the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the
judgment is deemed to be 9 September 2025.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
MARUMOAGAE AJ
A INTRODUCTION
1. This is an opposed application wherein t he Applicant seeks a provisional
sequestration order against the Respondent on the basis that the Respondent
committed two acts of insolvency. The court is required to determine whether the
Applicant has made out a case for a provisional order to be granted against the
Respondent’s estate.
B PARTIES’ ALLEGATIONS
i) Applicant’s version
2. On 11 November 2019, the parties concluded an agreemen t where they agreed
that the Applicant would sell to the Respondent two properties , Erf 2139
Roodepoort and Erf 719 Roodepoort, for the total purchase price of R 4 000 000.00.
The parties agreed that the Respondent would pay monthly instalments of R 65
000.00. They also agreed that, should the Respondent fail to make payment of any
instalment on the due date, the full amount outstanding at that time would become
due and payable , subject to the Applicant giv ing the Respondent a seven -day
notice to remedy her breach.
3. Between February and December 2020, January and April 2021 , June and
December 2021, and January 2022 and February 2024, the Respondent failed to
pay the monthly instalments. Due to the Covid-19 lockdown, the Applicant agreed
to reduce the monthly instalment to R 30 000.00. The Respondent was already
substantially in arrears on her obligations under the parties’ agreement. According
to the Applicant, this was not a formal written amendment to the monthly
instalments, but a benevolent indulgence granted to the Respondent.
4. The reduction in instalments was a temporary measure to assist the Respondent
because the school at which she worked as a principal was experiencing financial
challenges. Notwithstanding this reprieve, the Respondent repeatedly defaulted on
her payments. According to the Applicant, the Respondent defaulted in making any
payment from December 2022 to April 2023 and continued to default from
September 2023 to February 2024. On 14 February 2023, the Applicant requested
the Respondent to bring her payments up to date , but this did not occur.
5. On 25 February 2023, the Respondent sent a letter to the Applicant ’s attorneys
requesting a ‘grace period’ and indicat ing that she will not be able to settle the
outstanding balance of her debt. The Applicant contend ed that the Respondent
explicitly acknowledged her inability to pay her debts, which amounted to an act of
insolvency in terms of section 8( g) of the Insolvency Act .1 The Applicant alleges
further that, in her letter, the Respondent also indicated that she c ould not settle
the outstanding arrears and requested until 21 April 2023 to bring her account up
to date. Further, the Respondent also attempted to arrange with the Applicant to
be partially released from her debts, thereby committing an act of insolvency in
terms of section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act.
6. The Respondent instructed her attorneys to write a letter to the Applicant which
stated that the Respondent made payments to the Applicant in terms of the relaxed
terms, and future payments due to the Applicant would be paid into the
Respondent’s attorneys’ trust account. Since this was not what the parties agreed
to, the Applicant demanded payment of the outstanding amount of R 3 733 161.89.
to, the Applicant demanded payment of the outstanding amount of R 3 733 161.89.
The Respondent has not paid this amount, and the Applicant alleges that it would
be in the advantage of creditors for the Respondent’s estate to be placed under
sequestration.
1 24 of 1936.
7. The Applicant alleges that the Respondent owns immovable property in
Meadowlands, Soweto, which is not subject to any security . Further, the
Respondent is also a director of about five companies, including the company that
owns the school where she works as a principal, from which she may be receiving
income. According to the Applicant, there is a reasonable prospect that some
pecuniary benefit will result for creditors should the Respondent be placed under
sequestration. A trustee will be appointed to investigate the Respondent’s financial
affairs, collect and realise them to satisfy the creditors' proven claims.
ii) Respondent’s version
8. The Respondent alleges that she is a disabled and qualified woman teacher who
is running a non -profit organisation that owns a school that educates about 102
learners from disadvantaged backgrounds. She alleges that she is a single woman
who is taking care of her four unemployed children. The Respondent confirmed
that she signed an instalment sale agreement with the Applicant on 1 November
2019. However, she denies that the deponent to the Applicant’s affidavit is aware
of the circumstances surrounding the instalment sale agreement, as he was not
present when it was signed.
9. The Respondent contended that the signature of the deponent to the Applicant’s
founding affidavit, who is currently the only member of the Applicant, does not
appear on the agreement, which was signed at the Applicant’s attorney’s office.
The Respondent alleges that , at the time the contract was signed, there was a
verbal agreement that the purchase price would be R 3 500 000.00. Further, no
purchase price was agreed upon for ERF 719 Roodepoort. She alleged that she
was not represented when the agreement was signed. According to the
Respondent, the Applicant’s attorney informed h er that ERF 719 Roodepoort was
sold as land but not as an actual physical building.
10. The Respondent contended that she did not have legal knowledge and
10. The Respondent contended that she did not have legal knowledge and
understanding of the legal submissions made by the Applicant’s attorney when the
agreement was signed . Further, she informed him that she needed legal
representation before signing the agreement , but the Applicant’s attorney led her
to believe they would not mislead her, which led her to sign the contract. However,
she claims that she was misled. According to the Respondent, she subsequently
established that the properties subject to the instalment sale agreement were
endorsed by the South African Bank of Athens for R 14 000 000.00, a factor that
was not disclosed to her at the time the agreement was signed. The Respondent
alleged that she was advised that , when a property is endorsed, it is used as
security for a loan, which means the Applicant could not have owned the two
properties at the time the agreement was signed.
11. According to the Respondent, the Applicant also refused to pay electricity to City
Power. There was also an illegal connection at the properties , which City Power
disconnected. This forced the Respondent to install and use a solar panel system.
The Applicant owes City Power over R1 600 000 .00 in rates and taxes. The
Applicant’s officials misled the Respondent into believing that the properties were
in good condition.
12. The Respondent contended further that she made regular payments between
December 2022 and April 2023. However, she admitted that from September 2023
to February 2024 , she stopped making payments because the Applicant had
misled her . The Respondent alleged further that the Applicant failed to provide
proof that she is unable to pay her debts or that she committed acts of insolvency.
The Respondent alleged that it is, in fact, the Applicant that has committed acts of
insolvency by installing an illegal electric meter to frustrate the Respondent and
City Power, and also by failing to pay rates and taxes to the municipality.
C LEGAL PRINCIPLES
i) Legislative Framework
13. In terms of section 10 of the Insolvency Act:
‘[i]f the Court to which the petition for the sequestration of the estate of a debtor has
been presented is of the opinion that prima facie—
(a) the petitioning creditor has established against the debtor a claim such as is
mentioned in subsection (1) of section 9; and
(b) the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and
(c) there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the
debtor if his estate is sequestrated,
it may make an order sequestrating the estate of the debtor provisionally’.2
14. In terms of section 9(1) of the Insolvency Act:
‘[a] creditor (or his agent) who has a liquidated claim for not less than 50 pounds, or
two or more creditors (or their agent) who in the aggregate have liquidated claims for
not less than 100 pounds against a debtor who has committed an act of insolvency,
or is insolvent, may petition the Court for the sequestration of the estate of the debtor’.
ii) Relevant Case Law
15. In First Rand Bank Ltd v Evans , it was held that:
‘[o]nce the applicant for a provisional order of sequestration has established on a prima
facie basis the requisites for such an order the court has a discretion whether to grant the
order. There is little authority on how this discretion should be exercised, which perhaps
indicates that it is unusual for a court to exercise it in favour of the debtor. Broadly speaking
it seems to me that the discretion falls within that class of cases generally described as
involving a power combined with a duty. In other words w here the conditions prescribed
for the grant of a provisional order of sequestration are satisfied then, in the absence of
some special circumstances, the court should ordinarily grant the order. It is for the
respondent to establish the special or unusual circumstances that warrant the exercise of
the court’s discretion in his or her favour’.3
16. The Constitutional Court in Stratford and Others v Investec Bank Limited and
Others, authoritatively held that:
2 See Standard Bank of South Africa v Vermeulen, Standard Bank of South Africa v Vermeulen
2 See Standard Bank of South Africa v Vermeulen, Standard Bank of South Africa v Vermeulen
(1025/2011, 1027/2011) [2012] ZANWHC 6 (9 February 2012) para 8.
3 2011 (4) SA 597 (KZD) (18 March 2011) para 27. This exposition of the law was endorsed in AR v HR
(3565/2018) [2020] ZAECPEHC 10 (19 May 2020) para 17.
‘[i]n terms of the Insolvency Act, a court may grant a sequestration order, either
provisionally or finally, if “there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of
creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated”. It is the petitioner who bears the
onus of demonstrating that there is reason to believe that this is so’.4
D EVALUATION
i) Overview
17. It is common cause that on 11 November 2019, an instalment sale agreement was
entered into between the parties. It does not matter who was representing the
Applicant. There is no suggestion that the person representing the Applicant lacked
authority to do so. There is a valid contract between the Applicant, as a juristic
person, and the Respondent . It is also clear that, from this date, the Applicant
assumed control of the properties subject to this contract and began making
payments in terms thereof. It is undisputed that the Respondent has , on different
occasions, made payments under this contract. This means there is a valid contract
between the parties that mandates, among other things, that one party make
monthly payments to the other. If monthly payments are no t made in accordance
with the agreement, that would constitute a breach of contract, which gives the
seller the right to use not only contractual remedies but also insolvency law
remedies.
18. The Applicant decided to pursue an insolvency law-related remedy of
sequestration following a breach of contract based on the Respondent’s failure to
settle the outstanding money owed in terms of the parties’ contract . Now, the
Respondent seeks to raise incompetent defences to defeat the sequestration
claim. The first attempted defence is that she was misled when she was signing
the instalment sale agreement. However, there is no indication that the
Respondent was ‘tricked’ into signing the agreement. The Respondent wanted to
purchase the properties and committed herself to doing so on credit. It cannot be
purchase the properties and committed herself to doing so on credit. It cannot be
that when she is experiencing payment difficulties, she is now claiming to have
been misled without providing any proof of misrepresentation.
4 2015 (3) BCLR 358 (CC); 2015 (3) SA 1 (CC); (2015) 36 ILJ 583 (CC) para 43 (footnotes omitted).
19. If indeed any of the officials who had authority to represent the Applicant when the
contract was signed misrepresented themselves, that would be a valid ‘tool’ to use
to challenge the validity and enforceability of the contract. However, such a
challenge would be separate from the current proceedings, unless the Respondent
brought a counterclaim, which this court would have been forced to entertain. This
would have also led to the Applicant being granted an opportunity to respond to
the counterclaim . No such application was made, and the court is requested to
consider untested allegations that raise a host of material factual disputes.
20. For instance, the Respondent refers to several verbal agreements that were made
between the signatories of the instalment sale agreement and the Applicant’s
attorneys, which the Applicant disputes. The Respondent also claims that because
there was an endorsement on the property by another bank, the Applicant was not
the owner of the Bank at the time the contract was concluded. If indeed the
properties were endorsed at the time the instalment sale agreement was
concluded, and this had any effect on the contr act itself or would have led the
Respondent not to contract at all or to contract on different terms, once this was
established, the Respondent ought to have taken steps if she believed it amounted
to misrepresentation.
21. Similarly, the dispute relating to who was responsible for the payment of municipal
rates and taxes is not relevant to the fulfilment of the other terms of the instalment
sale agreement, unless compliance with any of the other terms was contingent on
any of the parties paying the municipal rates and taxes. In fact, clause 6.1 of the
instalment sale agreement clearly states that the Respondent, as the purchaser,
shall be responsible for all rates, charges, and fees payable to the seller or the
municipality. The allegation that the Applicant , as the seller, would be responsible
municipality. The allegation that the Applicant , as the seller, would be responsible
for municipal rates and taxes is without merit and contrary to the objective evidence
before the court. In any event, while the Respondent tried to make payment
arrangements, there is no indication that she took any steps to address any of
these other concerns before she was served with the sequestration application
papers. This cannot be used as a defence in an insolvency matter. In my view,
there is no merit to this submission. The reality is that there is an uncontested
contract between the parties, the terms of which have not been fully complied with.
The Applicant demanded payment , and the Respondent has not paid.
ii) Requirement for Provisional Sequestration
22. Apart from ultimately relieving the debtor from her debts, a sequestration order
changes the status of a person and fundamentally limits the activities in which such
a person can engage . However, it is essential to note that it is the estate of the
person that is sequestrated and not the person herself. An order sequestrating a
person effectively declares that person to be insolvent. This is a legal confirmation
that such a person’s assets are exceeded by her liabilities. This will empower the
Master of the High Court to appoint the trustee after a prescribed meeting of
creditors, who will be legislatively responsible for collecting , protecting, and
quantifying all the assets that fall within the insolvent person’s estate to realise and
equitably distribute them to all the creditors who have proved their claims against
the insolvent’s estate in accordance with their rankings .
23. Once the court has granted either a provisional or final order of sequestration, a
concursus creditorum will be established and the trustee or provisional trustee, as
the case may be, will be duty-bound to start the process that will lead to the winding
up of the insolvent person’s estate in a way that will enable creditors who proved
their claims to be equitably paid from the insufficient assets collected and placed
in the insolvent estate .5 This demonstrates that Insolvency law is , by design, not
intended to relieve the insolvent person from her debts, even though ultimately
such a debtor will be released from her debts. The main purpose of a sequestration
order is to ensure that creditors are paid from the insolvent’s available assets. This
5 See Richter N.O v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209 at 223, where the court quoted Glück
Pandecten 16:2.934, vol. 15, p. 105 was quoted with appro val, that ‘… [t]he expression, concursus
creditorum … [denotes] the object of lawfully distributing the insufficient assets in the estate of the
debtor among a number of pressing creditors in accordance with the rights of priority of each creditor.
Concursus, therefore, presupposes: (1) conflicting interests (Collisio n) of a number of creditors who
pursue their claims against his property (Gutermasse); (2) insufficiency of the debtor's means to satisfy
all his creditors in full; and it requires, (3) when the Court has satisfied itself, upon inquiry, that the assets
are not sufficient to discharge the debts, an order of Court opening and commencing the concursus. In
regard to the assets in the insolvent estate, the creditors entered into a kind of community . . . It is a
consequence of this community that, until the Court has determined upon the correctness and priority
of the creditors' liquidated claims, no creditor may be satisfied out of the assets to the prejudice of other
creditors’.
is achieved by removing these assets from the insolvent person’s control and
vesting them in the trustee, who will equitably distribute the ir proceeds among the
creditors who proved their claims.
24. A sequestration order can be granted when either the insolvent person voluntarily
surrenders her estate or one or more of her creditors apply to the court for the
sequestration of her estate. When the creditor seeks a sequestration order, the
court must first consider whether a prima facie case has been established to place
the estate of the person sought to be sequestrated provisionally under
sequestration. Three legislative requirements should be satisfied to make out a
prima facie case. First, the sequestrating creditor must demonstrate that s/he or it
has a liquidated claim of not less than 50 Pounds against the person sought to be
sequestrated. I indicated in Steyn v Steyn N.O and Others, that:
‘[i]t is disappointing that despite a Rand being adopted as the South African currency
in 1961 and thirty (30) years into democracy this section still refers to Pounds as
opposed to Rands. The danger with this is that the value of the Rand is much less
than that of the British pound which was the South African currency before it was
replaced by the Rand. Without any justification and serious consideration of the
differences in the value of the Rand and the British Pound, South African courts have
generally interpreted this provision as requiring that the creditor must demonstrate
that he, she, or it has a liquidated claim of not less than R 100. It is not clear why the
Legislature has not ‘modernised’ the Insolvency Act to reflect the applicable South
African currency’.6
25. Be that as it may, it appears that the insolvency law practitioners and the courts
generally, despite the apparent difference in the values between the South Africa
Rand and the United Kingdom Pound, which was once the currency of the ‘Union
Rand and the United Kingdom Pound, which was once the currency of the ‘Union
of South Africa ’, generally view the liquidated amount to be R 100 .00, when
sequestration applications are made to the court. 7 It is interesting to note that, just
like in this matter, most practitioners, when representing only one creditor, present
to the court that their clients have a liquidated claim of not less than R100.00 .
6 2024 (4) SA 285 (GP) (10 January 2024) para 39.
7 See generally Bana v Georgiou (3759/2023) [2024] ZAFSHC 336 (21 October 2024) para 2; R.D.M v
M.T.M (M608/22) [2023] ZANWHC 216 (21 November 2023) para 40; and Jordaan and Another v Le
Roux and Others (070088/23) [2025] ZAGPPHC 651 (20 June 2025) para 36.
26. This leads courts occasionally to state, without reliance on any authority, that a
single creditor must have a liquidated claim of over R 100.00 to succeed with a
sequestration application . For instance, in L.M.V v M.V , the former husband
brought an application for the sequestration of her former wife. In assessing
whether a prima facie case has been established, the court casually held that it
was required to assess whether the ‘… [a] pplicant has established against the
debtor a liquidated claim of not less than R100.00 ’.8 Again, in Shapiro v Wolpe ,
where the court was dealing with only one creditor in an application for provisional
sequestration, it was held that the amount referred to in section 9(1) of the
Insolvency Act is R 100.00.9 This legal exposition, which, from the clear wording of
section 9(1) of the Insolvency Act, appears to be incorrect , is not restricted to the
courts. In academic cycles, there is also a consistent, and incorrect narrative, that:
‘if application is made by a single creditor his claim must be for a liquidated amount
of not less than R 100; if by two or more creditors their claims in the aggregate must
be for a liquidated amount of not less than R 200’.10
27. This cannot be correct because section 9(1) explicitly states that a liquidated claim
by a single creditor should not be less than 50 Pounds and that of two or more
creditors in the aggregate should not be less than 100 Pounds. To my knowledge,
there has been no legislative amendment that provides for the conversion of
Pounds to Rands. However, it appears to be acceptable to effect a ‘direct’
conversion for practical purposes. Assuming that such a conversion is sound in
law, then the liquidated claim should no t exceed R 50.00 when a single creditor
has brought a sequestration application and R 100 .00 in aggregate when more
than one creditor brings such an application.
28. Given the fact that the Respondent in this case admitted in her answering affidavit
28. Given the fact that the Respondent in this case admitted in her answering affidavit
that she did not make payment for the period between September 2023 and
February 2024, this clearly demonstrates that there is an amount over R 50.00 that
8 (7833/2016) [2018] ZAGPPHC 505 (6 July 2018)
9 (2024/060632) [2025] ZAGPJHC 752 (30 July 2025)
10 See Bertelsmann et al ‘Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 10ed (Juta 2019) 119. See also
Smith et al Hockly’s Law of Insolvency Winding Up & Business Rescue 10ed (Juta 2022) 42, where
identical statements are made without reference to any authority that seem to justify this position.
the Respondent owes the Applicant. This means that the Applicant has a liquidated
claim against the Respondent, and the first requirement is met.
29. The second requirement is that the sequestrating creditor must establish that the
person sought to be sequestrated has either committed an act of insolvency or is
in fact insolvent. It will be almost impossible for the sequestrating creditor or any
creditor to establish as a matter of fact that the person sought to be sequestrated
is, in fact, insolvent. Factual insolvency would be established when the assets of
the person sought to be sequestrated , after being fairly valued, are determined to
be less than that person’s accumulated liabilities. Satchwell J in Cohen v Jacobs
(Stand 675 Dowerglen (Pty) Ltd intervening) , explained that factual ‘… insolvency
may be established directly by evidence of the respondent’s liabilities and the
market value of his assets’.11 It has been correctly held that:
‘… in order for the applicant to establish factual insolvency, it must put up evidence
of the debtor’s liabilities and the market value of his assets. Actual insolvency means
that the debtor’s liabilities actually exceed the value of his assets’.12
30. In this case, there is no direct evidence of the Respondent’s insolvency. In fact, it
was argued on behalf of the Applicant that the Respondent is the only party that
can effectively provide evidence to the court of her solvency or factual insolvency.
However, this does not mean that the Applicant is left without a remedy. Because
establishing factual insolvency is difficult, the Legislature created a mechanism that
allows creditors to apply to sequestrate their debtors even when they cannot
establish factual insolvency. This was done by inserting section 8 into the
Insolvency Act, which provides for eight different grounds of ‘indirect’ insolvency.
31. Any of the acts of insolvency provided for in section 8 of the Insolvency Act can
31. Any of the acts of insolvency provided for in section 8 of the Insolvency Act can
be understood as conduct by the person who owes another, which, when it occurs,
creates a legal impression that such a person may be insolvent. When such
conduct occurs, the creditor's impression that the debtor may be insolvent would
11 [1998] 2 All SA 433 (W) para 51.
12 See Sedwin Investments (Pty) Ltd v Datnow and a related matter [2023] 2 All SA 525 (ECP) para 37,
where the approach adopted in Absa Bank Ltd v Rhebokskloof (Pty) Ltd and others 1993 (4) 436 (C) at
443 was followed.
be sufficient to justify a sequestration application to the High Court. The creditor
can rely directly on this conduct, and there will be no need to provide proof that the
debtor is in fact insolvent. In this case, the Applicant relies on two acts of
insolvency. The first act of insolvency relied upon is that the Respondent arranged
with the Applicant as her creditor to release her partially from her debts. In terms
of section 8( e) of the Insolvency Act , a debtor commits an act of insolvency if he
‘… makes or offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors for releasing
him wholly or partially from his debts’.
32. On 25 February 2023, in the letterhead of her school, the Respondent wrote a letter
to the Applicant. In this letter, the Respondent first stated that the instalment was
reduced and that whenever she missed a payment, she made arrangements for
subsequent payments. She explained that she wanted to meet the Applicant's
officials to ‘re -look’ at the repayments due to the financial difficulties she was
experiencing with the Department of Education in Gauteng. Secondly, the
Respondent indicated that she was asking for grace while her school was trying to
find its footing after COVID-19.
33. Thirdly, she explained that the school was still financially constrained , and load
shedding worsened its financial situation, which is her primary source of income. It
is clear from this letter that the Respondent was making payment arrangements ,
as opposed to attempting to be released wholly or in part from her debts. There is
no indication of the Respondent asking for any part of her debt to be extinguished.
On the contrary, she was pleading for patience as she tried to improve her school's
financial situation, presumably to pay. In fact, it is common cause that despite her
financial challenges, the Respondent made some payments to the Applicant. I am
not convinced that the Applicant proved that the Respondent committed an act of
not convinced that the Applicant proved that the Respondent committed an act of
insolvency mentioned in section 8( e) of the Insolvency Act.
34. The second act of insolvency relied upon by the Applicant is that the Respondent
notified the Applicant in writing that she is unable to pay her debts. In terms of
section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, a debtor commits an act of insolvency ‘if he gives
notice in writing to any one of his creditors that he is unable to pay his debts’. While
the Respondent’s letter dated 25 February 2023 may not amount to an effort to be
released from paying the amount due, it does constitute an acknowledgement in
writing that the Respondent was unable to pay the amount she owed. In this letter,
the Applicant clearly stated that she did not have the amount claimed . This
essentially means that she admitted in writing that she was unable to pay her debts.
In this respect, the Respondent committed an act of insolvency provided for in
section 8( g) of the Insolvency Act. This entitles the Respondent to bring a
sequestration application against the Respondent.
35. The third requirement is that the Applicant must demonstrate that there is reason
to believe that the sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors. In Meskin &
CO v Friedman,13 it was held that the phrase ‘reason to believe’ :
‘… indicates that it is not necessary, either at the first or at the final hearing, for the
creditor to induce in the mind of the Court a positive view that sequestration will be to
the financial advantage of creditors. At the final hearing, though the Cour t must be
“satisfied”, it is not to be satisfied that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors,
but only that there is reason to believe that it will be so’.14
36. Because sequestration is fundamentally about what the creditors will benefit from
the process, the court must be satisfied that there is reason to believe that such an
advantage will materialise. In the context of provisional sequestration applications,
there is a need for the sequestrating creditor to place sufficient and satisfactory
facts and evidence before the court that establishes that some benefit will be
derived by the creditors should a provisional sequestration order be granted. The
Applicant in this case demonstrated that the Respondent owns a bond-free
property in Soweto, which can be sold and its proceeds used to settle creditors'
proven claims.
37. There is also evidence before the court that the Respondent holds directorship in
37. There is also evidence before the court that the Respondent holds directorship in
various companies. Should the trustee be appointed, he or she would be in the
position to investigate and determine whether there is any pecuniary benefit that
the creditors can benefit from the Respondent’s directorship s and shareholding, if
any. In my view, there is reason to believe that creditors will derive some benefit if
the sequestration order is granted. Thus, there is no reason why a provisional
13 [1948] 2 All SA 416 (W).
14 [1948] 2 All SA 416 (W) 559.
sequestration order should not be granted. The Respondent did not raise any valid
defence that justifies the order not being granted. In my view, the Applicant has
established a prima facie case for the Respondent’s estate to be placed under
provisional sequestration.
E CONCLUSION
38. It is trite that once the Applicant who has approached the court for a provisional
order of sequestration has established a prima facie case that warrants such an
order to be granted, the court has a discretion whether to grant such an order.15
Such a discretion must be exercised judiciously based on an adequate assessment
of all the facts and evidence before the court. I am of the view that such discretion
must be exercised in favour of the Applicant in this case.
ORDER
39. In the result, I make the following order:
39.1. the estate of the Respondent , Mohomane Lydia Pitsoane , is placed under
provisional sequestration;
39.2. the Respondent and any other party who wishes to avoid such an order
being made final are called upon to advance the reasons, if any, why the
court should not grant a final order of sequestration of the said estate on the
26th day of January 2026 at 10.00 or as soon thereafter as the matter may
be heard.
39.3. a copy of this order must be served:
39.3.1. on the Respondent, personally;
39.3.2. employees of the Respondent, if any;
15 Solid Living Homes (Pty) Ltd v Dhlomo (37086/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 295 (17 March 2025) para
29.
39.3.3. on all trade unions of which the employees of the Respondent are
members, if there are any;
39.3.4. on the Master of the High Court, Johannesburg; and
39.3.5. on the South African Revenue Service.
39.4. a copy of this Order must be published in one edition of the local or national
paper that is readily circulated around the place of the Respondent’s
residence and in the Government Gazette;
39.5. Costs of the Application in the sequestration of the Respondent’s Estate.
C MARUMOAGAE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
Counsel for the applicant : Adv W Bava
Instructed by : Stan Fanaroff & Associates
Counsel for the respondent : Mr Phethedi Kabu
Instructed by : Masina Attorneys and Conveyancers
Date of the hearing : 1 September 2025
Date of judgment : 9 December 2025