[1] The applicant, JDG Trading (Pty) Ltd (the first respondent in the appeal, which
served before us) seeks leave to appeal the judgment we handed down as a
full be nch on 7 May 2025 , to the Full Court of the Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg alternatively to the Supreme Court of Appeal, against the whole
of the judgment and orders we granted. The applicant seeks costs of the
application to be costs in the appeal.
[2] We found that the applicant contravened sections 106, 90(1) and (2) and 91 (1)
and (2) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. The applicant, as per the common
cause facts, sold disability cover to disabled people ; retrenchment cover to
pensioners; and neither of the group of consumers would ever lodge a claim,
being already disabled or unemployed. The cover was sold in the form of
bundled insurance, and the applicant offer it as such because it claims it is cost
effective and therefor accessible at the low rates. The applicant justifies the
policy on the basis that is it the only life cover available to older persons and at
a competitive rate, without the hassle of taking medical examinations and the
like.
[3] We found it unreasonable to require consumers to maintain such insurance and
considered the earlier evidence before the National Consumer Tribunal.1 The
cover they paid for was meaningless , as disabled consumers would never
benefit from disability cover and the pensioner s, already unemployed or no
longer employed, would never benefit from retrenchment cover.
[4] Furthermore, we found that the procedure to lodge claims was unreasonable.2
1 Judgment para 27 28 CL 01-14
2 Judgment para 21 CL 01-12
[5] The applicant raised four grounds of appeal . It contended that this court
overlooked the provisions of the 2017 Credit Life Regulations. However the first
respondent, the National Credit Regulator (the ap pellant in the appe al before
us) pointed out that the point was never raised before the Tribunal, nor in the
applicant’s heads of argument or in its answering papers. The court is bound to
the record. No evidence was led on the provisions in the regulations. Obviously
the regulations supplement the National Credit Act and therefor no conflict
arises.
[6] The applicants argue that we misunderstood the benefits of cross subsidisation.
We hold the view that the poor and aged, would not have agreed at the point of
sale, to subsidise the young and more affluent member of the group , who will
benefit fully from the cover . We relied on common cause facts before the
tribunal.3 The applicants argued that we ought not to have considered the
administrative process to lodge a claim . We hold the view the claims process
brings into sharp focus the unreasonableness of the cover offered.
[7] The applicant correctly point out that our judgment has far reaching effect. We
are of the view that the dispute pertains to consumer rights and particularly
vulnerable groups, who are entitled to clarity. We are acutely aware that the
insurance cover for such transactions is only secondary, if at all, on the minds
of consumers. The consumer must know what he/she pays for and what value
he/she derives from such payment. We think it is in the interest of justice to
grant leave in this instance and that the significance of our judgment on the
material segm ent of th e credit industry serves as “some other compelling
3 Vol 21 p 2120 para 19 l 8 CL 9-2209
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Applicant CDA Loxton SC, with him
A Milovanovic-Bitter and
M Zikalala
Counsel for the First Respondent: PL Carstensen SC
Counsel for the Amicus Curiae: J Bhima