SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

JUDGMENT

CASE NO.: 17216/2023
REPORTABLE

In the matter between:
DE SAUDE SADAT DARBANDI IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS INC Applicant
and
THE ACTING PROVINCIAL MANAGER: WESTERN CAPE
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS First Respondent
THE DISTRICT DIRECTOR: CAPE TOWN
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS Second Respondent

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS Third Respondent
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS Fourth Respondent
Neutral citation: De Saude Darbandi Immigration Attorneys Inc v The Acting
Provincial Manager, Western Cape: Department of Home Affairs
(Case no 17216/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC (04.12.25)
Coram: MOOSA AJ
Heard: 12 September 2025
Delivered: 9 December 2025
Summary: Declaratory order – failure to comply with declarator – whether contempt is
competent relief arising from declarator – this question of law answered in the
affirmative.

ORDER

1 It is declared that the respondents failed to comply with paragraph (a) of the
order granted by Nziweni J on 6 March 2025 under the above case number when
their screening officials at the Cape Town Home Affairs office refused to accept
the late birth registration applications of certain clients of the applicant.

2 Each party shall be liable to pay their own costs.


JUDGMENT

Moosa AJ
Introduction
[1] This judgment concerns an application launched on 18 July 2025. Its genesis lies
in a judgment penned by Nziweni J delivered on 6 March 2025 (“the Nziweni
judgment”).1
[2] At para [85] of the Nziweni judgment, the following orders are granted:
‘a. It is declared that the conduct of officials acting in the course and the scope of their
employment duties to the Respondents, who, whilst not being authorised or
delegated to do so, refuse to accept or process applications in terms of the South
African Ci tizenship Act 88 of 1995 (“the Citizenship Act” ) and /or the Births and
Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 (“the Registration Act”) at the offices of the
Department of Home Affairs (“the Department”), is ultra vires the Citizenship and/or
Registration Act and unlawful.
b. The Respondents are directed to accept the applications of the Second to Eight
Applicants at the offices of the Department in Cape Town and to take the
necessary steps to transfer such applications to the appointed adjudicators within
the Department;
c. The costs of this application are to be paid by the Respondents, jointly and
severally, the one paying the others absolved.’

[3] In the application before me, the applicant initially sought various forms of relief,
including costs. By the time this application was heard, the only relief sought, in addition
to costs, is an order framed in the Notice of Motion as follows:

‘2. It is declared that the Respondents are in contempt of, alternatively have failed to
comply with, the judgement and order handed down in this matter in this Court
(per Nziweni J) on 6 March 2025 (“the Judgment”)’.

[4] At the hearing, Mr Simonsz for the applicant conceded that, as a matter of law,
the respondents cannot be held in contempt or breach of Nz iweni J’s judgment read as
a whole, but only in relation to obligations imposed by any orders made by the judge.

a whole, but only in relation to obligations imposed by any orders made by the judge.

1 See De Saude Sadat Darbandi Immigration Attorneys Inc and Others v Acting Provincial
Manager, Western Cape Department of Home Affairs and Others (17216/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 83.

[5] This application was argued solely on the basis that the applicant seeks an order
holding the respondents in contempt or in breach of paragraph (a) of Nziweni J’s order
quoted in para [2] above. To this end, it is necessary to provide some context. Hence, I
commence by briefly narrating the material facts which gave rise to this application.


Relevant background
[6] De Saude Sadat Darbandi Immigration Attorneys Inc (“De Saud e”) is a law firm
specialising in immigration law. It brought the application forming the subject of the
Nziweni judgment primarily for the benefit of its clients. Pursuant to th at judgment, De
Saude assisted various clients by facilitating the lodgement of applications at the offices
of the Department of Home Affairs in Cape Town in relation to matters falling within the
Department’s jurisdiction under legislation administered by it. De Saud e’s clients
included L[...] M[...] (“L[...]”) and Thamisanqa Molepo (“Molepo”).

[7] L[...] is a 17-year old South African who is a citizen by birth. However, L[...]’s birth
was never registered by his parents. Since L[...] has no documentation which proves his
South African citizenship, this has caused him to endure immeasurable hardship. In the
pleadings, L[...]’s precarious situation is explained as follows:

‘L[...] is 17 years old. He has no birth certificate, no ID number, no passport, and no
nationality. He cannot write matric, register for a tertiary institution, obtain a driver’s
licence, open a bank account, or even legally exist in the eyes of the State. He is, for all
legal purposes, invisible, not because he has done anything wrong, but because the
systems designed to protect him have systematically failed him.’

[8] On 21 May 2025, L[...] attended the Home Affairs offices in Cape Town where he
attempted to file an application for the late registration of h is birth. To add insult to his
long-standing injury, the screening officials responsible to receive such applications for

long-standing injury, the screening officials responsible to receive such applications for
processing refused to accept it. They aver red that L[...] did not have an appointment
with Home Affairs for the filing of his application . De Saud e states that no such
appointment process exists , and that the refusal by the screening officials at Home

Affairs to accept L[...]’s application is a contemptuous breach of paragraph (a) of the
Nziweni judgment.

[9] The refusal to accept L[...]’s application meant that his application for recognition
as a South Africa n citizen with all the benefits that flow from citizenship could not be
processed. De Saude complained that this refusal perpetuates L[...]’s statelessness and
violates L[...]’s constitutional right not to be stateless. I pause to mention that this point
is unassailable. Mr Nyathi for the respondents did not contend otherwise, and rightly so.
[10] L[...]’s afore-described plight is unacceptable in our open and democratic society
based on the trinity of human dignity, equality , and freedom. T o ensure that the
respondents fulfil their duties arising from Nziweni J’s decision and order, De Saud e
stepped in by assisting L[...]. Its intervention proved successful.

[11] L[...]’s application was accepted by Home Affairs on 11 August 2025, being after
this application was launched. It was then forwarded to the respondent’s Pretoria hub.

[12] Molepo is an adult who is a lso a South African whose birth was not registered.
When Molepo attended the offices of the Home Affairs Department in Cape Town, the
screening officials refused to accept his late registration of birth application for
processing by the Pretoria hub. De Saude intervened and complained that the refusal to
accept Molepo’s application is a contemptuous breach of paragraph (a) of the Nziweni
judgment. This complaint succeeded in getting Molepo’s application accepted for
processing.

Issues for adjudication
[13] De Saude persisted with its petition for the relief prayed for in paragraph 2 of its
Notice of Motion. A key defence raised in answer is that this application is moot owing to
the respondents’ acceptance of the applications for the late registration of birth.

[14] Two key issues arise for adjudication: first, whether this case is moot. If not, then

[14] Two key issues arise for adjudication: first, whether this case is moot. If not, then
the second issue is whether the respondents are in contemptuous breach of paragraph
(a) of Nziweni J’s order.

[15] Flowing from the second issue formulated above, a third issue was raised at the
hearing mero motu, namely, whether the declarator framed in paragraph (a) of Nziweni
J’s order can found a claim for contempt, bearing in mind that (i) Nziweni J declared
certain past conduct by officials in the respondents’ employ to be ultra vires and
unlawful, namely, their unauthorised refusal to accept applications which were sought to
be lodged by some of De Saude’s clients under the Citizenship Act and/or the
Registration Act, and their unauthorised refusal to process applications lodged by some
of De Saude’s clients; and (ii) Nziweni J did not expressly direct anything to be done by
the respondents.

Issue 1: Mootness
[16] It is settled law that c ourts do not exist to provide abstract legal opinions, or
decisions which would only have academic value or little, if any, practical effect. A case
is moot and, therefore, not justiciable when there is no longer a live dispute or
controversy.2

[17] The case with which I am seized is not moot. There are still live disputes.

[18] Although the respondents accepted the late birth registration applications of De
Saude’s clients which were initially rejected , that acceptance did not render this case
moot. De Saude is not seeking an order to compel acceptance of the applications of its
clients that were initially refused. If that was the relief sought , then the re would no
longer be a lis that is live and ripe for determination, save possibly for the issue of costs.

[19] The relief sought by De Saude is an order that declares the initial refusal of its
clients’ applications to be contemptuous gatekeeping by the respondents in view of the
order granted by Nziweni J that declared conduct of that nature to be ultra vires and
unlawful; alternatively, De Saude seeks an order that declares the initial refusal to
accept its clients’ applications to be a failure to comply with the order granted by
Nziweni J.

Nziweni J.

2 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 21; Minister of Tourism and Others v Afriforum NPC and Another 2023 (6) BCLR
752 (CC) para 23.

[20] The responden ts refute the allegation that they, or any among them, acted in
contempt of court when their screening officials initially refused to accept the late birth
registration applications which were sought to be filed by De Saude’s clients.
Accordingly, this dispute remains extant.

Issue 2: Declaratory orders as a legal basis for enforcement proceedings
[21] Although the parties’ counsel made off -the-cuff submissions on th e issue raised
mero motu , I afforded them an opportunity, at Mr Simonsz’s request, to conduct
research thereon after the hearing and to file a supplementary note. Mr Simonsz did so.
Mr Nyathi stood by his oral submission that since the application is moot , th e issue
raised mero m otu does not arise for adjudication . I disagree. The mootness defence
holds no water.
[22] Mr Simonsz argued, persuasively in my view, that there is no sound, rational
basis to exclude declaratory orders from enforcement through a proceeding designed to
hold a party accountable for non-compliance therewith. He rightly conceded that, by its
nature, declaratory orders generally do not impose positive duties, but rather negative
ones. Relying on R v R3 and Municipal Manager, OR Tambo Municipality and Another v
Ndabeni,4 Mr Simonsz submitted that there are declaratory orders which, properly
construed, impose positive duties that must be complied with on pain of sanction.

[23] R v R supra involved a divorced couple. A court order had been granted which
directed that both Mr and Mrs R ‘shall remain joint owners of the property known as 4[. .
.] R[. . .] d[. . .] M[. . .], M[. . .], Mozambique which may not be sold or encumbered
without prior written consent of both p arties and who shall equally be entitled to
whatever net rental income the property generates ’.5 The apex court described this
order as ‘purely declaratory in nature and did not require Mr R […] to do anything’.6


3 2023 (9) BCLR 1126 (CC).
4 2023 (4) SA 421 (CC).
5 At para 37.

3 2023 (9) BCLR 1126 (CC).
4 2023 (4) SA 421 (CC).
5 At para 37.
6 At para 37.

[24] The High Court held that this declaratory order imposed an obligation on Mr R to
pay his ex-wife her share of the net rental. The High Court held that Mr R’s failure to pay
his ex-wife her share was, on the facts, contemptuous breach of the court order quoted
above. On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the finding of contempt was set aside.

[25] The Constitutional Court considered the terms of the declaratory order and held
that it did not have the effect of imposing a positive duty on Mr R to transfer and pay to
his ex -wife her share of the net rental collected. It held that, at most, the declaratory
order placed an implied obligation on Mr R to ensure that neither he, nor anyone else,
utilise Mrs R’s share of the rental . On this basis, non -payment to her was not
contemptuous.

[26] In Ndabeni supra, Mjali J granted the following declarators:

‘1. The applicant is hereby declared the permanent employee of the first respondent in
her capacity as the Manager at Aids Training Information and Counselling Centre
Manager Section — ATICC by virtue of Resolution No 10/11 of 30 January 2011 and
any contrary conduct or action taken by the respondents is hereby declared a nullity;
2. The post referred to as AIDS Training Information and Counselling Centre Manager
(ATICC) previously occupied by the applicant is hereby declared a permanent post in
line with Resolution No 10/11 of 30 January 2011’.

[27] Ms Ndabeni applied to the High Court to hold her employer in contempt of Mjali
J’s declarators. She averred that the afore -quoted declarators entitled her to be treated
as a permanent employee , but that her employer terminated her employment in
violation of her permanent status under the declarators. The High Court dismissed the
contempt application on the basis that the elements of contempt were not proved.

[28] On appeal, the SCA set aside the High Court’s order and replaced it with an
order that the respondent ’s employer was guilty of contempt o f Mjali J’s declaratory

order that the respondent ’s employer was guilty of contempt o f Mjali J’s declaratory
order in paragraph 1 quoted in para [26] above (but not paragraph 2 thereof). Although
the Constitutional Court later set aside the SCA’s order, it did not do so on the basis that
declaratory orders cannot be enforced through contempt of court proceedings.

[29] The judiciary has no army to enforce its orders and decisions. The public’s
respect for the dignity of our courts and its confidence in the judiciary are the most
effective ways to ensure that court orders and decisions are complied with by all and
sundry. To honour judicial authority and uphold the rule of law, courts orders and
decisions must not only be complied with diligently in form but in spirit too.7 The spirit of
an order or decision is to be found in the values and principles which underpin it. T he
foundations of our democracy will be imperilled if court orders and decisions may be
breached without consequence.

[30] To protect our Constitution and to ensure that the judicial order created thereby is
not rendered impotent, it is incumben t on our courts to ensure that its orders and
decisions, including declaratory o nes, are not flouted but are respected and are
enforced against everyone who is bound thereby.8
[31] Declaratory orders are issued d aily by our courts . In Rail Commuters Action
Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others ,9 it was held that declarators
are useful tools in a democracy because they enable courts to declare what the law is in
a particular context . Doing so , in turn, brings clarity to the legal cum constitutional
obligations of persons and/or organs of state to whom the declarator applies.

[32] Declaratory orders would lose their usefulness if they were rendered less
effective, or completely ineffective, by bein g unenforceable, including in the court which
granted the order in the first place. Such a situation is intolerable . Consequently,
declarators, like all other court orders, must be capable of judicial enforcement.

[33] However, whether enforcement is , in any instance, permissible through the
remedy of contempt is an issue to be determined with reference to the terms of the
declarator itself. This is a matter of interpretation in relation to each declarator . No hard

declarator itself. This is a matter of interpretation in relation to each declarator . No hard
and fast answers of invariable application can be laid down in advance. It is to this

7 SS v VVS 2018 (6) BCLR 671 (CC) para 23.
8 Pheko v Ekurhuleni City 2015 (5) SA 600 (CC) paras 1 - 2; Secretary, Judicial Commission of
Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture v Zuma and Others 2021 (5) SA 327 (CC) para 87.
9 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) paras 107 - 108.

question that I now turn my attention as concerns Nziweni J’s order quoted in para [2]
above.

Issue 3: Contemptuous non-compliance or mere breach of declarator?
[34] As a matter of law, there can only be a failure to comply with the declarator
issued by Nziweni J in paragraph (a) of her order, whether contemptuous or not , if it
imposed an obligation on the respondents to doing something, and/or to refrain from
certain conduct. Determining this entails an interpretation of paragraph (a) of Nziweni
J’s order utilising the trite principles of interpretation.10

[35] The proper approach to interpreting a court order is explained in Finishing Touch
163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd and Others11 as follows:

‘The starting point is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In interpreting a
judgment or order, the court’s intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language
of the judgment or order in accordance with the usual well -known rules relatin g to the
interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the
court’s reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its intention.’

[36] The authors of Herbstein and Van Winsen12 state the following of relevance here:

‘The order with which a judgment concludes has a special function: it is the executive
part of the judgment that defines what the court requires to be done or not done. While it
may be said that the order must be read as part of the entire judgment and not as a
separate document, the court’s directions must be found in the order and nowhere else.
Thus, if the meaning of an order is clear and unambiguous, it is decisive and cannot be
restricted or extended by anything else stated in the judgment.’

[37] This extract has received the imprimatur of our courts .13 I too endorse the
interpretive rule expounded by the learned authors, namely, that where the language in

10 See Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) para 29.

10 See Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) para 29.
11 2013 (2) SA 204 (SCA) para 13 (cited with approval in Eke v Parsons supra at para 29).
12 Cilliers A, Loots C, and Nel H Herbstein and Van Winsen: Civil Practice of the High Courts and
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 5 ed (2009) at 937.

the executive part of a judgment is clear and unambiguous as to what is instructed to be
done or not done, then the order itself should be determinative of the court’s intention as
to what it directed the unsuccessful litigant must do, or refrain from doing.

[38] The natural corollary flowing from this salutary interpretive principle is that in
cases where a court order is unclear or ambiguous as to the direction given, or an
inconsistency or contradiction appears, then the executive part of the judgment cannot
be decisive. In such event, the modalities of contextual cum purposive interpretation
necessitate that the court’s intention be ascertained with reference to the judgment read
holistically. After all, a court order does not exist in isolation. It is an integral part of a
broader legal document.

[39] In every instance, a court order at the end of a judgment takes its shape and
colour from the discussion and analysis that precedes it. The order is an embodiment of
the result which should flow logically and rationally from an application of the values
and/or principles discussed as part of the court’s adjudicative process in answering the
issues, both factual and legal, which arose for determination by the court.
[40] In cas u, the order in paragr aph (a) of the Nziweni judgment is not directory in
nature in the sense of instructing that something be done, or not done. The order is
purely declaratory in nature : it declares certain past conduct to be ultra vires and
unlawful.

[41] Mr Simonsz concedes that paragraph (a) of Nziweni J’s order does not , in
express terms, impose obligations on the respondents. He argues that , properly
interpreted, the declarator imposes implied positive obligations on them . For the
ensuing reasons, I agree.

[42] Understanding the purpose of the declarator in paragraph (a), and its spirit,
requires consideration of the Nziweni judgment as a whole. A reading of that judgment

requires consideration of the Nziweni judgment as a whole. A reading of that judgment
reveals that it is underpinned by two central themes:14 first, it concerns fulfilment of the

13 See Disability Economic Empowerment Trust v Independent Development Trust and Another
(2025/183503) [2025] ZAECMKHC 91 (25 November 2025) paras 16 - 18.
14 The Nziweni judgment at paras 44 - 45.

constitutional right of De Saude’s clients, and members of the public generally, to
procedurally fair administrative action by the respondents, being constitutional organs of
state responsible for statutory functions falling within the sphere of public administration.

[43] Secondly, the Nziweni judgment concerns the twin roles that courts play to, on
the one hand, protect the constitutional rights vested in the hands of those beneficiaries
for whose benefit De Saude approached the court ; and, on the other, to ensure
fulfilment by the respondents of their obligations arising from, inter alia , s 7(2) of the
Constitution.15

[44] It was in this context that t he Nziweni judgment engaged the distinction between
the permissible, even admittedly necessary, practice of screening applications lodged ,
or sought to be lodged , for processing by the Pretoria hub in accordance with the
Citizenship Act or the Registration Act (as defined), and the unlawful practice of
gatekeeping that denies members of the public access to services in public
administration to which they are entitled by law.16
[45] The highwater mark of the Nziweni judgment is the court’s finding that the refusal
by the respondent’s s creening officials to accept applications for processing by the
Pretoria hub which the screening official s deem to be defective is conduct not only
beyond the screening officials’ levels of expertise, but also beyond their delegated
powers. Nziweni J, at para 65, held:

‘As such, in the performance of their screening functions, officials do not have wide
latitude in the execution of their filtering responsibilities. Inter alia, though the screening
officials have the power to screen, they do not have the power to refuse to accept an
application.’


15 Section 7(2) reads:
‘The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’
16 The Nziweni judgment distinguishes the practice of screening and gatekeeping as follows:

16 The Nziweni judgment distinguishes the practice of screening and gatekeeping as follows:
‘The phrase “gatekeeper” signifies access control. It is evident that there are several forms of
gatekeeping, particularly in the public sector. However, there is a distinction between gatekeeping
and the screening. While gatekeeping may be distinct from the screening process, it does,
however, contain elements of screening. In my view, the definitions of ‘gatekeeping’ and
‘screening’ are supplementary and not mutually exclusive.’ (at para [55])

[46] Nziweni J concluded that the refusal by the screening officials to accept
applications for processing by the Pretoria hub is , on this basis, ultra vires and
unlawful.17 This conclusion directly led Nziweni J to grant the declarator in paragraph (a)
of her order.

[47] When the wording of paragraph (a) of Nziweni J’s order is interpreted in its
proper context within the judgment viewed holistically, then it becomes clear that the
declarator was not confined to declaring past offending conduct by the respondent’s
screening officials to be ultra vires and unlawful . Of necessity, it applies to future
conduct as well.

[48] The declaratory order in paragraph (a), read with s 165(5) of the Constitution, 18
placed a n implied positive duty on the respondents to ensure that their screening
officials obey the order , both in form and spirit , by not engag ing in the same , or
substantially the same , conduct as that which was declared unlawful by Nziweni J ,
unless the screening officials are imbued with the relevant delegated authority. A
restrictive interpretation of the declarator would have the unpalatable effect that it only
covers past offending conduct. If so, the declarator would be impotent to deal with
similar unlawful conduct in the future . Such violations of the law would have to be met
each time with a fresh court application. This would create a state of affairs that makes
a mockery of declarators, and undermines the rule of law and public confidence in the
judicial system.

[49] It is common cause that the authority of the respondents’ screening officials has
not been extended to include the power to assess or evaluate applications sought to be
lodged for onward transmission to, for e.g., the Pretoria hub where the applications
would be processed. Put differently, at all material times to the application with which I
am seized, the powers of the screening officials were the same as they were when

am seized, the powers of the screening officials were the same as they were when
Nziweni J adjudicated the application before her and granted the declarator concerned.

17 The Nziweni judgment at paras 64 - 65.
18 Section 165(5) reads:
‘An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it
applies.’

[50] In these circumstances, I find that the decisions by the respondents’ screening
officials to refuse acceptance of the late birth registration applications of L[...] and
Molepo were ultra vires and unlawful. Moreover, they breached the declarator issued by
Nziweni J on 6 March 2025 . That order was disseminated to the parties’ legal
representatives.

[51] It is common cause that the respondents had, at all material times, knowledge of
Nziweni J’s order s and understood their import and effect. By reason that their
screening officials committed the same unlawful conduct which formed t he subject of
the Nziweni judgment, I find that the respondents violated the declaratory order by
failing to take the necessary steps to ensure that their screening officials cease d and
desisted from the kind of unlawful conduct dealt with in the declarator in question.

[52] For purp oses of the contempt of court application, t his latter finding place d an
evidential onus on the respondents to show that their non -compliance was neither wilful
nor mala fide . To this end, t he respondents filed answering papers in which the y
explained their conduct vis -à-vis Nziweni J’s orders . The respondents explained the
circumstances under which their screening officials refused to accept the applications
concerned which were sought to be filed at the Cape Town office of the Department o f
Home Affairs.

[53] After careful consideration of the respondents’ explanations, I am not persuaded
that their failure to comply with the declaratory order issued by Nziweni J was proved,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to be wilful and/or mala fide.

[54] In these circumstances, while I find that the respondents failed to comply with the
declarator order issued by Nziweni J, their non -compliance did not rise to the level of
contempt of court.
Costs
[55] It is trite that liability for costs is a matter entir ely within a court’s discretion. That

discretion is relatively wide, except that the discretion must be exercised judiciously.

[56] De Saude has been successful in obtaining the alternative relief sought by it .
That success is a pyrrhic victory. De Saude’s primary focus was on the contempt
application.

[57] At the hearing, and in the court papers, much time and effort w as spent on the
contempt issue. The respondents were successful in resisting the contempt application.

[58] In my vie w, since the applicant and the respondents have some measure of
success, it would be unfair to mulct any of them with costs. Consequently, an order that
each party pay their own costs would be just in the circumstances of this case.

Order

[59] In the result, the following orders are granted:

(a) It is declared that the respondents failed to comply with paragraph (a) of the
order granted by Nziweni J on 6 March 2025 under the above case number
when their screening officials at the Cape Town Home Affairs office refused to
accept the late birth registration applications of certain clients of the applicant;

(b) Each party shall be liable to pay their own costs.


________________________________
F .MOOSA
Acting Judge of the High Court



Appearances
For applicant: D Simonsz

Instructed by: De Saude-Darbandi Immigration Attorney Inc, Cape Town

For respondents: D M Nyathi
(first to fourth respondent)
Instructed by: State Attorney, Cape Town