THE HIGH COURT OF SO U TH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISIO N , MBOMBELA MAIN SEAT
( l) REP OR T A BLE: NO
(2) O F INTEREST TO O THE R JUDG ES: YES
(3) REV ISED .
08 May2025
DATE
In the m atter between:
SIG N ATUR E
MAMOKUTHUDEVELOPMENTCC
And
CAS DRY ATTORNEYS INC
BAREND MARITZ DRY
CASE NO: 919 / 2020
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPO N DE N T
SECOND RESPO N DENT
N AD PROPERTY INCOME FUN D (PTY) LTD THIRD RESPO N DE N T
BUSHBUCKRIDGE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY FOURTH RESPONDE N T
2
_________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
_________________________________________________________________
RATSHIBVUMO DJP:
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be
on 08 May 2025 at 09H00.
[1] Background
This is the application for leave to amend the particulars of claim by the plaintiff
(the Applicant in casu). The application is premised on Rule 28, following the
objection to the Applicant’s notice to amend by the First and Second
Respondents (the Respondents), first and second defendants in the main action.
At this stage, the pleadings are closed, and matter was set down for hearing on
a special plea of prescription, but it was postponed pending the finalisation of
this application. According to the Applicant, the amendment was necessitated
by the discovery and failure to discover certain documents by the Respondents.
The application to amend is opposed by the Respondents on the basis that the
amendment would cause them prejudice.
[2] In the main action, the claim against the Respondents is for the payment of the
proceeds of sale following the deed of sale agreement signed on 31 May 2013,
in terms of which an immovable property was sold by the Fourth Respondent to
the Third Respondent for about R12.2 million . The Applicant was also
contracted in this agreement with mandate to develop the property into a
3
shopping centre. According to the particulars of claim as they stand currently,1
the claim is for the payment of the balance of the purchase price to the Applicant
following the full payment and the registration of the property in the names of
the Third Respondent. The First Respondent as the conveyancer that attended
to the registration of the property, together with the Second Respondent who is
a Director for the First Respondent, received the full payment from the Third
Respondent and the property registration is complete.
[3] According to the deed of sale, the Third Respondent had to deposit R1 million,
as part of the purchase price, for the First Respondent to invest in an interest-
bearing account for the Applicant’s benefit. This amount would be released by
the First Respondent to the Applicant, on the date the Third Respondent would
have acquired a valid final occupation certificate from the Municipality,
entitling it to unconditionally commence its business as a shopping centre.
[4] This application focuses on amending paragraph 8 of the particulars of claim
which, in its current format reads as follows:
8.1 “In the premises, following the Plaintiff’s performance, the Third Defendant’s
occupation of the immovable property and registration of the immovable property
in favour of the Third Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to receive the balance of
the purchase price less commissions due to the First Defendant as provided for in
the sale and development agreement.
8.2 The Third Defendant paid the purchase price to the First Defendant prior to the
parties’ final performance in terms of the sale and development agreement ,
alternatively prior to the Third Defendant occupying the immovable property , in
the further alternative prior to the immovable property being registered in favour
of the Third Defendant.
8.3 The Plaintiff’s entitlement to receive the balance of the purchase price in the
premise, flows forth from the Plaintiff’s performance in terms of the sale and
premise, flows forth from the Plaintiff’s performance in terms of the sale and
development agreement.
1 See p. 78 of the paginated bundle. The particulars of claim were amended once before.
4
8.4 The obligation to have received the purchase price from the Third Defendant and
to have effected payment of the balance of the purchase price to the Plaintiff befell
the First Defendant, as a result of the appointment of mandate as transferring
attorneys in terms of the sale and development agreement.
8.5 The First Defendant to date hereof effected payment of an amount of
R3 025 576.59 (three million, twenty-five thousand, five hundred and seventy six
rand and fifty-nine cents) to the Plaintiff from the purchase price it held as a result
of the aforesaid mandate.
8.6 The balance payable from the purchase price so payable by the First Defendant to
the Plaintiff amounts to R6 521 135.03 (six million five hundred and twenty one
thousand, one hundred and thirty five rand and three cents) which monies the First
Defendant by virtue of its mandate ought to hold in an interest bearing account ,
alternatively the sum of R1 million which ought to have been held in an interest-
bearing account.
8.7 The aforesaid amount became due and payable to the Plaintiff upon the date of
registration of the immovable property in favour of the Third Defendant, and in
the premises interest accrued on such claim as from date of registration of the
immovable property, being July 2013.
8.8 Furthermore, the totality of the purchase price , alternatively an amount of R1
000 000.00 (one million rand) was to be invested in terms of an interest -bearing
account by the First Defendant and the Plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds thereof,
the specific particulars of which are not at this stage at the Plaintiff's disposal.
8.9 The Plaintiff concedes that the First Defendant i s entitled to deduct from the
purchase price commission of 3% plus V AT on the amount of R 8 000 000.00 as
well as the First Defendant's costs in terms of clause 2.10, to the maximum amount
of R200 000.00 (two hundred thousand rand).
8.10 In the premises the Plaintiff is entitled to receive payment from the First Defendant
8.10 In the premises the Plaintiff is entitled to receive payment from the First Defendant
of the amount of R6 521 135.03 (six million five hundred and twenty-one
thousand, one hundred and thirty-five rand and six (sic) cents), t ogether with
interest thereon as well as interest on the amount of R1 000 000.00 (one million)
as gained in an interest-bearing account.
8.11 The Plaintiff is currently not in a position to state the particulars of the applicable
interest rate to the aforementioned interest -bearing accounts and shall , upon
5
discovery by the parties , consider amending the particulars of claim in relation
thereto and insofar as such may be required.”
[5] In terms of the notice to amend, which is now subject of this application, the
Applicant seeks an order authorising that paragraph 8 of the particulars of claim
shall now read as follows,
8.1 “In the premises, following the Plaintiff's performance, occupation and registration
of the immovable property in favour of the Third Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled
to receive the balance of the purchase price less the deductions which are permitted
in terms of the sale and development agreement.
8.2 The Plaintiffs entitlement to receive the balance of the purchase price , in the
premise, flows forth from the plaintiff ’s performance in terms of the sale and
development agreement.
8.3 The obligation to have received the purchase price from the Third Defendant and
to have effected payment of the balance of the purchase price to the Plaintiff befell
the Third Defendant as a result of the appointment of mandate as transferring
attorneys in terms of the sale and development agreement.
8.4 The First Defendant to date hereof effected payment of an amount of
R3 025 576.59 (three million, twenty-five thousand, five hundred and seventy six
rand and fifty-nine cents) to the Plaintiff from the purchase price it held as a result
of the aforesaid mandate.
8.5 The balance payable from the purchase price so payable by the First Defendant to
the Plaintiff amounts to R6 521 135.03 (six million five hundred and twenty one
thousand, one hundred and thirty five rand and three cents) which monies the First
Defendant by virtue of its mandate ought to hold in an interest bearing account ,
alternatively the sum of R1 million which ought to have been held in an interest-
bearing account.
8.6 The aforesaid amount became due and payable to the Plaintiff upon the date of
registration of the immovable property in favour of the Third Defendant, and in
registration of the immovable property in favour of the Third Defendant, and in
the premises interest accrued on such claim as from date of registration of the
immovable property, being July 2013.
8.7 Furthermore, the totality of the purchase price , alternatively an amount of R1
000 000.00 (one million rand) was to be invested in terms of an interest -bearing
6
account by the First Defendant and the Plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds thereof,
the specific particulars of which are not at this stage at the Plaintiff's disposal.
8.8 In the premises the Plaintiff is entitled to receive payment from the First Defendant
of the amount of R6 521 135.03 (six million five hundred and twenty -one
thousand, one hundred and thirty-five rand and three cents), together with interest
thereon as well as interest on the amount of R1 000 000.00 (one million) as gained
in an interest-bearing account.
8.9 The Plaintiff is currently not in a position to state the particulars of the applicable
interest rate to the aforementioned interest-bearing accounts.”
[6] Grounds of objection by the Respondents.
In response to the Applicant’s notice to amend the particulars of claim, the
Respondents raised the following as the grounds of objection to the envisaged
amendment:
5.1 “The Plaintiff intends to introduce with the proposed amendment a new c ause of
action into the claim of the plaintiff in respect of payment of the purchase price
and the R1 million when no such c ause of action exists , against the First and
Second Defendants.
5.2 Any such claim and the new cause of action has become prescribed and cannot
therefore be introduced by amendments.
5.3 The Plaintiff tries to exclude paragraphs 8.2 and 8.9 of the existing particulars of
claim, which in effect constitutes a withdrawal of admissions without bringing an
application for the withdrawal of such admission.
5.4 In this regard the substitution of the reference to “commissions” due to the First
Defendant in paragraph 8.1 with the wording “less the deductions which are
permitted in terms of the sale and development agreement ,” constitute an attempt
of a withdrawal of an admission.
5.5 The exclusion of the current paragraph 8.2 of the current particulars play
constitutes an attempt to avoid an admission of prescription of the claim of
constitutes an attempt to avoid an admission of prescription of the claim of
Plaintiff, as a result of the allegations made therein, and should not be allowed as
it is tantamount to a withdrawal of an admission.
7
5.6 The attempt to exclude the current paragraph 8.3 of the current particulars of play
it's a further attempt to avoid prescription and admission of prescription of the
plaintiffs claim which is also tantamount to a withdrawal of an admission.”
[7] Rule 28.
Rule 28 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court provides,
“Amendments to pleadings and documents
(1) Any party desiring to amend any pleading or document other than a sworn
statement, filed in connection with any proceedings, shall notify all other parties of
his intention to amend and shall furnish particulars of the amendment.
(2) The notice referred to in subrule (1) shall state that unless written objection to the
proposed amendment is delivered within 10 days of delivery of the notice, the
amendment will be effected.
(3) An objection to a proposed amendment shall clearly and concisely state the
grounds upon which the objection is founded.
(4) If an objection which complies with subrule (3) is delivered within the period
referred to in subrule (2), the party wishing to amend may, within 10 days, lodge an
application for leave to amend.
(5) If no objection is delivered as contemplated in subrule (4), every party who
received notice of the proposed amendment shall be deemed to have consented to the
amendment and the party who gave notice of the proposed amendment may, within
10 days of the expiration of the period mentioned in subrule (2), effect the amendment
as contemplated in subrule (7).
(6) Unless the court otherwise directs, an amendment authorized by an order of the
court may not be effected later than 10 days after such authorization.
(7) Unless the court otherwise directs, a party who is entitled to amend shall effect the
amendment by delivering each relevant page in its amended form.
(8) Any party affected by an amendment may, within 15 days after the amendment
has been effected or within such other period as the court may determine, make any
8
consequential adjustment to the documents filed by him, and may also take the steps
contemplated in rules 23 and 30.
(9) A party giving notice of amendment in terms of subrule (1) shall, unless the court
otherwise directs, be liable for the costs thereby occasioned to any other party.
(10) The court may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this rule, at any stage
before judgment grant leave to amend any pleading or document on such other terms
as to costs or other matters as it deems fit.
[8] In what appears to be a quotation from a judgment by Watermeyers J, in
Moolman v Estate Moolman2 counsel for the Respondents made the following
submission: ‘[T]he practical rule adopted seems to be that amendments will
always be allowed unless the application to amend is mala fide or unless such
amendment would cause an injustice to the other side which cannot be
compensated by costs, or in other words unless the parties cannot be put back
for the purposes of justice in the same position as they were when the pleading
which it is sought to amend was filed.’3
[9] The practical rule is that an amendment will not be allowed if the application to
amend is made male fide or if the amendment will cause the other party such
prejudice as cannot be cured by an order for costs and, where appropriate, a
postponement.4 Erasmus’ Commentary on Uniform Rules of the High Court 5
defines prejudice as ‘embracing prejudice to the rights of a party regarding the
subject matter of the litigation, provided there is a causal connection which is
not too remote between the amendment of the pleading and the prejudice to the
other party’s rights. ’ Where a party would be no worse off if the amendment
was granted with a suitable order as to costs than if his adversary’s application
2 1927 CPD 27 at 29.
3 See also Villa Crop Protection (Pty) Ltd v Bayer Intellectual Property GmbH 2024 (1) SA 331 (CC) at paragraphs
[64]–[67] and [87] where this approach was referred to with approval.
[64]–[67] and [87] where this approach was referred to with approval.
4 See Media 24 (Pty) Ltd v Nhleko and Another (109/22) [2023] ZASCA 77 (29 May 2023) at para 16.
5 RS 25, 2024, D1 Rule at p. 28-7.
9
or summons were dismissed unamended and proceedings were commenced
afresh, there is no prejudice in granting the amendment . The mere loss of the
opportunity of gaining time is not in law prejudice or injustice. As Riley AJ
remarked in YB v SB and Others , the primary consideration in applications of
this nature seems to be whether the amendment will have caused the other party
prejudice which cannot be compensated for by an order for costs or by some or
other suitable order such as a postponement.6
[10] Whereas the courts have a discretion to allow amendments at any stage
before the handing down of judgment, it goes without saying that the closer the
proceedings are, to the judgment stage, the likelihood of prejudice being
suffered by the opponent becomes real. This is because of the inconvenience
associated with the reopening of the case that could be closed already at that
stage, in order to rebut the lacuna caused by the amendment, and the expenses
that comes with it. If, however, the proceedings are far from the judgment stage,
like where the trial has not even commenced, the prejudice would be less likely,
and the courts would be inclined to allow the amendments. Equally, the fact that
the granting of the amendment would necessitate the reopening of the case for
further evidence to be led is no ground for refusing the amendment where the
reason for the failure to amend or lead that evidence during the pleadings’ stage,
was not a deliberate failure on the part of the applicant.7
[11] The Respondents aver that in the application to amend, the Applicant
attempts to withdraw admissions without applying to the court for leave to
withdraw. The Respondents however fail to demonstrate any admission that
would be withdrawn if the amendment is allowed. Further to this, they are
unable to refer the court to any authority to the effect that if the particulars of
6 See YB v SB and Others (8064/2014) [2015] ZAWCHC 109; 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC) (13 August 2015) at para 11.
7 Myers v Abramson 1951 (3) SA 438 (C) at 450A–B.
10
claim can constitute or contain an admission, such cannot be withdrawn except
with the leave of court.
[12] The Respondents do not elaborate as to what they mean when alleging that
excluding paragraphs 8.2 and 8.9 of the existing particulars of claim, the
Plaintiff tries to withdraw admissions without bringing an application for
withdrawal. Paragraph 8.2 referred to provides, “the Third Defendant paid the
purchase price to the First Defendant prior to the parties final performance in
terms of the sale and development agreement, alternatively prior to the Third
Defendant occupying the immovable property, in the further alternative prior to
the immovable property being registered in favour of the Third Defendant. ” I
do not see any admission made by the Applicant in this paragraph, especially
pertaining to the Respondents. This paragraph lays bare a claim to the effect that
the First Respondent was paid the purchase price by the Third Respondent.
[13] When the matter was argued, counsel for the Respondents submitted that
the paragraph sought to be omitted comprised of an admission in that a payment
was made by the Third Respondent prior to the parties’ final performance in
terms of the sale and development agreement, alternatively prior to the Third
Defendant occupying the immovable property, in the further alternative prior to
the immovable property being registered in favour of the Third Defendant. The
gist of the admission so alleged is when the payme nt was made in that this
bolsters the Respondents’ argument that the claim has prescribed.
[14] However, in pleading to this paragraph, the Respondents made no
admission of these averments. In their plea, the Respondents said, “the first and
second defendants deny each and every allegation in this paragraph and pl ead
that the third defendant paid the amount of R2 425 576.59 into the trust account
of Caz Dray Attorneys, the firm, whereafter the amount was paid to the plaintiff
11
on 7 August 2013 .”8 What is clear from the plea is that the Respondents deny
each and “every allegation in the paragraph” that they now claim contains an
admission.
[15] An admission is an unequivocal agreement by one party with a statement
of fact by the other.9 The effect of an admission is to render it unnecessary for
the plaintiff to prove the admitted fact.10 As Shepostone AJ noted in Thompson
Kusela judgment, this does not imply that a party who has made an inaccurate
or mistaken admission is left without recourse. Such a party may deliver a notice
of its intention to withdrawal the admission . There is clearly no “unequivocal
agreement between by one party with a statement of fact by the other” that can
be read into paragraph 8,2 of the particulars of claim as they stand. What appears
from the plea is a clear dispute between them.
[16] Under paragraph 8.9, the Applicant had averred that “the Plaintiff concedes
that the First Defendant is entitled to deduct from the purchase price
commission of 3% plus VAT on the amount of R8 000 000.00 as well as the
First Defendant's costs in terms of clause 2.10, to the maximum amount of
R200 000.00 (two hundred thousand rand).” In the notice to amend, this
paragraph would now be replaced with, “ in the premises, following the
Plaintiff's performance, occupation and registration of the immovable property
in favour of the Third Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to receive the balance
of the purchase price less the deductions which are permitted in terms of the
sale and development agreement.” [My emphasis].
[17] My understanding of the proposed new paragraph is that it does not
withdraw anything, but it expands from what it had provided, which was limited
8 See p. 119, paragraph 55 of the paginated bundle.
9 See Wild Sea Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Vuuren 1983 (2) SA 450 (C) at 452F).
10 Thompson Kusela CC t/a Thompson Security Group v Dewald Buys t/a Masima Block Watch (2017/39176)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 692 (13 June 2023) at paragraph 11.
12
to deductions of commissions and VAT. In its proposed format, VAT and
commissions could just be some of the deductions that are provided for in the
contract, but there could be more.
[18] To the extent that th e proposed paragraph could be a withdrawal of a
concession made in the particulars of claim, the Applicant remains covered and
protected by Rule 28 in that one can amend an admission erroneously made in
the particulars of claim. This is the whole purpose of introducing this rule. The
Applicant’s case needs not be mistaken for a case where in a claim, a party
admits the merits of the claimant’s case . Thus, a court will not allow an
amendment introducing a defence on the merits where the parties have agreed
that the merits and the quantum are to be separately following a concession on
the merits by the defendant, that has been accepted by the plaintiff. By
compromising the merits , the defendant precludes himself from being able to
revisit the merits just the same as judgment had been given thereon.11
[19] If a party makes a mistake in the pleadings by, for example, demanding too
little when more is owing, or by admitting that the defendant has paid portion
when in fact he has not, he gives his opponent an advantage which justice and
fair dealing would not condone. If the opponent is then deprived of this unjust
advantage by an amendment, the parties are put back for the purposes of justice
in the same position as they were when the pleading sought to amend was filed.
The opposing party suffers no injustice and is not prejudiced, for he is in no
worse position than he would have been if the pleading in its amended form had
been filed in the first instance.12
11 GMF Kontrakteurs (Edms) Bpk v Pretoria City Council 1978(2) SA 219 (T) at 223B.
12 See Ergo Mining (Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality [2020] 3 All SA 445 (GJ) at paragraph [8].
13
[20] In De Beer v Unica Iron and Steel (Pty) Ltd 13 Davis J remarked that if a
party makes a tactical blunder by, for example, admitting an allegation which
can only be proved by a particular witness, who is then released by his opponent
and leaves the country, his opponent may be prejudiced by an amendment
withdrawing the admission. If the witness were not capable of recall or evidence
could not be obtained from him on commission, then even though the admission
might have been made bona fide, withdrawal of the admission would probably
not be allowed.
[21] I take note of the fact that the trial in this matter has yet to commence.
There is no allegation that the Respondents may have released some witnesses
as a result of the concessions allegedly made. In actual fact, there is no real
prejudice that the Respondents may suffer if the amendments referred to in this
paragraph were to be allowed. The Respondents are not in any worse situation
than they were under the current particulars of claim. The fact that there could
be chances for the Respondents to lose the case does not qualify on its own to
be categorised as prejudice. Furthermore, there is no factual basis on which to
reject the Applicant’s averment to the effect that no dates can be put on these
paragraphs, owing to the Respondents refusing to discover bank statements
bearing the dates thereon.
[22] The argument by the Respondents that the claim has prescribed does not
salvage their objection. The special plea on prescription is yet to be heard and
decided. The prescription of the claim has very little to do with the omission or
inclusion of the dates on which payments were made by the Third Respondent,
into the First Respondent’s account. It has everything to do with the date on
which the debt became due and payable.
13 (88472/2018) [2021] ZAGPPHC 793 (26 November 2021) at para 4.
14
[23] If the court shall find in favour of the Respondents in the special plea, the
claim shall be dismissed. The notice to amend does not introduce a new claim
but clarifies what may not have been clear in the particulars of claim as they
stand. In the current particulars of claim, the Applicant reserved the right to
amend its particulars of claim given the fact that the documents that would
disclose the interests acquired in the interest-bearing account, were yet to be
discovered.
[24] In R M van de Ghinste & Co (Pty) Ltd v Van de Ghinste14 it was held that
where an objection is raised to a proposed amendment to a pleading on the
ground that the pleading as amended would be excipiable, the court should not
confine itself to an inquiry as to whether or not the question of excipiability is
arguable. The court should instead make a finding and if it finds that the
pleading as amended would be excipiable, the application for amendment
should be refused.
[25] In casu, t he Respondents do not elaborate as to how the proposed
amendment can be said to be excipiable. One remains not knowing if they
suggest that the proposed amendment could be vague and embarrassing or if it
does not disclose the cause of action. Presuming that such is their argument, this
court is of the view that the proposed amendment is not vague and it does
disclose a cause of action. If the amendment was the Applicant’s way to remove
the cause of complaint, the notice of amendment should therefore be
commended for that. This I say without necessarily holding that the particulars
of claim was by anyway vague and embarrassing or that they disclosed no cause
of action. The court finds that paragraph 8 of the amended particulars of claim
is therefore not excipiable.
14 1980 (1) SA 250 (C) at 258H–259A. See also See also Krischke v Road Accident Fund 2004 (4) SA 358 (W) at
363D–F; Neale N.O. v Pipeflo (Pty) Ltd (23970/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 667 (19 September 2022) at paragraphs 46–
53.
15
[26] Rule 28(9) provides that a party giving notice of amendment in terms of
subrule (1) shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be liable for the costs
thereby occasioned to any other party. There is no reason advanced for ordering
otherwise. The costs associated with this provision are dependant on what the
Respondents are caused to do as a result of the amendment. These are not the
costs of opposing the application for amendment, which costs would normally
follow the outcome, unless the court orders otherwise.
[27] While the court has a discretion to order that the costs of objecting to the
amendment should be included as costs occasioned by the amendment, the
circumstances of this case do not justify that order. I hold a view that the
objection to the amendment was frivolous and not necessary as the Respondents
clearly suffer no prejudice therefrom. In Rabinowitz v Van Graan15 it was held
that ‘a bona fide amendment of a pleading with the object of ventilating the real
issues between the parties must be allowed. The party choosing to contest the
issue is expected to decide at its own risk whether or not to declare battle. There
is no consideration why I should deviate from the general principle. For these
reasons the costs should follow the result, ie the unsuccessful parties should be
ordered to pay the costs.’
[28] The Order:
For the aforesaid reasons, I make the following order.
28.1The Applicant is granted leave to amend the particulars of claim in terms
of the notice of intention to amend dated 30 July 2024.
28.2The First and Second Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this
application including costs of two counsel.
15 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) at paragraphs 45-46. See also Moolman v Estate Moolman 1927 CPD 27; Kirsh
Industries Ltd v Vosloo and Lindeque 1982 (3) SA 479 (W) at 486A–C; Cordier v Cordier 1984 (4) SA 524 (C) at
536A
16
-VUMO
DEP U TY JU DGE PRESIDENT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION OF THE HIGH CO U RT
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPLICANT:
IN STRUCTED BY:
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
IN STRUCTED BY:
DATE HEARD:
JU DGMENT DELIVERED:
ADV. G SHAKOANE SC &
ADVMHMBATHA
MPHO MSHILOA N E ATTORNEYS
MBOMBELA
ADV. R DU PLESSIS SC &
ADV M BOO N ZAAIER
CAZ DRY ATTORNEYS INC
MBOMBELA
06MAY2025
08MAY2025