(1)
(2)
(3)
DA TE:
REPORTABLE: YES/ NO
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA)
CASE NO: A120 /2025
O F INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/ NO
REV ISED: YES/ NO
Signat~ 9 Decem ber 2025
In the matter:
SOPHIA BENT APPELLANT
And
RAND MUTUAL ASSURANCE (PTY ) LTD RESPONDENT
This Judgment is deemed to have been handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives via email and uploaded onto the
case/ines system 09 De cember 2025 at 11h00.
Judgment
l .. .. ~ .
Thup aatlase AJ (Lenyai J concurring)
Introduction
[1) This is an appeal by the appellant, Ms Bent against the refusal by Rand Mutual
Assurance (Pty) Ltd, the respondent to com pensate her for personal injuries in terms
of section 22 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act1
hereafter referred to in this judgment as COIDA or the Act. The appellant lodged the
claim as envisaged by the Act and same was rejected by Rand Mutual. In terms of
section 91 (1) of the Act, Ms Bent, and her employer lodged an objection with the
Commissioner. A tribunal envisaged by section 91 (2)2 was constituted and it upheld
the rejection and dismissed the objection.
[2] This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal as it relates to and turns on the
interpretation of the provisions of the Act as contemplated by section 91 (5)(a)(i)3.
There is no dispute between the parties that indeed this court enjoys jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. This court is a High Court as envisaged by section 6( 1) of the Superior
Court Act4.
[3) The salient question in this appeal relates to whether the tribunal was correct in
making a determination that personal injuries suffered by Ms Bent didn't 'arise out of
her employment' within the meaning of 'accident' as defined in section 1 of the Act. If
the court finds that indeed such injuries were suffered at her workplace, Ms Bent will
be entitled to be compensated as envisaged In section 22(1 )5 of the Act.
Background
[4] Ms Bent was at the time of the incident employed by Maccarthy (Pty) Ltd, the
employer as a credit clerk at its business place situated at Madiba Street in Hatfield.
The company conducts business as motor vehicle dealership and provides other
I 130 Of 1993
2 Section 91 (1) A ny person affected by a decision of the commis 5ior.er or a trade union or employers'
representative of which that person w as a member at the relevant time may , within 90 days after such a
decision, lodge an objection against the decision with the commissioner in the prescribed manne r
3 'Any person affected by a decision referred to in subsecti•Jn (3)(a) may appeal to any provincial division or
local division of the Supreme Co urt having jurisdiction against a dec;sion regarding-(1) the interpretation of
this Act of any other law.
• Act 10 of 2013 .
; 'If an em p!oyee meets with an accident resulting his disablement or death such employe e or dependents of
such emp loyee shall subject to the prc.-,is1on; of this Act, be entitled to the benefits provided for and
prescribed in this Act.'
services related to its core business. The business is housed in a three .. storey building
and is exclusively used by the company for its operations. Different categories of
employees are accommodated on separate floors of the building. The creditor clerks
of which Ms Bent is part of are housed on the third floor of the building, and debtors
clerks are accommodated on the second floor. The show room in which motor vehicles
are displayed is on the ground floor and member s of the public also have access to
the ground floor. These are ostensibly customers and potential clients of MaCartt,y.
[5] It is not in dispute that Ms Bent was injured on the 27 July 2022. It was
approximately 17h00 and she had just knocked off and was walking down the stairs
going home. She walked from the third floor as the lift was not functioning and whilst
on the stairs of the second floor she slipped and fell and fractured her ankle. As a
result of such an injury. her employer, Maccarthy lodged a claim on her behalf with
Rand Mutual in terms of section 22 of the Act, and such claim was repudiated by Rand
Mutual.
[6) The reason for such a repudiation was on the basis that '_ .. the emp loyee wa s not
performing her duties when she vvas injured. The claim therefore does not meet requirements
as an accident as defined and it is for these reasons that the claim is repudiated'. As a
consequence of such repudiation a notice of objection was sent to Rand Mutual. The
respondent is a mutual association as contemplated by section 306 the Act.
[7] In the objection letter the emp loyer's representative asserts that: 'the employee's
injury arose in the place of w ork which warrant for an injury on duty because she fell walking
down the stairs of the building, she worl<s in. It would not be fair to decline the claim because
she was not at her desk performing her duty at the time of the injury'. In order to deal with
the objection a tribunal was constituted as envisaged by section 91 (2) of the Act, in
the objection a tribunal was constituted as envisaged by section 91 (2) of the Act, in
order to consider such an objection and repudiation.
[8] Unfortunately for Ms Bent, the objection suffered the same fate. The tribunal ruled
that: 'the accident cannot be connected to her employment and ordered that the objection to
the rejection falls to be dismissed. no order is made as to costs'. It is against the ruling by
the tribunal that this appeal lie.
"Section 30 p1011ides that 'The l\tl,r.;;tu may for such oer·;;d and subject to such cond itions as he m ay
determ ine issue a license to carry on the b~siness of insurance of employ ers against their liabilities to
employee in terms of this Act to mutual a~:e:ciat!cn w t-.,ch w3s licensed on the date o f this Act in the terms of
section 95 91) of the Workman's Cor1pen~3t1cn Act'
3
Legislative Framewo rk and legal principles
[9] The legislative framework governing this matter is the Act. The purpose thereof is
stated in the long title as been: 'To provide for compensation for disablement caused by
occupational injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the course of their
employmen t or death resulting from such injuries or disease and to provide for matters
connected therewith'. (My emphasis). The Act further provides a definition of an 'accident'
in section 1 ( 1) to me an that 'accident means an accident arising out of and in the course
of an emp loyee's emp loyrnent and resulting in personal injury'. The Act also describes
'occupational injury' to mean 'personal injury sustained as a result of an accident.'
[1 O] Arising from the purpose and definitions of the Act, the Supreme Court of A ppeal
(SCA) in M EC for Health. Free State v ON' at para 8 put the objective of the Act as
follows:
'In a nutshell, the Act provides a ready source of compensation for employees who
suffer emp loym ent related injuries and provide compensation without the necessity to
prove negligence, although negligence may result in greater compensation. It should
how ever be borne in m ind that the object is to benefit employees and that their
common -law remedies w ere restricted to enable access to compensation. It does not
necessarily me an that compen sation for every kind of harm they suffer whilst at their
place of employm ent has to be pursued through that statutory channel. However , if the
injury w ere (sic) caused by an accident by an accident that arose out of an employee's
emp loyment, then the latter ,s restricted to a claim under the Act'.
[11] The SCA also quoted with approval at para 78 that:
'In 13(3) LAWSA 2 ed p114 MP O livier stated that: '[COIDAJ provides a system of no
fault compensation for em ployees who are injured in accident that arise out of and in
the course of their emp loyment or wh o contract occupational diseases.'
the course of their emp loyment or wh o contract occupational diseases.'
[12] In addition to the purpose and objectives of the Act as stated in its long title, the
Superior Courts have also pronounced themselves on the m anner this A ct should be
interpreted. In Davis v Wo rkmen 's Compensation Commissioner3 at 69F the court
stated that:
7 201 5 {1} SA 182 {SCA }
8 O N supra
9 199 5 (3) SA 6e9 { C)
4
'The policy of the Act is to assist workmen as far as possible. See W illiams v
Workmen 's Compensation 1952 (3) SA 105 (CJ ... at 109C. The Act should therefore
not be interpreted restrictively so as to prejudice a workm an if it is capable of being
interpreted in manner more favourable to him'
[13) In the case of Clementz v Mi/Iba Paper CC and Others10 the court undertook an
extensive review of the judicial decisions that have been decided by our high courts.
The court dealt with interpretation of the Act at para 40 as follows:
'Where a generous definition of an ·accident' cuts its double-sided swath is wh ere the
employee fails to claim compensation under the Act. Section 43 of the Act provides
that a claim for compensation must be lodged by or on behalf of the claimant emp loyee
in the prescribed manner within twelve months after the date of the accident or, in the
case of death, within twelve months after the date of death, failing which the claim for
compens ation will not be considered, save in certain limited circumstances. Should an
employee fail to lodge his or her claim for statutory compens ation timeously, he or she
would not only be unable to claim statutory compensation but will also forfeit his or her
common law claim to damages '.
[14] The Constitutional Court has also added its voice regarding the manner in which
tl1is piece of legislation, being a social legislation should be interpreted. In the case of
Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour lnte,vening11) the
purpose of the Act was stated as follows at para 13:
'The purpose of the Compensat ion Act, as appears from its long title, is to provide
compensa tion for disability caused by occupational injuries or diseases sustained or
contracted by employees in the course of their employme nt'.
Issue for determination
(15] The issue for determination is whe ther the repudiation of the claim lodged by Ms
Bent and the reason given for such repudiation of the claim are consistent with the
Bent and the reason given for such repudiation of the claim are consistent with the
law. The court will proceed to consider various decisions that have sought to interpret
the two phrases namely 'arising out employment and 'in the course of
empl oyme nt'. As observed by ~Javsa JA (as then w as) at para 11 of ON :
10 (27096/2019} [2021] ZAGPJHC 43; [2021I 2 All SA 774 (GJ); [2021I 7 BLLR 728 (GJ); 2021 (4) SA 186 (GJ);
(2021) 42 IU 1796 (GJ) (19 March 2021)
11 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC); 199 (2) BCLR 139; [1998] ZACC 8
'Courts in this country and elsewhere have over decades grappled with the enduring
difficulty of determining. for the purposes of sim ilar preceding and present legislation,
whether an incident constitutes an accident and arose out of and in the course of
emp loyment of an emp loyee. They also discussed the policy to be adopted in
interpreting the legislation·
(16] The cases that have served before courts fall in broad three categories. There is
a category of cases where the emp loyees were headquartered outside the business
or employment premises and suffered injuries whilst travelling either to work or from
work. There is also a category of workers who met their injuries whilst within vicinity of
their place of employment. This will be the case where employee has knocked off but
still in the workplace premises. The last category is of employees who sustained
injuries whilst in the course of their ernployment, but such injury doesn't arise out of
the scope of emp loyment.
[17] In the first category I shall refer to the case of Leemhuis & Sons v Havenga12 the
facts are briefly that the employee was injured in an accident while on his way home
from a weekend leave. He was travelling in a motor vehicle supplied by his employer
free of charge. The use of the of such means of transport was optfonal but if the
employee used any otl,er transport, he t1ad to bear the costs himself. During the time
U,at he is on leave he was at the disposal of his employer in the sense that he was
liable to be called upon to resum e his em ployment at any time before the expiration of
the leave.
[18) The court had to decide whether the accident arose 'out of and in the course of his
employme nt'. The court held that what has to be determined and ascertained are the
terms governing the employee's relations with the employer at the time of accident. At
page 526-527 tt1e court held that.
' ... in m y opinion, be no doubt that we should take advantage of and adopt the lucid
' ... in m y opinion, be no doubt that we should take advantage of and adopt the lucid
exposition of the law contained in the case which has been repeatedly applied by the
same tribunal. I propose merely to refer to the judgm ent of LORD ATK INSON . At page
75 he says: .. I think the •-Nords ·arising out of' suggest the idea of cause and effect, the
injury by accident being the effect and the employm ent, i. e. the discharge of the duties
of the w orJ..man ·s service, the cause of that effect, and that the wo rds 'in the course of
ll 1938 TPD 524
6
his emp loyment' mean while the workman is doing what he is emp loyed to do i.e.
discharging the duties to his employer imposed upon him by his contract of service.
Although the test is the duty of the employee to the employer this does not prevent "'
things necessary and incidental to the employment' being covered by the language.
So, if employee is accidentally injured while eating his lunch on the employer's
premises, he may not strictly be perfom1ing any duty at the precise moment but what
he is doing is not separable from his work and the accident is deemed to have arisen
in the course of the emp loyment. Where however, the emp loyee is proceeding to or
from his place of work the journey is disassociated from emp loyment unless in
travelling as he did the employee was fulfilling an obligation to his emp loyer imposed
by the contract of service'.
[19) The court concluded that despite travelling in the transport provided by the
employer the employee he was not fulfilling an obligation imposed by his employer.
The court took the view that because there was no obligation on the employee to use
such transport it could not conclude that the accident arose out of his employment.
[20] The next case is Gevaflekommissaris v Santam Verseketingmaatskappy Bpk 13 .
The emp loyee was an agronomist and was employed as a field worker. He was
required in term of the contract of employm ent to conduct experiments and give advice
to the farming communities he was servicing. Importantly for our purposes he was
provided with transport to enable him to fulfil his duties. He had no fixed hours of work,
and his home was his headquarters. He was killed in a motor vehicle whilst driving
from visiting one of the farms and whilst on the way home a collision occurred and he
died. He was with his wife in the vehicle. The question was whether the death had
arisen 'out of the course of his emp loyment'.
[21] The court examined case law including Leemhuis and also English cases and
concluded as follows at page 199:
concluded as follows at page 199:
'The facts in the instant matter are in m any respects essentially similar to the three
decisions by the English Commiss ioners, parlicular/y so in the last case. The
employers stipulated that in order that he should be able to function in the allocated
district he should establish a home there. That was the centre from which he was to
operate. That is v;here customers and the public generally could contact him for the
obtaining of information or advice related to employers' operations and business. That
13 1965 (2) SA 193 ( D & CLD)
7
was the place from where the Company officials could seek him out. That was the
place from which the emp loyee was to conduct business of his employers. He was, as
stated above, provided with a car and telephone the expenses in connection wherewith
were bome by the Company. It is true that he was free to use these facilities for his
private purpose. And indeed, as submitted by defendant's counsel on the day in
question he could, after leaving Nortier's farm, have proceeded to visit friends or
relations. But the evidence sho-..,-.,-s that when the unfortunate accident took place, he
was not engaged in indulging m any private jaunt but simply returning to his
headquarters. I have come to the conclusion that where as in this case an employee
in the circumstances here disclosed operates from his home as a base from which it
his duty to work, the travelling to and fro must, unless undertaken on some project
unconnected with the employer's undertaking, be considered to be in fulfilment of a
term of contract·_
[22] The next case involves a police officer who was injured by his colleague while on
duty in a police van. They were guarding prisoners. This is the case of Minister of
Justice v Khoza 14 . The court concluded that the accident had arisen in the course of
employment and out of such employment. The judgment was a concurrence between
Rumpff JA (as he then was) and Williamson JA (as then was) wrote for the majority.
At page 419 Williamson JA states as follows:
'On every set of facts, the question to be answered is the same; but if is seldom that
the facts are identical. The decision in essence in each case is one of fact related only
to the particular facts in issue. The enquiry on the particular issue is whether if was the
actual fact that he was in the course of his employment that brought the workman
within the range or zone of hazard giving rise to the accident-causing injury. If it was,
the accident arose "out of the employment '.
the accident arose "out of the employment '.
[24) The court concluded that the police officer was injured through the gross
negligence of his colleague and was in the course of his employment as a constable.
His employment at that time place brought him within the range of the peril he
encountered, and the accident therefore arose both in the course of and out of his
employment.
[25] The next category of employees in similar situation as of Ms Bent. The plaintiffs
didn't obtain the similar outcome . The first case is the matter of Net v Minister van
,,. 1966 (1) SA 410 (AA)
8
Publieke Werke15. The facts of this case are almost similar to our case. The plaintiff
M s Nel w orked in Agricultural Building. She finished her wo rk and was on her way
home and she was in the passage that granted access to her wo rkplace wh en she fell.
The passage was also accessible to members of the public. The court concluded that
the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.
[26) In the course of its judgment the court remarked that at 148f the court observed
that:
'Gemeenskplike grond tussen die partye is dat die aanspreeklikheid kragens die Wet
voorduur terwyl die Werksman besig is om werkplek te verlaat'. Loosely translated
the passage states that it is common ground between the parties that the Act
applies during the time the workman is busy leaving a place of work.
[27] The court in Ne! referred at 148g with approval to Smith v South Nom1anton
Colliery Company 1903 ( 1) KB 204 at 207 that:
'While the workman is physically engaged in making his exit from his place where he
is employed, I think the emp loyment v-:ould still continue for purposes of the Act and
t/1e wor/..man will still be entitled to the protection thereby given. But, although the
employment may continue during the interval which is necessarily occupied by the
workman , after his suspension from v-,1ork, in getting off the employer's premises, there
must come a time after the suspension of a workman , when he can no longer be said
to be engaged in the employment. so that. if an accident happens to him. it can be said
to arise out of and in the course of the employment·.
The court then proceeded to discuss at wha t point can it be said that the employee is
now in public space.
[28] The next case is the ma tter Rauff v Standard Bank Properties16• The case
considered previous cases and in particular Ne!. The court criticised and didn't follow
Ne!. In this case the employee was injured whilst on her w ay home. She had left the
Ne!. In this case the employee was injured whilst on her w ay home. She had left the
office suite in which she was employed and had passed through glass doors to the
passage. The lift in which sl,e was went up to the 8th floor wh ere it became stuck before
it suddenly fell to the 6th floor and in the process the employee was injured. The plaintiff
sued her employer for damages . The employer took an exception and argued that the
1~ 1962 (20 SA 14 7 (TPD)
16 2002 (6) SA 605 (WLD )
9
plaintiff w as precluded by section 35 of the Act from instituting a delictual claim. It w as
argued by the defendant that the injury 'arose out of and in the course of the plaintiff's
emp loyment. The court dismissed the exception and held at para 12 that:
'it m ay be that in a specific case the means required by (or the only m ethod provided
to) the employee to become occupied in the day's duties (or terminate those duties)
are integral with their work to be done or the nature of the premises. An instance of the
fom1er may be getting up to the control seat of a construction crane or a bulldozer. An
examp le of the latter may have been the physical layout in the N e/ case ... {if sufficient
information was before the C ourt). But it w as for the defendant in this case to prove
that the employment involved more than the timeous arrival at the [office] ... "
[26) In the case of De Gee v Transnet SO C Ltd17 the court dealt with precedents and
found that precedents establish certain guidelines amongst that:
15.1. a workman is acting in the course of his emp loyment w hen he is engaged 'in
doing something he V/as emp loyed to do' or 'when he is doing something in discharge
of a duty to his employer, directly or indirectly, imposed upon him by his contract of
service':
15.8. after a workman has finished his day's work and started out on his way home ,
his emp loyment continues while he is traversing the prem ises on which he has been
working and any private m eans of access thereto which he is entitled to use by reason
only of his status as a wor'i<man, but that. unless engaged on some special errand for
his emp loyer, which necessitates his being there, his emp loyment ceases when he
reaches a place to which the public have a right of access, such as the public street.
From that moment , he loses his identity as a workman and becomes one of the general
public. A similar principle, of course, applies to a workm an on his w ay to work.
public. A similar principle, of course, applies to a workm an on his w ay to work.
15. 1 O. In all cases, therefore. where a workman on going to or on leaving his work,
suffers an accident on the w ay. the first question to be determined is whether the
workman was at the place where the accident occurred by virtue of his status as a
workman or by virtue of his status.
(28) The next category of cases involves where the court concluded that compen sation
cannot be in terms of the Act. The court concluded that compens ation is excluded by
:7 (30(185/2015} [2019) ZAGPJHC 2; 2020 (2) SA 43;:: (GJ) (29 January 2019}
10
section 35 of the Act. The case of ON 18quoted above dealt with a scenario where a
doctor was claiming damages from the employer (MEG for Health Free State) for
damages sustained during rape. The court concluded that the question whether such
damages should be claimed under delictual claim. At para 31 that court stated the test
as follows:
'However, it appears to me that the problem can be resolved by slight adjustment,
namely, to ask the question whether the w rong the injury bears any connection to the
employee's emp loyment. Put differently, the question that might rightly be asked is
whether the act causing the injury was a risk incidental to the employment. There is of
course as pointed out in numerous authorities, no bright-line test. Each case must be
dealt with on its own facts.
(29] The decision of Churchill v Premier Mpumalanga 19 also the dealt w ith the two
phrases confirmed that an accident m ight arise 'in the course of and also 'out of' a
person's employment. The court stated that 'the two expressions are not coterminous
so that an accident may arise in the course of but not out of an employee's
emp loyment20'. The court held that an accident arises 'in the course of a person's
employment when that person is 'engaged in their basic duties and responsibilities"
and employee.
(30] On the other hand Churchill confirmed that an accident arises 'in the course of a
person's employment when there is a sufficiently close connection to 'the injury
sustained and the performance of the ordinary duties of the employee' or put another
way , the risk of injury is something that can properly be considered as a risk and
'inherent to' or 'incidental to' the em ployee's normal duties21 .
Analysis
(31] The next question is w hether on the facts and the law what the fate of this appeal
should be. Do the facts accord w ith the interpretation of the appellant or that of the
respondent. The approach to statutory interpretation is settled. This approach was
respondent. The approach to statutory interpretation is settled. This approach was
stated in the case of Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality. 22 The
lE See fc.0tnote 6
19 (265/2019120211 ZASC A 16; 120211 ? A ll 323 (SCA ); (2021 IU 978 (SCA); 1202116 BLLR 539 {SCA); 2021 (4) SA
422 (SCA) (4 Ma rch 2021)
1° Ch urchill at para 14
21 Churcf:i/1 at para 19
21 (920/2010) [2012] ZAS CA 13; [20 12] 2 All SA 262 (SCA); 201 2 (4) SA 593 (SCA ) (16 Mar ch 2012).
11
inevitable starting point is tt1e language of the provision understood in the context in
which it is used and having regard to the purpose of the provision.
[32] The position was affirmed the in the matter of Capitec Bank Ho ldings Ltd and
Another v Coral Lagoon Investment 194 (P ty) Ltd23 by stating that:
'Interpretation begins with the text and its structure. They have a gravitational pull that
is important. The proposition that context is everything is not a licence to contend for
m eanings unmo ored in the text and its structure. Rather, context and purpose may be
used to elucidate the text24.'
(33) The scheme of the Act provides a system of 'no fault' compensation for emp loyees
who are injured in w ork-related accidents or who contract occupational diseases.
Emp loyees are therefore entitled to compens ation regardless of whether their injury or
illness was caused by the fault of their employer or any other person.
[34) At the same time, employees are prevented from instituting damages claims
against their employers for the dam age suffered as a result of the accident or disease.
A system of 'no fault' workers' compensa tion such as that established by COIDA can
be seen as representing a balance between the competing interests of employers and
employees. This is so provided by section 35 of COIDA.
[35] There are advantages for all parties in the system. The emp loyer is relieved of the
prospect of costly damages claims and in return is required to make regular
contributions to the Comp ensation Fund established by the COIDA. The employee, on
the other hand, is able to receive comp ensation without having to prove that any
person's negligence caused the accident or disease and without the worry that the
employer may have no assets to satisfy a successful claim for damages .
(36] The policy of workers' compens ation legislation is to assist workers as far as
possible. It is for that reason COIDA must be interpreted and applied in a manner that
possible. It is for that reason COIDA must be interpreted and applied in a manner that
does not unnecessarily prejudices employees and that is most favourable to them.
(37) For the purposes of this Act an accident shall be deemed to have arisen out of
and in the course of the emp loyment of an employee notwithstanding that the
employee was at the time of the accident acting contrary to any law applicable to his
23 (470/2020) [2021] ZASCA 99; [202113 All SA 647 (SCA); 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA) (9 July 2021).
24 Cap itec at para 51
12
employment or to any order by or on behalf of his employer, or that he was acting
without any order of his employer. if the employee was, in the opinion of the Director
General, so acting for the purposes of or in the interests of or in connection with the
business of his employer.
[38] This court is satisfied that the injury by Ms Bent arose 'out of' her emp loyment.
The action of coming and going away from her workstation is sufficiently and closely
connected to 't11e injury sustained by her. The risk of sustaining an injury whilst walking
in the emp loyer's premises is inl1erent and incidental to the employee's normal duties.
The employees are expected to shuttle between floors.
[39] And to find otherwise will defeat the purpose of the Act. It is worth noting that the
employer also took the same view that Ms Bent's injury arose from her employment.
The conclusion is consistent with the generous interpretation that is to be accorded to
COIDA.
O rder
1. The appeal succeeds with costs,
2. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and substituted with the following:
2. 1. The decision of the Tribunal dated 3 April 2025 including the decision of
the respondent dated 23 September 2022 is set aside and it is declared
that the Appellant is entitled to compensation as envisaged in section
22(1) in terrT1s of the Compensation tor Occupational Injuries and
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 as amended .
2.2. The matter is remitted to the Respondent (Rand Mutual Assurance (Pty)
Ltd for a calculation and determination of the amount for compensation
payable to the Appellant as a result of the accident on 27 July 2022.
2.3. The Respondent to pay costs on an attorney and client scale.
13
T THUPATLAASE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAU TENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
I concur and it is so ordered.
Heard on: 23 Oc tober 2025
Judgment delivered on 9 Decemb er 2025
Appearances:
For the A ppellant: Adv. J D u Plessis
Instructed by· Briel Incorporated
For the Respondents. Adv. M Meyerowitz
MMD LENYAI J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG D IVISION, PRETORIA
Instructed by: Precious Nobuhle Mudau Inc (PNM Incorporated)
14