THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No: JS422/23
In the matter between:
ZELMARI KLOPPERS Applicant
and
@SOLD PROPERTIES CC Respondent
Heard: 31 July 2025 and 1 August 2025
Delivered: 10 December 2025
JUDGMENT
ERASMUS, AJ
Introduction
[1] This matter came before Court as a claim in terms of section 158(1)(a) of the
Labour Relations Act 1 (LRA), read with sections 77(3) and 77A(e) and (g) of
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act2 (BCEA).
[2] It is a claim for the payment of accrued leave pay . In its response to the
statement of claim, the Defendant stated that the claim in respect of the leave
pay had formed part and parcel of the claim of unfair dismissal , which had
1 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
2 Act 75 of 1997, as amended.
(1) Reportable: Yes/NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
been settled at the CCMA, alternatively that the leave could not have accrued
for more than six months after the end of the leave cycle.
[3] The matter was set down before me for trial on 31 July and 1 August 2025,
where the Plaintiff sought an order declaring that the claim in respect of leave
pay had not been settled and that the Defendant be ordered to pay the
accrued leave due.
Background facts
[4] The following facts are common cause between the parties:
4.1 The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant in March 2009.
4.2 The Defendant undertook a retrenchment exercise during September
2022, resulting in the Plaintiff’s dismissal for operational requirements
on 30 November 2022.
4.3 At the time of the Plaintiff’s dismissal, she earned a gross salary of
R69,309.64 per month.
4.4 The Plaintiff was paid a retrenchment package, which included
payment in respect of 18.83 accrued leave days.
4.5 The Plaintiff referred a dispute to the CCMA on 1 December 2022,
alleging unfair dismissal based on operational requirements.
4.6 The matter was enrolled for arbitration at the CCMA in Lephalale on
28 February 2023, but was not arbitrated as the parties had entered
into a settlement agreement at the CCMA on that day.
4.7 The Plaintiff claims payment of an additional 53.4 leave days
amounting to R175,018.37, which claim the Defendant disputes.
Issues for determination
[5] The Court is required to determine whether:
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5.1 The leave pay dispute has been settled, and with it, whether the
settlement agreement signed at the CCMA constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties, in full and final settlement.
5.2 If the claim in respect of leave pay has not been settled by means of
the settlement agreement signed at the CCMA, w hether the Plaintiff is
entitled to payment in respect of her remaining accrued leave pay ,
either in contract or in statute.
Interpretation of contracts
[6] In University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary and
another3, the Constitutional Court held that:
‘[66] The approach in Endumeni “updated” the previous position, which was
that context could be resorted to if there was ambiguity or lack of
clarity in the text. The Supreme Court of Appeal has explicitly pointed
out in cases subsequent to Endumeni that context and purpose must
be taken into account as a matter of course, whether or not the words
used in the contract are ambiguous. A court interpreting a contract has
to, from the onset, consider the contract’s factual matrix, its purpose,
the circumstances leading up to its conclusion, and the knowledge at
the time of those who negotiated and produced the contract.
[67] This means that parties will invariably have to adduce evidence to
establish the context and purpose of the relevant contractual
provisions. That evidence could include the pre- contractual
exchanges between the parties leading up to the conclusion of the
contract and evidence of the context in which a contract was
concluded. As the Supreme Court of Appeal held in Novartis:
“This court has consistently held, for many decades, that the
interpretative process is one of ascertaining the intention of the
parties – what they meant to achieve. And in doing that, the
court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the
contract to determine what their intention was in concluding
it… A court must examine all the facts – the context – in order
3 2021 (6) SA 1 (CC).
4
to determine what the parties intended. And it must do that
whether or not the words of the contract are ambiguous or lack
clarity. Words without context mean nothing.”’
[7] The Supreme Court of Appeal in Capitec Bank Holdings L td and Another v
Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others4 held that how the parties
to an agreement conducted themselves after the conclusion of the agreement
may have some relevance for the purpose of deciding upon the meaning of a
provision in an agreement.
[8] I now turn to the settlement agreement and thereafter to the employment
contract and leave pay.
Settlement agreement
[9] The Plaintiff referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA in Lephalale .
She did not include a claim in respect of leave pay in her referral to the
CCMA, and the outcome required was for reinstatement and/or compensation
to be awarded to her.
[10] The parties entered into negotiations on the day of the arbitration, which
culminated in a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was a
standard pre-printed settlement agreement used by the CCMA when parties
reach a settlement at the CCMA. It provides various options which are to be
populated by the parties or deleted according to the particular circumstances
of each case. As was the case here, the Commissioner usually completes the
settlement agreement as per his understanding of the terms of the settlement
agreement reached, whereafter parties are given an opportunity to read and
append their signatures to the agreement.
[11] For the sake of completeness , I deem it prudent to capture the clauses of the
settlement agreement relevant to these proceedings hereinbelow:
‘The undersigned parties record the settlement of their dispute in the following terms.
By signing this agreement, the parties acknowledge that the agreement was read to
them and interpreted (where necessary) and that they understand the content hereof.
4 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA).
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This agreement is in full and final settlement of the dispute referred to the CCMA as
well as in full and final settlement of all statutory payments due to the applicant as
reflected at paragraph 5 of this agreement (where no statutory payments are due and
owing to the applicant it shall be specified at paragraph 6 of the agreement).
1. REINSTATEMENT
1.1 …
2. RE-EMPLOYMENT
2.1 …
3. MONETARY SETTLEMENT
3.1 The respondent agrees to pay the applicant the amount of R ……………. by no
later than ……………….. (date)
3.2 The amount in paragraph 3.1 is inclusive of statutory payments due to the
applicant unless specifically excluded in terms of paragraph 6 below.
3.3 In the event that the parties agree to settle the amount in stallments, the
following plan is agreed with the specific understanding that the entire amount
will become due and payable to the applicant on the first payment date if the
respondent fails to meet its obligations to pay the applicant the specified
amount on any date set out hereunder:
R…………………On ……………… R…………………On ………………
R…………………On ……………… R…………………On ………………
3.4 Method of payment
…
4. AGREEMENT ARISING OUT OF NMWA, BCEA AND WRITTEN
UNDERTAKINGS OR COMPLAINCE ORDERS
….
5. BREAKDOWN OF THE AMOUNT REFLECTED AT PARAGRAPH 3.1
The amount reflected at paragraph 3.1 above is inclusive of statutory payments
as reflected below.
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Outstanding wages / salary R………………………………..
Severance pay R………………………………..
Notice pay R………………………………..
Leave pay R………………………………..
Overtime R………………………………..
Other (please specify) R………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………
6. EXCLUSION OF STATUTORY PAYMENTS
The parties agree that there are no statutory payments due and owing to
the applicant.
A dispute about statutory payments is already before the Department of
Employment and Labour under the following reference number:…………..
A Compliance Order has been issued by the Department of Employment
and Labour under the following reference number:…………………………..
7. OTHER
…………………………………………………………………………………….
8. No variation of this agreement shall be legally binding unless reduced to writing
and signed by the parties.
9. The parties consent to this agreement being made an arbitration award in
terms of s142A(1) of the Labour Relations Act.
10. The parties agree that in terms of non-compliance with this agreement, the
party defaulting will pay the full costs incurred by the other party in enforcing
this agreement.’ (Own emphasis added)
[12] The numbered paragraphs 1, 2 , 4 and 5 of the agreement and their sub-
paragraphs were struck by means of a line drawn through them. Numbered
paragraph 3 was selected with an “X” and the amount of “140 000,00 ( ex
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gratia)” was inserted together with the payment terms. No markings or details
were inserted at numbered paragraphs 6 or 7.
[13] The first unnumbered paragraph of the settlement agreement confirms that
the agreement is in settlement of both the dis pute referred to the CCMA, as
well as the statutory payments due to the Plaintiff , as reflected at paragraph 5
of the agreement and where no statutory payments are due and owing to the
Plaintiff, it shall be specified at paragraph 6 of the agreement.
[14] Paragraph number 5 of the agreement has been struck through and does not
show any amount or detail in respect of leave pay. The unnumbered
paragraph, read with paragraph 5, therefore indicates that the payment made
in settlement does not include payment in respect of leave pay. If one reads
paragraph 6 with the unnumbered paragraph, it clearly states that paragraph
6 must indicate if no statutory monies are due. Two of the three options under
paragraph 6 relate to disputes regarding statutory monies pending at the
Department of Labour . The other option is to be marked to indicate that the
parties agree that no statutory payments are due and owing.
[15] Paragraph 3.2, however, contains an anomaly when read with the remainder
of the clauses in that, contrary to the above, it states that the amount payable
is inclusive of statutory payments unless specifically excluded in paragraph 6.
[16] This takes us back to paragraph 6 of the agreement , which provides three
options, two of which confirm that disputes pending at the Department of
Labour can be excluded by means of ticking those boxes and inserting the
reference numbers. The third option, however, does not provide for a recordal
of what statutory monies of due and is therefore excluded. It simply provides
for a situation whereby it is confirmed that no monies are due and owing.
[17] The sensical manner to therefore read the paragraph which has not been
selected to show that no monies are due and owing, is to read it with the
selected to show that no monies are due and owing, is to read it with the
unnumbered paragraph and paragraph 5. The unnumbered paragraph is clear
that the settlement only includes the stat utory payments reflected at
paragraph 5, and where paragraph 6 does not indicate that any statutory
payments are due and owing. In addition thereto, paragraph 5 in itself
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provides for an indicat ion whether leave pay or other claims are included in
the settlement payment stipulated at paragraph 3.1, and there is no such
indication that leave pay is included in the settlement amount.
[18] Furthermore, despite the Plaintiff clearly asserting that a substantial amount of
leave pay is due to her , no such claim was included in the referral to the
CCMA, which is a further indication that the parties did not intend to include
the leave pay in the settlement agreement.
[19] Last but not least, no explanation has been provided as to why the Plaintiff
would have settled both her unfair dismissal claim, as well as her leave pay
claim, for an amount less than what she contended was due in terms of the
leave pay in itself.
[20] On a consideration of all the factors , I cannot find that the Plaintiff’s claim in
respect of leave pay was also settled by the agreement concluded at the
CCMA.
Accrual of leave pay
[21] The Plaintiff’s employment contract is in Afrikaans and provides as follows:
‘5. VERLOF
5.1 Die WERKNEMER is geregtig op een en twintig (21) werksdae
verlof per voltooide jaar met dien verstande dat alle verlof soos
deur die WERKNEMER geneem deur die jaar afgetrek sal word
van bogenoemde vasstelling. Vir elke diensjaar voltooi is die
WERKNEMER geregtig op ‘n addisionele dag verlof.
5.2 Die WERKNEMER sal skriftelik aansoek doen om jaarlikse
verlof, voor sodanige verlof ‘n aanvang neem, en sal sodanige
verlof geneem word in oorleg met die WERKGEWER, in
besonder the WERKGEWER se bedryfsbehoeftes.’
[22] The relevant portions, loosely translated, state that the Plaintiff was entitled to
21 working days’ leave per completed year, with the Plaintiff being entitled to
an additional day’s leave per year for every year’s completed service with the
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Defendant. Leave taken during the year would be subtracted from the leave
entitlement, and leave is to be taken in consultation with the Defendant, with
reference to the employer’s operational requirements.
[23] The agreement also has a clause providing that the agreement constitutes the
entire agreement between the parties and that no amendment to its terms
would be valid unless captured in writing and signed by both parties. Apart
from these clauses, there is no indication to be found in the agreement which
could assist the Court in determining the matter.
[24] Due to the Plaintiff having been entitled to an extra day’s leave for every
year’s completed service, the Plaintiff’s annual entitlement to leave over the
years was as follows from March of every year:
9.1 2010: 22 working days
9.2 2011: 23 working days
9.3 2012: 24 working days
9.4 2013: 25 working days
9.5 2014: 26 working days
9.6 2015: 27 working days
9.7 2016: 28 working days
9.8 2017: 29 working days
9.9 2018: 30 working days
9.10 2019: 31 working days
9.11 2020: 32 working days
9.12 2021: 33 working days
9.13 2022: 34 working days
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[25] The Plaintiff worked as the Defendant’s Manager , and her duties included
Financial and HR Management. She reported to the owner and principal of
the Defendant, Ms Arona Rossouw. Her HR duties included issuing warnings,
capturing leave, including annual leave and sick leave. When employees took
leave, they would complete a leave form , and she would capture same,
including her own, on an Excel spreadsheet.
[26] The Plaintiff contended that she took leave and carried leave over , which can
be summarised as follows in table format:
Period Entitlement Number of
days taken
Days
carried over
Accumulative
days
1 March 2009 to
28 February 2010
21
16
5
5
1 March 2010 to
28 February 2011
22
15
7
12
1 March 2011 to
28 February 2012
23
24
-1
11
1 March 2012 to
28 February 2013
24
27
-3
8
1 March 2013 to
28 February 2014
25
20.5
4.5
12.5
1 March 2014 to
28 February 2015
26
30.5
-4.5
8
1 March 2015 to
28 February 2016
27
28
-1
7
1 March 2016 to
28 February 2017
28
22
6
13
1 March 2017 to
28 February 2018
29
23
6
19
1 March 2018 to
28 February 2019
30
24
6
25
1 March 2019 to
28 February 2020
31
25
6
31
1 March 2020 to
28 February 2021
32
24
8
39
1 March 2021 to
28 February 2022
33
22
11
50
1 March 2022 to
30 November
2022
34 ÷ 12 =
2.8333333
x 9 months
= 25.5
1
24.5
74.5
Total number of leave days not taken 74.5
Less number of days’ leave pay paid upon retrenchment 18.83
Equals balance accrued 55.67
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[27] The Plaintiff’s calculations, however, differed from that of the Court in that she
indicated that the total number of leave days not taken was 73.5 and that she
was owed 53.4 days after her retrenchment. The difference in calculations
appears to stem from the last incomplete cycle.
[28] Section 20 of the BCEA regulates annual leave in terms of the BCEA, also
known as statutory leave, and provides as follows:
‘Annual leave –
(1) In this Chapter, "annual leave cycle" means the period of 12
months' employment with the same employer immediately
following –
(a) an employee's commencement of employment; or
(b) the completion of that employee's prior leave cycle.
(2) An employer must grant an employee at least –
(a) 21 consecutive days' annual leave on full remuneration
in respect of each annual leave cycle; or
(b) by agreement, one day of annual leave on full
remuneration for every 17 days on which the employee
worked or was entitled to be paid;
(c) by agreement, one hour of annual leave on full
remuneration for every 17 hours on which the
employee worked or was entitled to be paid.
(3) An employee is entitled to take leave accumulated in an
annual leave cycle in terms of subsection (2) on consecutive
days.
(4) An employer must grant annual leave not later than six months
after the end of the annual leave cycle.
(5) An employer may not require or permit an employee to take
annual leave during –
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(a) any other period of leave to which the employee is
entitled in terms of this Chapter; or
(b) any period of notice of termination of employment.
(6) Despite subsection (5), an employer must permit an employee,
at the employee's written request, to take leave during a period
of unpaid leave.
(7) An employer may reduce an employee's entitlement to annual
leave by the number of days of occasional leave on full
remuneration granted to the employee at the employee's
request in that leave cycle.
(8) An employer must grant an employee an additional day of paid
leave if a public holiday falls on a day during an employee's
annual leave on which the employee would ordinarily have
worked.
(9) An employer may not require or permit an employee to work
for the employer during any period of annual leave.
(10) Annual leave must be taken –
(a) in accordance with an agreement between the employer
and employee; or
(b) if there is no agreement in terms of paragraph (a), at a
time determined by the employer in accordance with this
section.
(11) An employer may not pay an employee instead of granting
paid leave in terms of this section except-
(a) on termination of employment; and
(b) in accordance with section 40 (b) and (c).’
[29] In terms of the BCEA, the Plaintiff was entitled to 15 working days’ statutory
leave per leave cycle.
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[30] From the table above, it is clear that the Plaintiff exhausted her statutory leave
entitlement every year, with the exception of the last incomplete cycle, and
has most years also used additional leave from her non- statutory or
contractual entitlement.
[31] This brings us to the question of whether the non-statutory leave could accrue
and to what extent.
[32] The Plaintiff testified that any leave not taken would roll over to the following
year. There was , however, no policy or manual which regulated leave
entitlement. The Defendant’s accountants asked her to provide them with the
leave records and calculations in respect of all the Defendant’s employees at
the time when she heard about the possibility of retrenchment. She was told
to provide the calculations from ‘start to end ’. The Plaintiff provided these
records, which she kept on Excel, including the records in respect of herself.
A copy of her own record was presented to Court and had clearly set out the
number of days as well as the dates on which the Plaintiff had taken leave
over the years. It also showed the calculations of how many days were due,
taken and accrued annually.
[33] She explained that there was no mention in her employment contract of
accrual or forfeiture of leave, and no discussions were held in this regard
either. She confirmed that during the cycle for the period 1 March 2014 to 28
February 2015, she took 30.5 days’ leave, which was in excess of the annual
entitlement that year of 26 days , and she was not taken to task for taking
more days than her entitlement.
[34] During cross-examination, the Plaintiff insisted that her leave accrued despite
her contract of employment not providing for such accrual and there being
nothing in writing that confirms that accrual may take place. She explained
that leave forms were completed by all staff, including herself, which forms
were given to Ms Rossouw and from which she would then subsequently
were given to Ms Rossouw and from which she would then subsequently
capture the leave taken. She would send her own leave forms to Ms
Rossouw. Ms Rossouw knew who had taken leave and when.
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[35] During the part of her employment when she worked from home, the forms
would be sent to Ms Rossouw. A leave form would be completed in respect of
each and every period of leave taken. She indicated that her Excel sheets
also showed that another employee by the name of Carmen had rolled over
leave that was not depleted. The document was , however, not placed before
Court as it was on the laptop that had been returned to the Defendant. Upon
termination of her employment, she had sent a box of documents back to the
Defendant, together with her laptop, which she disputed wiping before
sending it back.
[36] She further stated during cross -examination that although she did not initially
receive payslips, she did later in her employment receive them from the
Defendant’s accountants. The payslips did, however, not reflect annual leave.
The issue of rolling excess leave entitlement over was never d iscussed, but it
was also never questioned.
[37] Ms Rossouw , who is the Defendant’s owner and Principal, confirmed the
employment contract and that it did not deal with the accrual of leave. She
also confirmed that it was the Plaintiff’s role to attend to all HR related
matters, including leave pay, in addition to her other functions. She explained
the leave process to be that the employees would send the leave forms to the
Plaintiff, who would then capture and forward the details to the accountants
who did the payslips. No employees were paid out any acc umulated leave.
The laptop used by the Plaintiff had been wiped clean upon its return, and she
had to engage a specialist to retrieve the data from the laptop.
[38] During cross -examination, Ms Rossouw conceded that the employment
contract also does not provide that any leave not taken will be forfeited. It
does, however, state that leave that has been taken will be deducted. She
confirmed that no policy existed regarding leave. She said that a discussion
confirmed that no policy existed regarding leave. She said that a discussion
was held at the office, which was attended by the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff
had to tell the staff that leave could not accrue. This version was , however,
not put to the Plaintiff when she testified. Ms Rossouw stated that the Plaintiff
was responsible for HR. She did not dispute that, over the Plaintiff’s total
employment period, she was entitled to an additional 175 days’ annual leave.
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Despite having had sight of the Plaintiff’s calculations on the Excel sheet prior
to the Plaintiff’s retrenchment, she did not confront her about those
calculations. She also did not produce evidence that would gainsay the
Plaintiff’s version of calculations. She could not explain how the Defendant
calculated the leave entitlement of 18.83 days that the Defendant had paid out
to the Plaintiff and stated that she had relied on the calculations of the
accountants.
[39] She further confirmed during cross -examination that the Plaintiff reported to
her, that she knew what the Plaintiff was doing in terms of work , and she
knew when the Plaintiff had taken leave or was working. She could not
dispute that the Plaintiff took 30.5 days’ leave in the 2014/2015 cycle, which
was in excess of her annual entitlement. She never guided or trained the
Plaintiff with regard to leave capturing during her 14 years of employment.
She did not ensure that employees did not take more leave than their
entitlement and left it to the Plaintiff to manage. In response to it being put to
her that it was part of her (Ms Rossouw’s) duties to control who took leave
and who had leave remaining, she stated that it ‘ could be’. She stated that
she trusted the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff was appointed to handle the
leave. She also confirmed that all the employees who were employed during
the period between 2009 and 2012 were entitled to 21 working days leave per
year, plus an additional day per year for every year thereafter. This position ,
however, changed with respect to new employees when the employment
contract was changed in 2012.
[40] The Plaintiff reported to Ms Rossouw , who conceded to being aware whether
the Plaintiff was on leave or not. The Defendant, being the employer, has an
obligation to keep records in respect of their employees. This obligation rings
true in respect of the Plaintiff as well. Ms Rossouw, being aware of the leave
true in respect of the Plaintiff as well. Ms Rossouw, being aware of the leave
that was being taken by the Plaintiff, would have known that leave in excess
of the entitlement for a particular year was being taken. This could only
happen if the Plaintiff was entitled to accrue leave.
[41] The Plaintiff’s employment contract provide d her with very generous leave.
The Defendant knew the leave provisions were generous to the extent that
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the contracts of employees who joined later provided for the bare minimum
number of leave days. The Defendant was therefore aware of the position it
had created with regard to leave and, despite that, allowed leave to accrue
and made no attempt to place a cap or any form of restriction on the accrual
or forfeiture thereof.
[42] Ms Rossouw’s belated statement during cross -examination that there had
been a discussion at the office at some stage which was attended by the
Plaintiff and during which the Plaintiff was told to inform the employees that
they cannot accrue annual leave, in circumstances where no reference was
made to same in her own evidence in chief and without such version having
been put to the Plaintiff, is not accepted. It also flies in the face of Ms
Rossouw’s earlier statement that leave days did not accrue as employees
forfeit their leave not taken within six months after the end of the cycle
according to ‘common law’.
[43] The position with regard to leave pay is , however, regulated by the BCEA ,
which has been interpreted by several cases, setting out two different
positions insofar as the accrual of leave pay in terms of the BCEA is
concerned, albeit that position in favour of forfeiture of leave has been more
readily accepted.
5 Section 19(2) of the BCEA, however, provides that Chapter
three of the BCEA, which deals with leave, does not apply to leave granted to
an employee in excess of the employee’s entitlement in terms of the chapter,
unless an agreement provides otherwise. There is no provision in the
employment agreement which makes the provisions of the BCEA applicable
to it.
[44] Ms Rossouw, on behalf of the Defendant, knew that leave in excess of the
minimum stipulated in the BCEA was granted to the Plaintiff and some other
employees, and she left it to the Plaintiff to regulate it on behalf of the
Defendant, without any instructions with regards to accrual or forfeiture.
Defendant, without any instructions with regards to accrual or forfeiture.
5 Jardine v Tongaat-Hulett Sugar Ltd [2003] 7 BLLR 717 (LC), Jooste v Kohler Packaging Ltd (2004)
25 ILJ 121 (LC) , Ludick v Rural Maintenance (Pty) Ltd [2014] 2 BLLR 178 (LC), Misra v It hala Ltd
(D1074/12) [2014] ZALCD 64 (19 November 2014).
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[45] As a result, the Plaintiff provided for the accrual of her own leave, as well as
that of other employees. At no point did Ms Rossouw verify that leave was
being dealt with in terms of what she alleged the position was.
[46] The Plaintiff’s testimony that the Defendant’s accountants asked her to
provide them with the leave records and calculations in respect of all the
Defendant’s employees at the time when she heard about the possibility of
retrenchment, and that she was told to provide the calculations from ‘ start to
end’, was not challenged. This begs the question of why the records from start
to end would be requested if the only relevant period was the last incomplete
leave cycle due to the leave allegedly being forfeited six months after the end
of the previous cycle. The previous leave cycle ended at the end of February
2022, and any leave in respect thereof would have been forfeited by the end
of August 2022, had the Defendant genuinely believed that leave not taken
within six months is forfeited. On the Defendant’s version, the only relevant
period would therefore have been the last incomplete cycle of 1 March 2022
to 30 November 2022. Yet it requested all calculations from start to end.
[47] Ultimately, the Plaintiff was paid 18.83 days’ leave, which is less than even
the entitlement during the last incomplete leave cyc le, as the Plaintiff was
entitled to 24.5 leave days during the last cycle and had taken only one day.
The Defendant’s only witness, Ms Rossouw, could not provide any
explanation regarding how the amount of 18.83 was arrived at.
[48] As a result, I find that the Plaintiff has discharged her onus to prove her
entitlement to payment in respect of all leave accrued by her from the
inception of her employment until termination, capped at the amount as
claimed by the Plaintiff.
Costs
[49] The Plaintiff conceded that the Court has a discretion to award costs. I do not
believe that this is a matter where costs should follow the result.
believe that this is a matter where costs should follow the result.
[50] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
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1. The dispute relating to the Plaintiff’s leave pay has not been settled by
means of the settlement agreement concluded on 28 February 2023.
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff an amount of
R175 018.37 in respect of leave pay accrued.
3. There is no order as to costs.
_____________________________
L. Erasmus
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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Appearances:
For the Plaintiff: Adv DJ Groenewald
Instructed by: Cronje, De Waal Skhosana Inc.
For the Defendant: Adv WJ van Wyk
Instructed by: Maree Attorneys