THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case no: 2025-094402
In the matter between:
LUTCIA PRIMICH GRIESSEL Applicant
and
TRI-TEMP PROJECTS (PTY) LTD
TRICON AFRICA HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD Respondents
Heard: 03 November 2025
Delivered: 04 December 2025
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
STEENKAMP, AJ
Introduction
[1] The matter came before this Court as an unopposed application for the
amendment of a writ of execution and further to order the Sheriff of the High
Court to attach the bank accounts held by the Respondents in order to execute a
writ from proceeds of those bank accounts.
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Background facts
[2] In the strikingly brief founding affidavit filed by the Applicant, she alleges that it
was communicated during May 2024 that the employees of Tricon Africa
Holdings (Pty) Ltd would be systematically absorbed into Tri-Temp Projects (Pty)
Ltd, which was a newly registered entity and that the “ workforce” of both entities
remained the same during the transition. Save to state that she was employed
by both of the Respondents, t he Applicant made no further allegations with
regard to the nature of the dispute between herself and the Respondents.
[3] The Applicant enumerated other companies or businesses in which Mr. C Crous,
his spouse Mrs. G. M. Crouse, and Mrs. T. van Heerden are involved in various
capacities. None of these other entities are alleged to be the employer or
erstwhile employer of the Applicant. The Applicant simply alleges that some of
these entities have the same directors or have shared premises. None of these
individuals are joined in these proceedings.
[4] The only reference to dispute resolution proceedings, ostensibly before the
CCMA, is CCMA case number : GATW2437/24. No detail s about the CCMA
proceedings are set out in the founding affidavit, and no arbitration award is
appended to the application before this Court. No details of the certification
process of such award and proof thereof were disclosed.
[5] Save for the returns of non -service issued by the Sheriff , there is no evidence
before this Court to suggest that the Respondents have been served with the
certified awards, and that insufficient assets could be attached to satisfy the writ.
The returns of service require some elucidation. The Sheriff attempted to serve
the ‘enforcement of the award ’ at the address indicated therein. The Sheriff
could not effect service, as the Tri-Temp Projects (Pty) Ltd was indicated to be
unknown at the address. There is no return of service in respect of Tricon
unknown at the address. There is no return of service in respect of Tricon
Holdings (Pty) Ltd. Accordingly, the certified award was not served on the
Respondents, which in turn means that the Sheriff could not make any attempt at
execution in the prevailing circumstances.
[6] The Applicant seeks an order directing the Sheriff to attach the bank accounts
that she believes are the bank accounts of the Respondents. The Sheriff is
however not joined in the current proceedings.
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[7] The Applicant further made no allegations with regard to the bank accounts, save
for attaching a screenshot of First National Bank (‘FNB’) banking details and an
email to her service affidavit. FNB is also not joined to these proceedings.
Legal Framework
[8] Once an arbitration award has been certified, there is no need for writs of
execution to be issued by the Registrar of this Court. In this regard, Section
143(1) of the Labour Relations Act1 (‘LRA’) determines that:
‘An arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and it may be
enforced as if it were an order of the Labour Court in respect of which a writ has
been issued…’
[9] It is apposite to state that Section 143(1) of the LRA creates a legal fiction. The
certified award may be enforced, as if it was an order of this Court.
[10] A legal fiction is a deliberate assumption that a fact is true even though it is
known to be false . It is a pragmatic tool that allows existing legal rules to be
applied to new situations, bridge gaps in the law, and ensure justice is served in
a practical or consistent manner. By way of example, the nasciturus fiction
applies to a fetus in utero, whereby the unborn child is regarded as having been
born for the purposes of accruing certain rights or benefits, provided that the child
is born alive. This fiction is encountered most frequently in the law of succession
which would entitle an unborn child to an inheritance in terms of a will once the
child is born . In rudimentary terms, it means that something is fictitiously
assumed to be the case in order for certain legal consequences to follow.
[11] Legal fictions are often indicated by terms like "deemed," "presumed," or
"construed" within legislation . They have a limited scope and cannot be
extended beyond their intended purpose. In respect of Section 143(1) of the
LRA, the words “as if” creates the fiction that the certified award can be enforced
LRA, the words “as if” creates the fiction that the certified award can be enforced
“as if” it was an order of this Court, with the purpose of enabling the Sheriff to
execute on th e certified award without the employee having to engage in a
cumbersome process of first having to approach this Court in terms of Section
158(1)(c) of the LRA to have the award made an order of Court for the purposes
1 Act 66 of 1995, as amended
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of obtaining a writ of execution from the Registrar in execution of the award. The
status of the award is thus fictionally assumed to be an order of this Court for the
purposes of simplifying the process of execution.
[12] In CCMA v MBS Transport CC and Others, CCMA v Bheka Management
Services (Pty) Ltd and Others 2 (‘MBS Transport’ ) the Labour Appeal Court
(‘LAC’) explained it as follows:
“The CCMA does not issue writs in the conventional way. The certified award is
the equivalent of a Labour Court order in respect of which a writ has been issued.
The certified award is therefore not only assumed to be an order of the Labour
Court but it must also be assumed that a writ was issued in respect of that order.
The certified award is therefore the writ….”
[13] The certified award thus stands as the writ of execution.
[14] It is apposite to state that a certified award is not in fact an order of this Court,
and it remains a sui generis executable legal instrument until it is made an order
of Court in terms of Section 158(1)(c) of the LRA.
[15] Rule 26 of the Labour Court Rules 3, in dealing with the service and execution of
orders of this Court, provides that:
‘In terms of section 163 of the Labour Relations Act, service and execution of the
court’s decisions, judgments or orders must take place in accordance with the
procedure for service and execution of decisions, judgments or orders of the High
Court of South Africa.’
[16] The corollary is that only actual decisions, judgments or orders of this Court can
be executed with deference to the Uniform Rules of Court, and the provisions of
Rule 45(8) of the Uniform Rules of Cou rt4, which deals with the attachment of
2 [2016] 10 BLLR 999 (LAC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2793 (LAC) at para 39
3 GN 4775, G. 50608 of 3 May 2024 which came into effect on 17 July 2024
4 Rule 45(8)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court states that:
‘If incorporeal property, whether movable or immovable, is available for attachment, it may be attached
without the necessity of a prior application to court in the manner hereinafter provided—
…………
(c) In the case of the attachment of all other incorporeal property or incorporeal rights in property as
aforesaid-
(i) the attachment shall only be complete when-
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incorporeal property, can thus only be invoked with regard to actual as opposed
to fictionally assumed Court orders.
[17] In MEC for The Department of Public Works and Others v Ikamva Architects and
Others5 (‘Ikamva’) the full Court explained the purpose of Uniform Rule 45(8) as
follows:
‘Put differently, the purpose of Uniform Rule 45(8) is simply to authorise
attachment of a particular class of property (incorporeal rights) where the
judgment creditor previously first had to obtain the leave of the court to execute
against such property, and to regulate the way incorporeal rights are attached.
What it does not do, is to give the judgement creditor the right to choose which of
the judgement debtor’s movable property must be attached by the sheriff. The
rule, in other words, does not serve as authority for the judgement creditor to
choose to only attach a particular incorporeal right belonging to the judgement
debtor, and to authorise the registrar to issue a writ that limits the authority of the
sheriff to the attachment of specific movable incorporeal property. Subrule (8)
cannot derogate from the issuing of a writ as envisaged in subrule (1), in
substantial compliance with Form 18.
In addition, Uniform Rule 45 requires several consecutive steps for the valid
attachment in execution of the movable property of a judgement debtor. The most
important being:
(a) The issue of a valid writ of execution;
(b) A demand that the writ be satisfied;
(c) If not satisfied, a demand that the judgement debtor point out
sufficient movable and disposable property, failing which the sheriff is
authorised to search for such property;
(a) notice of the attachment has been given in writing by the sheriff to all interested parties and
where the asset consists of incorporeal immovable property or an incorporeal right in immovable
property, notice shall also have been given to the registrar of deeds in whose deeds registry the
property or right is registered, and
property or right is registered, and
(b) the sheriff shall have taken possession of the writing or document evidencing the ownership of
such property or right, or shall have certified that he has been unable, despite diligent search, to
obtain possession of the writing or document;
(ii) the sheriff may upon exhibiting the original of the warrant of execution to the person
having possession of property in which incorporeal rights exist, enter upon the
premises where such property is and make an inventory and valuation of the right
attached’. (own emphasis)
5 [2022] 3 All SA 760 (ECB); 2022 (6) SA 275 (ECB) at paras 73 - 74
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(d) The making of an inventory of the goods;
(e) Subject to Uniform Rules 45(3) and (5), the sheriff shall take the
movables into custody;
(f) The making of a return of the manner of execution;
(g) If the judgment debtor does not give an undertaking, and unless the
execution creditor directs otherwise, the sheriff shall remove the
goods to a convenient place of security or keep possession thereof
on the premises where they were seized;
(h) Notice of sale to be forwarded at least 15 days before the date of
sale; and
(i) The sale of the property attached at a sale in execution.
The writ is the source of the sheriff’s authority for all actions taken pursuant to the
writ. The sheriff derives authority to act from the writ itself and enjoys no residual
authority. The manner in which the writ was framed in this instance undoubtedly
contributed to the sheriff failing to comply with the proper process during
execution. As indicated, the sheriff in this case was ‘ Directed to attach and take
into execution sufficient funds in the Department of Health’s Standard Bank
account’ (own emphasis) and proceeded accordingly. There is no suggestion that
the department was afforded the opportunity, in terms of Uniform Rule 45(3), to
point out sufficient movable property, other than the bank account, to satisfy the
writ. A judgement debtor should not be deprived of this opportunity before the
sheriff searches for property and proceeds to attach so much of the judgment
debtor’s movables as is sufficient to satisfy the writ.’ (own emphasis)
[18] In Windybrow Theatre v Maphela and Others6 (‘Windybrow’), the LAC said that:
‘In executing the writ and in performing his functions generally, the Sheriff acts as
an officer of the law and not as the agent of the judgment creditor or his attorney.
It is not for the judgment creditor to elect in what form or manner execution
should take place, or which particular assets should be attached. Execution can
should take place, or which particular assets should be attached. Execution can
only proceed to attachment, sale and distribution, once there is proper service of
the writ of execution on the judgment debtor. Failure to do so will render the
execution invalid. There will not be an attachment where neither the writ nor the
notice of attachment have been served on or brought to the notice of the owner.
6 (2016) 37 (ILJ) 2641 (LAC) at para 10
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The Labour Court was accordingly correct that the attachment of the applicant’s
funds was unlawful.’ (own emphasis)
Analysis
[19] The Applicant ostensibly had her arbitration award certified. T his is gleaned only
from the contents of the returns of non -service. The process the Sheriff
attempted to serve on the Respondents or execute was ‘enforcement of the
award’. The Sheriff could not have done so in the absence of a certified award.
It is accepted that the legal principle applicable is that the certified award
authorizes the Sheriff to execute thereupon as if it was a writ of execution.
[20] The Applicant did not attach the arbitration award, the application for certification
or the Form LRA 7.18 to her founding affidavit herein. The only evidence
available to this Court is the return of service, which indicate s that the
enforcement process came to naught as the Tri-Temp Projects (Pty) Ltd were
allegedly not known at the premises where the Sherrif attempted to serve and or
execute the award. There is no return of service in respect of Tricon Africa
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (‘Tricon’).
[21] From the authorities cited , it is clear that service is essential for execution of an
award. Rule 45(8) (b) of the Uniform Rules make s it clear that a demand for
satisfaction of the writ must be made to the judgment debtor . In casu , no
demand has been made to the Respondents, as the enforcement process could
not be served at the address set out in the return of service. This Court aligns
itself to, and is bound by, the judgment of the LAC in Windybrow. Execution may
only commence after the writ has been duly served upon the judgment debtor.
[22] Furthermore, as set out in Ikamva, giving the judgment debtor an opportunity to
point out sufficient moveable assets to satisfy the writ, as contemplated in Rule
45(3) of the Uniform Rules of Court is necessary prior to execution against
incorporeal property, such as bank accounts , held by judgment debtors. The
incorporeal property, such as bank accounts , held by judgment debtors. The
application before this Court falls short on this requirement, as the process could
not be served.
[23] The Applicant has not provided any proof that Tricon was ever joined to the
proceedings before the CCMA, or whether any dispute between the Applicant
and Tricon was ever referred to, or con ciliated by the CCMA during those
proceedings. Due to the Applicant’s failure to place the arbitration award before
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Court, there is no evidence that any award was ever made against Tricon, and
this is presumably why the returns of service do not indicate that the Sheriff
attempted to enforce the award against it.
[24] The Applicant failed to put sufficient proof before this Court that the bank
accounts identified are indeed the verified accounts of the Respondents.
[25] The matter at hand must be distinguished from the provisions of Section 143( 4)
of the LRA, which specifically empowers this Court to make an order in contempt
of Court where the defaulting party fails or refuses to perform the act (such as
reinstatement) as set out in the certified award. This provision does not apply to
awards sounding in money, and the ordinary hierarchical execution process must
be pursued.
[26] An additional point of concern in this matter is that a certified arbitration award
does not constitute an actual order of this Court. The purpose of Section 143(1)
of the LRA is to facilitate and expedite the enforcement of arbitration awards 7;
however, it does not change the arbitration award into an actual order of this
Court. The Sheriff’s authority to execute stems from the certified award itself, and
the jurisdiction of this Court to intervene or issue directives with regard to the
execution of the certified award is not engaged . It must also be noted that the
Applicant has not sought a review or variation of the arbitration award.
[27] The Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of the Applicant , but due process
must be followed. This Court can only grant relief where a proper case for such
relief is made out and the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the judgment of Rogers , J (as he
then was) in the matter of Nkata v Firstrand Bank Limited and Others 8 (‘Nkata’)
where the powers of the Court with regard to execution w ere neatly summarized
as follows:
where the powers of the Court with regard to execution w ere neatly summarized
as follows:
‘Where a credit provider obtains a monetary judgment against the consumer for the
outstanding amount of the loan, the court order will not include an order for the
7 Explanatory memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill, 2012, which Bill then became the Labour
Relations Amendment act of 2014, wherein, inter alia Section 143 was amended to simplify execution of
arbitration awards. This amendment created a legal fiction in respect of the status of certified arbitration
awards. A certified arbitration award is simply that. It is an arbitration award upon which the Sheriff is
empowered to execute, without the need to make the arbitration award an order of court prior to
execution, as was the law prior to the 2014 amendments.
8 2014 (2) SA 412 (WCC) at para 49
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attachment of any property. In such cases, the rules of court entitle the judgment
creditor to obtain a writ of execution. The writ is addressed by the registrar to the
sheriff. A writ of execution is not itself an ‘order’. It is a process which may be
issued where an order for the payment of money has been made. Even where the
loan agreement is secured by a mortgage bond and the court declares the bonded
property to be specially executable, the court’s order does not include an order for
the attachment of the property. The order of executability merely entitles the
creditor to levy execution on the immovable property in terms of rule 46 without
first attempting execution against movables in terms of rule 45. The court does not
order the immovable property to be attached; it is for the judgment creditor to
determine how it will go about execution.’
[28] The issuing of a writ falls within the purview of the powers of the Registrar of this
Court, and the execution thereof within the powers of the Sheriff. The current
application seeks relief that this Court is unable to grant. This Court has no
jurisdiction to “amend” a writ of execution.
[29] The Applicant’s application is fatally flawed and must consequently fail.
[30] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The application is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
L. Steenkamp
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: In person
For the First Respondents: No appearance
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