(e) Nel served as the fourth investigating officer after
Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Mahlangu allocated the case to
him. Nel obtained approximately 20 affidavits from 16
November 2010 to May 2021, but with "delays of close to a
year between these statements." Marion emphasised this
showed not just negligence but a "no care attitude," noting
it was "unusual practice in his experience" to have such
lengthy delays in an investigation that "could have been
finished in 6 months".893
(f) Captain Peterson became the fifth investigating officer
when the docket resurface d on 1 August 2021, handed
over as Enquiry EP 4/08/2021 to Eastern Cape DPCI.894
1.266 Forensic and crime scene investigation failures:
1.266.1 Marion provided damning expert testimony on the substandard crime
scene investigation, particularly criticising Stassen's performance as senior forensic
officer. His analysis revealed multiple critical failures that violated basic investigative
protocols even by early 1990s standards.

892 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 10.6; Tran script of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, pp. 14–
15.
893 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras: 10.7–10.8;Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 15–16.
894 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 10.9; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, p. 17.

1.266.2 Fingerprint evidence failures:895
(a) The most egregious failure was the complete absence of
fingerprint analysis on spent AK-47 cartridges and grenade
fly-off levers. Marion emphasised that "fingerprints can be
lifted of f these metal surfaces, and in fact, in my
experience, metal surfaces are often the best surfaces on
which to take fingerprints." He testified that in his extensive
experience investigating "many murders and massacres
where multiple cartridges were found," the forensic
fieldworker would routinely fingerprint cartridges, often on
his instructions. This was standard operating procedure.
(b) While Swartbooi's evidence and copies of the Folien
confirmed palm prints were lifted at the scene, there was
no evidence that spent cartridges or grenade levers were
dusted for fingerprints. The Investigation Diary indicated
that fingerprints were investigated, yet crucial items were
ignored.
(c) Marion highlighted Stassen's disingenuous testimony when
he claimed he could determine whether cartridges were
fingerprinted if shown them now, as chemical traces would
remain visible. Marion noted Stassen was keeping abreast
of the inquest proceedings by virtue of his comments made
online, and therefore must have known that the ca rtridges
were stolen from the Post Office in Cape Town. This made
his offer to examine non-existent evidence "disingenuous".

895 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 33–39; Trans cript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 27–29.

1.266.3 Stassen’s dereliction of duty:896
(a) Marion's assessment of Stassen's performance was
scathing. Despite being a senior forensic officer present for
seven hours, Stassen:
Failed to conduct preliminary scoping to identify focus
areas, claiming the scene was "chaotic" on arrival;
Never carried o ut this exercise even after the scene was
cleared;
Failed to directly supervise fingerprint collection;
Admitted he "stood outside the hotel and chatted to his
colleagues" instead of supervising;
Did not instruct subordinates to fingerprint cartridges and
levers despite conceding this should have been done;
and
Justified his inaction by claiming his subordinates were
"experienced".
(b) Marion concluded that, in his view, the forensic
investigation carried out by Stassen at the scene was
substandard. He failed to scope the scene and did not offer
his team any supervision or advice. If he had ensured that

896 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 39.1–39.4, 40; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 30–33.

the cartridges and levers were printed, leads may have
been generated for the investigation".
(c) Marion characterised this as substandard and totally
unacceptable for a person of such rank to have done such
a poor job, calling it "an absolute disgrace" that
demonstrated gathering evidence, “one of the most
important functions" and "one of the first lines of the
criminal justice system," was completely bungled.
1.266.4 Missing fingerprint report:897
(a) The Investigation Diary entry by Captain Schwartz on 6
May 1993 stated "Local Cri minal Record Centre F.P.
Report filed as per B2," indicating a scene examination
report was generated by at least 6 May 1993. This report is
not before the court, and Marion noted, "It is not clear what
happened to the report." The missing B2 report could have
also clarified what prints were lifted at the scene and
provided vital evidence.
(b) Additionally, elimination prints were never taken from
patrons and staff present at the scene, meaning the palm
prints in Exhibit "Y" could belong to either patrons o r
perpetrators, "which we are likely never to know".
1.267 Critical missing statements and documentation:
1.267.1 Marion identified numerous police officers who failed to submit statements
despite conducting crucial identification procedures, creating fatal gaps in the chain

897 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras, 41–42; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 32–33.

of evidence. This represented a fundamental breach of police procedure that
compromised the entire investigation.
1.267.2 Warrant Officers Venkile, Ru tters, Roos, and Els failed to submit
statements regarding photo identifications conducted with multiple witnesses:
(a) René Naudé identified a person to Rutters.
(b) Eileen Margaret Clarke identified a person to Rutters.
(c) Koliwe Mildred Kweleta identif ied a person to Warrant
Officer Venkile;
(d) Charles John Bodington identified a person to Bossr.
(e) John Dirk Van Niekerk identified a person to Els;
(f) Hermanus G Martiz identified a person to Els.
(g) Arnott identified a person to Rutters; and
(h) Charles Johannes Classen (“ Classen”) identified a person
to Roos.
1.267.3 Marion emphasised that these officers did not submit affidavits to explain
who these witnesses identified and under what circumstances they were pointed out.
No further investigations were conducted on those pointed out.898
1.267.4 When Roos was shown Classen's affidavit during the inquest, he could not
remember the photo identity kit shown to Classen and admitted that, in normal
circumstances, he would have submitted an affidavit about the photo identification.

898 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 44; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, pp. 35–37.

He could not explain this omission. Marion noted that proper affidavits would have
created the requisite links in the chain of evidence, and their absence represented
total negligence.899
1.268 Critical missing Security Branch documentation:
1.268.1 Marion expressed particular alarm about missing affidavits from Security
Branch officer De Lange. The Investigation Diary indicated De Lange submitted an
affidavit filed as A51, which formed t he basis for arrest warrants issued for
Ngxabane and Nontshokweni.
1.268.2 He found this very alarming, as there would have been important
information in this regard, stating it was very strange that such crucial documents
establishing probable cause for arrests were either lost or removed.900
1.268.3 The missing warrants of arrest for Ntintile (A50), Xundu (A49), Xolile
Ngxabane (A52), and Dumisile Nontshokweni (A53) further compromised the
investigation. Marion noted these warrants, mentioned in the diary as issued based
on affidavits from Classen and Arnott, contained crucial information that is now
lost.901
1.269 The explosives expert's missing report:
1.269.1 No affidavit was found from the explosives expert who attended the scene,
despite this being vital to the investigation. This forced CDH to appoint their own
expert, Naudé, whose analysis revealed:
(a) A tear gas grenade was used at the scene.

899 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 46; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, p. 37.
900 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 58.2; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 Septem ber 2025, pp. 41–
42.
901 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 59–60; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, p. 43.

(b) The fly-off lever was from either a Soviet F-1 hand grenade
or an RDG-5 anti-personnel fragmentation grenade;
(c) The tear gas grenades were manufactured at the Swartklip
Products factory in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town, from the
early-mid 1980s to the mid-2000s; and
(d) The crater and scorch marks confirmed a high -explosive
hand grenade detonation.
1.269.2 Marion emphasised that these conclusions should all have been contained
in a report prepared by Sergeant Brandt during the initial stages of the
investigation.902
1.270 The stolen ballistic evidence:
1.270.1 Marion expressed deep suspicion about the theft of ballistic evidence from
the Cape Town Post Office on the night of 14/15 July 1995. According to Lieutenant
Colonel Lucas Wilem Visser's affidavit, the Western Cape Ballistics Section
requested Highgate exhibits for comparison with suspect firearms. On 10 July 1995,
the file was sealed and posted via registered mail (PA 005 097 403 SA) from
Silverton Post Office. When Sergeant Moore attempted collection on 18 July 1995,
the post office could not produce the parcel. Mr S.E. Davids, Chief Investigation
Officer of the P ost Office, issued an affidavit stating the parcel was allegedly stolen
during the night of 14/15 July 1995.
1.270.2 Marion found this highly suspicious for multiple reasons. First, it violated
standard procedure as it is not standard procedure to send important exhibits by
post. He stated that during his time with SAP and SAPS, it was standard procedure

902 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 47–57; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 39–41.

to protect the integrity of the chain of custody and to hand -deliver exhibits by driving
them to the forensic science lab. He stated that he would have driven up the exhibits
by hand in important matters like this, even if it took the whole night.
1.270.3 Second, the theft made no sense as the cartridges had no commercial
value, and he saw no reason why they would have been stolen. While other
packages were reportedly stolen that night, Marion questioned whether it was
genuine theft or made to look that way . He emphasised the extreme difficulty of
breaking into a post office safe, expressing scepticism about how this was possible.
His conclusion was unequivocal: In his view, it is absolutely suspicious that, of all of
the cases, this is the one where exhibits go missing.903
1.271 Critical uninvestigated leads:
1.271.1 Marion detailed multiple crucial leads that were never pursued ,
representing fundamental investigative failures that could have solved the case.
(a) The Citizen newspaper call:
At 06h45 on 3 May 1993, Vivian Angela Warby received a
call at The Citizen newspaper from someone claiming
to be "Karl Zimbiri," a supposed A PLA Commander,
claiming responsibility for the attack. Marion testified
that this lead was not followed up by the investigators,
even though at that time the police routinely
approached telephone exchanges to trace calls.
Tracing the call would have disclosed the address from
where it was made, allowing investigators to locate
and interview the caller or occupant. This could have

903 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 62–67; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 47–52.

potentially assisted the investigation and could have
assisted the investigation to assess the claim that
APLA was behind the attack.904
(b) The Highgate Hotel phone booth call:
Vogl's affidavit described seeing a black male and two
black females at the pay telephone at approximately
11h50 on the morning of the attack. She overheard the
male saying something to the effect of: We are at the
Highgate Hotel, give us directions from here.
Arnott confirmed identifying this black male to Sergeant
Rutters from the photo album "A" at photograph
number 6. Marion noted: The recipient number of this
alleged call was also not traced, and since this call
was not traced, we will never know why the call was
made or if it was related to the attack that happened at
the Highgate later that day.905
(c) The untraced vehicle registration:
Arnott saw the three individuals leave in a blue and white
bakkie (either a Toyota or a Mazda) with a license
plate number starting with XB 3. Marion testified: The
police did not run a check on the number plates
starting with XB 3 at that stage.

904 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 26–29; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 24–25.
905 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 30–31; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 25–26.

Had this been done, it could have narrowed down the cars
that fit Arnott's description. He noted that XB would
have denoted Butterworth in the Transkei before
homeland reincorporation.906
1.272 The Mama arrest:
1.272.1 Marion analysed the arrest and charging of Mama on 29 April 1994, with
charges withdrawn on 2 May 1994. He testified that there is no indication of what
evidence he was arrested, and there is no evidence in the docket to substantiate his
arrest. It is also not known why the charges were withdrawn. He stated he was of the
opinion that, in terms of the docket, there was no justification for the arrest. While
charges could have been withdrawn for this reason, normally an entry would be
made explaining withdrawal, but there is no such entry in the docket, and no letters
of withdrawal from prosecutors to the investigating officer were found. The evidence
section and C clip showed o nly that he was arrested, detained, and charged without
justification. 907
1.273 Analysis of teargas usage:
1.273.1 Marion conducted r esearch analysing teargas usage across all seven
volumes of the TRC Final Report, producing statistics that fundamentally challenged
the APLA narrative:
(a) SAP: 123 incidents
(b) SADF: 3 incidents

906 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 32; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, pp. 26–27.

907 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, para. 61; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, p. 44 ;
Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025, pp. 11–12.

(c) Homeland Police (Bophuthatswana, QwaQwa, Transkei,
KwaZulu, KwaNdebele): 51 incidents
(d) IFP: 1 incident
(e) ANC: 0 incidents
(f) APLA: 0 incidents
(g) PAC: 0 incidents
(h) Other Liberation Movements: 0 incidents
(i) Unknown: 1 incident (being the Highgate Massacre)
1.273.2 Out of 178 total incidents involvi ng teargas, liberation movements,
including APLA, showed zero usage. Marion emphasised that according to the TRC
Report, liberation movements, including APLA, did not use teargas in their attacks.
He explained that typically one uses teargas after an attac k to disorientate people
and get away, making its use at Highgate inconsistent with APLA's operational
profile.908
1.274 General incompetence:
1.274.1 Marion referenced Flanagan's report, which stated police demonstrated, at
times, astonishing incompetence in investigations into APLA attacks.

908 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 62–70; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 52–53.

1.274.2 The Eikenhof attack exemplified this incompetence, where police
convicted the wrong people, an ANC group, based on manipulated evidence, with
two accused ending up on death row.
1.274.3 The chronology revealed police had seized APLA documents confirming
their responsibility for Eikenhof (including reports from Phila Martin Dolo (“ Dolo”)).
During raids on 25 May 1993, Dolo was arrested with the weapon used on 29 May
1993, and Minister Hermanus Kriel (“ Kriel”) had listed Eikenhof as an APLA attack
on 27 May 1993.
1.274.4 Despite this, they proceeded to have innocent ANC members conv icted
on 20 June 1994. The convictions were only overturned in 1999 after Dolo's affidavit
confirmed APLA involvement. 909
1.275 Comprehensive analysis of investigation narratives:
1.275.1 Marion provided expert analysis of multiple narratives that emerged
around the Highgate Massacre, emphasising th at while several narratives or
theories might serve to explain the Highgate Massacre, there is no hard evidence to
sustain any of the narratives. He explained that narratives are theories that are not
based on hard evidence but are worthy of being explored , and investigators must
have an open mind when information comes from various sources.910
1.275.2 The APLA Narrative:911
(a) The APLA narrative originated on the night of the
massacre, according to the Investigation Diary entry at

909 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 62–63; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 45–47.
910 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 71–73; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 53–55.
911 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 74–82; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 56–59.

23:30 on 1 May 1993. The press ran sketches nationwide
with a R150,000 reward authorised by Major General
Huggett, and Kriel attributed the attack to APLA. Some 64
persons connected to APLA and the ANC were
questioned, with fingerprints and palm prints checked.
Several were arrested, and at least one (Mama) was
formally charged, though charges were later withdrawn.
(b) Marion noted Flanagan's research showing the SAP raided
PAC homes and offices nationwide on 25 May 1993,
arresting 81 PAC members and seizing documents.
Despite these raids occurring weeks after Highgate, there
did not appear to be anything uncovered linking APLA to
the Highgate Massacre. Large numbers of PAC/APLA files
seized during the 1995 SADF raids in Umtata and Lesotho
similarly revealed no Highgate connection. APLA
commander Mphahlele commented on the absence of
evidence in these files.
(c) Marion quoted Flanagan's critical observat ion: “If this
attack was carried out by an APLA unit, what happened to
those involved? Why did they not claim amnesty, as for
similar attacks?" The standard APLA practice involved
geographically separate groups knowing of operations, but
it is the operational unit and commanders who would claim
media responsibility.
(d) Marion concluded that, in his view, the investigation about
APLA had been thoroughly conducted, with APLA
command categorically denying involvement. He noted
APLA claimed responsibility for 36 of 64 attacks in Robert
John Tyrrell’s (“ Tyrrell”) report, and suspects' particulars,

fingerprints, and weapons from other attacks should have
been linked to this attack by now, at least by way of the
palm-prints and ballistic evidence. However, he
acknowledged the possibility cannot be ruled out, that
APLA renegade operatives committed the attack and kept
quiet and did not apply for amnesty, though this remains in
the realm of conjecture or speculation.
1.276 The Hammer Unit narrative:912
1.276.1 This theory emerged during Els's private investigation in 2006 when he
told Beling a "Third Force" called the Hammer Unit was involved. At a Kennaway
Hotel meeting on 28 November 2006 with survivors and Mphahlele, Els stated that
the attackers were not APLA, listing multiple inconsistencies:
(a) Attackers wore black/dark blue, used AK -47s, hand
grenades, and teargas, which APLA did not;
(b) APLA used R1s, R4s and R5s as t hey could not get AK-47
ammunition;
(c) Withdrawal under teargas was a first;
(d) Some attackers had camouflage paint on their faces,
suggesting they were white;
(e) No vehicles were reported stolen/hijacked before the
attack, unlike typical APLA operations;

912 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 83-86; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025, pp. 60–
62.

(f) Attackers showed greater training and shooting accuracy
than in APLA incidents;
(g) AK-47s were never linked ballistically before or afterwards,
suggesting they were used specifically for that attack and
destroyed;
(h) Police received no intelligenc e reports on Highgate, unlike
other attacks; and
(i) No documentation existed in the seized APLA files.
1.277 The disgruntled patron’s narrative:913
1.277.1 This narrative arose from multiple incidents on 1 May 1993, where black
patrons experienced discrimination at the Highgate.
(a) The bar lady sold cigarettes to two black males around
10h00, but told them they were out of stock for beer.
Marion noted that it was highly unlikely that the Highgate
would have actually run out of beer.
(b) Arnott told a black male who was using the public
payphone that the phone was not a public phone and that
there was a public phone down the road. The black male
ignored him and continued using the phone. Eventually, he
ordered them to leave the premises. They eventually left
the premises and drove off in a blue and white Toyota or

913 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 87–89; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 64–66.

Mazda bakkie with a white canopy in the direction of
Summerpride.
1.277.2 Classen furthermore observed two black men enter the Men's Bar at
11:25, with one grinning at him before they left after a hand gesture from barman
Gontshi.
1.277.3 Marion noted this narrative suggested aggrieved patrons may have
returned that night to exact vengeance against the white patrons and staff.
1.278 The Askari unit narrative:914
1.278.1 Marion provided extensive detail on the Askari narrative, which Flanagan's
research suggested as particularly compelling. Askaris were turned liberation
movement member s who underwent military training outside South Africa, were
arrested on return, and either turned by the Security Branch's C1 unit or voluntarily
became informers. They were trained in Eastern Bloc weapons, including AK -47
rifles, Tokarev and Makarov pist ols, limpet mines, Soviet F -1 hand grenades, and
RDG-5 anti-personnel fragmentation grenades - matching Highgate evidence.
1.278.2 The East London Askari unit was established in the late 1980s (likely
1987-1988) under Eugene de Kock's overall Vlakplaas com mand. They initially
rented a farm in the Summerpride area near the Johnson & Johnson factory and
possibly on the Thornycroft Road, less than 5km from the Highgate Hotel, before
moving to Greenfields in mid-1992. The unit grew from about 10 members in 1989 to
a larger group by April 1993.
1.278.3 Eugene De Kock's amnesty testimony confirmed he supplied Eastern Bloc
weapons to East London operatives under Captain Willie de Lange's command,

914 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 90–110; Transcr ipt of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 1, 2 September 2025,
pp. 66–80.

stating weapons were "for clandestine, covert operations which would have led to
the death or injury of the enemy" and would "leave the impression that the Security
Police could not be connected... it would point in the wrong direction." Eugene De
Kock testified he provided "four AK -47 assault rifles with magazines and 16 h and
grenades" to East London operatives.
1.278.4 Alfred Benjamin "Ben" Bambatha's affidavits to Minister Sydney Mufamadi
confirmed Askaris received "extensive firearms training" at locations including
Westbank Prison shooting range and Mooiplaas Security B ranch training area, with
specialized Task Force training. Bambatha referenced planting weapons, including
F1 hand grenades, at crime scenes. The unit's operations included murders rather
than arrests, planting weapons to justify killings, executing allege d guerrillas
following abduction, and the disappearance of targets intending to join exile
movements.
1.278.5 Crucially, the Askari units were closed down at the end of April 1993, with
Askaris paid out, just days before the Highgate attack. The SAPS payo ut list (Exhibit
"CRMC2") revealed significant discrepancies: black Askaris received between
R27,000 and R476,000 (most around R150,000), while white supervising officers
received substantially more - P.J. Van Dyk (R796,525.73), E.A. De Kock
(R1,001,444.46), and J.S. Vermeulen (R1,102,929.93). Marion noted that it is not
known whether the discrepancy was known to the Askaris, but as suggested by
Flanagan, the abrupt dismissal could have prompted some or a few of the Askaris to
attack the Highgate Hotel with weapons at their disposal as an act of reprisal for
their poor treatment.
1.278.6 Flanagan identified four crucial aspects: Askaris knew the Summerpride
area well enough to identify escape routes; they likely knew Highgate was a police
hangout where senio r officers frequented; they had police weapons training,
including from special task force trainers; and they had access to unaccounted -for

including from special task force trainers; and they had access to unaccounted -for
weapons provided by Eugene De Kock.

1.278.7 Captain Peterson's investigations traced and interviewed three Askaris:
Fokazi, Oliphant, and Twala, all of whom denied involvement
1.279 The disruption or false-flag narrative:915
1.279.1 Marion contextualised this narrative within the fragile 1993 transition
period when the Transitional Executive Council announced elections for 27 April
1994. He testified: political violence was often used to try to sabotage the negotiation
process, polarise communities, and erode trust. The Highgate Massacre might not
be an isolated and seemingly random attack but rather part of a broader scheme
orchestrated by those aiming to manipulate the fragile political climate.
1.279.2 He detaile d how false -flag operations are designed to appear as though
they were perpetrated by an entity other than the group actually responsible,
calculated to generate sympathy for the attacked group and justify retaliatory
operations. The TRC found the South Af rican state responsible for various false -flag
operations, including arranging Eastern bloc weapons caches to justify attacks on
Botswana (1988), bomb explosions at Joubert Park and J.G. Strydom Hospital
(1989), attacks on SAP Flying Squad headquarters usi ng AK -47s and RGD -5
grenades (1989), planting arms at Khanya House and COSATU buildings, and
various bombings of railway stations and power plants.
1.279.3 The day after Highgate, both the ANC and the Democratic Party
suggested it was carried out by those wanting negotiations to fail. ANC Border
official Mcebisi Bata stated that some people in the right wing are trying to whip up
emotions, and in the South African security forces who are trying to mobilise whites
against negotiations. Democratic Party MP An dre de Wet also said something to the
effect of: “I'm personally not convinced it's APLA... As we move closer to an interim

915 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 111–119; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025,
pp. 1–5.

government and joint control of the security forces, such attacks will continue and
escalate".
1.279.4 Flanagan's research revealed a covert SADF/SAP group operated in the
Eastern Cape led by SADF officer Anton Nieuwoudt with access to weapons from
Eugene de Kock, suggesting renegade elements might have carried out Highgate as
a false-flag operation to instigate right-wing backlash and derail democracy.
1.280 Expert conclusions:916
1.280.1 Marion's final assessment was unequivocal: "I regrettably conclude that
there are no clear suspects at this stage of the inquiry into the Highgate Massacre."
He characterised the investigation as "less than satisfactory" and stated that "certain
shortcomings amount to gross negligence."
1.280.2 His comprehensive list of failures included improperly investigated scenes,
failure to lift fingerprints from cartridges and grenade levers, missing elimination
prints, lost ballistic and fingerprint evidence, incom plete statements linking photo
parades, docket dormancy for over 11 years, and unexplained, lengthy investigative
delays showing "little or no urgency".
1.280.3 Marion concluded by stating that despite the significance of the Highgate
Massacre and the seni or level of experience and expertise of the investigative
officers, particularly Stassen and Schwartz, on the scene, there were numerous
investigative blunders. He stated, “I must conclude that this investigation was grossly
substandard. But for these blun ders, this investigation may have solved this brutal
crime, particularly if forensic evidence had been properly collected, safeguarded,
and tested”.

916 Exhibit CCC, Statement of Clifford Marion, paras. 120–124; Transcript of Proceedings, Day 19, Part 2, 2 September 2025,
pp. 5–7.

1.280.4 He added that such gross incompetence inevitably gives rise to a deep
suspicion on the part of the survivors, families, and members of the public that the
investigation was designed to fail.