IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appeal: A160/2025
Court a quo: 017060-2024
DE LETE WH ICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABL E
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDG ES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
9 December 2025
DATE
In the matter between:
TEMPELHOF FILLING STATION (PTY) LTD
Trading as Shell Ultra City, Limpopo, Musina
and
Appellant
THE CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 1st Respondent
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY SOC LTD 2nd Respondent
MUSINA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 3rd Respondent
EAGLE GREEK INVESTMENTS 154 (PTY) LTD
MMJ LOUW ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATES 1070 CC
SHELL DOWNSTREAM SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
JUDGMENT
4th Responde nt
5th Respondent
61h Respondent
2
MINNAAR AJ (Swanepoel J and Mooki J concurring)
[1] The appeal is before us with the Supreme Court of Appeal's special
leave. The appeal is against an order ('the order') granted by Nyathi J
on 11 October 2024 ('the court a quo'). Only the fourth and fifth
respondents ('the respondents') are opposing the appeal.
[2] The appellant launched an application in March 2024. The application
consisted of Part A and Part B. In Part A, the appellant sought an urgent
interim interdict pending the finalisation of Part B. In Part B, the
appellant, in terms of the provisions of Rule 53, sought an order to review
and set aside the site and retail license rights granted by the first
respondent to the respondents for the site situated at Portions 6 and/or
7 of the Farm Uitenpas 2, N 1 , Musina.
[3] The central issue in this appeal is whether the Gauteng Division of the
High Court ('Gauteng Division') had jurisdiction to adjudicate Part A of
the application.
[4] On 13 March 2024, Collis J granted the interim relief sought in Part A
and issued a rule nisi returnable on 22 May 2024. The application
became opposed, and the rule nisiwas extended. Part A was eventually
argued before the court a quo.
3
[5] In their opposition to Part A, the respondents raised a point in limine that
the Gauteng Division lacked the required jurisdiction as:
a. Part A is solely directed and aimed against the respondents from
ceasing any construction of a fuel filling station and the operation
thereof. It is not aimed at or affects any rights of any other
respondents in the application.
b. The appellant's sole reliance on vesting jurisdiction is premised
on the first respondent's offices situated in Pretoria. This, whilst
the first respondent also has regional offices located in different
provinces and more specifically, a regional office in Polokwane.
c. The jurisdiction vested in the first respondent's Pretoria office only
finds application to Part B of the application.
d. The respondents' registered addresses are situated in Musina,
Limpopo. The respondents do not conduct any business within
the court a quo's jurisdiction. As such, the respondents' registered
and business addresses fall within the sole and exclusive area of
jurisdiction of the Polokwane High Court ('Limpopo Division').
e. As Part A only relates to the respondents, the court a quo had no
jurisdiction over the respondents.
[6] The court a quo upheld the point in limine by finding that the Gauteng
Division lacked jurisdiction. As to the order, the rule nisi issued on 13
March 2024 was discharged, and Part A of the application was
dismissed.
4
Jurisdiction:
[7] In its judgment, with reference to the provisions of Section 21(1) of the
Superior Court's Act, 10 of 20131 ('the Act'), the court a quo found that
the application ought to have been initiated in the Limpopo Division, as
that court was empowered and authorised to adjudicate the dispute
between the parties. The basis for this finding was the respondents'
residence, business activities, and registered addresses, all of which are
situated in Limpopo. Further justification was that the cause of action,
namely the authorisation and issuing of the permits at issue, occurred in
Polokwane, Limpopo. The court a quo also concluded that since the
subject property is situated in Limpopo, the Limpopo Division had sole
jurisdiction to entertain the interdict.
[8] The court a quo failed to take into account the provisions of section 21 (2)
of the Act, which provides:
"(2) A Division also has jurisdiction over any person residing or being
outside its area of jurisdiction who is joined as a party to any cause in
relation to which such court has jurisdiction or who in terms of a third
party notice becomes a party to such a cause, if the said person resides
or is within the area of jurisdiction of any other Division."
i (/) A Division has jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in, and in relation to all causes
arising and all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may
according to law take cognisance, and has the power-
(a) to hear and determine appeals from all Magistrates' Courts within its area of
jurisdiction;
(b) to review the proceedings of all such courts;
(c) in its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to enquire into and
determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that such person
cannot claim any relief consequential upon the determination.
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[9] The court a quo failed to consider that the first, second and sixth
respondents are all domiciled within the Gauteng Division. In terms of
section 21 (2), where a court has jurisdiction over one of the respondents,
it would have jurisdiction over all other respondents joined to the
proceedings.
[1 O] The appeal must succeed as the Gauteng Division had
jurisdiction to consider the relief sought in Part A of the application.
Mootness:
[11] The respondents raised the point that the appeal might be moot,
as Part B had already been adjudicated. Part B of the application was
argued on 25 August 2025 and was subsequently dismissed on 8
October 2025. The appellant applied for leave to appeal against the
dismissal of Part B. The appeal process is still pending.
[12) Usually, a court will not adjudicate a matter that will have no
practical effect and/or result.2 The court, however, has discretion in this
regard.3
[13] In light of the pending appeal to Part B, it would be in the interest
of justice that the merits of this appeal be adjudicated.
2 City Capital SA Property Holdings Ltd v Chavonnes Badenhorst St Clair Cooper and Others 2018 ( 4)
SA 71 (SCA)
3 Centre for Child law v Hoi!rskool Fochville 2016 (2) SA 121 (SCA) at para 11
6
Costs:
[14] There is no basis to depart from the regular order that costs
should follow the outcome. There exists no grounds to justify any
punitive costs order. The issues in the appeal are not complex and, as
such, costs on Scale Bare appropriate.
Consequently, I propose the following order:
1. The appeal is upheld with costs on scale B.
2. The order granted by the court a quo is set aside and replaced with the
following order:
'This point in limine to the effect that the Gauteng Division lacks
jurisdiction to hear Part A of the application is dismissed with costs. '
3. Part A is remitted to the court a quo to be placed on the opposed motion
roll.
I agree:
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
7
I agree:
Mook i J
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Heard on
For the Appellant
Instructed by
8
: 9 October 2025
: Adv. BGSavvas
: Murray Kotze & Associates Attorneys
For the 4th and 5th Respondents : Adv. R de Leeuw
Instructed by : Schabert Potgieter Attorneys
Date of Judgment : 9 December 2025