Brief Summary

Inquest Proceedings — Inquests Act 58 of 1959 — Failure to hold public inquest and hear oral evidence — The appellant, Sean David Todd, challenged the magistrate's finding that the death of his wife, Theresa Wampach-Todd, was caused by his actions, made without hearing oral evidence. The magistrate's decision was based solely on circumstantial evidence and police statements, despite a request from the Director of Public Prosecutions for a public inquest. The legal issue was whether the magistrate misdirected himself by not conducting a public inquest and whether this constituted a material irregularity. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the magistrate's failure to hold a public inquest and hear oral evidence vitiated the proceedings, resulting in the appeal being upheld and the matter remitted for a fresh inquest.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

The proceedings were an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the dismissal by the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town, of a review application directed at inquest proceedings conducted under the Inquests Act 58 of 1959.

The appellant was Mr Sean David Todd, the husband of the deceased. The respondents were the Magistrate: Clanwilliam (the inquest magistrate), the Director of Public Prosecutions: Western Cape, and Mrs Kendal Victor (née Wampach), the deceased’s daughter from a previous marriage.

The procedural history was that, following an inquest finding made under s 16(2)(d) of the Inquests Act, Mr Todd launched a review in the High Court seeking to set aside the magistrate’s finding and substitute it with a finding that no act or omission prima facie involving an offence had been established. The High Court dismissed the review and later refused leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal entertained the matter with leave granted by that Court. The appeal was unopposed: the magistrate and the DPP abided the outcome, and no party opposed Mr Todd’s case.

The dispute concerned whether the inquest magistrate acted lawfully and procedurally properly by dispensing with a public inquest and oral evidence, determining the matter on written statements, and nonetheless making an adverse prima facie offence finding against Mr Todd; and, allied to that, what the proper source of review power is in the constitutional era for reviewing inquest proceedings.

2. Material Facts

The undisputed background facts were that on 14 January 2016 Ms Theresa Wampach-Todd (the deceased) died after falling from a cliff in the Cederberg Mountains in the district of Clanwilliam. At the time of the incident the deceased and Mr Todd were together, and the judgment treated Mr Todd as the only person with first-hand knowledge of what occurred.

Following a police investigation, the Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) on 22 June 2017 requested the magistrate, in terms of s 8(1) of the Inquests Act, to hold a public inquest and to do so by hearing oral evidence. The record also reflected that an earlier magistrate had decided that the inquest should proceed by hearing oral evidence.

Despite these indications, on 1 November 2018 the magistrate decided to conduct the inquest without hearing oral evidence, relying instead on the written statements contained in the police docket. After perusing the docket, the magistrate set the inquest down for 24 January 2019 and notified interested parties. On that date, Mr Todd (with legal representatives) attended, the deceased’s daughter (Mrs Victor) attended, and the DPP was represented by a prosecutor.

During the inquest proceedings, Mrs Victor was permitted to make oral submissions without being under oath. She made allegations adverse to Mr Todd and urged that there were unanswered questions requiring resolution through the hearing of viva voce testimony, including testimony from various witnesses, and requested that Mr Todd be required to testify under oath.

Mr Todd’s legal representative argued that there was no evidence implicating Mr Todd; that the only witness with direct knowledge was Mr Todd; that his version would not differ from what appeared in his statement; and that the magistrate should find that no person was criminally responsible for the deceased’s death.

On 27 May 2019, without hearing oral evidence and relying only on the written material, the magistrate made findings under s 16(2) of the Act, including a finding under s 16(2)(d) that the deceased’s death was brought about by an act or omission on the part of Mr Todd prima facie involving or amounting to an offence. The magistrate’s reasoning relied on what the magistrate described as “available circumstantial evidence”, including Mr Todd’s post-incident conduct and demeanour, an allegation by an investigating officer that Mr Todd attempted to tamper with the scene, opinions attributed to a paramedic and a mountain rescue expert regarding whether the injuries were consistent with a simple slip and fall, and the magistrate’s conclusion that the fall was “probably due to the use of some force” and that the deceased “must have been pushed”.

The judgment treated as material that the magistrate’s decision to dispense with oral evidence was taken without recorded reasons, notwithstanding the DPP’s request under s 8(1), the earlier magistrate’s decision favouring oral evidence, and the request by Mrs Victor as an interested person.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal questions were whether the inquest magistrate acted in accordance with the Inquests Act by not holding a public inquest and by not hearing oral evidence, particularly in light of s 8(1) (including its proviso) and s 10(1) as interpreted in authority; and whether the failure to proceed publicly and orally constituted a material misdirection or irregularity that vitiated the inquest proceedings and required them to be set aside.

A further legal question concerned the source of the High Court’s power to review inquest proceedings in the constitutional era: specifically, whether such review power is rooted in common-law review, PAJA, statutory review provisions, or the principle of legality under the Constitution.

These issues largely concerned questions of law (interpretation of the Act and the source of review jurisdiction), together with the application of legal standards to the procedural choices made in the inquest. The inquiry also involved evaluative judgment as to whether the departure from the ordinary procedure was justified by any exceptional circumstances, and whether the procedure followed was procedurally fair in circumstances where an adverse finding was made on written material alone.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court of Appeal first addressed the proper review foundation for inquest proceedings. It accepted that inquests involve the exercise of public power, but held that inquest proceedings are not “court proceedings” and the presiding judicial officer does not sit as a magistrate exercising powers under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. Although certain criminal trial procedures apply mutatis mutandis for securing witnesses and recording evidence under the Inquests Act, an inquest is not itself a criminal proceeding, and its findings are not binding on the prosecuting authority.

The Court reasoned that, because inquest proceedings are not proceedings of a magistrates’ court, they are not reviewable under s 22 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (which concerns review of magistrates’ court proceedings). It further reasoned that PAJA does not apply because the powers exercised by a judicial officer in an inquest are not administrative action; and there is no statutory review pathway in the Inquests Act beyond the limited automatic review mechanism in s 18(1) in the specific circumstances contemplated by s 16(1).

Against that background, the Court relied on the Constitutional Court’s statement in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa that common-law review principles have been subsumed under the Constitution, and that judicial review of public power is regulated by the Constitution. The Court concluded that the source of review power for inquest proceedings, as an exercise of public power outside PAJA and outside statutory review mechanisms, is found in the constitutional principle of legality. The Court reinforced this approach by analogy to reviews of commissions of inquiry, with reference to the High Court’s decision in Corruption Watch and Another v The Arms Procurement Commission and Others, which located review control of such public power within constitutional rule-of-law requirements.

Turning to the inquest procedure itself, the Court restated the principles governing inquests drawn from Marais NO v Tilley. It treated the default position as requiring a full and fair investigation, adherence to basic procedural principles, and in the normal course the hearing of viva voce evidence. It emphasised that s 10(1) of the Inquests Act provides that, unless oral evidence is dispensed with under the Act or the judicial officer directs otherwise, an inquest shall be held in public, and that a public inquest is ordinarily purposeless if only affidavits are admitted without oral evidence.

The Court recognised that s 13(1) confers a discretion to proceed on affidavits, but held that the discretion must be exercised judicially and consistently with the purposes of the Act as expressed in s 10, meaning that departure from the general rule is justified only in exceptional circumstances. The Court reiterated the guidance from Marais that a departure would broadly be justified where the affidavits raise no relevant disputes of fact and are conclusive on relevant matters, or where they strongly indicate no offence is involved, such as clear suicide or accidental death.

Applying these principles, the Court found it was unclear on what basis the magistrate dispensed with oral evidence, and it considered it material that no reasons were recorded. The Court treated as significant that the DPP had requested a public inquest with oral evidence under s 8(1), that a previous magistrate had already decided to proceed with oral evidence, and that the deceased’s daughter—described as having a substantial and peculiar interest—also requested oral evidence.

In interpreting s 8(1), the Court focused on the proviso stating that the judicial officer “shall” (peremptorily) subpoena persons to give oral evidence if requested by the relevant prosecuting authority. The Court characterised the DPP’s “recommendation” as, in substance, a request contemplated by the provision, and thus one with which the magistrate was obliged to comply.

The Court then addressed the High Court’s reasoning. It noted that the High Court had accepted the magistrate’s decision was wrong and misguided and that the magistrate was under an obligation to call for oral evidence, but nevertheless declined to set aside the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that this was incorrect because it conflicted with the approach in Marais and the statutory scheme.

The Court considered the High Court’s reliance on Claasens v Landdros Bloemfontein. It held that Claasens was distinguishable on its facts (including that some oral evidence was heard and reasons existed for dispensing with additional witnesses), and also that Claasens pre-dated the later authoritative guidance in Marais. The Court further considered that, on the facts of the present matter, there was a dispute of fact about how the deceased died and that the magistrate made an adverse prima facie finding against the only eyewitness without giving him a meaningful opportunity to address the adverse inferences drawn from circumstantial material.

The Court concluded that the magistrate’s failure to proceed with a public inquest and oral evidence, absent exceptional circumstances and in the face of the DPP’s request, amounted to a failure to comply with statutory duties under ss 8(1) and 10 and involved procedural unfairness. It also held that, given the totality of circumstances and absence of reasons, the decision to dispense with oral evidence was arbitrary, and therefore the inquest proceedings were vitiated by material irregularities warranting review and setting aside.

As to remedy, the Court declined to substitute the finding with one favourable to Mr Todd because doing so would still rest on the same affidavit material and would perpetuate the procedural illegality complained of. It treated substitution as an extraordinary remedy not appropriate in the circumstances, and held that the correct outcome was remittal for a fresh public inquest before another judicial officer with oral evidence.

5. Outcome and Relief

The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and made no order as to costs.

It set aside the High Court order and replaced it with an order setting aside both the inquest proceedings and the magistrate’s s 16(2)(d) finding.

The matter was remitted to the Magistrates’ Court, Clanwilliam, for the appointment of another judicial officer within 30 days to hold a public inquest and hear oral evidence regarding the circumstances of the death expeditiously and without undue delay.

Cases Cited

Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111.

Hirt & Carter (Pty) Ltd v Arntsen NO and Others [2021] ZASCA 85.

Padi en ‘n Ander v Botha NO en Andere 1996 (3) SA 732 (W).

Marais NO v Tilley 1990 (2) SA 899 (A).

Memela v Chairperson of the State Capture Commission and Others [2025] ZAGPPHC 816 (14 August 2025).

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).

Corruption Watch and Another v The Arms Procurement Commission and Others [2019] ZAGPPHC 351; [2019] 4 All SA 53 (GP); 2019 (10) BCLR 1218 (GP); 2020 (2) SA 165 (GP); 2020 (2) SACR 315 (GP).

Canada (Attorney General) v Canada Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (1997) 3 SCR 440.

Keeting v Morris and Others; Leck v Morris and Others [2005] QSC 243.

S v Mabena and Another [2007] 2 All SA 137 (SCA); 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA).

Claasens v Landdros Bloemfontein 1964 (4) SA 4 (OFS).

Legislation Cited

Inquests Act 58 of 1959.

Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944.

Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

Rules of Court Cited

Uniform Rule 53.

Held

The Supreme Court of Appeal held that inquest proceedings are an exercise of public power that is reviewable in the constitutional era under the principle of legality, rather than under PAJA or statutory review provisions, and not under s 22 of the Superior Courts Act.

It held that the inquest magistrate materially misdirected himself and acted irregularly by refusing to hold a public inquest and by failing to hear oral evidence, despite the peremptory implications of s 8(1) read with s 10(1) and the governing principles requiring a full and fair investigation as articulated in Marais NO v Tilley.

It held that, absent exceptional circumstances and in the context of disputes of fact and an adverse prima facie finding against Mr Todd, the procedure adopted was procedurally unfair and arbitrary, vitiating the inquest proceedings and requiring them to be set aside and remitted for a fresh inquest before another judicial officer.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Inquest proceedings under the Inquests Act 58 of 1959 are not criminal trials and not ordinary proceedings of a magistrates’ court, even though certain criminal trial procedures may apply mutatis mutandis for securing attendance and examining witnesses. The findings in an inquest, including those under s 16(2)(d), are not binding on the prosecuting authority.

In the constitutional era, where inquest proceedings do not constitute administrative action for purposes of PAJA and where no statutory review mechanism applies, the review of such exercises of public power is grounded in the principle of legality flowing from the Constitution’s rule-of-law requirements, and public power must not be exercised arbitrarily or contrary to law.

The default position under the Inquests Act, particularly s 10(1) as interpreted in Marais NO v Tilley, is that an inquest should be held in public and ordinarily entails the hearing of viva voce evidence to ensure a full and fair investigation consistent with basic procedural principles and the requirement that justice be seen to be done.

Although a judicial officer may in terms of s 13(1) determine an inquest on affidavits, that discretion must be exercised judicially and consistently with the statutory purpose, and departure from oral evidence is justified only in exceptional circumstances, such as where affidavits raise no relevant dispute of fact and are conclusive on all relevant matters, or where they strongly indicate no offence is implicated.

Where the prosecuting authority requests oral evidence under the proviso to s 8(1), the statutory language “shall” is treated as peremptory, requiring compliance unless lawful grounds exist to justify departure consistent with the Act and the governing procedural principles.

A decision-maker who forms adverse conclusions potentially exposing a person to prosecution, without following the prescribed procedure and without affording a fair opportunity to address adverse inferences, commits a material irregularity that may vitiate the proceedings and justify setting aside and remittal rather than substitution.

Todd v Magistrate: Clanwilliam and Others (432/2024) [2025] ZASCA 185 (4 December 2025)