IN THE H IGH COU R T OF SOU TH AF R ICA
GAU TE NG DIVIS ION , PR ETOR IA
( l) RE PO RTA BLE: ~ /N O
(2) O F IN TE REST TO OTH ER JUDG ES: ~ /NO
(3) REV ISED .
u 24 No vember 2025
SIG NATURE DATE
In the matter between:
THE PLACEMENT INTERNATIONAL GROUP LIMITED
and
MINETTE PRETORIUS
BIANCA LAUREN NEUMANN
INTEGRICORE GLOBAL (PTY) LTD
JUDGMENT
LABUSC HAGNE J
CAS E NO : 184067/2025
Applicant
First Responden t
Second Responden t
Third Responden t
Page 2
[1] The applicant approached the urgent court for relief in terms of Part B of a
composite notice of motion, Part A of which pertained to Anton Pill er relief
which had already been granted and executed by the time Part B came before
this court. The applicant obtained its ex parte Anton Pillar order on 13 October
2025, and that order has a return date in February 2026.
[2] In terms of Part B of the notice of motion the applicant seeks interim relief
against the respondents restraining them from unlawfully competing in the
field of placement of candidates sourced in South Africa with international host
companies. The third respondent is Integri Core Global, a company
established by the first respondent at the end of July 2025.
[3] The applicant has for the past 20 years been involved in placing candidates
with host companies worldwide. The first and second respondents were
contracted to the applicant to assist with facilitating the placement of South
African candidates at host companies. The first respondent was working for
the applicant for just short of 8 years and the second, just an excessive 6
years.
[4] The directors of the applicant are based in Spain. The applicant is based in
Hong Kong. The first and second respondents signed employment contracts
with the applicant with a choice of law clause selecting Hong Kong law. The
contracts contain post-termination covenants in restraint of trade. The
applicant has expressly stated that it does not seek to enforce those contracts
through this application and relies solely on South African common law.
Page 3
[5] The applicant has set out in detail how it operates and claims confidentiality in
respect of its pool of candidates and host companies. One of the host
companies is Brennan’s, which hosts an annual Brennan’s Job Fair in South
Africa assisting the Ralph Brennan Restaurant Group with sourcing, screening
and processing of top candidates for its team.
[6] The applicant contends that the first and second respondents, as country
development managers, gained access to the applicant’s proprietary
confidential information including its confidential databases, including
candidate lists, applicant and placement pa cks, placement agreements,
training materials, standard operating procedures, marketing materials and
institutional relationships.
[7] The respondents were good at what they did but relations with the directors
soured in recent times when another employee entered the fray and appeared
to have the directors’ ea r, at the expense of the first respondent. The
Brennan’s Job Fair were scheduled for August 2025 and was arranged by the
first and second respondents.
[8] On 11 July 2025 the first respondent confirmed the itinerary with Mr Pendleton
of Brennan’s and as at that date, the applicant was on track preparing to host
the Brennan’s Job Fair. The first respondent terminated her contract with the
applicant on 16 July 2025 with a two-month notice period. The last day of the
first respondent’s employment was however brought forward by a director, Mr
Riveyran after an acrimonious discussion on 28 July 2025. She was told to
leave that day.
Page 4
[9] The second respondent terminated her agreement finally on 22 August 2025.
The applicant contends that the respondents proceeded to appropriate the
Brennan’s Job Fair, thereby unlawfully competing with the applicant.
URGENCY
[10] Matters of unlawful competition are inherently urgent. In Boomerang Trade
CC v Groenewald and Another 2012 JDR 1713 ECG the following was
stated:
“The harm complained of is continuing and consists in the ongoing operation
of a competing enterprise alleged to trade on the applicant’s confidential
information and relationships.”
[11] At paragraph [36] the following was stated:
“I agree with Mr Paterson that proceedings for the enforcement of a restraint
of trade agreement are usually, by their very nature, urgent. They invariably
seek to interdict ongoing unlawful action in respect of which an applicant
continues to suffer financial losses which are notoriously difficult to qua ntify,
or to recover by way of action.”
[12] It suffices to state that matters of this nature are aimed at protecting the
applicant’s proprietary interest in confidential information, which by its very
nature has a limited validity period or shelf life. I am satisfied that the matter
is of sufficient urgency to be entertained in urgent court proceedings.
Page 5
ARGUMENTS IN LIMINE
[13] The respondents have raised a number of points in limine. The first point in
limine attacks the locus standi of the applicant. It is contended that the
applicant has not established that it is a juristic person. The applicant however
produced a certificate of registration in Hong Kong which suff ices as proof of
its existence
[14] It is contended that the applicant is not registered as a foreign company in
terms of the South African Companies Act. This is not a bar, though. The
Companies Act provides that the Applicant can be requested to register by the
CIPC on pain of being prevented from doing business in South Africa. No such
request has been made.
[15] The respondents initially asserted that, because the applicant is not registered
as a private employment service in terms of the Employment Services Act, 4
of 2014 it cannot lawfully render the services which it offers and therefore may
not protect against unlawful competition in relation to those services. This
latter point was not proceeded with by the respondents since section 13 of the
Employment Services Act, which creates the prohibition, has not been put into
operation. In any event, the placements in terms of the Employment Services
Act relate to placements within South Africa, whilst the applicant makes its
placements abroad.
[16] A second point in limine was raised that the applicant is not seeking the
protection of a legally recognisable interest. It is essentially seeking to prevent
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and eliminate lawful competition. This is not a point in limine but is part of the
merits of the case which are discussed below.
[17] The third point in limine related to a contractual choice of Hong Kong law.
[18] The fourth point in limine related to an alleged repudiation or breach of the
employment agreements with the applicant.
[19] The fifth point in limine related to urgency, with which I have already dealt.
[20] The sixth point in limine relates to the unenforceability of agreements allegedly
sought to be enforced.
[21] The applicant’s response to the last point in limine as to enforceability of
agreements and to the choice of Hong Kong law point in limine is that it does
not seek the enforcement of the employment contract relied upon. The third,
fourth and sixth points in limine form part of the discussion on the merits below.
[22] The applicant’s disavowing of reliance on the contracts of employment is
anomalous in that the fiduciary relationship which the applicant relies upon for
purposes of its common law claim arises from the contracts of employment.
As stated, that contract was subject to a choice of law clause electing Hong
Kong law.
INTERIM RELIEF
[23] The applicant has formulated the relief that it seeks to be interim, subject to
clause 3 of the notice of motion. Clause 3 of the notice of motion provides for
Page 7
final relief being sought on the same papers, duly supplemented. There is no
indication of the timeline within which the final relief will be sought or what the
nature of the supplementation would be.
[24] Since the interdictory relief that is sought has a limited shelf life, the impact of
interim relief is that it is final in effect in many instances. In this instance the
third respondent is a competitor of the applicant and the first and second
respondents are the directing minds of the third respondent. The third
respondent was set up in the latter part of July 2025 at a time when the first
respondent’s employment had terminated or was in the process of termination.
[25] The applicants assert an entitlement to elect whether t o sue in contract or in
delict. In general terms a South African employer may make such an election,
as the fiduciary duty not to use confidential information as a springboard would
be implied both in contract and in delict. The question arises what the position
would be in terms of Hong Kong law.
FOREIGN LAW
[26] There is no proof in the proceedings before me of what Hong Kong law is on
the topic of restraints of trade after termination of employment contracts.
There is a presumption in South African law that foreign law is the same as
the South African law. This is however not an immutable presumption. In
cases where the status of foreign law is readily ascertainable through internet
research, the court can take judicial notice of the status of foreign law on the
topic in question.
Page 8
[27] In SS v HP (2015/18402) [2019] ZAGPJHC 468: [2019] 3 All SA 645 (GJ) (23
May 2019), Snyckers AJ dealt with the issue of foreign law as follows:
“[53] At issue is the principle that foreign law is a question of fact, proved
by experts, in the absence of evidence of which the foreign law is
presumed to be the same as the South African law. But this is subject
to the important exception that a court can t ake judicial notice of
foreign law to the extent that it is readily ascertainable and certain. A
good example of how far the Supreme Court of Appeal was willing to
go to regard foreign law as readily ascertainable and certain occurred
in Kwikspace Modular Buildings Ltd v Sabodala Mining Co SARL and
Another 2010 (6) SA 477 (SCA). Here, a building contract had a
choice of law clause designating the law of the state of Western
Australia as the choice of law for the contract. The parties were
content to apply the presumption that the law was the same as South
African law. The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the Australian
law to be sufficiently ascertainable to allow for judicial notice, despite
the fact that this required interpretation of the import of a line of
Australian precedent, which conflicted with certain English authorities,
and a conclusion essentially on what the Australian courts would have
made of this.”
[28] In Hong Kong post -termination restrictive covenants are generally void for
being in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy, unless the employer
can show that the restrictions are necessary to protect their legitimate
Page 9
business interests, and are reasonable in all the circumstances to protect such
interests.
[29] In the case of Moxie Communications Limited v La i Cheuk Lok [2024]
HKDC 1323 an employer sought to enforce two post -termination restrictive
covenants against a former employee. The District Court found that the
company failed to demonstrate any legitimate interests justifying the
imposition of the two post-termination restraints on the employee and held that
they were unenforceable at law.
[30] The implication of the aforesaid is that it would be in correct to assume that
Hong Kong law is the same as South African law. The contract of the applicant
with the first and second respondents containing post -termination restrictive
covenants is prima facie void and against public policy, unless specifically
justified by the applicant. In the absence of an attempt by the applicant to do
so, in these proceedings, I must accept that the applicant chose not to
establish an entitlement in terms of contract to the restraints under Hong Kong
law. This is relevant insofar as the applicant is seeking to establish by means
of reliance on South African common law, relief which on the face of it was not
willing to establish in terms of the contractual dispensation applicable between
the parties.
[31] This raises a question as to whether the applicant has a prima facie right to
the relief that it seeks in terms of contract. It relies upon the fiduciary duties
that an employee owes its employer in terms of a contract of employment. The
Page 10
prima facie right exists in South African common law , but there are
considerations that may militate against its enforcement.
[32] There are two such considerations in this matter. The first was the failure to
disclose the prima facie invalidity of post termination restraints of trade in Hong
Kong in respect of contracts of employment and the failure to establishment
of an entitlement to enforce them in South Africa . The second is the
repudiation of that contract by the applicant.
[33] It is a far cry to approach the court for common law relief based on a fiduciary
duty arising from the contract of employment when the same contract does
not have the same consequence under Hong Kong law as a South African
contract of employment. That creates doubt on the applicant’s entit lement to
common law interdictory relief by merely jettisoning a troublesome
consequence of the choice of law in the contract of employment . Had the
applicant sought to establish an entitlement to interdictory relief in contract
under Hong Kong law, with an alternative in common law, the enquiry would
have been different.
[34] A concursus actionum may result in an appropriate case result in a choice
of remedy. In Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (Pty)Ltd)
the following is stated by the Appellate Division:
“In the present case it is common cause that the damages which the
respondent is claiming pursuant to the Aquilian action could, in so far as they
arose before the assignment of the contract to Salanc, have been claimed on
the basis of breach of contract. The respondent's contention is that in the
Page 11
circumstances of the present case the facts gave rise to both causes of action.
In principle there would be no objection in our law to such a situation. Roman
law recognized the possibility of a concursus actionum, i.e. the possibility that
different actions could arise from the same set of facts. More particularly, the
facts giving rise to a claim for damages under the lex Aquilia could overlap
with those founding an action under certain types of contract such as
deposit, commodatum, lease, partnership, pl edge, etc. In such a case a
plaintiff was in general entitled to elect which actio to employ (although he
could of course not receive compensation under both). See, e .g., D 9.2.7.8;
9.2.18; 9.2.27.11; 9.2.27.34; 9.2.42 and 44.7.34. The same principles were
accepted and applied in Roman -Dutch law. See Voet Commentarius ad
Pandectas 9.2.31 (Gane's trans vol 2 at 592 - 4). In modern South African law
we are of course no longer bound by the formal actions of Roman law, but our
law also acknowledges that the sam e facts may give rise to a claim for
damages ex delicto as well as one ex contractu and allows the plaintiff to
choose which he wishes to pursue. See Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD
438; Hosten (op cit at 262); R G McKerron Law of Delict 7th ed at 3; J C van
der Walt in Joubert The Law of South Africa vol 8 para 5 at 7 - 11. The mere
fact that the respondent might have framed his action in contract therefore
does not per se debar him from claiming in delict. All that he need show is that
the facts pleaded establish a cause of action in delict. That the relevant facts
may have been pleaded in a different manner so as to raise a claim for
contractual damages is, in principle, irrelevant.”
[35] Where both a valid contractual claim and a delictual claim can coexist, a free
choice would not be objectionable. But where a contract defin ing the
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relationship is prima facie invalid in respect of post termination covenants in
restraint of trade, and this is not disclosed, it raises a concern relevant to the
court’s discretion to grant interdictory relief.
[36] The second matter affecting the prima right to relief is whether an applicant
who has repudiated the very contract of employment alleged to giv e to the
fiduciary relationship does not approach the court with unclean hands. The
first respondent contends that the applicant repudiated the contract of
employment. This was not disputed in the replying affidavit. The first
respondent’s contention was that she had resigned on 16 July 2025 and was
working on two months’ notice. Had the applicant allowed her to complete the
two months’ notice the applicant would have reaped the benefit of the
Brennan’s Job Fair in August 2025. On 28 July 2025, however, her discussion
with Mr Riveyran of the applicant resulted in her being told that 28 July 2025
was her last day and that she had to depart immediately.
[37] This was a repudiation of the contract and its notice provisions, and the first
respondent raises such repudiation as a bar to the applicant obtaining relief.
[38] There are a number of cases in which the doctrine of unclean hands has been
espoused in discretionary matters such as the granting of interdictory relief.
In such matters the basis on which it is contended that the applicant
approaches the court with unclean hands is merely a consideration amongst
others in the exercise of a judicial discretion rather than a bar to the relief
sought.
Page 13
[39] The doctrine of unclean hands is a species of abuse of process . This is the
implication of the Constitutional Court’s approach to the topic. The doctrine of
unclean hands was discussed in detail by the Constitutional Court in Villa Crop
Protection (Pty) Ltd v Bayer Intellectual Property Gmbh 2023 (4) BCLR 461
(CC). It is appropriate to quote the relevant passages from the Constitutional
Court’s judgment in full. The Constitutional Court held as follows in the
relevant part (references omitted):
“[71] Whether there is a common -law doctrine of unclean hands that can
deprive a plaintiff of its claim . . . was a matter much debated before us.
[72] Our courts have long recognised their power, in exceptional
circumstances, to prevent an abuse of process. That power has more
recently been affirmed, and an abuse of process may include a litigant
who comes to court with unclean hands. The power is an incident of the
court’s inherent power to ensure that those who use the process of law
do not do so for ulterior ends that undermine what the courts are
established to secure. It is a power most sparingly used. That is so
because the exercise of the power prevents a litigant from having their
dispute resolved before the courts, the very essence of their right under
section 34 of the Constitution. But the authorities do bear out the
proposition that to dismiss a claim that a litigant would pursue before
the courts on the grounds of abuse is not precluded because that claim
exists in law. The claim is dismissed because the litigant who would
bring it is disqualified from doing so by reason of their abuse.
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[73] Villa Crop relied upon a number of cases that it contended recognised
and applied the doctrine of unclean hands … The essential proposition
was that the courts will not assist a wrongdoer, irrespective of whether
their rights derive from the common law or a statute.
…
[77] This binary position fails to appreciate the true juridical nature of the
power enjoyed by the courts to prevent an abuse of process, of which
the doctrine of unclean hands is a species. An abuse of process can
occur in a variety of ways. The litigation may be frivolous or vexatious.
A litigant may seek to use the legal process for an ulterior purpose or
by recourse to conduct that subverts fundamental values of the rule of
law. The behaviour of the litigant may be so tainted with turpitude that
the co urt will not come to such a litigant’s aid. The unclean hands
doctrine references this latter type of abuse. It is the abusive conduct
of the litigant that, in a proper case, may warrant the exercise of the
court’s power to non-suit such a litigant. The court does so, even though
the litigant claims a right that they would vindicate in the court
proceedings. For this reason, the power is to be exercised with great
caution. Put simply, the court enjoys the power to safeguard the
integrity of its process. The court will only exercise this power upon a
careful consideration of the prejudice that this may cause to the abusive
litigant, and, in particular, the harm that may be occasioned to a litigant
whose claim of right will not be decided by the court. But the court’s
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power to prevent the abuse of its process is not determined by the right
that the abusive litigant claims.”
[40] The repudiation of the agreement is not a bar to the relief sought as suggested
by the first respondent. It is a consideration relevant to the exercise of a judicial
discretion in granting discretionary relief . The applicant’s application cannot
be characterised as an abuse of process, despi te the presence of the
concerns raised. It is not known how a Hong Kong court would treat a
repudiation of the contract. There is more than just some doubt on whether
the applicant could establish a right under Hong Kong contractual law for the
enforcement of restrictive covenants against the first and second
respondents.The protection of lawful competition is a valid consideration.
[41] As the applicant bases its application on the common law, I cannot move from
the premise that the applicant is in the same position at common law as a
South African employer with a contract of employment with the first and
second respondents. It bears acknowledging that t he concerns that are
addressed may very well relate to the discretion to grant discretionary relief
rather than the prima facie right to relief.
[42] Even assuming the establishment of a prima facie right to relief, t he next
element of the interdict is the establishment of a reasonable apprehension of
irreparable harm. The applicant bemoaned the so -called capture of the
Brennan’s Job Fair in August 2025 by the respondents, blaming the first and
second respondents for having solicited the custom of Brennan’s for the
benefit of the third respondent.
Page 16
[43] In an email of 29 September 2025 Mr Christian Pendleton, General Manager
of Brennan’s wrote to the two directing minds of the applicant. In his email he
inter alia states the following:
“Brennan’s and our group has been fortunate to work with your company over
the past 8 years; we have built a strong partnership and we would like to
continue that partnership. At the same time, we have also built a very strong
relationship with Minette. She has been vital in building and maintaining our
relationships with schools, teachers and the students in South Africa and
throughout the African continent.
Going forward, Brennan’s and our group will be supporting IntegriCore Global
for our recruiting needs on the African continent. I have spoken with the
sponsor companies that will be working with her company and they have
already begun processing candidates from this past job fair. I have also sent
out an email to all the schools that we worked with, informing them of our
decision to solely support IntegriCore Global in Africa. Her knowledge of this
market is unparalleled; her relation ships across the con tinent are deep and
personal. We are confident that this is the best partnership for us in Africa at
this time.
We are looking forward to working with your teams in other markets. As you
know, we have hired interns/trainees from around the world with Placement
and we would like to continue to do so. I am confident that your company will
continue to find us excellent candidates in other locations.”
Page 17
[44] From the aforesaid it is apparent that Brenn an’s has made its own choice to
support IntegriCore Global for recruitments in Africa. The applicant has
retained it as a customer in other parts of the world but the decision to support
the first respondent and her company, the third respondent, has been taken
by the company for its own reasons. In light hereof, the harm that the applicant
seeks to prevent has already occurred by virtue of the client’s choice. The
purpose of interdictory relief is not to rever se the past, but to prevent future
harm. In this instance the allegiance that Brennan’s has expressed in favour
of IntegriCore Global, is not an allegiance that this court should prevent. The
fact that Brennan’s is not a party to these proceedings underscores that it
would not be bound by any interdictory relief this court is asked to grant.
[45] The result of the aforesaid is that the principal initiating cause for the current
proceedings, namely the appropriation of the results of the Brennan’s Job Fair
by the first, second and third respondents , is something which has been
caused by the switch of allegiance on the part of Brennan’s. The first
respondent was the face of the applicant in respect of the job fair. Had the
applicant not terminated the first respondent’s employment on 28 July it would
have had no cause for complaint. August was part of the first respondent’s
notice period and the applicant would reap the benefits of the fair because of
the endeavours of the first and second respondents. As soon as the first
respondent’s employment with the applicant was terminated on 28 July ,
Brennan’s acted to protect its interests by switching its allegiance .To
Brennan’s the first respondent’s knowledge of the African market and personal
relationships were vital to its interests . In the premises an interdict would
Page 18
merely serve to prevent the choices that Bennan’s may exercise with whom it
wishes to do business.
[46] The client’s aforesaid choice was communicated by it to participating host
companies. They are on board to support the third respondent. The proverbial
horse has bolted for the Brennan’s group in Africa. There is insufficient
evidence of harm elsewhere. To force Brennan’s by an interdict against the
respondents to deal with the applicant in Africa, in the face of its reasons for
supporting the third respondent, would not be appropriate.
[47] A further consideration that informs this approach is that the first respondent’s
knowledge of the African market is part of her general set of skills and is not
confidential information to which the applicant can claim any propri etary
interest.
[48] In a recorded discussion between the directors of the applicant, the second
respondent and a Ms Szeb the issue of the loss of Brennan’s was discussed.
The director of the applicant indicated that they have faced setbacks like that
many times and that it was nothing. This is an indicat ion that it is not
catastrophic for the applicant to have lost the African market serviced by
Brennan’s to the third respondent. By contrast, the granting of interim relief
against the first and second respondents would preclude them from earning a
living in the only field in which they know how to operate. I find that the balance
of convenience does not favour the applicant in circumstances such as these.
[49] In the premises the applicant has not established a right to interdictory relief
against the first, second and third respondents.
Page 19
[50] Even if I have erred in assessing the aforesaid, and even if all the elements of
the interdict w ere established, I w ould decline granting interdictory relief in the
exercise of my judicial discretion. In essence, the applicant is asserting a
position in South African common law w hich is doubtful as far as the applicant
is concerned due to the effect of its contract of employme nt being governed
by Hong Kong law. The applicant has repudiated the agreement w ith the first
respondent and Brennan's has made an autonomous choice to support the
third respondent.
[51] In the premises the follow ing order is made:
1. The application is dism issed w ith costs, such costs to be on Scale C .
LABUSCHAGNE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES:
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT
INSTRUCTED BY
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
INSTRUCTED BY
: WHITCUTT SC
: WEBBER WENTZEL ATTORNEYS
: BISSCHOFF SC
: GREYLING ORCHARD ATTORNEYS