IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE NO: 2025-174684
In the matter between:
ZULU NYALA GAME RANCH (PTY) LIMITED APPLICANT
and
CHRISTIAAN BEUKES FIRST
RESPONDENT
CUSTOM TRAILS (PTY) LIMITED SECOND
RESPONDENT
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
Accordingly, I make the following order:
1. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from using, distributing,
copying or publishing any confidential information of the applicant and
personal information, as defined in the Protection of Personal Information Act
4 of 2013 (‘the Act ’), of the applicant’s existing customers in any manner,
2
either directly or indirectly, for any purpose, including the solicitation of
business from such customers.
2. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from contacting, dealing with,
securing or soliciting the business of the applicant’s customers, including but
not limited to social media platforms, either directly or indirectly, for any
purpose whatsoever.
3. The respondents are directed to delete, remove and destroy all of the
applicant’s customers’ personal information, as defined in the Act, and the
data in the first respondent’s possession from his electronic devices, including
laptops, cellular phone(s), storage disks, including hard disk drives, solid state
drives, USB flash drives and micro disks , and tablets o f any kind and any
cloud storage service, including but not limited to Google Drive.
4. The respondents are directed to delete, remove and destroy all soft copies of
the applicant’s confidential information and documentation, as contemplated
in clauses 11.9, 13.1, 19.1 and 22.1 , respectively, of the first respondent’s
employment contract with the applicant, from the first respondent’s electronic
devices including laptops, cellular phones, storage disks (including hard disks
drives, solid state drives, USB flash drives and micro disks) and tablets of any
kind and any cloud storage service, including but not limited to Google Drive.
5. The respondents are directed to hand over to the applicant all hard copies of
confidential information and documentation, as contemplated in clauses 11.9,
13.1, 19.1 and 22.1 , respectively, of the first respondent’s employment
contract.
6. The respondents are to pay the costs of the application, jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to be absolved, such costs to be taxed on scale B.
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
SAKS AJ:
3
[1] This application came before me as an urgent application in which the
applicant sought to interdict the respondents from utilising confidential and/or
personal information, as defined in the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of
2013 ( ‘the Act ’). The applicant contended that the first respondent had accessed,
possessed and was making use of such information pursuant to the termination of
his employment with the applicant. It was common cause that the first respondent is
presently employed by the second respondent.
[2] The respondents raised two points in limine, firstly that the application was
not urgent and, secondly, that the application was bad for non -joinder. I deal with
each of these ad seriatim.
[3] The parties argued the question of urgency and , in my view , the applicant
made out a case that the matter was suffi ciently urgent as contemplated in Uniform
rule 6(12). In any event, any potential prejudice was ameliorated by the matter
having been postponed on 6 October 2025 to facilitate the exchange of affidavits
from the parties and the filing of heads of argument. Counsel for the respondent
wisely did not pursue it any further.
[4] The second point in limine raised by the respondents was that it contended
that the applicant had failed to cite the Information Regulator1 and the data subject s
referred to in paragraph 59 of the founding affidavit.2
[5] It is now settled law that the joinder of a party is only required as a matter of
necessity, as opposed to a matter of convenience, if that party has a direct and
substantial interest which may be affected prejudicially by the judgment of the court
in the proceedings concerned. 3 The mere fact that a party may have an interest in
the outcome of the litigation does not warrant a non -joinder plea. The right of a party
1 Established in terms of s 39 of the Act.
2 The applicant’s customers in question are listed in para 59 of the founding affidavit.
2 The applicant’s customers in question are listed in para 59 of the founding affidavit.
3 Bowring NO v Vrededorp Properties CC and Another [2007] ZASCA 80; 2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA )
para 21. See also Judicial Service Commission & Another v Cape Bar Council [2012] ZASCA 115;
2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) (Judicial Service Commission) para 12.
4
to validly raise the objection that other parties should have been joined to the
proceedings, has thus been held to be a limited one.4
[6] I am not convinced that the data subjects would be affected by an Order
granted by this Court. The data subjects would not be prevented from contacting the
respondents. The relief sought is aimed at preventing the respondents from making
use of the confidential and personal information to contact the data subjects
themselves to s olicit business. In the result, this point in limine must fail and is
accordingly dismissed.
[7] I now turn to deal with the merits of the application.
[8] The applicant offers bespoke wildlife and cultural vacations to its customers.
These vacations include accommodation and curated activities, which include offsite
excursions ( ‘excursions’) available at an additional cost. The majority of the
applicant’s customers comprise of international guest s, who for the most part , are
return customers.
[9] The first respondent was employed by the applicant for 11 years as a ranger.
He was responsible for marketing the excursions and game drives to customers
upon their arrival. He would also accompany them on the excursions.
[10] On 22 July 2019, the second respondent was registered by the first
respondent’s wife, Lee Ann Beukes. During the course of executing his duties, the
first respondent became privy to the applicant’s confidential customer list and the
customers’ personal information, including their contact numbers, their personal
preferences as well as the applicant’s pricing structure. Specifically, customers gave
the first respondent their contact details for the purposes of facilitating the excursions
whilst they were guests of the applicant.
4 Burger v Rand Water Board and Another [2006] ZASCA 150; 2007 (1) SA 30 (SCA) para 7; Judicial
Service Commission para 12.
5
[11] The first respondent’s employment contract contained confidentiality clauses
that expressly prohibited him from disclosing, inter alia , trade secrets, marketing
material, customer lists or supply lists, business affairs, technical methods, electronic
mail and processes of the applicant’s operations.5
[12] Clause 22.1 of the first respondent’s employment contract clearly stipulated
that upon the termination of his employment, he was immediately required to deliver
to the applicant all security access cards, assets , equipment, records, documents,
source code, accounts, letters, notes, software, memoranda and papers of every
description within his possession or control relating to the applicant’s affairs and
business whether or not they were originally supplied by the applicant.6
[13] On 8 August 2025, the first respondent was dismissed from the applicant’s
employment after the applicant discovered, during or about July 2025 , that the first
respondent was selling the second respondent’s excursions to the applicant’s
customers, whilst he was employed by the applicant and whilst the customers were
guests of the applicant.
[14] Almost immediately after the first respondent’s termination of employment,
the second respondent secured a license on 24 August 2025 , to permit it to conduct
business as a safari vehicle operator, specifically for game drives, in Hluhluwe -
iMfolozi Park, Mkuzi Game Reserve, Temb e/Ndumo Complex and Itala Game
Reserve (collectively referred to as ‘the reserves’).7
[15] The second respondent’s license allows it to offer excursions identical to
those offered by the applicant within the same reserves , as is demonstrated by the
applicant’s excursion list. 8 The first respondent’s license allows the second
respondent to reserve accommodation for its customers in the reserves, which
further expands the second respondent’s service offering, to bring it into direct
competition with the applicant.
competition with the applicant.
5 See clause 19.1 of the employment contract, Annexure ‘FA4’.
6 See clause 22.1 of the employment contract.
7 See annexure ‘CB1’.
8 See annexure ‘RA2’.
6
[16] Fundamentally, there would be nothing untoward in the second respondent
setting up a business in competition with the applicant; however, the applicant’s
complaint is that the first respondent has set about utilising the confidential and
personal information of the applicant’s customers in order to solicit business from the
same customers, to springboard the second respondent’s business into viability. The
applicant argues that this amounts to unlawful competition.
[17] The applicant does not seek to enforce a restraint of trade against the first
respondent, as no such clause is contained in the first respondent’s employment
contract. Instead, it seeks to enforce the confidentiality provisions contained in the
employment contract, which survive the termination of the first respondent’s
employment.
[18] In addition, the applicant seeks to invoke the provisions of the Act, in that the
first respondent has disclosed what the applicant contends is confidential and
personal information to a third party, namely the second respondent. It is now trite
that in order to qualify as confidential information, the information concerned must
fall within the following three requirements, namely:
(a) Firstly, the information must not only relate to, but also be capable of
application in the particular trade or industry.
(b) Secondly, the information must be secret or confidential. To that end, the
information must, objectively, only be available and thus known, to a
restricted number of people or to a closed circ le, or, as it is usually
expressed by the courts, the information must be something which is not
public property or public knowledge.
(c) Thirdly, the information must, likewise objectively viewed, be of economic
(business) value to the applicant.9
9 Townsend Productions (Pty) Ltd v Leech & Others 2001 (4) SA 33 ( C) at 53 I to 54B (Townsend
Productions). See also Motion Transfer & Precision Roll Grinding CC v Carsten and Another [1998] 4
All SA 168 (N) at 175. See also Van Heerden and Neethling Unlawful Competition 2 ed (2008) at 225
(Van Heerden).
7
[19] The second string to the applicant’s bow lies in s 20 of the Act, which
imposes a statutory obligation on it to treat personal information which comes to their
knowledge as confidential and must not disclose it.10
[20] The Act defines ‘personal information ’ as information relating to an
identifiable, living, natural person , and where applicable, an identifiable existing
juristic person . This includes, inter alia , their e-mail address, physical address,
telephone number, location information, online details or other particular assignment
to the person;11 the personal preferences of the person, 12 the name of the person , if
it appears, personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the
name itself would reveal information about the person.13
[21] It must, therefore, be accepted that the data which forms the subject of this
application falls within the definition of personal information in the Act. Mr Randles
who appeared on behalf of the respondents sought to distinguish personal
information from confidential information and to that end contend ed that whilst the
data in question constituted personal information, it did not constitute confidential
information for the purposes of the prohibition contained in the first respondent’s
contract of employment.
[22] Whilst the respondents may have sought shelter in the distinction contended
for, it is a distinction of no significance, in that s 20 of the Act required the applicant,
qua operator, or as an entity which processes personal information on behalf of a
responsible party or operator, to treat such personal information as confidential and
is obliged to ensure that it is not disclosed to third parties. For the sake of good
order, I find that the information is confidential and therefore subject to the relevant
provisions of the employment contract, which survived its termination.
10 Section 20 of the Act stipulates that : ‘An operator or anyone processing personal information on
behalf of a responsible party or an operator, must –
(a) process such information only with the knowledge or authorisation of the responsible party; and
(b) treat personal information which comes to their knowledge as confidential and must not disclose it,
unless required by law or in the course of the proper performance or their duties.’
11 See s 1 of the Act regarding the definition of ‘personal information’ subsec. (c).
12 Ibid subsec (e).
13 Ibid subsec (h).
8
[23] It is common cause that this information has been disclosed to a third party,
namely the second respondent. However, that is not the end of the matter, because
the applicant is not only seeking to prevent the First Respondent from disclosing
such information but it is additionally seeking to interdict the second respondent from
contacting its customers. Accordingly, it must meet the threshold by establishing that
the acquisition and use of the applicant’s trade secret is likely to cause the applicant
loss of custom, thereby, in princip le, infringing his right to goodwill, in this instance
the right to carry on its trade and attract customers.
[24] The leading decision is Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Limited v SA Merchants
Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) Pty Limited14 where Corbett J held:
‘…where, as in this case, a trader has by the exercise of his skill and labour compiled
information which he distributes to his client upon a confidential basis ( i.e. upon the basis
that the information should not be disclosed to others), a rival trader who is not a client but in
some manner obtains this information and, well knowing its nature and the basis upon which
it was distributed, uses it in his competing business and thereby injured the first mentioned
trader in his business, commits a wrongful act vis-à-vis the latter and will be liable to him in
damages. In an appropriate case the plaintiff trader would also be entitled to claim an
interdict against the continuation of such wrongful conduct.’
[25] Unlawfulness is determined by reference to the boni mores yardstick.15 The
acquisition and use of a competitor’s confidential information is in princi ple contra
bonos mores and, consequently, also prima facie unlawful if an infringement of an
applicant’s goodwill is likely. 16 In these circumstances, a prejudiced creditor is
entitled to move for an interdict, 17 independent from a claim for damages under the
entitled to move for an interdict, 17 independent from a claim for damages under the
actio legis Aquiliae. An interdict does not require the establishment of fault 18 or
damage, the unlawfulness of the conduct is sufficient.19
14 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1)
SA 209 (C) at 221.
15 See in this regard Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A) at 678-680; Van Castricum v Theunissen
and Another 1993 (2) SA 726 (T) at 732 (Van Castricum); Sibex Construction (SA) Pty Limited and
Another v Injectaseal CC and Others 1988 (2) SA 54 (T) at 63-64.
16 Van Heerden at 221.
17 Van Heerden at 221.
18 Townsend Productions at 56.
19 Townsend Productions at 56; Van Heerden at 222.
9
[26] The springboard doctrine in English law, which has been adopted in our
law,20 must also be taken into account. The basic philosophy of this doctrine is that
the competitor who acquires the plaintiff’s trade secret and uses it in his
performance, has an unfair and improper head start or springboard enabling him to
take advantage of the plaintiff. That certainly appears to be the case here as the
information or data that is the subject of the application will be used to springboard
the second respondent’s business and give it a head start at the expense of the
applicant.
[27] Mr Randles conceded that the second respondent could have not obtained
the confidential or personal information in question without that data having being
disclosed by the first respondent pursuant to the termination of his employment with
the applicant. The information was , therefore, not in the public domain nor could the
second respondent obtain such information by searching for it on the internet. These
customers, I was advised, are all internation al guests, and the customer list that has
been built up over time by the applicant could never have become public knowledge
or fall within the knowledge of the second respondent without such a disclosure,
which would have been in breach of the first respondent’s contract of employment.
[28] I now turn to deal with the three requirements . The first requirement is that
the information must not only relate to , but also be capable of application in the
particular trade or industry.21 The nature of the applicant’s business is such that the
information allows them to provide the bespoke service which it believes sets them
apart from other companies. That database allows them to provide a high level
service knowing full well the preferences and details of its customers, which it uses
to market business from time to time. Furthermore, that information was similarly to
be used by the second respondent and there can hardly be any argument to the
be used by the second respondent and there can hardly be any argument to the
contrary in that regard. Accordingly, the information is capable of being used in the
particular industry.
[29] The second requirement is that the information must be secret or confidential
and so the dat a or information must, objectively determined , only be available or
20 Van Heerden at 222.
21 Townsend Productions at 53. Van Heerden at 215.
10
known to a restricted number of people or close d circle, which is not public property
or public knowledge.22 The respondents did not attempt to argue that the information
in question was a matter of public knowledge or public property. Objectively
speaking, this information fell peculiarly within the knowledge of the applicant and its
employees. The data comprised international customers and their contact details,
preferences and the like, which remained solely within the domain of the applicant
and its business. Its game rangers would have these contact details on their cellular
phones or laptops for the purposes of being able to liaise with such customers for the
purposes of offering and facilitating the excursions. Accordingly, such information,
which constitutes personal information under the Act, also constitutes confidential
information or at the very least information that the applicant was bound to treat as
confidential, having regard to the provisions of s 20 of the Act and the terms of his
employment contract , respectively. Accordingly, the applicant has satisfied the
second leg of the test.
[30] Thirdly, the data must, objectively viewed, be of economic or business value
to the applicant. This is certainly the case as the applicant’s entire business model is
predicated upon offering a bespoke service to such customers who intend to
frequent the reserves. It is vital to the applicant’s business . It, therefore, has an
economic or business value in the circumstances and this satisfies the third leg of
the test.
[31] In the result, I find that the applicant has satisfied the test and such
information must be considered a trade secret, qui te apart from such information
constituting personal information under the Act.
[32] The applicant’s counsel directed my attention to the case of Van Castricum v
Theunissen & Another ,23 as being one which is remarkably simila r to the extant
matter. Much like this matter, the first respondent in Van Castricum24 was not bound
matter. Much like this matter, the first respondent in Van Castricum24 was not bound
by a restraint of trade clause in a contract of employment and , secondly, the case
22 Townsend Productions at 54; Waste Products Utilisation (Pty) Ltd v Wilkes and Another 2003 (2)
SA 515 (W) at 577; Lifeguards Africa (Pty) Ltd v Raubenheimer 2006 (5) SA 364 (D) at 377; Canon
KwaZulu-Natal (Pty)Ltd t/a Office Automation v Booth and Another 2005 (3) SA 205 (N) at 210.
23 Van Castricum.
24 Ibid.
11
considered the disclosure of confidential information. Much like Van Castricum,25 the
applicant’s business is greatly dependant on the confidential information relating to
clients.26
[33] Regarding confidentially in general and client lists in particular, the court in
Van Castricum27 referred to the following dicta in the English case of Printers and
Finishers Ltd v Holloway:28
‘The mere fact that the confidential information is not embodied in a document but is carried
away by the employee in his head is not, of course, of itself a reason against the granting of
an injunction to prevent its use or disclosure by him. If the information in question can fairly
be regarded as a separate part of the employee’s stock of knowledge which a man of
ordinary and honest intelligence would recognise to be the property of his own employer,
and not his own to do as he likes with, then the court, if it thinks that there is a danger of the
information being used or disclosed by the ex-employee to the detriment of the old employer,
will what it can to prevent that result by granting an injunction.’
[34] The court also referred to the early decision of Robb v Green29 where Lord
Justice Kaye held that:
‘It is enough for that purpose to say that where w e find a servant using after he has left his
employment, a document surreptitiously comp iled from his Master’s book to the detriment of
the Master, he is in breach of trust, if not in breach of contract.’
[35] It was then held that in that case that the employer was entitled to an
interdict and damages.
[36] This case is decidedly similar to Van Castricum 30 (if one considers the
physical client list data on the Bantex list as being similar to modern -day electronic
equipment, such as servers or hard drives on phones and laptops ) and I am ,
furthermore, in agreement with the dicta quoted above.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid at 732E-F.
27 Ibid.
28 Printers and Finishers Ltd v Hollaway [1965] RPC 239 (Ch) at 255 -6. See also Harvey Tiling Co.
(Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd & Another 1977 (1) SA 316 (T) at 321G-322E.
29 Robb v Greer [1895] 2 QB 315 (CA) at 319.
30 Van Castricum.
12
[37] It is, however, necessary to clarify the relief that may be granted. The
applicant is entitled to an interdict not for the enforcement of a restraint of trade
preventing the first respondent from taking up employment in the industry, but the
interdict lies against the use of the information in question.
[38] Put simply, the respondents are to be interdicted and restrained from
contacting the applicant’s clients . The first respondent is entitled to remain in the
employment of the second respondent. Finally, Ms Schulenburg, who appeared for
the applicant, correctly conceded that the applicant cannot prevent such clients from
contacting the respondents. It is the soliciting of business by the respondents from
such clients that forms the basis of the interdict.
Costs
[39] The general rule is that costs follow the result, however, the applicant seeks
punitive costs in the circumstances. The first respondent clearly believed that he was
entitled to act as he did. Furthermore, the applicant chose not to institute an Anton
Piller application, which may have established the mala fides it now contends was at
the heart of the respondents’ actions. I am, therefore, disinclined to award punitive
costs in this instance.
Order
[40] In the circumstances, I make the following Order:
1. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from using, distributing,
copying or publishing any confidential information of the applicant and
personal information, as defined in the Protection of Personal Information Act
4 of 2013 ( ‘the Act ’), of the applicant’s existing customers in any manner,
either directly or indirectly, for any purpose, including the solicitation of
business from such customers.
2. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from contacting, dealing with,
securing or soliciting the business of the applicant’s customers, including but
not limited to social media platforms, either directly or indirectly, for any
purpose whatsoever.
purpose whatsoever.
3. The respondents are directed to delete, remove and destroy all of the
applicant’s customers’ personal information, as defined in the Act, and the
13
data in the first respondent’s possession from his electronic devices, including
laptops, cellular phone(s), storage disks, including hard disk drives, solid state
drives, USB flash drives and micro disks, and tablets of any kind and any
cloud storage service, including but not limited to Google Drive.
4. The respondents are directed to delete, remove and destroy all soft copies of
the applicant’s confidential information and documentation, as contemplated
in clauses 11.9, 13.1, 19.1 and 22.1, respectively, of the first respondent’s
employment contract with the applicant, from the first respondent’s electronic
devices including laptops, cellular phones, storage disks (including hard disks
drives, solid state drives, USB flash drives and micro disks) and tablets of any
kind and any cloud storage service, including but not limited to Google Drive.
5. The respondents are directed to hand over to the applicant all hard copies of
confidential information and documentation, as contemplated in clauses 11.9,
13.1, 19.1 and 22.1, respectively, of the first respondent’s employment
contract.
6. The respondents are to pay the costs of the application, jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to be absolved, such costs to be taxed on scale B.
__________________
D.J. SAKS AJ
14
Appearances:
For the Applicant: S. Schulenburg
Instructed by: Hutcheon Attorneys, Bedfordview
c/o Macgregor Erasmus Attorneys
For the Respondents: G. Randles
Instructed by: Van Niekerk Attorneys
c/o Fourie Stott Attorneys
Date of Hearing: 17 October 2025
Date of Judgment: 10 December 2025