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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE W HICHEVER IS NOT APPLIC ABL E
(1) REPORTABLE:¥ESIN O
(2) OF INTERES T TO O THER JUDG ES: ¥ESJNO
(3) REV ISEO
DA T E : 4 D ecember 2025
In the matter between:
ZUMA, JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA
And
THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE STATE ATTORNEY
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No . 003372/2024
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
In re:
THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOl,ITH AFRICA
THE STATE ATTORNEY
THE SO LIC ITOR GENERAL OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
And
ZUMA, JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA
HULLEY & ASSOC IATES INC.
LUNGISAN I MANTSHA INC.
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS
C oram: Millar J
Heard on: 1 December 2025
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FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIRST APPLICANT
SECOND APPLICANT
THIRD APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDEN T
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
Delivered:
MILLAR J
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4 December 2025 -This judgment was handed down electronically
by circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being
uploaded to the CaseUnes system of the GD and by release to
SAF LII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12h15 on
4 December 2025.
JUDG ME N T
[1] On 22 October 2025, this Court issued orders, declaring inter alia that Mr. Zuma
make payment of the sum of R28 960 77 4.34 in respect of monies advanced for
his legal fees and associated expenses. Orders were also made for the payment
of interest and for the State Attorney to report to the Court on the steps taken to
enforce the judgment. Costs orders were also made against Mr. Zuma.
[2] Mr. Zuma has applied for leave to appeal against the whole of the judgment and
the orders granted. I have considered the application for leave to appeal as well
as the heads of argument filed by those parties who filed. I have also considered
the arguments advanced by the respective parties at the hearing.
[3] The test for the granting of leave to appeal pertinent to the present matter is set
out in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act1 as follows:
1 10of2013.
"(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that
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(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter
under consideration"
[4] The grounds of appeal relied upon by Mr. Zuma fall into three broad categories.
The application for leave to appeal is some 9 pages in length and does not set
out explicitly individual grounds. I propose dealing with each of these three
categories in turn.
[5] The first category is that neither the Full Court nor the Supreme Court of Appeal
explicitly ordered that Mr. Zuma personally be responsible for the repayment of
the costs expended on his behalf for his legal expenses.
[6] This aspect was dealt with in paragraphs [18] to [22] of the judgment handed
down on 22 October 2025. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with a
repetition of what is set out there save to state that the extracts of the judgments
of both Courts in plain language make it clear that both Courts contemplated that
any order for repayment would have to be made against Mr. Zuma personally.
[7] There is simply no rational basis to conclude that because the orders of the Full
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal did not explicitly say "Mr. Zuma it is you
who must pay back the money" that that was not what was intended. The
passages quoted in the judgement of 22 O ctober 2025 from the judgments of
both Courts, fortify this view. Since this Court is bound by the decisions of both
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the Full Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal and there is no basis to
distinguish or depart from what they found, this ground of appeal has no merit.
[8] The second category was that the Court "lacked the empathy and Constitutional
sensitivity" reflected in the Constitution by ordering Mr. Zuma to make repayment.
The highwater mark of this argument was that the impact of the orders on Mr.
Zuma were not taken into account.
[9] Indicatively, Courts do consider and recognise empathy, albeit with limits and
specific to the question at hand. However, it is prudent to bring to the fore that
wha t Mr. Zuma effectively seeks in this matter, is for this Court to depart from or
overrule the Full Court2 and the Supreme Court of Appeal,3 based on "empathy"
and "constitutional sensitivity".
(1 O] Even if judicial empathy and constitutional sensitivity were relevant, Mr. Zuma
should have raised these arguments before the Full Court or the Supreme Court
of Appeal. Those Courts, on the arguments advanced before them, did not find
any basis to exemp t Mr. Zuma from the corrective consequences of
unconstitutional and unlawful state expenditure. The Full Co urt observed that Mr.
Zuma "failed to contradict the EFF's proposed remedy, nor did he explain why he should
be entitled to retain the benefit of the unlawful payments. "4
[11] The Full Court applied the "corrective principle", which requires that the
consequences of an unconstitutional or unlawful act be reversed where possible.
This was with reference to the Al/pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd
and others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and
2 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Economic Freedom Fighters v State
Attorney and Others (21405/18; 29984/'18) [2018) ZAGPPHC 836.
3 Zuma v Democratic Alliance and Another (1028/2019) [2021) ZASCA 39.
4 See n.6 at para 82.
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others,5 where the Constitutional Court quoted Steenkamp with approval and
elaborated on the "corrective principle", as:
"[30] Logic, general legal principle, the Constitution and the binding authority of
this court all point to a default position that requires the consequences of
invalidity to be corrected or reversed where they can no longer be
prevented"
... The Constitutional Court further held that a party has 'no right to benefit
from an unlawful contract' (para 67)."
[12] This makes it moot whether Mr. Zuma aided or abetted the State's conduct.
Further, as the Full Court stated: " ... Simply declaring the agreements and the
decisions to appoint private legal representatives and to pay Mr Zuma 's private legal
costs unlawful, without ordering repayment, would not achieve the remedial objects
inherent in the relief which a cowt should grant in the vindication of the rule of law. "6
[13] Stressing the breadth and constitutional legitimacy of the remedy it granted, the
Full Court relied on Corruption Watch NPC and others v President of the Republic
of South Africa and others,7 where it was held:
"[68] There is no preordained consequence that must flow from our
declarations of constitutional invalidity. In terms of s 172(1 )(b) of the
Constitution we may make any order that is Just and equitable. The
operative word 'any' is as wide as it sounds. Wide though this
Jurisdiction may be, it is not unbridled. It is bounded by the very two
factors stipulated in the section - Justice and equity."
5 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC).
6 See n.6 at para 81.
7 2018 (2) SACR 442 (CC).
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[14] Considering binding authority, judicial empathy or constitutional sensitivity8,
which have a limited scope and context cannot operate to displace the Full Court
and Supreme Court of Appeal's findings. This is nothing more than an endeavour
to re-litigate the matter and for this reason is also without merit.
[15] The third category is that this Court failed to make a just and equitable order w ith
regards to Mr. Zuma. This argument was premised on what was referred to as the
"delinquency of the State" and a plea that it wou ld have been fairer for the individual
officials who had authorised the payment of Mr. Zuma's legal fees or his attorneys
who had received payment, to first be excussed before any order was made
against Mr. Zuma. This ground is entirely self-serving and meritless having regard
to what is set out in paragraph [14] above.
[16] The issue that served before this Court was not whether repayment was a just
and equitable remedy but rather what was to be paid by Mr. Zuma once it had
been ascertained. Mr. Zuma did not place any of the accounts or the calculation
of the legal costs in issue. Similarly, within this category, it was argued that there
was a failure on the part of this Court to "apply the principles of equity and justice
when considering the DA 's additional orders."
[17] This was dealt with pertinently in paragraph [14] of the judgment of 22 October
2025 in which it was recorded that opposition to both the locus standi of the DA
as well as to the orders to the payment of interest in its counter application, were
8 See Ellmann "Marking the path of the Law " (2009) 2 Constitutional Law Review 97 at 108 and especially
at 114 where it is stated "Is there anything more that can be said, then, about what values constitutional
judges should hold? Certainly, one can say, Judges should believe in such-and-such a vision of
transformation.' And perhaps they should. One can even make arguments for such a vision that draw
on the Constitution, and thus might be characterised as legal arguments. But if law can be employed to
argue for such choices, I do not think we can deny that we are simultaneously in the realm of politics.
On grounds of politics, you prefer one understanding of the constitution's values, someone else prefers
another. If the choice of judges depends in part on their commitment to the best conception of the
constitution's values, who is to say what the best conception is? That's not an easy question to answer."
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not pursued in argument on behalf of Mr. Zuma. This category of grounds is also
without merit.
[18] It was also argued that there were other compelling reasons in terms of Section
17(1 )(a)(ii) which militated in favour of granting of leave to appeal.
[19] The reasons advanced included that the State's own unconstitutional conduct in
the matter and its liability for it was a compelling reason which required
consideration by a higher Court. Additionally, it was contended that this case is
one of "significant public importance."
[20] This is without merit. The reason for this is that firstly, two H igher Courts have
already pronounced, ad idem, on the same issue. Secondly, the question of
public importance cannot override decisions of the Court. While the issue of
whether Mr. Zuma ought to have been held liable was indeed a matter of public
importance, this has been put to rest by the Full Court and the Supreme Court of
Appeal.
[21] The amount of money to be repaid, while possibly a matter of public interest, is
certainly not a matter of either public or legal importance. To keep the doors of
the Court open indefinitely to a litigant who refuses to accept the judgment on a
particular matter, serves no legitimate purpose. All it does, is serve to be a drain
on scarce judicial resources and to strengthen the view that accountability can be
deferred for so long as one has the means to do so. It is destructive of the notion
that all are equal before the law and confirmatory of the view that "there is far too
much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot. ,s
9
From an address given by Derek Bok, Dean of the Harvard Law School from his annual report to the
University's Board of Overseers in April 1983. This sentiment is also attributed to GK Chesterton,
English writer and philosopher.
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[22] I am not persuaded that another Court would come to a different conclusion or
that there is some other compelling reason why leave to appeal should be
granted.
[23] The costs will follow the result.
[24] In the circumstances, I make the following order:
[24.1] The application for leave to appeal brought by Mr. Zuma is dismissed.
[24.2) The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the first to third respondents
in the application for leave to appeal, which costs are to include the costs
consequent upon the engagement of two counsel. In respect of senior
counsel, such payment is upon scale C and in respect of junior counsel
upon scale B.
[24.3) The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the fourth respondent in the
application for leave to appeal, which costs are to include the costs
consequent upon the engagement of two counsel, both upon scale C.
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THI= HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST TO THIRD
RESPONDENTS:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE FOURTH
RESPONDENT :
INSTRUCT ED BY:
REFERENCE:
1 DECEMBER 2025
4 DECEMBER 2025
ADV . T MASUKU SC
ADV . C MZAMO
NTANGA-NKHULU INC.
MR . M NTANGA
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ADV. G AVVAKOUMIDES SC
ADV. E NDEBELE
THE STATE ATTORNEY, PRETORIA
MR. KCHOWE
ADV. S ROSENBERG SC
ADV. J BLEAZARD
MINDE SHAPIRO AND SMITH INC.
MS .EJONKER