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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: 2024-133414
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
PRETORIA HIGH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS:
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY Applicant
and
THE GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
AND SIX OTHERS Respondents
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal
representatives by e -mail and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
Caselines. The date and for hand-down is deemed to be 17 December 2025.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA, J
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
______________ _________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
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Introduction
[1] An interlocutory application is an application made in the midst of an ongoing
proceedings aimed at resolving a specific procedural issue. Such an application
does not resolve the main issues in the case. There is no dispute that involved
in the impugned judgment was a rule 30A application wherein the applicant
contended that the respondents have failed to comply with rule 53(1).
Indisputably, a rule 30A application is interlocutory in nature. The applicant is
seeking leave to appeal the interlocutory order made by this Court. It is
apposite at this stage to reverberate what the erudite Harms AJA, as he then
was, felicitously stated in Zweni v Minister of Law and Order of the Republic of
South Africa (Zweni)1. He said:
“5 The jurisdictional requirements for a civil appeal emanating from a
provincial or local division sitting as a court of first instance are twofold:
1. The decision appealed against must be a “judgment or order” within
the meaning of those words in the context of s 20(1) of the Act; and
2. The necessary leave to appeal must have been granted, either by the
court of first instance; or, where leave was refused by it, by this Court.
6 Leave is granted if there is reasonable prospects of success. So much
is trite. But, if the judgment or order sought to be appealed against does
not dispose of all the issues between the parties the balance of
convenience must, in addition, favour a piecemeal consideration of the
case. In other words, the test is then “ whether the appeal – if leave
were given – would lead to a just and reasonably prompt resolution of
the real issue between the parties” (footnote omitted).
The issue whether a decision is an appealable “judgment or order” is
complicated by a number of factors and has been the subject of a large
number of judgments over many years. In each instance the court had to
consider its appellate jurisdiction in the light of the then enabling statute, but
1 1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
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often general observations enunciated in other contexts were grafted onto
those provisions (footnote omitted).
[2] That said, in the present application , this Court must ask and answer the
question whether the appeal would lead to a just and reasonably prompt
resolution of the real issue between the parties. It is worth mentioning at this
embryonic stage that a success on appeal would simply mean that the
respondents would be compelled to comply with rule 53(1)(b) . Such an order
will have less to do with the already launched review application. Not an ounce
of the review application will be resolved by the appeal. The parties would be
directed back to the high court for the hearing of the appeal. So much for the
piecemeal adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Clearly, the interests
of justice shall not be dutifully served thereby.
[3] This Court must mention , in passing, that other than an appeal, other avenues
are open for the applicant to have access to the copy of the Report. For
instance, invoking the provisions of rule 35(12). As it shall be demonstrated
below, the appeal shall not lead to a just and reasonably prompt resolution of
the case. On the contrary, it shall simply serve to put a spoke on the wheels of
a review application. Just to demonstrate the point, in order to prosecute a
review of the exercise of statutory power (section 9 of the GDA), the applicant
does not require a co py of the Report. To this, counsel for the applicant has
already conceded . Assuming that a review Court finds that the power was
exercised unlawfully, as alleged, everything else that followed, inclusive of the
Report will be set aside.
[4] In opposing the present application, the respondents contended that the rule
30A in this instance is not appealable. The applicants strongly contends
otherwise. To my mind, this issue of the appealability of the interlocutory order
is dispositive of the whole application serving before Court. For that reason, I
is dispositive of the whole application serving before Court. For that reason, I
propose to deal with that issue first.
Is the rule 30A order appealable or not?
[5] In my view, it is wrong to ask only the general question whether rule 30A orders
are final and appealable. The fact that in Helen Suzman, the Constitutional
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Court, addressed an issue emanating from a rule 30A and rule 6(11), order
does not axiomatically provide authority to the proposition that all rule 30A
interlocutory orders are appealable. In Helen Suzman, the majority in accepting
jurisdiction stated the following:
“[11] The question whether and under what circumstances the JSC must
divulge a recording of its post -interview deliberations under rule 53 is of great
import. There are reasonable prospects of success. Thus it is in the interest of
justice that leave to appeal be granted.”
[6] It is clear that what prompted the grant for leave to appeal was the prospects of
success and the interest of justice. The Court did not specifically consider the
question whether a rule 30A order was appealable or not. However , what
sharply distinguishes the facts of Helen Suzman from the facts of this case is
that, in casu, the applicant is not seeking to be provided with a record of the
deliberations that may have led to the compilation of the Report. In Helen
Suzman, the deliberations in question led to the non -recommendation of a
judicial candidate (decision). That non -recommendation (decision) was
impugned and not the deliberations (part of the record of proceedings ) by way
of a judicial review.
[7] The applicant placed heavy reliance on the judgment of Bridon International
GmbH v International Trade Administration Commission and Others (Bridon)2 in
advancing a proposition that the rule 30A order is appealable. In this case, the
Commission refused to disclose what it considered to be confidential
information. In order to compel the Commission to disclose what it considered
to be confidential information , Casar launched what was simply termed in the
judgment as an interlocutory application. Different from the present matter,
Preller J granted the interlocutory order that was sought. Bridon as a party
whose confidential information was to be disclosed sought leave to appeal
whose confidential information was to be disclosed sought leave to appeal
since it considered the confidentiality regime set out in the court order of Preller
J not to be adequate protection of its confidential information. Such leave to
appeal was granted. Unlike in the present matter , the issue on appeal there,
2 2013 (3) SA 197 (SCA)
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was about the confidentiality regime set out in the Preller J order. The question
of the appealability of the order never arose nor was it determined. In upholding
the order of Preller J, the erudite Brand JA writing for the majority stated the
following:
“[32] In short, I agree with the sentiments expressed by Preller J in the
court a quo that a ban on disclosure of Bridon’s confidential information will
effectively deprive Casar of a fair hearing in the main application.
[8] Of significanc e, Casar sought an order reviewing and setting aside the
Commission’s decision to recommend the continued and increased duties to be
imposed on its exports and the Minister’s decision to accept and implement that
recommendation. Bridon was not a party to the review application. Its
interlocutory application was prompted by the disclosure of its confidential
information. In my considered view, the Bridon case is distinguishable from the
present case. Although the application of Bridon was labelled an interlocutory
application, in truth , it was an application launched by Bridon with a view to
protect its confidential information to be disclosed in a case where it was not a
party. It became an ‘interlocutory application’ simply because Bridon attacked
an order made in the midst of litigation inter partes, in the circumstances where
Bridon was an affected non-party.
[9] In addressing the important aspect of appealability, the applicant only
addresses the issue of whether the decision is final in effect and whether the
interests of justice require that a reversal opportunity be allowed. Regrettably,
the question of appealability does not only rest on those two legs (final
judgment and the interest of justice) . When regard is had to the applicable
Zweni test outlined above, an additional question is that of an appeal disposing
of issues in the main matter. In the recent judgment of MEC for Economic
Development, Gauteng and Another v Sibongile Vilakazi and others (Vilakazi)3,
Development, Gauteng and Another v Sibongile Vilakazi and others (Vilakazi)3,
Smith JA writing for the majority , reaffirmed the Zweni test requiring disposition
of the issues in the main case. With absolute perspicacity, the learned Smith JA
said:
3 (783/2023) [2024] ZASCA 126 (17 September 2024)
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“[25] Applying these legal principles to the facts of this matter, there can, in
my view be little doubt that the order is appealable. First, as I said earlier, the
judgment purports to make final pronouncements regarding virtually all the
issues that will fall for decision in the review application. These relate not only
to the rationality of the MEC’s decision but also her bona fides. Moreover, a
punitive costs order was made against her based on those findings. The
judgment thus has the effect of disposing of a substantial portion of the relief
sought in Part B of the notice of motion.”
[10] Smith JA cited with approval the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Von Abo
(Von Abo)4 where the SCA summarised the approach regarding appealability
as follows:
“It is fair to say that there is no checklist of requirements. Several
considerations need to be weighed up, including whether the relief granted
was final in its effect, definitive of the rights of the parties, disposed of a
substantial portion of the relief claimed, aspects of convenience, the time at
which the issue is considered, delay, expedience, prejudice, the avoidance of
piecemeal appeals and the attainment of justice.”
[11] Flowing from the above, it is perspi cuous that there is bo uquet of issues to be
considered in determining the appealability of an order.
[12] Similar sentiments were expressed by the Constitutional Court in United
Democratic Movement and Another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Ltd and
others (Lebashe)5 where, it with absolute sagacity, expressed the law to be:
“In deciding whether an order is appealable, not only form of the order must
be considered, but also, and predominantly, its effect. Thus, an order which
appears in form to be purely interlocutory will be appealable if its effect is
such that it is final and definitive of any issue or portion thereof in the main
such that it is final and definitive of any issue or portion thereof in the main
action. By the same token, an order which might appear, according to its
4 2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA).
5 2023 (1) SA 353 (CC).
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form, to be finally definitive in the above sense may, nevertheless, be purely
interlocutory in effect.”
[13] With considerable regret, there is no merit in a submission made by the
applicant in its heads of argument, to the following effect:
“3.2.2 The effect of the judgment, if not reversed, will be to deprive the
Applicant of sight of the very Report it seeks to review (let alone the very
Report that formed the basis of the MEC’s decision to implement the Report,
which the Applicant also seeks to review). That is about as final as final gets.”
[14] This submission , inaccurately place premium on the fact that, the Report
formed the basis of the alleged MEC ’s decision. As Lebashe, Von Abo and
Vilakazi states it, the finality contemplated is one that is dispositive of any issue
or portion of the main action. The effect of the impugned order is simply that the
respondents did not fail to comply with the provisions of rule 53(1)(b).
Regrettably, the impugned order is incapable of being elevated to the level of
privation of the glimpse of the Report. In order to demonstrate the point fully, it
is necessary to regurgitate the text of rule 53(1)(b) in this judgment. It states:
“(b) calling upon the magistrate, presiding officer, chairperson or officer, as
the case may be, to despatch , within 15 days after receipt of the notice of
motion, to the registrar the record of such proceedings sought to be corrected
or set aside , together with such reasons as the magistrate, presiding officer,
chairperson or officer, as the case may be is by law required or desires to
give or make, and to notify the applicant that such magistrate, presiding
officer, chairperson or officer, as the case may be has done so.”
[15] The fact that this Court concluded that the above rule was complied with,
particularly in the circumstances where the respondents were not called upon
to despatch the Report, hardly finally and in a definitive sense dispose of any
issue in the review.
issue in the review.
[16] Regarding the interests of justice, the narrative that the impugned order has the
effect of the review application being argued without the Report being availed,
is without merit. There are myriad of ways in which the Report may find its way
into the review proceedings. It is not the duty of this Court to dispense with
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legal advice. The narrative constitutes a complete misunderstanding of the
order. The order itself does not state that the applicant is prevented to introduce
the Report in the review proceedings. In the impugned judgment, the Court
clearly stated the following, which informs the order it reached:
“[21] … By way of an example, in an action situation, which situation may
apply to application proceedings, if rule 35(13) is complied with, a party may
rely on rule 35(3) to inspect and make copies of a document…”
[17] Considering the above reasoning, it is incongruent with proper reasoning to
remotely suggest that the interlocutory order prevents the arguing of a review
without a report. All rule 30A ruling provides is that rule 53(1)(b) was not
contravened by the respondents. Rule 30A(2) is salutary. It provides:
“(2) where a party fails to comply within the period of 10 days
contemplated in subrule (1), application may on notice be made to court and
the court may make such order thereon as it deems fit.”
[18] The phrase ‘such order thereon’ simply implies that, if the allegation, as in here,
is that of non-compliance with a rule, a court must rule on non -compliance or
compliance. Perhaps, the applicant used a wrong rule. Nevertheless, in Helen
Suzman reference was made to an interlocutory application being launched, in
terms of rule 6(11) as well as rule 30A. The first judgment only referenced an
interlocutory application and not rule 30A. It was only the second judgment that
referenced rule 30A. Most importantly, the second judgment stated the
following with regard to rule 30A:
“The rule provides a general remedy for no -compliance with the Uniform
Rules. But more importantly, the rule confers a wide discretion on the court to
which a rule 30A application is made. If that court finds that non-compliance
has been established it is free to make any order it deems fit. Notably, the rule
does not oblige the court to order compliance.
does not oblige the court to order compliance.
[19] On the other hand rule 6(11) provides as follows:
“(11) Notwithstanding the aforegoing subrules, interlocutory and other
applications incidental to pending proceedings may be brought on notice
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supported by such affidavits as the case may require and set down at time
assigned by the registrar or as directed by a judge.”
[20] To my mind an application contemplated in rule 6(11) is capable of producing a
final and definitive judgment, which may be impugned on appeal. On the facts
of this case an application contemplated in this rule was launched on 10
December 2024 and it still pending a decision. It is worth mentioning that such
a pending application sought an order to compel the delivery of the Report.
Applying the convenience rule, it will certainly not be in the interest of justice to
allow a piecemeal determination of the review case.
[21] As I conclude, the Supreme Court of Appeal in TWK v Hoogeveld Boerdery
Beleggings (TWK)6 sufficiently warned that granting leave based on the interest
of justice is only within the remit of the Constitutional Court 7 and no other
courts.
[22] In HJ v PJ (HJ)8 the Court reached the following apt conclusion:
“[16] The upshot of the above is that the regional court’s order to compel
the respondent to discover is purely interlocutory in nature. It has no final
effect, is not a definitive proceeding, and does not have the effect of disposing
of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the pending divorce
action between the parties. Neither does it affect the rights of the parties
whatsoever. The parties are still entitled to prosecute their case and are still at
liberty to direct the court to any evidence and to advance any argument that
they wish. The high court was obliged to entertain the issue, even if it was not
raised, as to whether the matter before it was an appeal against a ‘decision’
and thus an appeal within its jurisdiction mero motu. Its failure to do so
amounts to a misdirection which is fatal to the appeal before this Court. This
is so because the high court should not have proceeded with the merits as
the regional court’s order was not appealable. It should have struck the matter
off the roll.”
off the roll.”
6 2023 (5) SA 163 (SCA)
7 See City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and another 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC).
88 [2024] ZASCA 55 (19 April 2024).
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[23] In Minmetals Logistics Zheijang Co Ltd v The Owners and Underwriters of the
MV Smart and another (Minmetals)9, Koen AJA , as he then was , loudly
expressed himself as follows:
“If one of the attributes in Zweni is lacking, an order will probably not be
appealable, unless there are circumstances which in the interests of justice,
render it appealable. The emphasis has moved away from an enquiry focused
on the nature of the order, to one more as to the nature and effect of the
order, having regard to what is in the interests of justice. It is not in the
interest of justice to have a piecemeal adjudication of litigation, with
unnecessary delays resulting from appeals on issues which would not finally
dispose of litigation. As the Constitutional Court has held, albeit in a different
context, it is undesirable to fragment a case by bringing appeals on individual
aspects of the case prior to proper resolution of the matter in the court of first
instance, and an appellate court will only interfere in pending proceedings in
the lower court in cases of great rarity – where grave injustice threatens, and,
intervention is necessary to attain justice.”10
[24] This Court plentifully agrees with the sentiments expressed by the learned
Acting Judge Magardie, when the AJ concluded thus:
“As I have pointed out earlier, a piecemeal appeal against the order will not
bring finality to this litigation. The entire dispute between the parties remains
pending and has not been resolved. I am unable to conclude that an appeal
on an isolated issue relating to pre -trial discovery, would nonetheless lead to
a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties, as
required by section 17(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act.”
[25] In similar vein, this Court concludes that the isolated issue of discretionary
refusal to find that there is non -compliance with rule 53(1)(b) is not appealable
and it is not just and prompt for such piecemeal appeal to be allowed. Properly
and it is not just and prompt for such piecemeal appeal to be allowed. Properly
considered, the impugned order is in a form and actually has the effect of a
declaratory order. All it does is to effectively clarify the application of rule
53(1)(b) for the parties and declared that there was no non-compliance with it. It
9 [2025] 1 All SA 60 (SCA).
10 Minmetals para 32.
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does not mean that the applicant is prevented from using the Report, should it
access it th rough other available means. The impugned order does not have
such effect, as the applicant , wishes it to have. The pending review application
will proceed without this punted for appeal being heard. Moreover, the
executive summary of the R eport as well as the media statement are at hand.
In Baloyi v MEC for Health and Social Development Limpopo and others
(Baloyi)11, the Court remarked thus:
“[36] There may be cases where it will be contentious to determine a review
proceedings in the absence of a record or what remedy should follow when a
proper record is available. In this case, it was improper for the Labour Court
to dismiss the review without a proper record of the arbitration proceedings in
the face of evidence that no record existed.”
[26] Because of all the above reasons , the application for leave to appeal falls to be
dismissed. This Court has already debunked the myth that a review is
incapable of being prosecuted without the Report. In the event, this Court is
wrong in its conclusion that the rule 30A order is not appealable, for reasons
that will follow, the application is dismissible on its merits since it fails to satisfy
the section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act test.
Grounds of appeal
[27] As it is usually done, a barrage of grounds are raised herein in order to impugn
the judgment of this Court. It suffices to mention that an appeal lies against the
order of a Court and not the reasons12. Herein below, I shall deal with each of
those grounds. Is suffices to mention that in a number of instances one ground
is predicated on a number of similar basis. Accordingly, this judgment shall not
repeat itself unnecessarily. To do so will serve no purpose but to elongate this
judgment.
Report not a process but decision – rule 53(1)(b) not applicable
11 2016 (4) BCLR 443 (CC).
11 2016 (4) BCLR 443 (CC).
12 Neotel (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA (SOC) Ltd and others (605/2016) [2017] ZASCA 47 (31 March 2017).
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[28] As the text of rule 53(1)(b) perspicuously provides, a decision maker may be
called upon to despatch a record of proceedings sought to be corrected or set
aside. The rule does not define the phrase record of such proceedings. This
Court guided by amongst others decisions of the Constitutional Court reached a
conclusion that the Report is a decision as opposed to the record of
proceedings. Regarding that conclusion, the relevant question for the purposes
of the present application is whether I am of the opinion that another Court will
and not may come to a different decision 13. I must be satisfied that there is a
sound and rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success
on appeal.
[29] This Court did not and could not reasonably conclude that the Report is not a
decision capable of being reviewed. On the contrary, this Court opined thus:
“[19] … This is not suggesting that the review of the Report is meritless. It
simply points to the fact that there is no reviewable decision in law.
[35] Like findings and recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry, the
investigative findings have no direct external and adverse legal effects. Thus
not reviewable in law. Equally, an investigative report itself is not an exercise
of public or statutory…”
[30] It is one thing to state that a decision cannot be reviewed and it is yet another
thing to state that a decision is not reviewable in law. The question of the
reviewability or not of the Report shall be the function of the review Court . The
reviewability of the Report pends the decision of the review court. This Court
only expressed , as it could, perplex as to how the applicant can impugn a
report it never set its eyes on. This is not a review in the dark but a fear of the
unknown. Nowhere in the order does this Court order that the Report is not
reviewable in a sense of dismissing the review. In any review, a reviewing court
concerns itself with the route travelled (process) towards a decision (outcome).
concerns itself with the route travelled (process) towards a decision (outcome).
As an example, the Report may be set aside on the strength of failure of audi
13 S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567, 570 para 7
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alteram partem rule (process). This Court was not seized with a review but a
rule 30A application – allegations of non-compliance with rule 53(1)(b).
[31] Accordingly, this ground and many of its tentacles, as outlined in the application
for leave to appeal and heads of arguments, are predicated on an erroneous
basis. The ground and its tentacles are phantasmagorical, in my respectful
view. Therefore, in my opinion no other Court may arrive at a different
conclusion. The appeal will not have prospects of success.
Precedence of PAIA
[32] It is common cause that before instituting review proceedings, the applicant
initiated a PAIA request. At that time, section 7(1) of the PAIA was not operating
against the applicant. Section 7(1) kicked in after the applicant in its ebullience
initiated a review application. This Court simply remarked as follows:
“[27] … In launching Court proceedings midstride the PAIA process, the
SGB was inviting the section 7 of the PAIA exclusions upon itself. This was a
self-inflicted exclusion. To use a sports metaphor, it handed itself a red card.”
[33] What this Court observed was that after realising obstacles in a PAIA process,
the applicant resorted to Court proceedings. The opposite of the point made in
Standard Bank is that Court proceedings and its rules should not be used to
circumvent the PAIA obstacles. I fail to observe any legal basis for a Court of
appeal to quibble with such a juxtaposition. This echoes the point of abuse of
processes. In this regard, since the ground is formulated on the erroneous
reading of the reasons of this Court, I am unable to conclude that another Court
would come to a different conclusion.
Deciding matters not raised on papers
[34] Generally, a decision of a Court manifests itself in an order arrived at by a
Court. The bulk of the judgment only constitutes reasons of the order. The order
(decision) reached by this Court was:
“[40] For all the above reasons, I make the following order:
“[40] For all the above reasons, I make the following order:
1. The interlocutory application in terms of Rule 30A is dismissed.
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2. Costs are costs in the cause.”
[35] As indicated earlier, this is the only part that may attract an appeal if definitive
of the rights of the parties at review. A submission subliminally made and is
actually a minuscule, according to the applicant, has no presence in the
statement of grounds contemplated in rule 49(1)(a). It is made in the following
fashion:
“8.7 Finally, and although we do not make too much of this because it
really is ancillary, there is the fact that the essence of the reasoning in the
judgment did not emanate from the opposing GDE Respondents but rather
from hi s Lordship, and was never put to counsel for the Applicant in
argument.”
[36] It is understood why this submission is labelled an ancillary. It is, with such
melancholy, considering that the applicant was represented by two silks and a
junior, woefully lack ing in specificity. When it was made during oral
submissions, this Court mentioned to Mr Mullins that the Court was at a
disadvantage due to lack of specificity. He submitted that the details lies in the
transcript of the hearing. Rule 49(1) is clear , when applying for leave to appeal
a statement of grounds is required. In my considered view, it is inappropriate for
counsel to rely on a transcript of the oral submissions made during argument to
establish a ground for an application for leave to appeal. After hearing oral
submissions in the present application, a transcript of 132 pages was availed to
this Court in chambers. It is unclear as to why this sheer unprocedural step was
adopted. The question is, is it expected of a judge to trawl through the 132
pages, in order to find this reasoning that was allegedly never put to Ms Fourie?
This is, with respect, preposterous in the extreme. Such a stance is not awaited
from a silk.
[37] Owing to the fact that the applicant refers to this submission as ancillary, this
Court is not going to dignify this ancillary submission with any consideration. As
Court is not going to dignify this ancillary submission with any consideration. As
a demonstration that the submission was facetiously made, Mr Mullins
submitted that the disadvantage this Court faced , to deal with the submission
made, equates the situation allegedly faced by the applicant in launching and
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prosecuting a review without a copy of the Report. Facetious as it was , that
submission deserves no further consideration.
Conclusions
[38] In sum, the order under attack is not an appealable decision. Having
considered all the grounds submitted on behalf of the applicant, I am not of an
opinion that the appeal will have reasonable prospects of success. It was
suggested that this matter raises some compelling reasons why the appeal
should be heard. Far from it. This matter does not raise compelling reasons. It
lacks prospects of success and must fail. Rule 49(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules
requires the present application to be supported by stateme nt of grounds.
Those grounds must demonstrate an error of facts and law. The present
application constitutes nothing but a re-argument of the dismissed application.
[39] Because of all the above reasons, I make the following order:
Order
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of this application on a scale of
party and party t o be settled or taxed at scale C for the fees of a
senior counsel and scale B for the fees of a junior counsel.
____________________________
GN MOSHOANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES:
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For the Applicant: Mr JF Mullins SC, Ms HR Fourie SC, and Mr CK
Van Niekerk.
Instructed by: Savage Jooste & Adams, Pretoria.
For the Respondents: Mr FJ Nalane SC and Ms A Mofokeng
Instructed by: State Attorney, Pretoria
Date of Hearing 12 December 2025
Date of judgment: 17 December 2025