Armer v Naude (12000/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 577 (1 December 2025)

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN

CASE No: 12000/2024

In the matter between:

JANINE ARMER Applicant
and
PIETER ROY NAUDÉ Respondent

Heard: 21 November 2025
Judgment: 1 December 2025

Summary: Contempt of Court; joinder of necessity and effect on order of
court; rescission of order granted by agreement; variation of an interim order
of court.



ORDER




1. The respondent (Pieter Roy Naudé) is declared to be in contempt of paragraphs 2, 3 and
11.1 of the order of this court under the above case number handed down on 31 May 2024.
2. Should the respondent not comply with any aspect of this order, the applicant is given leave
to set this matter down on notice, with amplified papers as required, for c onsideration of
sanction for the respondent’s contempt of the 31 May Order. By ‘not comply’ is not meant
to ‘be in contempt’. The simple fact of non -compliance will entitle the applicant to set the

matter down and move for an appropriate sanction. That decision will be in the hands of the
court which hears such an application, should it materialise.
3. Pending the final determination of the action instituted in this Court under case number
16605/2024 ("the Action"), the applicant shall have the sole authority and discretion to
manage and operate the following entities, including any immovable property owned by
such entities, and any associated operational activities (“the Applicant Entities” and “the
Applicant Properties”):
3.1. ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2023/582492/07);
3.2. IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2017/320239/07);
3.3. Forestriver (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2019/617710/07);
3.4. Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2020/725235/07); and
3.5. Little Dinkum (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2020/706470/T07).
4. Pending the final determination of the Action, the Respondent shall have the sole authority
and discretion to manage and operate the following entities, including any immovable
property owned by such entities, and any associated operational activities (“the Respondent
Entities” and “the Respondent Properties”):
4.1. Hairbay (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2016/421693/07);
4.2. S-Cape Tourism (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2022/648990/07); and
4.3. MVPS Property CC (Reg. No. 1998/023488/23).
5. Pending the final determination of the Action, the applicant is interdicted and restrained
from exercising any authority, power, or control in respect of the Respondent Entities and
the respondent is interdicted and restrained from exercising any authority, power, or
control in respect of the Applicant Entities, including (but not limited to) the following:
5.1. Any signing powers at financial institutions.
5.2. Access to or control over banking applications, bank accounts, credit card machines and
any other payment method.
5.3. Access to or control over any letting platf orms, advertisements, websites and/or social
media accounts.
5.4. The appointment or dismissal of employees.

media accounts.
5.4. The appointment or dismissal of employees.
5.5. Engagement with or control over financial service providers including, banking
institutions, accountants and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).
6. The respondent is directed, within 7 (seven) days from the date of this order, to cause the
following amounts in respect of the following properties to be paid into the bank accounts
as indicated:
6.1. Sundeck Lodge (owned by Forestriver (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of R157 024.04, into
account number 0[...] with Standard Bank;
6.2. Dam House (owned by Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd) in the
amount of R201 101.80, into account number 4[...] with ABSA;
6.3. Strand Guest House (owned by ACP Metals (Pty) Lt d) in the amount of R101 345.84,
into account number 6[...] with First National Bank;
6.4. Bedrock Guest Studios (owned by IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of
R85 018.13, into account number 1[...] with Nedbank; and
6.5. Yacht View Lodge (owned by the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust) in the amount of
R142 082.73, into account number 1[...] with Standard Bank.

7. The respondent is directed to, immediately upon the granting of this order, provide the
applicant with all log-in details for all letting platforms, both historic and current, in respect
of the Applicant Properties and the business of letting them.
8. The respondent is directed to hand over to the applicant the keys to all the Applicant
Properties and is interdicted and restrained from entering such properties or removing any
contents therefrom, without the written consent of the applicant (email shall suffice).
9. Pending finalisation of the Action, the applicant is directed to provide the respondent with
copies of the following documents (“the Documentation”) in respect of the Applicant
Properties and the Applicant Entities, for each month from and including December 2025,
on or before the last day of the next month:
9.1. All bank statements in respect of all bank accounts linked to or used for the purposes of
receiving income and/or paying expenses, whether currently in use or opened in the
future;
9.2. All invoices and receipts issued for bookings, rentals (short and long term) or letting,
whether through the letting platforms, letting agents or privately;
9.3. Management accounts, which shall include at least an income statement (profit and
loss account), a balance sheet, a summary of cash flow movements, an age analysis of
trade creditors and trade debtors and income and expenditure schedules;
9.4. Booking summaries from any and all letting platforms, letting agents or private listings
for any and all listings whether currently in use or created in the future;
9.5. Bond statement and rates/utilities.
10. Pending finalisation of the Action, the respondent is directed to provide the applicant with
copies of the Documentation in respect of the Respondent Properties and the Respondent
Entities, for each month from and including December 2025, on or before the last day of the
next month.
11. The parties are each ordered and directed to provide each other, by 28 February 2026, with

11. The parties are each ordered and directed to provide each other, by 28 February 2026, with
all bank account statements and financial account statements which are in their possession
or control, in respect of each of the Applicant Properties or the Respondent Properties or
the Applicant Entities or the Respondent Entities for the period from 31 May 2024 to 30
November 2025.
12. The parties are each ordered and directed to provide each other, by 28 February 2026, with
a full accounting for all funds received, expended, and controlled by each of them in respect
of the Applicant Properties or the Respondent Properties or the Applicant Entities or the
Respondent Entities for the period from 31 May 2024 to 30 November 2025.
13. Each of the applicant and the respondent are authorised to contac t Microsoft Corporation,
the owner of OneDrive, and any other relevant service providers, to recover deleted or
removed business records and data.
14. Pending final determination of the Action and subject to the ordinary, bona fide conduct of
the Applicant Pro perties, the Respondent Properties, the Applicant Entities and the
Respondent Entities:
14.1. The parties shall not dispose of, encumber, or in any manner deal with any
immovable properties or material assets held by the aforesaid entities, without:
14.1.1. the prior wr itten consent of both parties, acting personally or through their
attorneys (email shall suffice); or, failing that
14.1.2. the leave of this Court on application.

14.2. This shall not prevent expenditure in the ordinary course of the business of the
aforesaid entities, including the payment of ordinary, legitimate operating expenses
of the Applicant Properties, the Respondent Properties, the Applicant Entities and
the Respondent Entities, such as rates, utilities, insurance, staff costs, routine
maintenance, and similar expenditures necessary to preserve the value of the assets
of such entities.
15. No obligation in this order is reciprocal on any other obligation.
16. The parties are each entitled to set this matter down on notice to the other, with amplified
papers as required, for the variation of this order should the circumstances require.
17. The respondent shall pay the costs of this application, with scale C applying.




JUDGMENT
Handed down by email to the parties on 1 December 2025



Judgment handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and released to SAFLII.


KANTOR, AJ:


1. On 31 May 2024 an order was granted in the above matter by agreement
between the parties in the following terms (“the 31 May Order”):
1. The forms, manner of service and time periods as prescribed by the Uniform Rules of
Court are dispensed with in terms of Rule 6(12)(a) and this application is heard on an
urgent basis.

2. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from preventing the applicant access to the
letting platforms which form part of the business entities that fall within the universal
partnership, including, but not limited to: Booking.com; Nightsbridge; Airbnb ;
RoomsforAfrica; SafariNow; Travelground; SleepingOut; AfriStay; SA Venues;
HomeAway; TravelIT; Agoda and Expedia. The respondent shall immediately furnish the
applicant with the latest login details of the current letting platforms and shall not in
future change any login details without the applicant’s written consent or a court order.

3. The respondent is directed to change the banking details in which the letting platforms

3. The respondent is directed to change the banking details in which the letting platforms
make payment into, and shall not in future change such details without the applica nt’s
written consent or a court order, for the following:

3.1 the banking details for the Strand guesthouse (owned by ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd) is
to be changed to First National Bank with account number: 6[...];

3.2 the banking details for the Bedrock guesthou se (owned by IPJA Investments
(Pty) Ltd) is to be changed to Nedbank with account number: 1[...];

3.3 the banking details for the Sundeck guesthouse (owned by Forestriver (Pty) Ltd)
is to be changed to Standard Bank with account number: 0[...];

3.4 the ba nking details for the Damhouse guesthouse (owned by Mufasa Global
Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd) is to be changed to Absa with account
number: 4[...]; and

3.5 the banking details for the Yacht View guesthouse (owned by the Phillip Naude
Trust) is to be changed to Standard Bank with account number: 1[...].

4. The respondent is directed to reinstate access to the applicant of all banking accounts,
banking apps and platforms and Sage accounting software by providing her with the
necessary username and p assword details and/or allowing her device to be linked to
such banking apps and platforms.

5. The respondent is directed to restore access to the applicant of the business email at
g[...], by providing her with the necessary username and password details and the
respondent shall not in future change the business email login details without the
applicant’s written consent or a court order.

6. The respondent is directed to restore access to the applicant of the business OneDrive
by providing her with the necessary username and password details and the respondent
shall not in future change any login details without the applicant’s written consent or a
court order.

7. The respondent is directed to ad d the applicant back onto all WhatsApp groups
necessary for her to operate the business entities that fall within the universal
partnership and shall not in future remove the applicant from any such WhatsApp
groups without her written consent or a court order.

8. The respondent shall advise all employees and staff, in writing and to which the
applicant shall be copied in, that the applicant remains a business owner in the various

applicant shall be copied in, that the applicant remains a business owner in the various
entities and they are to continue to communicate with her and follow any instruc tions
given by her.

9. Paragraphs 2 to 8, above, are to operate as an interim interdict pending the outcome of
the action proceedings referred to below.

10. The applicant shall issue out action proceedings against the respondent by no later than
21 June 2024, in order to fully ventilate all issues relating to the dissolution of the
universal partnership between parties.

11. Pending finalisation of the action to b e instituted as envisaged by the applicant in
paragraph 10, above:

11.1 all payments made by/on behalf of all entities forming part of the alleged
universal partnership will be made with the consent of both parties. If the
parties cannot agree in respect of an y payment and/or any other matter

pertaining to the conduct of the alleged partnership businesses, Mr Bernard
Shaw (CA) of Crowe HZK Auditors of Techno Park will have the right to decide in
his absolute discretion (without having to provide reasons) whethe r such
payment may be made and/or conduct is authorised or not and the business will
be liable for his remuneration in respect of the above;

11.2 the parties will exchange, through their respective legal representatives, all
records, accounts, vouchers and doc uments pertaining to the alleged universal
partnership and also confirm that both of them and their representatives will
have access to all records, documents, accounts and vouchers of and/or
pertaining to the alleged universal partnership which are in pos session of third
parties and also in possession of DFI Accounting (Pty) Ltd and Carlon Martin;
and

11.3 the applicant will, as far as possible, restore all files and/or folders which she
removed during the past 12 months from the business’ “one drive” device.

2. The entities referred to in paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order will be referred to as
“the Paragraph 3 Entities”.
3. Although not recorded as such therein, the 31 May Order was taken by
agreement between the parties, with the respondent being present in court o n
the day and having participated in the formulation of the order. For example, he
insisted on clause 11 and the appointment of Mr Shaw.
4. There are three main issues in this matter:
4.1. Whether the respondent is in contempt of the 31 May Order.
4.2. Whether the 31 May Order is to be rescinded.
4.3. Whether and, if so, to what extent and in what respects, the 31 May Order
should be varied or replaced.

5. In accordance with paragraphs 9 and 11 of the 31 May Order, it was interim in
nature, pending the determination of action proceedings to be instituted.
6. The anticipated action proceedings were instituted under case number
16650/2024 of this court and are pending (“the Action”).

7. It is common cause that the mechanism in the 31 May Order has failed: the
respondent says that “this mechanism has manifestly failed ” and the applicant
says that it “ has failed and simply will not work. ” W hy it has failed is not
common cause.
8. Being an interim order, the 31 May Order is subject to variation by this court in
appropriate circumstances: Freedom Stationary (Pty) Ltd v Hassam 2019 (4)
SA 459 (SCA) at 465A.
9. This matter involves various aspects, but at its core essence, besides the
contempt issue, is whether the 31 May Order is to be varied or replaced and, if
so, in what respects. Both parties seek relief in this respect, the applicant in the
main application and the respondent in the counter application.
10. A core aspect of this matter is a short-term accommodation business . This
business involves various property-owning entities, which together own thirteen
immovable properties. The applicant is the sole director/shareholder of five of
these companies . T he respondent is the sole direct or of three of them. In
addition to these, separate operating entities were used to run the short -term
accommodation business.
11. The applicant and respondent were involved in a personal relationship for
approximately nine years , during which they cohabited and had a child. The
existence and extent of any business relationship between them in respect of
the short-term accommodation business is in dispute and will be determined in
the Action.

12. The applicant contends for a universal partnership. The respondent de nies this
and contends that the applicant was an employee who did not do much and
lived a life of leisure. That is to be considered and determined in the Action.
13. The applicant is the sole shareholder and director of the following companies
which own the fo llowing properties forming part of the short-term
accommodation business: (1) ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd , which owns the Strand
Guesthouse; (2) IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd , which owns the Bedrock Guest
Studios; (3) Forestriver (Pty) Ltd , which owns the Sundeck Lo dge and (4)
Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd, which owns Dam House.
14. Hairbay (Pty) Ltd (“Hairbay”), of which the respondent is the sole director, owns
the Mansion Guest House (in Hartbeespoort) and various sectional units in 1 on
Albert.
15. The operating entities include Little Dinkum (Pty) Ltd , of which the a pplicant is
the sole shareholder and director, and S-Cape Tourism (Pty) Ltd and MVPS
Property CC, of which the applicant is the director and member respectively.
16. Over time, disag reements arose between the parties regarding the handling of
aspects such as business income flows and expenditure priorities.
17. An urgent application was launched by the applicant under the above case
number in May 2024. As mentioned, t he parties reached a settlement
agreement, which was made an Order of Court on 31 May 2024, being the 31
May Order.
18. The applicant alleges that the respondent did not comply with the 31 May Order
and i nstead implemented a parallel system for inter alia bookings, revenues

and banking of income, in breach of the 31 May Order, the effect of which was
to exclude the applicant financially while leaving her exposed in her capacity as
director, shareholder and surety of multiple entities.
19. The respondent contends that the applicant’s in competence resulted in the
problems.
Joinder and the rescission application
20. The entities forming part of the short-term accommodation business , which is
averred by the applicant to be part of the universal partnership claimed by her,
have not been joined as parties to these proceedings.
21. The respondent contends this to be a ‘ material misjoinder’ which he avers is a
fatal flaw in both the current application and the original order granted on 31
May 2024. I think that the respondent’s case is one of ‘ non-joinder’ and I will
proceed on that basis.
22. The point of departure is that if a party is required to be joined, the matter
cannot proceed in the absence of notice (Watson NO v Ngonyama and Another
2021 (5) SA 559 (SCA)).
23. Failure to join can be cured in an informal manner if the party in question, as
held in In re BOE Trust Ltd 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA) at paragraph 20, “ … was
properly informed of the n ature and purpose of the proceedings and
unequivocally indicated that it would abide the decision of this court.”

24. Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs 2005 (4)
SA 212 (SCA) at paragraph 66 confirms that the tests to determine whether a
party has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation are:
“The first was to consider whether the third party would have locus standi to claim
relief concerning the same subject matter. The second was to examine wheth er a
situation could arise in which, because the third party had not been joined, any
order the court might make would not be res judicata against him, entitling him to
approach the courts again concerning the same subject matter and possibly obtain
an order irreconcilable with the order made in the first instance.”

25. Watson at paragraph 53 approved the above dictum and added that “The
consequences spelt out in the last part of that dictum is what the rules on
obligatory joinder at common law sought to prevent.”
26. The test for joinder of necessity is described in Gordon v Department of Health:
KwaZulu-Natal 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) at paragraphs 7 to 11. A party must be
joined if it has “a direct and substantial interest ” in the subject matter that may
be affected prejudicially by the court ’s judgment, stating “ This has been found
to mean that if the order or ‘judgment sought cannot be sustained and carried
into effect without necessarily prejudicing the interests’ of a pa rty or parties not
joined in the proceedings, then that party or parties have a legal interest in the
matter and must be joined.” A financial interest does not suffice. There must be
a legal interest in the right that forms the subject-matter of litigation.
27. In Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Limited 2018 (1) SA 1
(CC) at paragraph 92 it was held that “No court can make findings adverse to
any person’s interests, without that person first being a party to the proceedings
before it.” In that ma tter the Constitutional Court found that persons could not

before it.” In that ma tter the Constitutional Court found that persons could not
be convicted for contempt without being parties (paragraph 103). In that matter

two officials were sought to be held in contempt of court without being cited as
parties. It is axiomatic that they h ad a legal interest in those proceedings and
that relief.
28. The respondent submitted that w hen orders purport to regulate corporate
affairs, the corporate entity has the most direct and substantial interest
possible. For this proposition he relied on Neves v Neves N.O. [2021]
ZAMPMBHC 2 (8 April 2021) at paragraph 12, in which it was held as follows:
“Any court order directing that the registration of transfer is to be reversed will
necessarily affect or involve the Registrar. As such, the Deeds Office shou ld be
part of these proceedings … The non -joinder of the Registrar is therefore fatal
to this application and the point in limine is upheld.” Again, as in Matjhabeng,
this is quite obvious. However, it is not authority for the respondent’s
proposition. Th e only relevance it can have to this matter is for the general
principles as to joinder.
29. What I consider to be of some moment on this issue is that each of the
corporate entities in question have as their sole directors one of the two parties
to this matte r and as a result are acutely aware thereof . The respondent
delivered an extensive answering affidavit of 130 pages (excluding annexures).
Despite this, those corporate entities have not sought or communicated a
desire to be joined (which is different to a party other than those entities raising
non-joinder for the first time in an answering affidavit without saying that the
relevant entities wish to be joined) . I believe the consideration in BOE at
paragraph 20 to be of some guidan ce: “Eventually each of the charitable
organisations w as properly informed of the nature and purpose of the

proceedings and unequivocally indicated that it would abide the decision of this
court.” The directors of all of the corporate entities, namely the applicant and
the respondent, are both parties to this application and both of them seek relief
in this application in regard to all of those entities. The corporate entities know
of the nature and purpose of the proceedings through the parties being thei r
sole respective directors. T heir attitude , manifested through the applicable
parties (as the directors thereof) to this application themselves both seeking
relief in regard to the control of all of them (in the respondent’s case) and some
of them (in the applicant’s case) without their joinder, in my view effectively
amounts to a decision to abide. Bearing in mind that both parties are doing this,
to suggest otherwise in regard to the other party only (as the respondent does)
would be somewhat opportunist ic, artificial and perhaps even hypocritical. The
court is not here to play games.
30. Parallel to the above aspect, is the question as to whether non -joinder must
result in the court not dealing with the matter until the non -joinder is cured, as
held in Khumalo v Wilkins 1972 (4) SA 470 (N) at 475A. Other cases have held
that the court takes a practical and common sense approach to the matter:
Marais v Pongola Sugar Milling 1961 (2) SA 698 (N) at 702F, Wholesale
Provision Supplies CC v Exim International CC 1995 (1) SA 150 (T) at 158 and
Bester NO v Mirror Trading International 2024 (1) SA 112 (WCC) at paragraph
22-25.
31. In Bester, this court held, relying on Wholesale Provision Supplies:
“[In] Economic Freedom Fighters and others v Speaker of the National Assembly and
others [2016] 1 All SA 520 (WCC), the court considered earlier authorities and explained,
in summary, that when conside ring the necessity of joinder, it must be done within the

context of the case and more particularly with reference to what the nature and effect
of the relief sought or that may be granted, is.
[23] The rationale for joinder is that all substantiall y and directly interested parties
may be heard before the order is given, which is a matter of fairness.
[24] Flexibility based on pragmatic grounds was remarked upon as follows in the
matter of Wholesale Provision Supplies CC v Exim International CC and Another 1995 (1)
SA 150 (T):
“the rule which seeks to avoid orders which might affect third parties in
proceedings between other parties is not simply a mechanical or technical rule
which must ritualistically be applied, regardless of the circumsta nces of the
case.”
…
[27] … it would simply not have been pragmatic to join all known members/investors
of MTI. In the circumstances I am of the view that the applicants should not be non -
suited as a result of non-joinder.”

32. I am bound by Bester unless I consider it to be clearly wrongly decided, which I
do not. On the contrary, I consider its approach to be appropriate and correct. I
am mindful of the fact that it and other cases involved a situation of a great
number of interested parties and wheth er it was pragmatic for them to be
joined, which does not apply on the facts of this matter. That being said, I do
not think that the intention was to limit the application of the principle to such
types of situations. Rather, I consider the principle to h ave been intended to be
general in nature, taking into account wording such as ‘ it must be done within the
context of the case and more particularly with reference to what the nature and effect of the
relief sought or that may be granted, is ’ and that non -joinder should not be applied
‘regardless of the circumstances of the case’.
33. There appear to be some compelling factors in the circumstances of this case:
(1) The sole director of each of the corporate entities is one or the other of the

(1) The sole director of each of the corporate entities is one or the other of the
parties. (2) They have filed very voluminous papers running to almost 1000

pages (of which the answering affidavit, excluding annexures, runs to 130
pages). (3) It was not suggested, both in the papers and in written and oral
argument, that anything else material could or would be raised by the corporate
entitles. (4) With each of them having one of the parties as their sole director,
each of those corporate entities would perforce adopt the same approach as
their applicable sole director has done. (5) Bearing in mind thes e factors and
the facts of the matter considered in this judgment, I think that this case is a
good example in which the practical common -sense approach would apply to
hear the matter even if there may have been a non-joinder.
34. As a result, e ven were the j oinder to have been necessary, the circumstances
of the matter do not require the joinder of the applicable entities.
35. Although unnecessary in the light of the above, I will briefly deal with whether
joinder was necessary.
36. The respondent contends that t he “… relief sought by the Applicant would
directly affect the rights and assets of these companies. For example, the
Applicant seeks exclusive control over all immovable property owned by such
entities and any associated operational activities. ” What the applicant seeks
control over is certain companies, to the exclusion of the respondent (the
respondent seeks the converse in respect of all of the entities). The companies
themselves have control over their immovable property and any associated
operational activities. This argument therefore does not avail the respondent.
37. The respondent also contends that t he “… the practical effect of the relief
sought is to determine rights in respect of assets that belong to the companies,
not to the Respondent personally .” I do not think that any rights in respect of

assets are being determined. The companies retain control over their assets
and the relief does not “ … determine rights in respect of assets that belong to
the companies.”
38. The respondent also contends that the “… the substantive relief [the applicant]
seeks affects the rights and property of separate legal entities that are not
parties to the proceedings. ” I do not think that any rights and property of the
applicable companies are being affected in a le gal sense. Those companies
retain control over their assets.
39. In my view, therefore, the non-joinder point fails.
Rescission
40. The 31 May 2024 order was taken by agreement between the parties while the
respondent was in court. He had insisted on certain chang es to the proposed
order which were incorporated, particularly in paragraph 11 thereof in relation to
Mr Shaw.
41. The respondent seeks rescission of the 31 May 2024 order on various grounds.
42. First, the non-joinder point dealt with above. As indicated, in my v iew that point
is not well taken.
43. Second, the failure of the shared control mechanism provided for in the 31 May
order. This failure is common cause: the respondent says that “this mechanism
has manifestly failed ” and the applicant says that it “ has failed and simply will
not work.” However, it is not a ground for rescission in terms of Rule 42 or the
common law. Be that as it may, this is somewhat academic, because the 31

May order was an interim order which can be varied by the court in certain
circumstances (Freedom Stationary (Pty) Ltd v Hassam 2019 (4) SA 459 (SCA)
at 465A) and its failure is potentially such a circumstance. Indeed, both parties
rely thereon to contend that the 31 May Order should be varied/replaced . That
is dealt with below.
44. Third, ‘the preservation of assets pending final determination ’. By this I think is
meant the final determination of the Action. This, too, is not a ground for
rescission in terms of Rule 42 or the common law. Be that as it may, this is
somewhat academic for the same reasons mentioned in the above paragraph.
45. There are other reasons, dealt with below, why I am of the view that the
rescission application should not succeed.
46. Rescission can be sought in terms of Rule 42 of the Uniform Rules
(erroneously granted orders), Rule 31(2)(b) (default judgments on good cause)
and common law rescission.
47. Uniform Rule 42 provides:
Variation and rescission of orders
(1) The court may, in addition to any other powers it may have, mero motu or
upon the application of any party affected, rescind or vary:
(a) an order or judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted in the
absence of any party affected thereby;
(b) an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, or a patent error or
omission, but only to the extent of such ambiguity, error or omission;
(c) an order or judgment granted as the result of a mistake common to the
parties.
(2) Any party desiring any relief under this rule shall make application therefor
upon notice to all parties whose interests may be affected by any variation
sought.
(3) The court shall not make any order rescinding or varying any order or
judgment unless satisfied that all parties whose interests may be affected have
notice of the order proposed.”

48. Rule 42(1)(a) rescission applies when an order was “erroneously sought or
erroneously granted in the absence of any party affected thereby. ” As held in
Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC v Bondev (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 87 (SCA) at
paragraph 25, “… a judgment to which a party is procedurally entitled cannot be
considered to have been granted erroneously by reason of facts of which the
Judge who granted the judgment, as he was entitled to do, was unaware … ”
The phrase ‘erroneously granted’ therefore relates to the procedure followed to
obtain the judgment (see also Freedom Stationary (Pty) Ltd v Hassam 2019 (4)
SA 459 (SCA) at 465GH). Questions of direct and substantial (legal) interests
required for non-joinder, a substantive aspect, therefore play no role.
49. Rule 42(1)(c) allows for the rescission of an order where there is a mistake
common to the parties. The respondent con tends that there was a fundamental
mistake common to both parties in that they agreed to an order which was bad
in law and unenforceable against the actual parties it concerned as these
parties were not before the court or party to the order.
50. A further problem is that Rule 42(3) provides that “The court shall not make any
order rescinding or varying any order or judgment unless satisfied that all
parties whose interests may be affected have notice of the order proposed. ” If
one adopts the strict technical approach of the respondent, notice of the
rescission application was not given to the corporate entities. Accordingly, if
the non-joinder point is good, then the corporate entities have an interest in the
rescission application in terms of Rule 42 which m ust then fail because it
cannot be granted without them having received notice of the application for

rescission; while if the non -joinder point is not good then the rescission
application must fail because there is no basis for it in law. Either way, the
rescission application in terms of Rule 42 fails. The respondent contended that
‘party’ in Rule 42(3) is confined to parties actually cited in the litigation. If that is
so, then ‘party’ in Rule 42(1)(a) is also so limited which means that Rule
42(1)(a) itself cannot be invoked which means that the respondent has no case
in terms thereof.
51. In Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry (CCT 52/21) [2021]
ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) (17 September 2021) at paragraph 53,
the Court held that:
“It should be pointed out that once an applicant has met the requirements for
rescission, a court is merely endowed with a discretion to rescind its order. The
precise wording of rule 42, after all, postulates that a court “may”, not “must”,
rescind or va ry its order – the rule is merely an “empowering section and does not
compel the court” to set aside or rescind anything. This discretion must be exercised
judicially.”

52. In my view, for the reasons mentioned, I believe that the appropriate approach
is to exercise that discretion against rescission, in the event that there was a
non-joinder.
53. The respondent also relies on the following dictum from Smith and Another v
Sheriff Cape Town North [2023] ZAWCHC 309 (albeit in the context of Rule 31
and with reference to Rossitter and Others v Nedbank Limited (96/2014) [2015]
ZASCA 196 (1 December 2015) ) that “ Generally a judgment is erroneously
granted if there existed at the time o f its issue a fact which the Court was
unaware of, which would have precluded the granting of the judgment and
which would have induced the Court, if aware of it, not to grant the judgment. ”

The court could only have been well aware that parties to the app lication were
limited to the applicant and the respondent, while the corporate entities were
not – a cursory scan of the 31 May Order, which refers specifically and by
name to many of them, shows this. The respondent also relied on Lodhi 2
Properties Inves tments CC v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd 2007
(6) SA 87 (SCA) at paragraph 24, to the effect that “… if notice of proceedings
to a party was required but was lacking and judgment was given against that
party, such judgment would have been erroneously granted.” No judgment was
given against any other party besides the respondent. This is therefore of no
assistance.
54. The respondent contends that material non -joinder vitiates court orders, relying
on Mafilika v Elundini Local Municipality [2025] ZASCA 142 in which it was held
at paragraph 11: “If an order or judgment cannot be sustained without
necessarily prejudicing the interest of third parties that have not been joined,
then those third parties have a legal interest in the matter and m ust be joined.”
That merely restates the well-known principle. It is not authority for court orders
to be vitiated due to non-joinder (other than on appeal, as in Matjhabeng).
55. The respondent relied on Bunton v Coetzee [2014] ZAGPPHC 553 at
paragraphs 17 to 20, at which it was found that the court cannot hear a matter
where there is a lack of locus standi. The original parties cannot, even through
agreement, confer standing on non-parties or affect rights of persons not before
the court. The court held that “1. Locus standi is fundamental to due process
without it the proceedings are invalidated ” and “ 2. Locus standi is a matter of
law and cannot be conferred by consent or by the condonation of the court.”

56. The respondent contended: “Naturally, the same principle must be applicable to
parties not before the court at all, who are, in law, separate legal persons to
those actually before the Court. ” In my view, t his contention is wrong in law
(BOE).
57. The common-law grounds for rescission are narrow. Rescission lie s for fraud
on the Court, justus error going to the root of the judgment, or truly “new”
evidence. The respondent alleges none of these. His grievance is that the 31
May Order is vitiated for non-joinder. For the reason set out above, I am of the
view that this does not avail him.
58. The application for rescission of the 31 May Order therefore fails.
Contempt of Court
59. The 31 May Order was taken by agreement, with the respondent having been
present at Court on the day when it was agreed and legally represented at all
times.
60. The applicant contends that:
60.1. The respondent did not comply with the 31 May Order and i nstead
implemented a parallel system for inter alia bookings, revenues and
bank accounts, in breach of the 31 May Order, the effect of which was to
exclude the applicant financially while leaving her exposed in her
capacity as director, shareholder and surety of multiple entities.
60.2. The conduct of the respondent, is not merely a technical or inadvertent
failure to comply with the 31 May Order, but a calculated and sustained

attack on the authority of, and a sign of complete disregard for, this
court. This conduct amounts to a cynical strategy to financially cripple
the applicant and dissipate the assets of the universal partnership before
the main action can be finally determined.
60.3. The respondent's strategy is to ensure that by the time the main action is
heard, there will be nothing left of the universal partnership to divide, and
the Applicant will be too financially broken to continue the fight.
60.4. The respondent’s actions, when considered holistically, demonstrate a
wilful disrespect for the rule of law and the legal system.
61. The respondent contends that:
61.1. The applicant has failed to establish the elements of contempt beyond
reasonable doubt. This is a conclusion which takes the matter no further.
61.2. The 31 May Order was entered into under duress and is fundamentally
unworkable. Even were the duress to be true, this and the order being
unworkable do not detract from the fact that there was an order in place
and takes the matter no further. In any event, as illustrated below, the
duress alleged was from a third party and the requirements to rely
thereon have not been established.
61.3. The applicant herself is in material breach of the order . This takes the
matter no further because the question is whether the respondent was in
contempt, discussed further below.

61.4. The Respondent's conduct, properly understood, was lawful, justified,
and taken in good faith. This is relevant and is considered in some detail
below.
61.5. There are genuine factual disputes that raise more than reasonable
doubt as to wilfulness and mala fides. This is relevant and is considered
in some detail below.
62. In my view, the contempt case depends in the main on the issues in 61.4 and
61.5 above.
Legal principles
63. Section 165(5) of the Constitution of 1996 provides that an order or decision
issued by a Court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it
applies.
64. In Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Limited and Others 2018
(1) SA (CC) at paragraph 48 it was held:
“To ensure that courts’ authority is effective, section 165(5) makes orders of court
binding on “all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies”. The
purpose of a finding of contempt is to protect th e fount of justice by preventing
unlawful disdain for judicial authority. Discernibly, continual non -compliance with
court orders imperils judicial authority.”

65. Civil contempt is a valuable mechanism for securing compliance with Court
orders (Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at
paragraph 42). Where the primary objective for contempt proceedings is to
force compliance with the court’s order, usually the period of imprisonment is

suspended pending the compliance by the contemnor with the court order.
Punishment is thus used for coercive purposes.
66. An order of a court stands until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Until that is done, the court order must be obeyed even if it may be wrong: “ …
all orders of court, whethe r correctly or incorrectly granted, have to be obeyed
unless they are properly set aside.” (Secretary, Judicial Commission v Zuma
2021 (5) SA 327 (CC) at 352G). There is a presumption that the judgment is
correct.
67. In Zuma at paragraph 61 it was held:
“Finally, I hasten to point out that “contempt of Court is not an issue inter partes
[between the parties]; it is an issue between the Court and the party who has not
complied with a mandatory order of Court” ... the overall damage caused to society
by conduct that poses the risk of rendering the Judiciary ineffective and eventually
powerless is at the very heart of why our law forbids such conduct.”

68. Fakie at paragraph 42 explains as follows:
“To sum up:
1 The civil contempt procedure is a valuable and imp ortant mechanism for
securing compliance with court orders, and pa in the form of a motion court
application adapted to constitutional requirements.
2 The respondent in such proceedings is not an ‘accused person’, but is entitled
to analogous protections as are appropriate to motion proceedings.
3 In particular, the applicant must prove the requisites of contempt (the order;
service or notice; non -compliance; and wilfulness and mala fides) beyond
reasonable doubt.
4 But once the applicant has proved the order, se rvice or notice, and non -
compliance, the respondent bears an evidential burden in relation to
wilfulness and mala fides: should the respondent fail to advance evidence that
establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether non -compliance was wilful and
mala fide, contempt will have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
5 A declarator and other appropriate remedies remain available to a civil

5 A declarator and other appropriate remedies remain available to a civil
applicant on proof on a balance of probabilities.”

69. The 31 May Order and respondent’s knowledge thereof are common cause.
What is in issue is (1) whether there has been non -compliance by the
respondent with the 31 May Order (2) which was wilful and in bad faith.
70. Applying Fakie, if non -compliance is established, the respondent b ears the
evidential burden in relation to wilfulness and mala fides: should the
respondent fail to advance evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to
whether non -compliance was wilful and mala fide , contempt will have been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
71. Whether there has been non-compliance by the respondent with any particular
paragraphs of the 31 May Order will now be considered.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 31 May Order

72. The applicant contends that the r espondent’s conduct is in direct breach of,
inter alia, paragraph 2 and 3 of the 31 May Order. Paragraph 2 interdicts the
respondent from “… preventing the Applicant access to the letting platforms ...”.
Paragraph 3 directs that platform payments in respec t of the Paragraph 3
Guesthouses are to be made into specified accounts and that the respondent
“… shall not in future change such details without the Applicant's written
consent or a Court order...”.
73. The respondent opened a new account on Booking.com and listed properties
under that account, using different addresses and names. For example, “The
Strand Guesthouse” , located at 3[...] D[...] Street, Strand, is advertised at his
instance as “Phala Guesthouse” with an address of 3[...] L[...] Street, Cape
Town. The properties and the images used are the same.

74. The respondent’s new listings on Booking.com for the Paragraph 3
Guesthouses were linked to his own bank accounts, not those required by the
31 May Order . The respondent changed the login details to the original
Booking.com platform in April 2025.
75. This is in non-compliance with paragraph 2 of the 31 May Order.
76. In my view, paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order is clear in its terms : income from
the letting platforms for the Paragraph 3 Guesthouses must be paid into the five
bank accounts specified therein.
77. The respondent utilised an ABSA credit card machine for payments by
guesthouse clients. The payments went to the respondent’s S -Cape Tourism
account at ABSA. The funds were not paid into the accounts stipulated in the
31 May Order. This is in breach of paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order.
78. Similarly, guesthouse income paid via electronic funds transfer s (EFTs) w as
paid into the respondent’s bank accounts. The respondent provided guests with
invoices on a ‘Bedrock Guest Studios’ letterhead. T he bank details provided
were not those as required by the 31 May Order, but rather his own bank
account and in one instance those of his ex -girlfriend (this latter instance he
said was an error, but is immaterial). The respondent confirmed that the
purpose was for this income to be paid into his accounts. That is in non-
compliance with paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order.
79. The payment of the funds contrary to the 31 May Order was substantial:

79.1. Between 1 April and 30 June 2024, R192 399.66 of Strand Guesthouse
and Bedrock income was paid into the account for the 1 on Albert
properties run by the respondent.
79.2. Between 1 July 2024 and February 2025, R676 608.62 of Strand
Guesthouse and Bedrock income was paid into the ABSA S -Cape
Tourism account controlled by the respondent.
79.3. MVPS Property CC (“MVPS”) is a close corporation of which the
respondent is the sole member. It has a bank accou nt with First
National Bank (“FNB”) which was historically dormant, but began to
receive large payments after the 31 May Order was made . The FNB
statements for this account show, for example, receipts of R81 110.00
in October 2024, R127 947.07 in January 2025 , R152 393.57 in March
2025 and R165 996.16 in April 2025.
79.4. Between April 2024 and June 2025 , R1 154 718.28 in income was not
paid into the accounts required by the 31 May 2024 Order and was
instead paid into the S -Cape Tourism ABSA account controlled by the
respondent using the ABSA credit card machine mentioned above.
79.5. The respondent made use of a Yoco payment machine linked to his
Capitec bank account for guests to pay R307 060.80 in the period from
May 2024 to June 2025 , but the banking details linked to this machine
were not those required by the 31 May Order.
80. The applicant produced a schedule which summarised the payment of income
of the Paragraph 3 Guesthouses from February 2024 to June 2025 which was

not made into the bank accounts required by the 31 May Order, but rather into
accounts controlled by the respondent. The total amount not paid int o the bank
accounts required by the 31 May Order according to this schedule was
R2 589 707.68 as at the end of June 2025. In the applicant’s heads of
argument and in oral argument, it was stated that this had increased to
R3 165 409.95, without demur from the respondent.
81. Further factors relevant to a consideration and evaluation of this diversion of
income in the context, and for the purpose, of contempt proceedings include:
81.1. The respondent’s own bank statements contain numerous transaction
narrations referencing “Booking.com”, “Accommodation”, and specific
guesthouse names like “Bedrock” and “Sundeck”, indicating that the
funds were from income earned which was required to be paid into the
bank accounts specified in the 31 May Order.
81.2. Funds began flowing into a historically dormant account only after the 31
May Order was granted and the new letting platforms had been created
by the respondent.
81.3. The r espondent did not identify any other legitima te source of income
that could explain this sudden and substantial influx of funds.
81.4. The use of new ABSA point-of-sale card machines at the physical
guesthouse locations provide d a mechanism for the diversion of income
from the bank accounts required by the 31 May Order.
81.5. During April 2025, the respondent changed the login details for the
original Booking.com platform and has not provided the new details to

the applicant . Since he changed these details, the applicant has not
been receiving notifications of income for the Paragraph 3 Guesthouses.
82. The non-compliance with the 31 May Order, including payment of the funds
contrary thereto, was substantial and brought to the attention of the respondent
on numerous occasions in writing, but it persisted nonetheless. For example,
on 27 September 2024, the applicant’s attorney sent an email to the
respondent’s then attorneys setting out in detail various contraventions of the
31 May Order as follows:
“Dear Alana
My instructions are to reply as follows:
Diversion of funds using ABSA credit card machines : Between April and July 2024 a
total of R192.399.66 was diverted away from Strand and Bedrock into the account for
the Woodstock properties (registered to your client). This is income that would
historically have been used to cover the fixed expenses of the relevant properties,
including the bonds (Letter to Bernard dated 24 July2024 and further email dated 19
August 2024). There has been no response from you.
Unauthorised payments: In our email dated 26 Jun e 2024 we set out numerous au
authorised payments made by your client (including R500.000 of the SARS refund
monies in May 2024 and more than R109.010 between 01 and 11 June 2024). In our
letter dated 15 July 2024 (paragraph 11.6) we again highlighted vari ous unauthorized
payments made by your client from the Forest River Standard Bank account. On 13
September 2024 we sent another email to Bernard attaching a schedule of
unauthorized payments made by your client from the Forest River account ( R28 526.00)
and from the Philip Naude Trust account (R20 031.25). There has been no response from
you.
Trackers: With reference to the tracker on the 2 vehicles. If the vehicles is used
exclusively for business purposes and it is company policy to have trackers on the
vehicles and for insurance purposes. I would approve that the debit orders for the

vehicles and for insurance purposes. I would approve that the debit orders for the
trackers must be applied for on the business that is utilising the vehicles (email from
Bernard dated 01 August 2024 in reply to our letter dated 24 July 2024). These tracking
devices have still not been reinstated.
Fines: With reference to the fines below: You are 100% correct, they will not disappear
and must be paid ASAP (email from Bernard dated 31 July 2024, responding to our
letter dated 24 July 2024.) These have still not been paid.
MTN Wi -Fi 1onAlbert: I will definitely advise that the debit order must run from the
bank account of the company that is utilizing the facility and approve the move of the

debit order (email from Bernard dated 26 July 2024 in reply to our let ter dated 24 July
2024.) This has still not been done.
Operational Salaries: Your client unilaterally increased his “operational salary” by
R50.000 per month in April 2024 to R186.954.19 and at the same time ceased paying my
client’s “operational salary” i n the amount of approximately R121.573.34 (our letters
dated 15 July 2024 and 16 August 2024 and follow up email dated 17 September
2024). There has been no response from you.
Our email to Bernard dated 17 September 2024 (see also our letter dated 24 July
2024): I am instructed that as a result of Mr Naude making unauthorised payments from
the Forest River account, the bond was again not paid and is in arrears in th e amount of
R49 814.02. I am further instructed that the Mufasa arrear bond instalments have still
not been paid, despite numerous demands that the arrears be paid. The amount owing
is R53.275.88. To avoid foreclosure by the bond holder banks, these arrears must be
paid immediately.
Replies from Bernard dated 17 September 2024:
As agreed in the meeting with all the parties, all bond payments need to be settled with
immediate effect, because it forms part of the list of assets and liabilities of the
partnership. As agreed in the meeting with all the parties, he needs to transfer the
money either directly into the bonds to settle the outstanding bonds or transfer the
money to an central account from which it can be settled with immediate effect via EFT
by Ms Armer.
Our reply to you dated 17 September 2024:
Dear Alana
Please can you ensure that your client complies with the below immediately and
provides us with proof of payment.
Your reply to dated 20 September 2024: is that my client must use funds received from
a booking on 19 Se ptember 2024 (which your client directed Mucha to have deposited
into my client’s account) to cover arrears on the Mufasa bond. Historical debts caused

into my client’s account) to cover arrears on the Mufasa bond. Historical debts caused
by your client’s unlawful hijacking of the business forming part of the universal
partnership are to be paid from the income your client diverted, not from new income
that should be being used to pay current expenses.
Maintenance for I[...]: Your client continues to refuse to pay any maintenance for I[...]
despite our request dated 23 April 2024 at paragraph 13, our letter dated 25 July 2024
to which you replied on 7 August 2024 saying that your clients authorized payment of
I[...]’s expenses “using funds from the various business accounts”. Our client was for ced
to make payment of I[...]’s dentistry from the Sundeck account.
VAT refund: Despite numerous requests your client has failed and/or refused to provide
us with details of what became of these funds in the amount 1.5 million Rand (our letter
dated 11 June 2 024 and further email dated 26 June 2024.) There has been no
response from you.
The effect of the above is as follows:
Benefits to your client:
Redirected funds (known) R192,399.66
Unauthorised payments R500,000.00
R28,526.00

R20,031.25
Increased “operational salary” (6 months at R186,954.19) R1,121,725.14
TOTAL_________________________________ R1,862,682.05
Loss to your client:
Loss of “operational salary” (6 months at R121,573.34) R729,440.04
Unpaid Forest River bond R49 814.02
Unpaid Mufasa bond R53,275.88
TOTAL_________________________________ R832.529.94"

83. The respondent created new separate listings on Booking.com to which the
Applicant was not given access. The income from the Paragraph 3
Guesthouses was not paid into the bank accounts required thereby.
84. By creating new listings and not complying with the payment requirements in
paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order , the respondent breached that order . I am
therefore of the view that breach of the 31 May Order has been established in
this respect.
85. The applicant submitted that the r espondent’s breaches are n either isolated
examples nor insubstantial, but rather that the r espondent engaged in a large -
scale and systematic diversion of funds in breach of the 31 May Order. I tend to
agree. As mentioned, the extent of the respondent’s breach is very substantial,
with over R2.5 million in fund s, as at the end of June 2025 , not paid into the
bank accounts as required by the 31 May Order . In heads of argument and in
oral argument, it was stated by the applicant that this had increased to
R3 165 409.95, without demur from the respondent.
86. The i nterpretation of an order of court is explained in South African
Broadcasting Corporation v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others
2007 (1) SA 523 (CC):

“The starting point is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In interpreting
a judgment or order, the court's intention is to be ascertained primarily from the
language of the judgment or order in accordance with the usual well-known rules
relating to the interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document, the
judgment or orde r and the court's reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in
order to ascertain its intention."

87. In my view, paragraph 3 of the 31 May Order could not be clearer. It decrees, in
unequivocal terms, that income from the letting platforms for the Paragraph 3
Guesthouses must be paid into the five specified bank accounts. The non -
compliance with this aspect of the 31 May Order was prodigious. The
respondent’s new listings on Booking.com for the Paragraph 3 Guesthouses
were linked to his own bank accounts, not those required by the 31 May Order.
When the respondent changed the login details to the original Booking.com
platform in April 2025, he also changed the linked banking details to accounts
under his sole control.
88. Conduct to this extent in non -compliance with the 31 May Order of which the
respondent was aware, had agreed to and had been reminded of on a number
of occasions can only, in my view, result in the inference that it was wilful and in
bad faith. This is considered further below.

Paragraph 11.1 of the 31 May Order

89. Paragraph 11.1 of the 31 May Order, requires that “all payments made by/on behalf
of all entities forming part of the alleged universal partnership will be made with the consent
of both parties. If the parties cannot agree in respect of any payment and/or any other matter
pertaining to the conduct of the alleged partnership businesses, Mr Bernard Shaw (CA) of
Crowe HZK Auditors of Techno Park will have the right to decide in his absolute discretion

(without having to provide reasons) whether such payment may be made and/or conduct is
authorised or not …”
90. On 26 June 2024, the applicant’s attorney communicated to the respondent’s
attorney that the respondent had made numerous unauthorised payments
between 1 and 11 June 2024, totalling just under R140 000.00. The
correspondence also highlighted that the respondent was refusing to make
funds available for bond instalment debit order payments for the property -
owning entities of which the applicant is the sole shareholder and director while
those for the entities of which he is the sole director were paid and that he was
refusing access to bank accounts in breach of paragraph 4.
91. This was followed by further correspondence detailing unauthorised
withdrawals from the Forest River Standard Bank account (R28 526.00) and
the Philip Naude Trust account (R20 031.25 and R66 900.00).
92. The respondent contends that these funds were used to cover “operational
expenses”. This is an admission of th e conduct. As with paragraph 3 thereof,
paragraph 11.1 of t he 31 May Order could not be clearer , decreeing in
unequivocal terms that all payments had to be by consent or, failing that, on the
directive of Mr Shaw.
93. In October 2024, the respondent purchased a new Amarok motor vehicle,
committing the business to a new monthly instalment of R19 666.46, without
the applicant’s knowledge or consent, in circumstances where the business
already had three available vehicles. This was done while bond instalment
payments were not being made.

94. A refund of approximately R1.5 million received from SARS was paid into the
Hairbay Standard Bank account. Despite numerous requests, the respondent
has not provided any details of what became of these funds.
95. I am therefore of the view that non-compliance with the 31 May Order has been
established in these respects.
96. The respondent insisted on the mechanism in paragraph 11.1 and the
appointment of Mr Shaw.
97. On 15 July 2024, Mr Shaw expressly refused to approve an expense of
R81 750.00 for an advertising signboard requested by the respondent for one
of the properties . Despite this, the respondent made a payment of R6 500.00
for the sign on 22 December 2024 and it was erected at his instance.
98. On 17 September 2024, Mr Shaw issued a directive that “all bond payments
need to be settled with immediate effect” to avoid foreclosure, as entities were
in arrears, such as Forest River in the amount of R49 814.02 and Mufasa in
the amount of R53 275.88. To date, the respondent has not complied with this
directive. This places the immovable properties at risk of foreclosure . The
banks have handed over bonds to their legal departments and the properties
are at risk of foreclosure.
99. The respondent has ignored other directives from Mr Shaw, including to
reinstate vehicle trackers (directive on 1 August 2024), pay outstanding traffic
fines (directive on 31 July 2024) and move the MTN Wi -Fi debit order for 1 on
Albert from the applicant’s personal account (directive on 26 July 2024).

100. I am therefore of the view that non-compliance with the 31 May Order has been
established in these respects.
101. The respondent’s non -compliance with the 31 May Order has been ongoing
despite protest. He has not rebutted the presumption of wilfulness and bad
faith. On the contrary, I consider that the facts establish these elements.
102. Conduct to this extent in non -compliance with the 31 May Order of which the
respondent was aware, had agree d to and had been reminded of on a number
of occasions can only, in my view, result in the inference that it was wilful and in
bad faith. I conclude that the presumption in this regard has not been rebutted.
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 11.2

103. The respondent complied with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 31 May Order by
restoring the applicant’s access to the original email and OneDrive accounts.
104. The applicant contends that: (1) The respondent immediately rendered this
compliance meaningless by migrating all live business operations to a new,
secret email address ( m[...]) and a new, secret Dropbox account, to which the
applicant has no access. (2) This is a deliberate act of informational warfare,
breaching the spirit of clauses 5 and 6, and the letter of claus e 11.2. (3) The
intention is to keep the applicant in the dark and render her powerless to
monitor his actions or manage the companies for which she is legally
responsible. (4) The applicant also contends that the respondent deleted the
information on the OneDrive. There is, however, a dispute of fact in this regard
which cannot be resolved on the papers.

105. Be the above contentions as they may, they only come into play if non -
compliance with the provisions of the 31 May Order is established. However,
unlike paragraph 2 of the 31 May Order which refers in general to the letting
platforms, paragraphs 5 and 6 refer to access to a specific email address and a
specific One Drive, which was provided. Accordingly, I do not find that this is in
non-compliance with the 31 May Order.
Further aspects and conclusion on contempt
106. The respondent contends that the applicant breached the 31 May Order and for
that reason he cannot be held in contempt of court. No authority was presented
in favour of this contention. On basic principles, if a party has obligations in
terms of an order o f court with which he/she does not comply, then he/she is
liable for contempt (provided the requisites are proved). If another party also
does not comply, the same applies to that person. But it does not follow that the
first party’s breach and contempt (i f established) are purged thereby . No
authority to this effect was cited and nor did I find any. In my view, therefore,
this defence does not avail the respondent.
107. The respondent says that he agreed to the 31 May Order under duress. The
duress being that h is own attorney told him that if he did not do so he was
going to be arrested and criminally charged. While a party can rely on duress
exerted by a third party, in order to do so it must be prove d that the other party
to the agreement knew of or procured t he duress . In Malilang v MV Houda
Pearl 1986 (2) SA 714 (A) , a case involving duress, the following was referred
to with approval at 731D: “ Where one party seeks to avoid a contract on the
ground of undue influence by a third person, it must appear that t he other party

to the transaction knew of the facts constituting the undue influence, or at least
that he entrusted another party with the task of procuring the contract, and that
party exercised undue influence. ” This was not attempted in the papers. This
defence therefore cannot avail the respondent.
108. The respondent’s main defence was that his conduct was ‘lawful, justified and
taken in good faith’ because it was (1) n ecessary to protect legitimate business
interests and prevent business collapse , (2) j ustified responses to the
applicant's own breaches of the order , (3) involved l awful business decisions
taken in good faith and (4) involved a ctions taken outside the scope and ambit
of the 31 May Order.
109. The respondent submits that his actions, when properly understood and viewed
in context, demonstrate reasonable business decisions made in response to
the applicant’s mismanagement and in protection of legitimate business
interests, and not any disrespect for the rule of law.
110. He contends that a ll payments made were either necessary operational
expenses to prevent business collapse , payments relating to entities not
covered by the order, emergency measures to preserve assets or actions taken
in good faith interpretation of the requirements of the 31 May O rder. He
contends further that t he necessity for intervention arose because the
applicant’s mismanagement created cash flow crises, her neglect of
maintenance led to properties deteriorating under her control, basic business
functions were not being performed, and she refused to engage constructively
in joint decision-making.

111. This, however, in my view, cannot pass muster on the facts of the matter,
including those considered in detail in the above two sections: (1) The bonds
on the properties owned b y the entities of which the applicant is the sole
shareholder and director were not paid while the bonds on the properties
owned by the entities of which the respondent is the sole director or trustee
were paid: no explanation for this transparently conve nient divide was
attempted. (2) The respondent caused R741 448 to be paid to himself in
respect of a loan which he claimed was owed to him by Hairbay. (3) The
systematic diversion of income. (4) The payments in breach of paragraph 11.1
of the 31 May Order . All of the above being despite the regular written protest
of the applicant.
112. In similar vein, the SARS refund of R1.5 million to Hairbay was spent at the
respondent’s instance as he saw fit without any recourse to the applicant
(including payment of the above R741 448 to himself).
113. The r espondent avers that his expenditure was applied entirely for legitimate
business purposes which, properly interpreted, was in compliance with the 31
May Order. I have dealt with the relevant provisions of the 31 May Order and, in
my view, they cannot reasonably bear the meaning contended for by the
respondent.
114. A determination by the respondent as to what he considers “legitimate” or
prioritised expenditure does not allow him to circumvent the terms of the 31
May Order.
115. For example, p aragraph 11.1 of the 31 May Order reads as follows (in part):
“all payments made by/on behalf of all entities forming part of the alleged universal

partnership will be made with the consent of both parties. If the parties cannot agree in
respect of any payment and/or any other matter pertaining to the conduct of the alleged
partnership businesses, Mr Bernard Shaw (CA) of Crowe HZ K Auditors of Techno Park will
have the right to decide in his absolute discretion (without having to provide reasons) whether
such payment may be made …”
116. This provision is unambiguous that payments must be by consent or failing that,
as directed by Mr Sha w. It is common cause that for many payments neither
consent, nor a directive from Mr Shaw, was even sought. On the contrary, at
times clear directives from Mr Shaw (such as in regard to signage, mentioned
above) were ignored by the respondent. This was in the context of regular
protest from the applicant.
117. Mr Shaw gave a directive that the bonds are to be paid which the respondent
ignored, but only insofar as the properties owned by companies of which the
applicant is the sole shareholder and director are concerned. The respondent
claims that he was faced with competing demands for limited funds and had to
make difficult choices to prevent the total collapse of the business and for this
reason ignored the directive from Mr Shaw.
118. What I think belies this claim, is that this ignoring of the directive was very self -
servingly selective: it only applied insofar as the properties owned by the
entities of which the applicant is the sole director and shareholder are
concerned while the caused the bond instalments in respect of the properties
owned by the entities of which he is the director to be paid . He also saw fit to
pay himself R741 448 in part repayment of a loan which he asserted against
Hairbay.

119. Similarly, the diversion of over R3.1 million in revenue incom e from the bank
accounts expressly specified in paragraph 3 of the Order belies his assertion of
legitimate conduct not in breach of the 31 May Order.
120. The respondent contends that the 31 May Order is a nullity because of non -
joinder. This aspect has alread y been dealt with and disposes of this question.
There is authority that where an order is granted by a court which it lacks the
jurisdiction to grant, it is a nullity and cannot ground contempt : The Master v
Motala 2012 (3) SA 325 (SCA) at paragraph 17, at which it was held that where
a court usurps a power which it does not have but in law resided in the Master
(ie acts without jurisdiction) , the order is a nullity . This is a question of
jurisdiction which does not apply in the instant matter. In the instant matter
there is no question of a lack of jurisdiction or of an order being sought to find a
person in contempt of court when that person is not cited as a party. Motala
was subjected to critical scrutiny in Department of Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd
2017 (2) SA 622 (CC) at paragraphs 188 to 197 and held t o be confined to
cases where a court acts without jurisdiction and not to be authority that any
invalid court order can simply be ignored . On the contrary, Tasima confirmed
that all o rders, including those incorrectly granted, must be obeyed until set
aside because they concern the dignity, repute and authority of the court . This
includes even where it is found that the court order is null and void, as held in
Tasima at paragraph 186 (see also Zuma at paragraph 59):
“This is because the legal consequence that flows from non -compliance with a court
order is contempt. The “essence” of contempt “lies in violating the dignity, repute or
authority of the court.” By disobeying multiple orders issued by the High Court, the
Department and the Corporation repeatedly violated that Court’s dignity, repute and

Department and the Corporation repeatedly violated that Court’s dignity, repute and
authority and the dignity, repute and authority of the Judiciary in general. That the
underlying order may have been invalid does not erase the injury. Therefore, while a
court may, in the correct circumstances, find an underlying court order null and void

and set it aside, this finding does not undermine the principle that damage is done to
courts and the rule of law when an o rder is disobeyed. A conclusion that an order is
invalid does not prevent a court from redressing the injury wrought by disobeying
that order, and deterring future litigants from doing the same, by holding the
disobedient party in contempt.”

121. In my view, the respondent’s conduct was in non -compliance with the 31 May
Order, his justification for this bears no relation to the terms thereof and was
continued in the face of repeated protest from the applicant. It is therefore
concluded that he has not rebutted the presumption of wilfulness and bad faith.
Indeed, in my view, the facts establish these elements. Accordingly, I find the
respondent to be in contempt of paragraphs 2, 3 and 11.1 of the 31 May Order.
122. As to sanction, it is common cause that the 31 May O rder should be replaced
or varied and a new regime be ordered to be in place. I therefore think that the
question of sanction should be dealt with as follows: should the respondent not
comply with any aspect of the order granted in this judgment, the appl icant is
given leave to set this matter down, with duly amplified papers as required, for
consideration of sanction for the respondent’s contempt of the 31 May Order.
By ‘not comply’ I do not mean ‘be in contempt’. The simple fact of non -
compliance will en title the applicant to set the matter down and move for an
appropriate sanction in respect of the findings in this judgment of contempt of
the 31 May Order . That decision will be in the hands of the court which hears
such an application, should it materialise.
The order to be granted in place of the 31 May Order

123. Being an interim order, the 31 May Order is subject to variation by this court in
certain circumstances: Freedom Stationary (Pty) Ltd v Hassam 2019 (4) SA
459 (SCA) at 465A.
124. It is common cause th at a new mechanism is needed because the mechanism
in the 31 May Order has failed: the respondent says that “this mechanism has
manifestly failed” and the applicant says that it “ has failed and simply will not
work.”
125. Both parties apply for a replacement mechanism (in the main application and
the counter application, respectively). They agree that they cannot work
together.
126. The respondent applies for the full spectrum of the properties and entities to be
placed under his sole control pending th e determination of the Action. The
relevant relief sought by him is as follows:
“2. PRIMARY RELIEF – RESCISSION OF ORIGINAL ORDER
2.1 That the order granted by this Honourable Court on 31 May 2024 under the
above case number ("the first court order") is rescin ded in its entirety, save
as provided for herein.
2.2 That the Counter -Applicant is granted full and exclusive control over all
business operations, entities, and assets that were established, funded, and
operated by him, including but not limited to:
2.2.1 All property-owning companies and their assets;
2.2.2 All operating companies and their business operations;
2.2.3 All booking platforms, letting systems, and revenue streams;
2.2.4 All bank accounts, financial systems, and payment processing
facilities;
2.2.5 All business records, documentation, and operational systems.
2.3 That, save by order of this Honourable Court or the prior written consent of
the Counter-Applicant, none of the properties owned by ACP Metals (Pty)
Ltd, IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd, Forestriver (Pty) Ltd, the Phillip N aude Trust
and Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd be sold, pending the
outcome of the action instituted by the Applicant against the Counter -
Applicant.

3 FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL RELIEF
3.1 That the Applicant is directed to provide the Counter-Applicant with
immediate and full access to all bank accounts, financial records, and
operational systems of all business entities involved in the hospitality and
property letting business.
3.2 That the Applicant is restrained and interdicted from maki ng any financial
decisions, payments, or transactions on behalf of any of the business
entities without the prior written consent of the Counter-Applicant.
3.3 That the Applicant is directed to account fully for all funds received,
expended, and controlled by her during the period from 31 May 2024 to
the date of this order.
3.4 That the Applicant is directed to return all misappropriated funds to the
respective bank accounts from which they were taken, with interest at the
prescribed rate.
4 MAINTENANCE PROVISION
4.1 That, in the event that the relief prayed for above in prayers 2 and 3 is
granted in the Counter -Applicant’s favour, the Counter -Applicant is to pay
maintenance for the parties' minor child, I[...], in the amount of R10,000.00
(Ten Thousand Rand) per month, paya ble on or before the first day of each
month to a bank account nominated in writing by the Applicant.
4.2 That the aforesaid maintenance amount may be varied by Court Order
upon proper application supported by appropriate financial disclosure and
justification.
5 RESTORATION OF BUSINESS RECORDS
5.1 That the Applicant is directed to restore all business information and
documentation that was removed or deleted from the Counter -Applicant's
business systems, including but not limited to the "Janine Admin Folder"
and all associated financial and operational records.
5.2 That the Counter-Applicant is authorised to contact Microsoft Corporation,
the owner of OneDrive, and any other relevant service providers, to recover
deleted or removed business records and data.
6 ALTERNATIVELY OR IN ADDITION TO PRAYERS 2 AND 3 – AUDIT AND
INVESTIGATION RELIEF

6 ALTERNATIVELY OR IN ADDITION TO PRAYERS 2 AND 3 – AUDIT AND
INVESTIGATION RELIEF
6.1 That a full forensic audit of all business entities under the control of the
Applicant, their financial records, transactions, and operations is ordered to
be conducted by two independent auditors to be appointed by each of the
parties within 10 (ten) court days of this order.
6.2 That both parties are directed to provide their full cooperation to the
appointed auditors, including the provision of all documents, records,
passwords, and access required to conduct the audit.
6.3 That the audit must be completed within 6 (six) months of the appointment
of the auditors.
6.4 That the costs of the audit are to be borne equally by both parties, pending
the outcome and recommendations of the audit.
7 INTERIM RELIEF PENDING FINALISATION

7.1 That pending the finalisation of this matter and the completion of the
forensic audit, the Counter -Applicant is granted interim control over all
business operations to prevent further financial deterioration and potentia l
insolvency of the business entities.
7.2 That the Applicant is interdicted and restrained from disposing of,
encumbering, or dealing with any assets of ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd, IPJA
Investments (Pty) Ltd, Forestriver (Pty) Ltd, the Phillip Naude Trust and
Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd without the prior written
consent of the Counter-Applicant or an order of this Honourable Court.”

127. The applicant seeks a separation of the properties and entities, with the
corporate entities of which she is the so le director and shareholder being under
her control and the remainder being under the respondent’s control. The
relevant relief sought by her is as follows:
“4 That pending the final determination of the action instituted in this Court under
case number 16605/2024 ("the universal partnership action"):
4.1 The Applicant shall have the sole right, authority, and discretion to
manage and operate the entities hereunder, including any immovable
property owned by such entities, and any associated operational activities
(“the Applicant’s Businesses”):
4.1.1 ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2023/582492/07);
4.1.2 IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2017/320239/07);
4.1.3 Forestriver (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2019/617710/07);
4.1.4 Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No.
2020/725235/07); and
4.1.5 Little Dinkum (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2020/706470/T07).
5 That pending the final determination of the action instituted in this Court under
case number 16605/2024 ("the universal partnership action"):
5.1 The Respondent shall have the sole rig ht, authority, and discretion to
manage and operate the entities listed hereunder, including any
immovable property owned by such entities, and any associated
operational activities (“the Respondent’s Businesses”):

operational activities (“the Respondent’s Businesses”):
5.1.1 Hairbay (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2016/421693/07);
5.1.2 S-Cape Tourism (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2022/648990/07); and
5.1.3 MVPS Property CC (Reg. No. 1998/023488/23).
6 That both parties are interdicted and restrained from exercising any authority,
power, or control in respect of the other party’s Businesses, includin g (but not
limited to) the following:
6.1 Any signing powers at financial institutions.
6.2 Access to or control over banking applications, bank accounts, credit card
machines and any other payment method.

6.3 Access to or control over any letting platforms, advertise ments, websites
and/or social media accounts.
6.4 The appointment or dismissal of employees.
6.5 Engagement with or control over financial service providers including,
banking institutions, accountants and the South African Revenue Service
(SARS).
7 That the powers stated in paragraph 6 above shall vest exclusively in the
Applicant in respect of the Applicant’s Businesses and in the Respondent in
respect of the Respondent’s Businesses.
8 That the Respondent is directed, within 7 (seven) days from the date of thi s
order, to pay all outstanding arrear mortgage bond instalments, municipal
accounts and other outstanding amounts into the relevant bank account of each
such entity as set out in clauses 3.1 to 3.5 of the first court order in respect of
the following properties and in the amounts set out below:
8.1 Sundeck Lodge (owned by Forestriver (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of
R157,024.04;
8.2 Dam House (owned by Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd)
in the amount of R201,101.80;
8.3 Strand Guest House (owned by ACP Metal s (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of
R101,345.84;
8.4 Bedrock Guest Studios (owned by IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd) in the
amount of R85,018.13; and
8.5 Yacht View Lodge (owned by the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust) in the
amount of R142,082.73.
9 That the Respondent is dire cted to immediately upon the granting of this order,
provide the applicant with all log in details for all letting platforms, both historic
and newly created by him, together with all documentation relating to the
applicant’s businesses and the Phillip Nau de Eiendomme Trust since April 2024,
including but not limited to all documentation he deleted from the One Drive
folder, all documentation stored in his Drop Box account and all management
accounts, income and expenditure statements and the like in respec t of the
applicant’s businesses and the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust.

applicant’s businesses and the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust.
10 That the Respondent is directed to hand over the keys to all properties owned
by the applicant’s businesses and the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust and is
interdicted and restrained from entering such properties or removing any
contents therefrom with immediate effect.”

128. The applicant alleges that the respondent did not comply with the 31 May Order
and i nstead implemented an alternative, parallel system for bookings,
revenues, staffing, and records, the effect of which was to exclude the applicant

financially while leaving her exposed in her capacity as director, shareholder
and surety of multiple entities. I have already found this to be the case.
129. The respondent contends that the applicant ’s incompetence resulted in the
problems. He says that she had never been any more than an employee who
did not have the competence and experience to run the business This dispute
cannot be resolved in this application, although the respondent’s version do es
appear to be at odds with some material facts, such as the applicant being a
shareholder and director, the applicant having undertaken liability as a surety
for R10.5 million in respect of loans secured by bonds over the properties and
an extremely leng thy WhatsApp sent by the respondent to the applicant on 15
March 2024 in which he said inter alia (in Afrikaans, the translation is mine):
“Your insight into the business like to take control over the business’s finances.
Not to follow my stupid instructi on in this time to give the bank details to other
people … Yes you are naturally my universal wife.”
130. Be this as it may, I believe that the facts dealt with in this judgment show that
the respondent diverted substantial funds, created competing listings for
properties, did not pay the bonds and acted in serial contravention of the 31
May Order despite repeated protest in writing.
131. In my view, the facts of this matter militate against putting the full spectrum of
properties and entities under the respondent’s sole control.
132. Subject to the content of the sub-paragraphs of this paragraph, the relief sought
by the applicant by and large makes sense to me in the context of the facts of
this matter (which includes that she is the sole registered shareholder and
director of the entities she seeks to control):

132.1. The relief sought in paragraph 9 of the Notice of Motion is to be limited
to the letting platforms in respect of the properties referred to in
paragraph 4 thereof because the One Drive issue remains unresolved
and the PNE Trust is not one of the entities referred to in paragraph 4
of the Notice of Motion.
132.2. The relief sought in paragraphs 2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 5.2 and 7 of the counter
application, with some variations, appears to make sense and will be
incorporated in the order.
132.3. I raised with counsel for both of the parties whether a reporting
mechanism should be in place pending the determination of the Action.
They agreed that it should . I requested them to provide the parties’
respective versions thereof. They did so. Certain aspects thereof will be
included in the order in this matter.
133. The formulation proposed by the applicant is:
“Pending finalisation of the action proceedings, the parties are directed to provide
each other with the following documents f or each and every entity / business / trust
/ company and/or closed corporation owned by, registered to or under his/her
control in terms of this order (“the entities”) on or before the last day of each month
commencing on 31 December 2025:
1. Full run of ban k statements on all bank accounts linked to or used for the
purposes of receiving income and/or paying expenses of the entities, whether
currently in use or opened in the future, including but not limited to those
reflected in Annexures “A” and “B” attached hereto;
2. All invoices issued for bookings, rentals (short and long term) or letting of the
entities, whether through the letting platforms, letting agents or privately;
3. Management accounts for each entity;
4. Income and expenditure schedules for each entity, together with
corresponding bank statements, invoices, receipts, payment/till slips, etc.;
5. Booking summaries from any and all letting platforms, letting agents or private

5. Booking summaries from any and all letting platforms, letting agents or private
listings for any and all listings whether currently in use or created in the future;
6. Bond stat ement and rates/utilities account for each entity and/or property
owned by such entity.

134. The formulation proposed by the respondent is part of an overall draft order.
The applicable portion is as follows:
“8. Pending final determination of the action:
8.1 The party in control of the day -to-day financial administration of the
Business Structures (or such person as may be agreed in writing between
the parties) shall cause monthly management accounts to be prepared
for each of the Business Structures.
8.2 Such management accounts shall, as a minimum, include:
8.2.1 an income statement (profit and loss);
8.2.2 a balance sheet;
8.2.3 a summary of cash flow movements;
8.2.4 an age analysis of trade creditors and trade debtors; and
8.2.5 copies of all bank statements for the relevant month for all bank
accounts held by or on behalf of the Business Structures.
9 The monthly management accounts and supporting bank statements shall be
delivered to the other party's attorneys of record by no later than 15 (fifteen)
days after the end of each calendar mont h, commencing with the month in
which this order is granted.
10 The financial information and documents provided in terms of this order:
10.1 Shall be treated as confidential and used solely for the purposes of the
Audit, the action, and any related settlement negotiations; and
10.2 May not be disclosed to third parties save for the parties' legal
representatives, the Auditor, their professional advisers, and any expert
witnesses (all of whom shall be bound to preserve confidentiality).
11 Pending final determination of th e action and subject to the ordinary, bona fide
conduct of business:
11.1 The parties are interdicted and restrained from disposing of,
encumbering, or in any manner dealing with any immovable properties or
material assets held by the Business Structures, other than in the ordinary
course of business and for fair value, without:
11.1.1 The prior written consent of both parties, acting through their
attorneys; or
11.1.2 Leave of this Court on application.

attorneys; or
11.1.2 Leave of this Court on application.
11.2 Nothing in this order shall prevent the payment of ordinary, legitimate
operating expenses of the Business Structures, including rates, utilities,
insurance, staff costs, routine maintenance, and similar expenditures
necessary to preserve the value of the businesses and assets.”

135. Certain aspects of the above formulations are included in the order below.

136. Finally, the respondent did formally contest urgency, but this was not pressed
with any conviction in argument, unsurprisingly because both parties sought
urgent relief. The application was launched in August 2025 and was postponed
to a date in November 2025 allocated by the Judge President , when it was

heard with a full set of voluminous papers having been filed. I am satisfied that
the application was heard with the appropriate degree of urgency. I do not
consider it necessary to burden this already lengthy judgment with an y further
exposition on this aspect.

Costs and order
137. On consideration, my view is that the following combination of the relief sought
by the parties, as contained in the order granted below, would be appropriate.

138. The applicant has been substantially successful in the contempt application, the
rescission application and the application for the variation/replacement of the
31 May Order and is entitled to her costs. As the matter had a degree of legal
and factual complexity. Scale C shall apply.

139. In the premise, it is ordered as follows:
1. The respondent (Pieter Roy Naudé) is declared to be in contempt of paragraphs 2, 3
and 11.1 of the order of this court under the above case number handed down on 31
May 2024.
2. Should the respondent not comply with any aspect of this order, the applicant is given
leave to set this matter down on notice , with amp lified papers as required, for
consideration of sanction for the respondent’s contempt of the 31 May Order. By ‘not
comply’ is not meant to ‘be in contempt’. The simple fact of non -compliance will
entitle the applicant to set the matter down and move for a n appropriate sanction.
That decision will be in the hands of the court which hears such an application, should
it materialise.
3. Pending the final determination of the action instituted in this Court under case
number 16605/2024 ("the Action"), the applicant shall have the sole authority and
discretion to manage and operate the following entities , including any immovable
property ow ned by such entities, and any associated operational activities (“the
Applicant Entities” and “the Applicant Properties”):
3.1. ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2023/582492/07);
3.2. IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2017/320239/07);

3.2. IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2017/320239/07);
3.3. Forestriver (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2019/617710/07);

3.4. Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2020/725235/07);
and
3.5. Little Dinkum (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2020/706470/T07).
4. Pending the final determination of the Action, the Respondent shall have the sole
authority and discretion t o manage and operate the following entities, including any
immovable property owned by such entities, and any associated operational activities
(“the Respondent Entities” and “the Respondent Properties”):
4.1. Hairbay (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2016/421693/07);
4.2. S-Cape Tourism (Pty) Ltd (Reg. No. 2022/648990/07); and
4.3. MVPS Property CC (Reg. No. 1998/023488/23).
5. Pending the final determination of the Action, the applicant is interdicted and
restrained from exercising any authority, power, or control in respect of the
Respondent Entities and the respondent is interdicted and restrained from exercising
any authority, power, or control in respect of the Applicant Entities, including (but not
limited to) the following:
5.1. Any signing powers at financial institutions.
5.2. Access to or control over banking applications, bank accounts, credit card
machines and any other payment method.
5.3. Access to or control over any letting platforms, advertisements, websites and/or
social media accounts.
5.4. The appointment or dismissal of employees.
5.5. Engagement with or control over financial service providers including, banking
institutions, accountants and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).
6. The respondent is directed, within 7 (seven) days from the date of this order, to cause
the following amounts in respect of the following properties to be paid into the bank
accounts as indicated:
6.1. Sundeck Lodge (owned by Forestriver (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of R157 024.04,
into account number 0[...] with Standard Bank;
6.2. Dam House (owned by Mufasa Global Management Enterprises (Pty) Ltd) in the
amount of R201 101.80, into account number 4[...] with ABSA;
6.3. Strand Guest House (owned by ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of

6.3. Strand Guest House (owned by ACP Metals (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of
R101 345.84, into account number 6[...] with First National Bank;
6.4. Bedrock Guest Studios (owned by IPJA Investments (Pty) Ltd) in the amount of
R85 018.13, into account number 1[...] with Nedbank; and
6.5. Yacht View Lodge (owned by the Phillip Naude Eiendomme Trust) in the amount
of R142 082.73, into account number 1[...] with Standard Bank.
7. The respondent is directed to, immediately upon the granting of this order, provide
the applicant with all log -in details for all letting platforms, both historic and current,
in respect of the Applicant Properties and the business of letting them.
8. The respondent is directed to hand over to the applicant the keys to all the Applicant
Properties and is interdicted and restrained from entering such properties or
removing any contents therefrom, without the written consent of the applicant (email
shall suffice).
9. Pending finalisation of the Action, the applicant is directed to provide the respondent
with copies of the following documents (“the Documentation”) in respect of the

Applicant Properties and the Applic ant Entities, for each month from and including
December 2025, on or before the last day of the next month:
9.1. All bank statements in respect of all bank accounts linked to or used for the
purposes of receiving income and/or paying expenses, whether currently in
use or opened in the future;
9.2. All invoices and receipts issued for bookings, rentals (short and long term) or
letting, whether through the letting platforms, letting agents or privately;
9.3. Management accounts, which shall include at least an income statem ent
(profit and loss account), a balance sheet, a summary of cash flow movements,
an age analysis of trade creditors and trade debtors and i ncome and
expenditure schedules;
9.4. Booking summaries from any and all letting platforms, letting agents or private
listings for any and all listings whether currently in use or created in the future;
9.5. Bond statement and rates/utilities.
10. Pending finalisation of the Action, the respondent is directed to provide the applicant
with copies of the Documentation in respect of th e Respondent Properties and the
Respondent Entities, for each month from and including December 2025, on or before
the last day of the next month.
11. The parties are each ordered and directed to provide each other, by 28 February
2026, with all bank account statements and financial account statements which are in
their possession or control, in respect of each of the Applicant Properties or the
Respondent Properties or the Applicant Entities or the Respondent Entities for the
period from 31 May 2024 to 30 November 2025.
12. The parties are each ordered and directed to provide each other, by 28 February
2026, with a full accounting for all funds received, expended, and controlled by each
of them in respect of the Applicant Properties or the Respondent Properties o r the
Applicant Entities or the Respondent Entities for the period from 31 May 2024 to 30
November 2025.

November 2025.
13. Each of the applicant and the respondent are authorised to contact Microsoft
Corporation, the owner of OneDrive, and any other relevant service providers, to
recover deleted or removed business records and data.
14. Pending final determination of the Action and subject to the ordinary, bona fide
conduct of the Applicant Properties, the Respondent Properties, the Applicant Entities
and the Respondent Entities:
14.1. The parties shall not dispose of, encumber, or in any manner deal with any
immovable properties or material assets held by the aforesaid entities,
without:
14.1.1. the prior written consent of both parties, acting personally or
through their attorneys (email shall suffice); or, failing that
14.1.2. the leave of this Court on application.
14.2. This shall not prevent expenditure in the ordinary course of the business of the
aforesaid entities, including the payment of ordinary, legitimate operating
expenses of the Applic ant Properties, the Respondent Properties, the
Applicant Entities and the Respondent Entities, such as rates, utilities,
insurance, staff costs, routine maintenance, and similar expenditures
necessary to preserve the value of the assets of such entities.

15. No obligation in this order is reciprocal on any other obligation.
16. The parties are each entitled to set this matter down on notice to the other, with
amplified papers as required, for the variation of this order should the circumstances
require.
17. The respondent shall pay the costs of this application, with scale C applying.


_________________
A Kantor
Acting Judge of the High Court








Appearances:

For the Applicant: Adv S Clarence
sian@rsabar.com
Karen Botha Attorneys

For the Respondent: Mr Tim Dunn
TJC Dunn Attorneys