IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Not reportable
Case no: 2030/2024
In the matter between
SIBAMU BUILDING CONTRACTORS (PTY) LTD FIRST APPLICANT
LEKGOTLA ELISHA SIBANYONI SECOND APPLICANT
HILDA KETLOGELWE SIBANYONI THIRD APPLICANT
and
ABSA HOME LOANS GUARANTEE
COMPANY (RF) PTY LTD FIRST RESPONDENT
ABSA HOME LOANS GUARANTEE SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Sibamu Building Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Absa Home Loans
Guarantee Company (R F) Pty Ltd and Another (2030/2024) ZAFSHC
374 (25 November 2025)
Coram: MHLAMBI J
Heard: Matter disposed of without oral hearing in terms of section 19(a) of the
Superior Court Act 10 of 2013.
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is
deemed to be 12h00 on 25 November 2025.
Summary: Application for leave to appeal – demonstration of merit or prospects of
success in application for leave to appeal.
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ORDER
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The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
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JUDGMENT
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Mhlambi J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal the whole of the judgment I handed down
on 28 February 2025 , in which I granted an application for summary judgment in favour
of the respondent . The grounds of appeal are that the Court erred in the following
respects:
‘1.1.1 finding that the applicants did not disclose a bona fide defense nor raise a triable issue.
1.1.2 In its application of Rees and Another v. Investec Bank Limited.
1.1.3 finding that the judgment of Rees and Another v. Investec Bank Limited was not
distinguishable from the facts of this case.
1.1.4 finding that the deponent to the affidavit supporting summary judgment could swear
positively to the facts relied on for summary judgment.
1.1.5 finding that the deponent to the affidavit in support of summary judgment had personal
knowledge of the facts relied upon in the affidavit in support of summary judgment.
1.1.6 The section 129 notices sent by the respondents are considered invalid because they were
withdrawn when the respondents withdrew the matter under case number 1416/2021.’
[2] The summary of the applicants’ argument , in their heads of argument , is that the
facts presented by the deponent in the summary judgment application are insufficient to
establish that the department has personal knowledge of those facts. The a pplicants
were never provided with a copy of the agreement and , therefore, could not verify the
claimed amounts. As a result, the applicants believe their appeal has a reasonable
chance of success. Although the applicants accept that the deponent and an employee
chance of success. Although the applicants accept that the deponent and an employee
of the bank need not know every fact, it was not pleaded how the deponent in this case
had personal knowledge of the facts.
[3] The respondents opposed the application and pointed out that the deponent to the
summary judgment application , as an officer of the corporate entity and by virtue of her
position, could rely on records in the company’s possession for her personal knowledge.
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First-hand knowledge of every fact was not required, but certain relevant facts from the
company’s records were required to swear positively to them.
[4] Section 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, (the Act)
provides that leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
believe that the appeal would have prospects of success or that there is some other
compelling reason why the appea l should be heard, including conflicting judgments on
the matter under consideration. The applicant’s leave to appeal is predicated solely on
the provisions of s 17(1) (a)(i) of the Act. In Ramakatsa and Others v African National
Congress and Another,1 it was held that the test of reasonable prospects of success
postulated a dispassionate decision based on the facts and law that a court of appeal
could reasonably conclude differently from that of the trial court.
[5] The appellants needed to convince the Court, on proper grounds, that they had a
prospect of success on appeal. Th at prospect of success must not be remote, but there
must exist a reasonable chance of succeeding. A sound, rational basis for the conclusion
that there is a prospect of success must be shown to exist.
[6] There is no merit in the application for leave to appeal . The grounds of appeal
have been dealt with in the judgment. The applicant s failed to discharge the onus of
showing that there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal. The application for
leave to appeal must therefore fail.
[7] I make the following order:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
_____________________________
J J MHLAMBI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
1 Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another [2021] ZASCA 31.
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Appearances
For the appellant: Z Nyezi
Instructed by: Blair Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For the respondent: W J Roos
Instructed by: Botha Attorneys, Bloemfontein.