IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRIC A
(GAUTENG D IVISION , PRETORIA )
Case No: 187776/2025
(1) REPORTABLE: no
(2) OF INTEREST TO O THER JUDGES: no
(3) REV ISED:
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9 DEC EMBER 2025
DAT E
In the m atter between:
SILWOOD CENTRE CC First Applicant
BRIXICLOX (PTY) LTD Second App licant
and
D EDWARDS CC t/a CAMPGROUND MOTORS First Respondent
COTTAGE MOTORS CC Second Respondent
CLAYTON HETHERINGTON N.O . Third Respondent
SA LLY HETHERINGTON N.O . Fourth Respondent
F ►
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DALE AMSTEL KOHLBERG N .O. Fifth Respondent
In re:
D EDWARDS CC t/a CAMPGROUND MOTORS First Applicant
COTTAGE MOTORS CC Secon d Applicant
CLAYTON HETHERINGTON N.O. Third Applicant
SALLY HETHERINGTON N.O. Fourth Applicant
DALE AMSTEL KOHLBERG N.0. Fifth Applicant
and
SILWOOD CENTRE CC First Re spondent
BRIXICLOX (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
THE CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS Third Respondent
ASTRON ENERGY {PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
ENGEN PETROLEUM LIMITED Fifth Respondent
THE MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND Sixth Respondent
ENERGY
This judgment is prepared and authored by the Judge whose nam e is reflected as
such and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties I their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 9 December 2025.
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JUDGMENT: LEAVE TO APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
[1] Silwoo d Centre CC [Silwood] and Brixiclox (Pty) Ltd [collectively the
applicants] apply for leave to the Full Court of this Division alternatively the Supreme
Court of Appeal against the whole order and judgment of this Court on the 17
November 2025 in which this Court granted interim relief pending a review and
rescission application brought by the first to fifth respondents (respondents] in the
main application.
[2] Due to the nature of order, what this Court is called to determine beforehand,
, is whether the interim relief granted, the subject matter of this application for leave
to appeal, is appealable.
APPEALABILITY OF THE ORDER
[3) To commence, this Court considers what Khampepe ADCJ (as she then
was), stated in the matter of the Economic Freedom Front v Pravin Jamnad as
Gordhan and Others1 [EFF matter] in the Constitutional Court:
"An interim interdict is a temporary order that aims to protect the rights of an
applicant, pending the outcome of a main application or action. It attempts to
preserve or restore the status quo until a final decision relating to the rights
of the parties can be made by the review court in the main application. As a
result, it is not a final determination of the rights of the parties (this will include
points raised in limine - own emphasis). fl bears stressing that the grant of
an interim interdict does not, and should not, affect the review court's decision
when making its final decision and should not have an effect on the
determination of the rights in the main application. The purpose of an interdict
is to provide an applicant with adequate and effective temporary relief."
CCT232/19 at par (47].
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[4] Bearing the aforementioned in mind it was common cause on the papers that
that the respondents' appeal against the first applicant, Silwood's successful
application for the rezoning of the site with the City of Cape town occurred on the
30 September 2025. In consequence, as at 30 September 2025, Silwood
notwithstanding being the holder of a site license in terms of the Petroleum Products
Act, 120 of 1977 [the Act], was in a in a position to commence with lawful
construction on the site.
[5] The respondents with the interim relief intended to temporarily stop the
construction pending the recission and review relief as set out in Part B [main
application]. Construction, as per the approval sought from the City could not
lawfully have commenced prior to the 30 September 2025. The respondents
launched the interim relief preserving the status quo prior to the approval, and before
lawful construction could commence in earnest, in October 2025, and without delay.
[6] The finding of the prospect of success at the interim stage by this Court is
not binding on the Court will not be binding on the Court seized with the main
application as clearly re-iterated again and set out by the CC in the EFF matter.
Therefore, the findings of the prospect of success as relied on by the applicants by
this Court at the interim stage, is not dispositive of the success of the main
application. Nor for that matter did it dispose of a substantial portion of the issues to
be traversed the main application. The Cities approval stands. In consequence the
nature of the order is not final and therefor by its nature not appealable.
[7] Notwithstanding the aforesaid and, applying the appropriate test for the
appealability of an interim interdict as set out by Moseneke DCJ in the OUTA 2
whether it is the interest of Justice as this stage to grant leave. This Court has
considered the germane circumstances in this matter and, weighing them carefully,
finds that they do not tip in favour of the appellants.
finds that they do not tip in favour of the appellants.
2 National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [2012] ZACC A 18: 2012 (6) SA
223 CC ); 2012 (11) BC LR 1148 (CC) (OUTA ).
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[8] In short, procedurally in the main application, save for the prospected of
supplementary papers filed in the review application, both parties have filed papers
traversing the issues raised in the main application No evidence on the papers
existed that the Silwood had suffered irreparable harm by commencing with the
construction as per the Cities approval, as yet.
[9] The interim relief does not unduly trespass on the exclusive terrain of any of
the branches of government that requires due consideration on appeal before
hearing the main application. This is because the germane facts demonstrate that
the respondents wish to disturb a Court order which was crafted to dictate the
decision of the Controller, the third respondent in the main application by order and
not, to disturb a decision duly taken by the Controller in terms of section 20 , dealing
with transitional licencing provisions of the Act, after being ordered to apply itself
and, the provisions of the Act in order to make the decision itself.
[10) Lastly, granting leave to appeal would lead to a piecemeal adjudication and
prolong the litigation. All the issues are intertwined in such a way that the applicants·
ability to obtain final credence to resurrect a fuelling station on the site and trade
dictates that a piecemeal approach to the litigation is not in their interest nor that of
the respondents. Finality is required. It is not in the Interest of Justice that leave be
granted to appeal this interim order.
[11] In consequence the necessity to consider yet further grounds raised on
appeal unnecessary based on this finding.
[12] Considering all the germane circumstances and reconsidering the reasoned
judgment in the urgent Court, this Court is not of the opinion that the applicants have
met the threshold of section 17(1 )(a)(i) or (ii) of the Superior Courts Act 1 0 of 2013
and in consequence, leave to appeal must fail.
COSTS
[13) There is no reason why costs should not follow the result.
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[14} The following order:
1. Leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The First and Second Applicants are ordered to pay the First to Fifth costs
associated with this application, Counsel's fees to be taxed on scale 8.
Appearances:
For the Applicants:
Instructed by attorneys:
For the Respondents:
Adv 8. Savvas
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division
Cell: 084 951 3157
Email: boris@asbex.blz
Murray Kotze & Associates
Tel: (012) 346 0934
Ref: JM Kotze/40860/MTR
Adv NB De Wet
Instructed by attorneys:
Date of hearing:
Date of judgment:
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Dingley Marshall Lewin Incorporated
Tel: (021) 200 0770
Email: matthew@drnllaw.co.za I
rnegan@drnllaw.co.za
C/O Savage Jooste & Adams
Email: yolanda2@savage.co .za
Ref: MT/MA T757
4 December 2025
9 December 2025
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