2
TWALA J
Introduction
[1] This is an application by Mr Enver Mohamed Motala, the applicant, wherein he
seeks an order against the respondent, the Chief Master of the High Courts, in the
following terms:
1.1 The respondent is ordered within 15 days of the date of judgment to take all
steps necessary to enrol the applicant on the National List of Insolvency
Practitioners,
1.2 costs in the event of opposition.
[2] The application is opposed by the respondent who has filed a substantial answering
affidavit. I propose to refer to the parties as applicant and respondent or Chief Master
in this judgment.
Preliminaries
[3] At the commencement of the hearing of this case, the applicant sought leave to file
a supplementary affidavit which had already been served on the respondent . The
applicant indicated to the court that this application in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) must be
dealt with first to allow and admit the further affidavit to the main application.
[4] It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that there existed exceptional
circumstances which necessitate further filing of the further or supplementary
affidavit. Counsel further submitted that the application in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) was
served on the respondent more than a month before the hearing and therefore there
is no prejudice meted against the respondent for it had ample time to file a further
answering affidavit.
3
[5] It is necessary to file the further affidavit, so the argument went, for it contains facts
which are relevant to the determination of the issues in this case which facts only
came to the knowledge of the applicant on 14 October 2025, after the replying ha s
already been filed. Such facts are that the deponent to the answering affidavit , Ms
Roberts, has been convicted of the offence of perjury regarding her signature in one
of the letters she addressed to the applicant in this case. She alleged under oath that
the signature on the letter was not her signature, and it was forged but later conceded
that it was her signature – thus she was convicted of the offence of perjury.
[6] Although the respondent intimated that it was opposed to the filing of a
supplementary affidavit, it did not fi le any answering affidavit in opposition
because, so it was submitted, it could not secure a consultation with the relevant
person who is the deponent of the main answering affidavit in this case. The
deponent having left the employ of the Master’s office. However, the respondent did
not dispute that the deponent to the answering affidavit was convicted of the offence
of perjury arising out of her handling of this case.
[7] It is trite and in the interest of the administration of justice that the well – known and
well - established general rules regarding the number of sets and the proper sequence
of filing of affidavits in motion proceedings should ordinarily be observed.
However, it does not mean that the general rule must be rigidly applied. Where it is
demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist and good cause is shown and that
no prejudice would be caused upon the opposing party, the court , in the exercise of
its discretion, may permit the filing of further affidavits.
[8] Rule 6(5)(e) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides as follows:
“(1) Every application must be brought on notice of motion supported by an
“(1) Every application must be brought on notice of motion supported by an
affidavit as to the facts upon which the application relies on for relief.
(2) …
(3) …
4
(4) …
(5)(d) Any person opposing the grant of an order sought in the Notice of Motion
shall –
(i) …
(ii) Within fifteen (15) days of notifying the applicant of his intention to
oppose the application, deliver his answering affidavit, if any,
together with the relevant documents; and
(iii) …
(e) within ten (10) days of the service upon him of the affidavit and documents
referred to in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (d) of subrule (5), the applicant
may deliver a replying affidavit. The Court may, in its discretion permit
filing of further affidavits.”
[9] In Hano Trading CC v J R 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd1 the Supreme Court of Appeal
stated the following:
“A litigant in civil proceedings has the option of approaching a court for relief on
application as opposed to an action. Should a litigant decide to proceed by way of
application, rule 6 of the Uniform Rules of Court applies. This rule sets out the sequenc e
and timing for the filing of the affidavits by the respective parties. An advantage inherent
to application proceedings, even if opposed, is that it can lead to a speedy and efficient
adjudication and resolution of the disputes between parties. Unlike ac tions, in application
proceedings the affidavits take the place not only of the pleadings, but also of the essential
evidence which would be led at a trial. It is accepted that the affidavits are limited to three
sets.1 It follows thus that great care must be taken to fully set out the case of a party on
whose behalf an affidavit is filed. It is therefore not surprising that the rule 6(5)(e) provides
that further affidavits may only be allowed at the discretion of the court.2
Rule 6(5)(e) establishes clearly that the filing of further affidavits is only permitted with
the indulgence of the court. A court, as arbiter, has the sole discretion whether to allow the
affidavits or not. A court will only exercise its discretion in this regard where there is good
reason for doing so.”3
reason for doing so.”3
1 (650/11) [2012] ZASCA 127; 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA)
2 Para 10
3 Para 11
5
[10] It is not in dispute that the applicant only became awar e of the plea -bargaining
process and the conviction of perjury of the deponent to the answering affidavit on
14 October 2025, almost six months after the replying affidavit was filed. Further,
it is undisputed that the application for filing a further affidavit was served on the
respondent more than a month before the hearing of this case. Furthermore, no case
was advanced by the respondent that the filing of the further affidavit will be
prejudicial to its case.
[11] It is my considered view therefore that the supplementary affidavit the applicant
seeks to file is relevant to these proceedings since it discloses facts that would
ordinarily not have come to the attention of the court which facts have a direct impact
on the credibility of the deponent to the answering affidavit of the respondent .
Furthermore, the respondent has not shown that it will be prejudiced by the
admission of the supplementary affidavit. I hold the view therefore that the applicant
has made out a case for the admission of the supplementary affidavit and it is allowed
to file same.
Factual Background
[12] The facts foundational to this case are undisputed and are the following: On
5 September 2011 the applicant was removed from the Panel of Insolvency
Practitioners by the Master of the High Court, Pretoria due to conduct which was
inconsistent with the conduct expected of a liquidator or trustee. On 20 November
2019 the applicant applied to the office of the Acting Chief Master for a decision
that he was not disqualified for appointment as a liquidator or trustee and to
recognise him as eligible for future appointments as a liquidator or trustee.
[13] The Acting Chief Master at the time advised the applicant that his application will
be referred to the Steering Committee for a decision. In about September 2021 a new
Acting Chief Master was appointed and on 19 November 2021 the new Acting Chief
Acting Chief Master was appointed and on 19 November 2021 the new Acting Chief
Master advised the applicant that his application would be referred to the Insolvency
6
Working Group (“the IWG”) for a decision. On 1 June 2022 the applicant received
a pile of documents from a ‘whistle blower’ which contained amongst others a
document titled ‘Internal Memorandum’ dated 11 March 2022.
[14] According to the internal memorandum of 11 March 2022, the I WG met on 15
February 2022, considered the applicant’s application and resolved that the applicant
be re-instated on the National List of Insolvency Practitioners(“National List”) on
condition that he submits a renewal affidavit at the next date for new intakes which
openings will be from 1 April 2022 to 30 April 2022 and that he be provided with
an outcome by no later than 31 May 2022. The resolution of the IWG was
communicated to the Acting Chief Master who did not approve of the resolution and
recommendations of the IWG – hence this application.
Submission of the Parties
[15] It is submitted by counsel for the applicant that the applicant ’s application served
before the committee of the Masters (IWG) which is tasked with the consideration
and determination of applicants who are suitably qualified for appointment into the
National List. Although it took more than two years for the IWG to reach a decision,
so it was argued, on 15 February 2022 the IWG resolved that the applicant met all
the requirements and should be reinstated in the National List.
[16] It was further contended by counsel for the applicant that the decision of the IWG,
which is the only authoritative body capable of making a decision regarding the
qualification of a person to be a liquidator or trustee, is final as it was also confirmed
by the Chairperson of the IWG in her correspondence to the respondent date d 19
July 2022. The duty of the Acting Chief Master was only to implement the decision
of the IWG by reinstating or placing the applicant on the National List. Once the
IWG has made a decision, so the argument went, it is final for the IWG is the only
IWG has made a decision, so the argument went, it is final for the IWG is the only
authoritative body which comprises of Masters and is tasked to deal with the
7
appointment of liquidators and trustees on the National List . The Acting Chief
Master was bound and obliged to implement its decision.
[17] It was contended further by counsel for the applicant that t he evidence of the
respondent in its answering affidavit flatly contradicts all that has been said by the
deponent in her correspondence with the applicant in that the decision of the IWG
is final and should be implemented by the Acting Chief Master. Because the
deponent in the answering affidavit now contradicts herself and say the IWG’s
decision is not final but subject to the Acting Chief Master ’s approval, so it was
argued, the answering affidavit of the respondent should be discarded for there is no
explanation why she is now making a complete about turn on what she
communicated to the applicant.
[18] The powers for the appointment of liquidators and trustees of insolvent estates are
conferred upon the Master by the Companies Act 4 and the Insolvency Act 5, so the
argument went, and the empowering provisions do not refer to the Chief Master who
is the executive officer of the various Masters, Deputy Master and Assistant Masters
with powers to control, direct and supervise. The Chief Master does not have any of
the statu tory powers accorded to the Masters by the Companies Act and the
Insolvency Act.
[19] A practice directive of the Chief Master, so it was contended, does not give the Chief
Master the power to make the final decision in the appointment or qualification of
an insolvency practitioner . The Chief Master has no power to determine the
appointment of liquidators and trustees since that power lies with the IWG as the
authoritative body nor does the decision of the IWG require the approval of the Chief
Master. A practise directive cannot trump the legislation it is founded upon.
4 61 of 1973
5 24 of 1936
8
[20] The deponent to the answering affidavit is plainly dishonest and her evidence
cannot be believed. She has demonstrated her dishonesty when she perjured herself
in alleging that her signature to correspondence in this case was forged but later
pleaded guilty to the offence of perjury and was convicted as such. It is contended
therefore that her evidence should not be believed and that her affidavit should be
discarded.
[21] Raising the issue that the applicant has a previous conviction of fraud and theft does
not assist the case of the respondent, so it was contended, for such a conviction has
been expunged and does not exist anymore. It does not l ie in the mouth of the
respondent that the applicant is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Motala v The Master of the North Gauteng High Court6 and until it is set
aside the applicant cannot approach the Chief Master to enrol him in the National
List.
[22] In sum, the respondent contended that the decision of the IWG is not final but subject
to the approval of the Chief Master. The decision of the IWG is a recommendation
which is forwarded to the Chief Master for approval. The Chief Master was not
satisfied with the decision of the IWG for the reasons that the IWG did not consider
the provisions of section 372 of the companies act, that the applicant was never part
of the National List nor did the IWG consider the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in the Motala case referred to above
[23] The applicant is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal which found
that the applicant was initially improperly placed on the roll of Insolvency
Practitioners when he did not meet the requirements of section 372 of the companies
act in that he was previously convicted of theft and fraud. Before applying to be
reinstated, so the argument went, the applicant must first apply to court to have the
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment set aside.
6 (92/2018) [2019] ZASCA 60 (17 MAY 2019)
9
Legal Framework
[24] It is now opportune to mention the relevant provisions of T he Administration of
Estates Act7 (“the Act”) which provides as follows:
“1. Definitions
‘Master’ in relation to any matter, property or estate, means the Ma ster,
Deputy Master or Assistant Master of a High Court appointed under section
2, who has jurisdiction in respect of that matter, property or estate and who
is subject to the control, direction and supervision of the Chief Master.
2. Appointment of Masters, Deputy Masters and Assistant Masters
(1) (a) Subject to subsection (2) and the laws governing the public
service, the Minister-
(i) shall appoint a Chief Master of the High Courts;
(ii) shall, in respect of the area of jurisdiction of each
High Court, appoint a Master of the High Court; and
(iii) may, in respect of each such area, appoint one or
more Deputy Masters of the High Court and one or
more Assistant Masters of the High Court, who may,
subject to the control, direction and supervision of the
Master, do anything which may lawfully be done by
the Master.
( b) The Chief Master-
(i) is subject to the control, direction and supervision of
the Minister;
(ii) is the executive officer of the Masters' offices; and
(iii) shall exercise control, direction and supervision over
all the Masters.
7 66 of 1965
10
[25] The Judicial Matters Amendment Act8 provides the following regarding the Chief
Master:
“Insertion of section 96A in Act 66 of 1965
8. The following section is hereby inserted after section 96 of the
Administration of Estates Act, 1965:
Powers, duties and functions of Chief Master
96A. The Chief Master, as the head of the Offices of the Master of the
High Court, shall have authority over the exercise of all powers, and
the performance of all the duties and functions, conferred or imposed
on or assigned to any Master by this Act or any other law.”
[26] It is convenient at this stage to restate certain paragraphs of the ‘internal memo’
titled INSOLVENCY WORKING GROUP RESOLUTIONS 9 which are relevant
for the discussion that will follow which state the following:
“1. Purpose
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the office of the Chief Master with
resolutions taken by the Insolvency Working Group Resolutions following a
meeting which took place on 15th February 2022 at the Master’s office in Pretoria,
in respect of the request to conduct a physical meeting as approved by the Chief
Master.
2. Background
2.1 The meeting was attended by Ms Robers, Ms Agulhas as well as Mr du
Plessis. It is submitted that at the time of the preparation of this memo, the
panel members formed a quorum and have considered the issues which are
discussed in this memo.
2.2 …
Resolution
2.3.1 …
8 15 of 2023
9 11 March 2022
11
2.3.2 Mr Motala’s request to be reinstated to the National Panel of Liquidators:
2.3.2.1. …
2.3.2.2 …
2.3.2.8. It has been resolved that Mr Motala be re-instated on the
National Panel of Liquidators on condition that he submits
a renewal affidavit at the next date for new intakes which
openings will be from 1 April 2022 to 30 April 2022. Mr
Motala will be provided with an outcome by no later than
31 May 2022.”
3. Recommendation
3.1 it is recommended that the Chief Master give effect to the
recommendations of the working group by granting approval as follows:
3.1.1 …
3.1.4 That Mr Motala be re-instated on the National Panel of Liquidators
on condition that he submits a renewal affidavit at the next date
for new intakes which openings will be from 1 April 2022 to 30
April 2022. Mr Motala be provided with an outcome by no late r
than 31 May 2022.”10
Discussion
[27] The issue for determination in this case is crisp and is whether the decision of the
IWG is final and binding on the Chief Master , or whether it is merely a
recommendation which requires the approval of the Chief Master.
[28] It is undisputed that the IWG is a committee established by the Chief Master and is
comprised of three Masters of the High Court with a Chairperson at its helm. Its
duties include, among others, the consideration of applications and determination of
the suitability of applicants to be appointed as liquidators and trustees , as well as
recommending the suitably qualified applicants to the Chief Master for enrolment
on the National List.
10 Note that at the bottom of each recommendation are the words ‘Approved/Not Approved and comments’
12
[29] In terms of the act, Masters of the High Court s are subject to the control, direction
and supervision of the Chief Master and the Chief Master is subject to the control,
direction and supervision of the Minister. Put in another way, a Master of the High
Court has no authority over the Chief Master for he is subject to the control, direction
and supervision of the Chief Master. The Chief Master is the executive and,
accounting officer of the Master’s Office as a department in the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development, and all the Masters of the High Courts are
accountable to him. The decision of the Chief Master is an administrative action
since he performs a public function in terms of the legislation.
[30] I am alive to the fact that the deponent to the answering affidavit was convicted of
the offence of perjury in relation to her correspondence addressed to the applicant
in this case. However, it would be an absurdity to discard the whole of the evidence
in her answering affidavit because of the perjury conviction. There is no evidence
before the Court why in the first place she wr ote the letter to the applicant and
postulated that the decision of the committee , the IWG, she was chairing is final
when the legislation clearly provides that the Masters of the High Courts are subject
to the control, direction and supervision of the Chief Master.
[31] The letter that the deponent denounced to have written and signed suggests that the
decision of the IWG , that the applicant is no longer disqualified from taking
appointments as a liquidator or trustee , is final and will be implemented in due
course. However, in the answering affidavit the deponent makes a complete about
turn and say the decision of the IWG is a recommendation to the Chief Master who
has the power to approve or disapprove the resolutions and recommendations of the
IWG.
[32] As much as the deponent was convicted of the offence of perjury in relation to the
[32] As much as the deponent was convicted of the offence of perjury in relation to the
letter she wrote to the applicant, it does not mean whatever she testifies about in this
case should not be believed. Her testimony that the decision of the IWG is not final
but is just a recommendation which is subject to the decision of the Chief Master is
13
correct and is in line with the act which provides that the Masters of the High Courts
are subject to the control, direction and supervision of the Chief Master. The letter
to the applicant from the chairperson of the IWG cannot be regarded as publication
of the decision of Chief Master for it was published by the Chairperson of the IWG
without the Chief Master’s authority.
[33] In De Wet and Another v Khammissa and Others 11 the Supreme Court of Appeal
stated the following:
“Back to the merits of the appeal. In this Court, counsel for the appellants fairly accepted
the correctness of the views expressed in paras 11 and 12 above, and that the case turns
on the legality of the second decision. I now turn to that decision. The respondents
contend that the Master became functus officio after making the first decision, and that
she was not empowered to revoke it and replace it with the second decision. Broadly
stated, functus officio is a doctrine in terms of which decisions of officials are deemed
to be final and binding once they are made. Thus, the question as to whether the Master
was functus officio, calls for a consideration whether the first decision was final. Hoexter
explains that finality is a point arrived at when the decision is published, announced or
otherwise conveyed to those affected by it, ie it must have passed into the public domain
in some manner.”12
[34] It should be recalled that the applicant testifie d in his founding papers that he had
received no communication from the Chief Master regarding the outcome of his
application until he was g iven a pile of documents by one shady character , a Mr
Aggrizy, in which pile of documents he found a copy of the internal memo and
correspondence between the IWG Chairperson and the Acting Chief Master about
his application. This confirms that the decision and recommendations of the IWG
were not communicated to the applicant nor were they made public by the office of
were not communicated to the applicant nor were they made public by the office of
the Chief Master – thus, the decision and the recommendations were not final but
were still subject to the decision of the Chief Master.
11 (358/2020) [2021] ZASCA 7 (4 June 2021)
12 Para 15
14
[35] In terms of the act the line of authority in the Master’s Office as a department in the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development flows from the Chief Master
as the executive or accounting officer and then the Masters of the High Court s. It is
disingenuous to suggest that a decision of a committee of the IWG status appointed
by the Chief Master to assist him in the execution of his administrative functions
would trump or override the decision of the Chief Master. It cannot be right that the
Chief Master’s role in this case was merely to implement the decision and
recommendations of the IWG and enrol the applicant on the National List. By
establishing the IWG, it cannot be said that the Chief Master has abdicated his
responsibility in the appointment of insolvency practitioners onto the National List.
[36] In President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Ruby
Football Union and Others13 the Constitutional Court stated the following:
“In law, the appointment of a commission only takes place when the President’s decision
is translated into an overt act, through public notification. In addition, the Constitution
requires decisions by the President which will have legal effect to be in wri ting. Section
84(2)(f) does not prescribe the mode of public notification in the case of the appointment
of a commission of inquiry, but the method usually employed, as in the present case, is by
way of promulgation in the Government Gazette. The President would have been entitled
to change his mind at any time prior to the promulgation of the notice and nothing which
he might have said to the Minister could have deprived him of that power. Consequently,
the question whether such appointment is valid, is to be adjudicated as at the time when the
act takes place, namely at the time of promulgation. This the Judge failed to do. He erred,
not only in treating the press statement as proof of an abdication of authority, but also in
not only in treating the press statement as proof of an abdication of authority, but also in
holding that the abdication, which he found as a matter of fact to have taken place, was
irrevocable.14
In Administrator, Cape v Associated Buildings Ltd, the Appellate Division had to consider
an argument that a power vested by a provincial ordinance in the administrator acting with
the consent of the executive committee of the province, had been wrongly delegated to the
13 (CCT16/98) [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1; 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (10 September 1999)
14 Para 44
15
provincial secretary, and could not thereafter be exercised by the administrator in
accordance with the requirements of the Ordinance. It dealt with that argument as follows:
“In any event, whether there had been an effective delegation or not, there can be no
question of the competency of the authority – the Administrator acting with the consent of
the Executive Committee – that dealt with the matter on the 14 November 1955. That was
the occasion when the decision was taken which was communicated to the respondent’s
attorneys by the letter of the 17 November. I do not agree with the statement in the
judgment of the Court a quo that:
‘having delegated his authority to the Provincial Secretary and the latter official or
somebody to whom he had delegated his powers having completed the matter
delegated to him, the Administrator could not thereafter handle the matter himself.’
The delegation was obviously not intended to be an irrevocable one or one that would divest
the Administrator of the power of acting himself, nor can I conceive of any principle which
could have given it that effect.”
In that case there had been a purported delegation of power to the provincial secretary prior
to the exercise of the power by the administrator. Because the purported delegation was
invalid, it could have no legal effect and could not preclude the administ rator from
subsequently exercising the power conferred upon him. The same holds true in this case.
Even if, as a matter of fact, there had been an improper abdication by the President to the
Minister on 5 August 1997, such abdication would have had no legal effect. It would have
been a nullity, and as such, could never have been irrevocable. Like the administrator in
the Associated Buildings case, the President would have retained the capacity to exercise
the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution and the Commissions Act.”15
[37] There is no doubt in my mind that the decision of the IWG in this case was a
[37] There is no doubt in my mind that the decision of the IWG in this case was a
recommendation to the Chief Master , who is vested with the ultimate authority in
the appointment and enrolment of insolvency practitioners on the National List, that
the applicant no longer be disqualified to take appointment as liquidator or trustee
and that his name be placed on the National List. A recommendation is subject to
the approval or disapproval of the person or authority it is given to. As indicated
above, each and every recommendation made in the IWG document has a provision
15 Para 45
16
at the bottom thereof for approval or disapproval by the Chief Master and with
regard to the applicant, the Chief Master disapproved the recommendation and
furnished his reasons therefor.
[38] Even if the answering affidavit were to be completely discarded from the record as
suggested by the applicant, I do not agree with the contentions of the applicant that
the submission of the resolutions of the IWG and its recommendations to the Chief
Master is only a formality and does not require the Chief Master’s approval. This is
so because the document itself , titled Internal Memo, provides at the foot of every
recommendation for the approval or disapproval of the recommendation and for the
comments if not approved. I hold the view therefore that the only reason why the
decision and resolutions of the IWG are submitted to the Chief Master, is because
the IWG is accountable to the Chief Master for it is subject to his (the Chief Master)
authority, control, direction and supervision.
Conclusion
[39] The unavoidable conclusion is therefore that the IWG decisions are subject to
approval by the Chief Master who performs a public function in terms of the act .
The refusal of the Chief Master to approve the recommendation to list the applicant
on the National List is a decision taken by the Chief Master in the performance of a
public function. The decisions of the IWG are just recommendation s and are not
final since they are internal decisions and recommendations by a committee
appointed by the Chief Master which still require final consideration of the Chief
Master, as the ultimate statutory authority, before they could be implemented.
[40] The Chief Master, as the statutory head of the Master’s Office, does not only rubber
stamp decisions of the IWG but has the power to consider them and refuse or allow
their implementation. The decisions of the IWG cannot trump or override the
decision of the Chief Master – thus the final decision lies with the Chief Master who
decision of the Chief Master – thus the final decision lies with the Chief Master who
performs a public function in terms of legislation. It is therefore not open to the
18
For the Applicant: Advocate R Bhana SC
Advocate I Currie
Instructed by: Knowles Husain Linday Inc
Tel: 011 669 6034
Email: ivl@khl.co.za
For the Respondent: Advocate M Pompo
Instructed by: State Attorney
Email: bnkoane@justice.gov.za
Tel: Tel: 011 330 7639
Date of Hearing: 24 November 2025
Date of Judgment: 15 December 20252025
Delivered: This judgment and order was prepared and authored by the Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to Parties
/ their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on Case Lines. The date of the order is deemed to be
15 December 2025.