SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA
(GRAAFF-REINET CIRCUIT COURT)
NOT REPORTABLE
Case no: CC33/2025
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
FABIAN ROMEO LIESING Accused
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
Govindjee J
[1] F[...] M[...] (the deceased) died in her home (the home) on the morning of 2
November 2024 due to blood loss caused because of a single stab wound to the
chest.1 The accused (Mr Liesing), her live-in partner, is charged with her murder. He
pleaded not guilty and denies that he inflicted the fatal injury.
The state’s case
[2] Mr Liesing, the deceased and Ms Matayi had spent the evening of 1
November 2024 drinking together. The y continued to do so at Ms Matayi’s home
between approximately 06h00 and 08h00 on the day of the incident, consuming
approximately two litres of a type of wine. Mr Liesing, who was under the influence of
alcohol, then accompanied Mr Adams to town, while th e deceased and Ms Matayi
continued to consume alcohol.
[3] Mr Adams recalled that he had fetched Mr Liesing around 08h00 on 2
November 2024. Mr Liesing appeared normal to Mr Adams, who sent him into a
cash loans business to obtain some money. Mr Adams then p urchased meat for Mr
Liesing, and biltong for himself. He was offered the use of an Okapi knife (the knife)
by Mr Liesing, which he refused. The two drove together to the home, talking jovially.
Mr Adams gave Mr Liesing R30 and dropped him off on the stree t corner, close to
the home.
[4] Mr Adams had himself been drinking the previous evening and his evidence
revealed various shortcomings. I accept Mr Liesing’s testimony that he consumed a
beer in Mr Adams’ presence. In addition, contrary to Mr Adams’ evidenc e that Mr
Liesing was ‘normal’, I accept the latter’s testimony that he was moderately under
the influence at that stage, and when he returned to the home. Whereas Mr Adams
initially testified that he had been with Mr Liesing for one to two hours, he later
conceded that a period of under an hour was more likely. I find that this timeframe
accords better with the other accepted evidence. What occurred in the home in the
hour or so after Mr Liesing’s return from the trip to town forms the crux of the case.
1 The chief post mortem findings were described as follows: ‘stab wound on right chest anterior
cutting through right sub -clavian artery just before it goes into axilla … pale internal organs’. The
wound was 4cm in length on the right chest interior, just b elow the right clavicle and 10 cm right of the
midline. The tract of the wound proceeded downwards, to the back and from left to right towards the
right axilla (armpit), cutting through the right sub-clavian artery before proceeding into the axilla.
[5] During that time, Mr Liesing arrived at Ms Dampies’ door and asked her to
come to the home. Speaking calmly, he told her that the deceased had been
washing and had fallen on a beer bottle. As she had another visitor, she informed
him to call somebody else. She did not realise that anything serious had occurred
and was surprised to find the deceased lying in her own blood, on her back and
wearing only a T -shirt, when she attended the home ten to fifteen minutes later. I
accept her evidence that this was durin g the time that Mr Liesing had proceeded to
call Ms April and that they arrived approximately fifteen minutes thereafter, followed
by ambulance personnel and, later, the police. Mr Liesing, still speaking normally,
had tried to wake the deceased by calling her name. Ms Dampies was a good
witness who gave considered responses to the questions posed of her and who was
able to deduce Mr Liesing’s movements once he had returned with Ms April.
[6] Ms April, the deceased’s cousin, lived approximately 15 minutes’ wal k away
from the home. She recalled that Mr Liesing arrived between 09h00 and 10h00 and
asked her to accompany him. He said only a few words, repeatedly called her,
uttered the deceased’s name and the words ‘the blood’. His voice sounded normal to
her, but with a sense of urgency. The two then walked quickly to the home. Ms April
testified that Mr Liesing and the deceased loved each other very much, which
accords with the evidence of Ms Dampies. She resided across the road from the
home and had spent time wi th the couple, who were a popular couple in the
neighbourhood. The two were not known to fight.
[7] Mr Liesing informed Sgt Amsterdam, one of the police officers who attended
the scene, that the deceased had fallen off the toilet seat onto a beer bottle. As was
the case with Ms Dampies, Sgt Amsterdam did not observe any glass bottles in the
bathroom. Cst Gomfa, who accompanied Sgt Amsterdam, confirmed this evidence,
bathroom. Cst Gomfa, who accompanied Sgt Amsterdam, confirmed this evidence,
as did Mr Jooste, an ambulance emergency assistant who had attended the scene
shortly after 10h00 and completed the declaration of death. Cst Gomfa recalled that
Mr Liesing had said that he ha d been sitting and talking to the deceased before she
had proceeded to the bathroom.
[8] Mr Dlova, a senior forensic pathology officer, requested a second opinion
because he had not observed any broken bottle, or pieces of a bottle, at the scene.
He was present when the autopsy was performed by Dr De Beer three days after the
incident. His evidence confirms that the deceased had been wearing leggings, which
had been pulled down, and a rolled -up T-shirt at the time of her death. The T -shirt
had covered the wou nd which caused the deceased’s death. He testified that,
despite all the blood, he had felt for a cut on her head, from which blood had flowed.
While he believed that such a cut existed, based on what he recalled feeling, this
evidence is unsupported by th e medical examination and testimony of Dr De Beer
and must be rejected.
[9] Dr De Beer, a forensic pathologist, was an excellent witness who offered
clear, well -supported evidence based on his knowledge and experience. He had
been called by WO Kruger because of the quantity of blood at the scene and
because the emergency medical services personnel had been unable to find any
fatal wounds to the body. The deceased was found lying on the floor of her bathroom
with a large amount of blood on the floor and walls. As a cursory external
examination at the scene revealed no wounds, Dr De Beer decided to examine the
body at the morgue. He then observed the fatal chest wound and informed WO
Kruger.
[10] Dr De Beer opined that the 4cm -wound, given its nature, had been caus ed by
a sharp object, most probably a knife. The skin had not burst, as would have been
the case with a wound caused by a blunt object. The absence of other marks around
the wound meant that it was unlikely that a broken bottle had caused the injury.
[11] Dr De Beer deduced that the injury had likely been caused at a time when the
deceased was standing, although it was possible that she had been seated on the
toilet. This was due to the spread of the blood around the bathroom. At some point
she would have falle n on the floor. The tract of the wound proceeded downwards,
towards the back and from the left to right of the deceased’s body, towards the right
towards the back and from the left to right of the deceased’s body, towards the right
armpit. The wound was not a particularly deep wound but had severed the sub -
clavian artery. Scientifically, th e doctor explained that the length of the wound need
not correlate with the size of the blade considering that a cutting action would have
been applied to the skin. The nature of the wound was such that the deceased had
likely collapsed within ten to fifte en minutes from the time the wound was inflicted.
The same amount of time would typically have elapsed prior to her passing.
[12] Dr De Beer also considered the blood alcohol report obtained from the
deceased’s blood sample. He confirmed that she had been sev erely intoxicated at
the time of the death, which correlated with Ms Mantayi’s description of the
deceased’s condition at the time they parted. Dr De Beer’s view was that the
deceased was so intoxicated that she might not even have noticed that she had
been stabbed and, therefore, not sought help immediately. Initially, she would have
been able to walk around, despite the wound, and may not have realised the
seriousness of her injury. In his opinion, the deceased had likely stood over the toilet
bowl while bleeding.
[13] Cognisant that he had also been drinking, Dr De Beer testified that Mr Liesing
would not necessarily have been able to realise the severity of what happened.
When the wound had been inflicted there would not have been a lot of blood visible
immediately. With each heartbeat, however, he would have observed the blood
being released through the open wound. A person capable of making decisions
would have seen enough to worry approximately two minutes after the injury had
been inflicted.
[14] Sgt Theron, a crime scene investigator, had observed and photographed the
knife on a television stand in the lounge of the home when he attended the scene.
Once Dr De Beer had informed WO Kruger of the discovery of the wound that had
been the cause of death, he had r eturned to the scene to collect the knife. Sgt
Theron had observed only an oiliness on the blade, without any sign of blood. The
knife had been duly processed and sent for DNA analysis.
[15] WO Kruger testified that Mr Liesing had spoken to him of his own acco rd
when he arrived on the scene sometime after 10h00, having been informed of his
rights. He had described that he and the deceased had lay in bed together to sleep,
rights. He had described that he and the deceased had lay in bed together to sleep,
having consumed alcohol that morning. The deceased proceeded to the bathroom
and, a short while later, called him by his nickname seeking assistance. At that stage
she lay in the bathroom in front of the toilet on her stomach. He had turned her over
and there was no blood emanating from her body. She had, he said, fallen off the
toilet and knoc ked her head on the bath and he had proceeded to seek assistance
from Ms April.
[16] Despite the volume of blood in the bathroom, WO Kruger saw no signs of
blood on the bath itself. He confronted Mr Liesing with this fact, adding that the
distance between the toilet and bath was such that his explanation was unlikely. Mr
Liesing then suggested that she had fallen forward onto the washing machine.
[17] According to WO Kruger, Mr Liesing had not behaved in a way that suggested
he was distraught at having lost a loved one. He was subdued, showed no emotion
and did not appear to be upset. On WO Kr uger’s own assessment, Mr Liesing was,
however, under the influence of alcohol at the time, without being drunk beyond self -
control and in control of his faculties. He appeared the same when he made a
warning statement the following day, by which time he w as sober. His version had
now changed to include reference to a bottle as the cause of the injury. He had then
confirmed that he and the deceased had been alone at home at the time of the
incident. WO Kruger testified that he had seen little blood on Mr Li esing when he
attended the scene, with no blood on his upper body. He had also searched the
home and found no evidence of bloody clothes in any of the rooms. This suggested
that Mr Liesing had not changed clothing after the incident.
[18] Cst Morley, the inves tigating officer, had accompanied WO Kruger when he
arrested Mr Liesing. He testified that Mr Liesing had offered a different version of
events at the station on the day of the arrest, at a time when he was still tipsy and
appeared nervous, compared to the written warning statement he had made the
following day when sober. In essence, he had joined the deceased in bed when he
returned from his drive with Mr Adams. At some point the deceased had proceeded
returned from his drive with Mr Adams. At some point the deceased had proceeded
to the bathroom, informing him that she wanted to uri nate. She then screamed from
the bathroom that she had fallen. He attended to her and found her lying on the floor,
bleeding. The deceased asked him to seek help. He called the neighbour across the
way and then returned to the home to assess the deceased’s condition. She then
said he should call Ms April, which he did.
[19] The warning statement made no mention of the time spent with Mr Adams, or
the visit to the neighbour across the way. Mr Liesing confirmed in that statement that
he and the deceased had been alone at the home during the time of the incident.
There were, however, various similarities between what had been said on the day of
the arrest and the following day, including Mr Liesing’s time spent drinking with Ms
Matayi, that he and the deceased had been lying in bed before he heard her call and
that he had proceeded to seek assistance.
[20] Cst Morley noted that Mr Liesing’s demeanour had remained unaltered on
both occasions that they had interacted, and that he had not displayed any overt
emotions. Cst Morley indicated that human DNA had been located on the knife.
Further analysis was necess ary to determine if this matched the DNA of the
deceased.
Mr Liesing’s testimony
[21] Mr Liesing testified that he had spent time drinking with Ms Matayi and the
deceased the night before the incident. They had returned to the home and slept but
then returned to Ms Matayi’s residence early in the morning to complete the leftover
liquor. To that they added additional liquor that had been purchased. Mr Liesing had
met Mr Adams around 08h00 and drawn money for him from a cash loan business.
When Mr Adams had retu rned from the butchery shortly thereafter, Mr Liesing had
offered him the use of the knife, which he had in his possession. He had consumed a
beer in the vehicle before being dropped on the corner close to the home.
[22] Mr Liesing gave the deceased the meat, vegetables and later the knife, when
he entered the home. He asked her to cook. She had not done so, and he had
decided to go to bed. He had passed out on the bed but was aware that the
deceased was in the home. He then heard her scream from the bathroom and was
asked to call
Ms April. He jumped out of bed and observed her lying in the bathroom. He tried to
Ms April. He jumped out of bed and observed her lying in the bathroom. He tried to
speak to her, but she was insistent that he should call Ms April. She was lying on her
abdomen, and he had tried to turn her. He thought that she was becoming sick
because of her chronic cardiac ailment. He observed blood on the floor, but no
injuries.
[23] Mr Liesing proceeded to Ms Dampies given her proximity. He asked her for
assistance but mentioned only that the deceased had fallen in the bathroom. Wh en
she did not return with him, he proceeded to Ms April and informed her that the
deceased had fallen in the bathroom. Both Ms Dampies and Ms April were aware
that the deceased took chronic medication for her condition.
[24] Later, when the police had arrive d, Mr Liesing told them that he assumed that
she must have sustained the fatal injury by falling against the bathtub, sink or on a
bottle. He testified that he had been crying on the couch and that WO Kruger had
observed this. On his own assessment, he was moderately under the influence of
alcohol at the time that the incident occurred. As for the knife, this was used for
domestic purposes by both Mr Liesing and the deceased. He described that the two
had enjoyed a very good relationship, had lived together for more than eight months
and were often in each other’s company.
[25] Mr Liesing distanced himself from the version put on his behalf as to what he
had told Ms Dampies about the deceased having fallen on a bottle. He had, he said,
only informed her that the deceased had fallen in the bathroom and made no
mention of the blood he had observed. He later testified that he could not recall
whether he had told Ms Dampies about any bottle. That version must be rejected
considering the quality of Ms Dampies’ evidenc e on the point. Various other pieces
of evidence appeared for the first time during his cross-examination. For example, he
now explained that he had run across the road to Ms Dampies. He had not heard her
response to him because, at that moment, the deceas ed shouted to him to proceed
to Ms April. His uncertainty about where he had met Mr Adams had been replaced
by conviction that they had met some distance away from Ms Matayi’s home. He
had, he said, walked to meet Mr Adams on a street corner. This contrast ed with the
had, he said, walked to meet Mr Adams on a street corner. This contrast ed with the
plea explanation tendered on his behalf, in terms of which he had been woken by Mr
Adams’ hooting, and shaken awake by the deceased, outside Ms Mantayi’s home
that morning. The accepted evidence is that he had been awake, aware and
watching the clock so that he could meet Mr Adams timeously around 08h00,
notwithstanding his alcohol consumption in the time he had spent at Ms Mantayi’s
home. He was sober enough to proceed by himself into the cash loan business and
recalled signing for the loan he obtained for Mr Adams. On his own version, he
consumed no more than a single beer, which was consumed in the vehicle, from that
time until the time of the incident.
[26] He also stated, for the first time, that the deceased had been in the company
of her friends when he returned to the home and handed her the groceries. He now
indicated that he had proceeded straight to the bedroom to sleep and made no
mention of giving the knife to the deceased. He laughed and was unable to answer
when asked why he would have had the knife with him when he was with Mr Adams,
considering that it was used for domestic purposes. He recalled that the deceased
had joined him in bed, which suggests that, on his own version, he remained aware
of the events occurring around him and ha d not fallen into a deep sleep. He
conceded on various occasions that the two were alone it the home together.
Towards the end of his cross-examination, however, he seemed to suggest only that
he had not seen anybody else in the home, the implication being that somebody else
may well have been present.
[27] Cross-examination also elicited, for the first time, the version that he had
continuously, and unsuccessfully, attempted to call the ambulance while he ran to
Ms April’s house. He had, however, not thought to call Mr Adams, who worked as an
ambulance practitioner, because he was off duty. He chose to walk back to the home
with Ms April, rather than run and admitted having no expectation that she would be
able to offer any assistance whatsoever. He also added a second chronic liver
condition to the deceased’s cardiac ailment he had mentioned during evidence -in-
chief.
Analysis
[28] There are three main issues that require consideration. Firstly, the state’s
case against Mr Liesing is based on circumstantial evidence . Where the evidence is
purely circumstantial, a court must apply the two rules of logic referred to in R v Blom
(Blom), before a conviction is possible:2
(Blom), before a conviction is possible:2
‘In reasoning by inference there are two cardinal rules of logic which cannot be ignored:
2 R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202–203.
1) The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts. If it is
not the inference cannot be drawn.
2) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from
them save the one sought to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable
inferences, then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is
correct.’
[29] An inference of guilt can only be drawn from facts which have been
objectively established, and due allowance must be made for the reasons why the
accused may have been a mendacious witness or dishonestly denied certain facts. 3
Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There can
be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts
which it is sought to establish. It is important to note that if there is an absence of
proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails
and all that is left is speculation or conjecture. 4 In other words, before he can be
convicted as charged, there must be proved facts which justify an inference that Mr
Liesing is linked to the death of the deceased. In the absence of such facts, there is
no prima facie case against Mr Liesing and even mendacious evidence would not
serve to supplement gaps in the State case and justify a finding of guilt. The
evidence must be considered in its totality before applying the Blom logic. It is
inappropriate to, piece -meal, subject each individual piece of evidence to a
consideration of whether it excludes the reasonable possibility that the explanation
given by an accused is true.5
[30] The common cause or proven facts are the following:
(a) Mr Liesing and the deceased had lived together as a couple for eight months
at the time of the incident.
(b) The deceased died due to blood loss caused by a single stab wound to the
chest sometime before 10h00 on the morning of 2 November 2024.
chest sometime before 10h00 on the morning of 2 November 2024.
3 S v Mtsweni [1985] 3 All SA 344 (A) at 345 –346; 1985 (1) SA 590 (A) at 593D –594G. Also see S v
Steynberg 1983 (3) SA 140 (A), detailing the various factors that must be considered in assessing the
mendacious evidence of an accused,
4 S v Essack and Another 1974 (1) SA 1 (A) at 16D.
5 S v Reddy and Others 1996 (2) SACR 1 (A) at 8.
(c) Mr Liesing had the knife in his possession when he was with Mr Adams and
returned to the home with it. The knife has since been assessed as containing
some human DNA.
(d) No glass bottles, broken or otherwise, were found on the scene. The injury
inflicted was, in any event, inconsistent with that typically caused by a broken
bottle.
(e) The deceased and Mr Liesing were both at the home at the time of the
incident.
(f) The deceased was severely intoxicated at the time of death, to the extent that
she might not even have realised that she had been stabbed. She was,
however, able to communicate verbally with Mr Liesing following the incident,
and did so.
(g) She would likely have collapsed ten to fifteen minutes after having been
stabbed and passed away the same period thereafter.
(h) Mr Liesing was moderately intoxicated at the time of the incident.
(i) After the incident, he first sought assistance from M s Dampies and then Ms
April.
(j) He offered various possible explanations to the police as to what may have
occurred.
[31] The inference that it was Mr Liesing that stabbed the deceased with the knife
is consistent with all these facts. Furthermore, the proved fac ts are also such that
they exclude every other reasonable inference. As Ms McCallum, for Mr Liesing,
suggested, the only other remote possibility to consider was that an unknown
intruder had managed to enter the home while Mr Liesing was asleep, stabbed th e
deceased once and fled the scene without trace. The proposition needs only to be
stated to be rejected as fanciful. There was simply no evidentiary basis to support
any such scenario, including forced entry. In addition, accepting the evidence of Dr
De Beer, the deceased and Mr Liesing were likely able to interact for some minutes
after the incident before she collapsed. On his own version, he had no difficulty being
roused from sleep and engaged with her before deciding how to proceed. That being
roused from sleep and engaged with her before deciding how to proceed. That being
the cas e, the deceased would clearly have communicated in a wholly different
manner to Mr Liesing had she been stabbed by an intruder, notwithstanding her
state of intoxication. She would, at the very least, have communicated that she had
been stabbed, and not merely insist that Ms April, who could offer no real assistance,
should be called. Indeed, Mr Liesing voluntarily indicated in his warning statement
that he and the deceased had been alone in the home at the time of the incident
and, up to the time of his own cross-examination, conducted his case on that basis.
[32] That aside, Mr Liesing would have the court believe that he had laboured
under the assumption that her chronic condition(s) had caused her to fall and bleed.
Considering the medical evidence, and all the evidence, including photographic
evidence of the bathroom and the testimony of those who attended the scene, any
suggestion that the deceased had impaled herself on a sharp object in the bathroom
may safely be rejected. There was no object in the bathr oom, or found in the
bathroom after the incident, supportive of that scenario.
[33] The SCA has confirmed that it is folly to think that circumstantial evidence
means some sort of weaker or less reliable evidence. 6 In the present circumstances,
on my assessment the result is that the circumstantial evidence is compelling and
proves beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Liesing stabbed the deceased with the
knife shortly after he returned to the home after his trip to town with Mr Adams. It
was for these reasons too that the application for discharge in terms of s 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977,7 was unsuccessful.
[34] Mr Liesing was a mendacious witness who had no qualms about repeatedly
modifying his version to suit his preferred narrative. Various inconsistencies in his
version have been detailed, above. I also accept Ms Dampies’ evidence that he had
referred to the deceased bathing and falling on a bottle when he sought her
assistance. This was also the version put on his behalf. He spoke calmly to her, so
that she had no real appreciation of the severity of the situation. While he was not to
know that she would not accompany him immediately to the home, it must be
know that she would not accompany him immediately to the home, it must be
accepted that he had already, by then, taken steps to clean the knife, while the
deceased was bleeding in the bathroom. This also speaks to his state of mind at the
time. He had subsequently proceeded to Ms April on what was close to a 30 -minute
6 Jantjies v S [2014] ZASCA 153 para 17.
7 Act 55 of 1977.
round trip, knowing that the deceased was still bleeding and that Ms Dampies was
unable to assist, rather than seeking any other form of assistance. His version that
he had attempted to call an ambulance must also be rejected as a fabricated
afterthought. Despite being in possession of his phone, he had not called a nyone
throughout this time. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that Mr Liesing acted
after the incident, and has continued to act during these proceedings, in a manner
designed to avoid accountability for his conduct. All of this is not to suggest in any
way that the inferences have been drawn against Mr Liesing merely as punishment
for untruthful evidence.8
[35] The second issue is the question of intention. This requires the court to
consider all the circumstances of the case, including the good relat ionship between
Mr Liesing and the deceased, and Mr Liesing’s individual characteristics which the
evidence has brought to light, notably his degree of intoxication. The court is obliged,
to the best of its ability, to place itself in Mr Liesing’s position at the time of the
commission of the act and then try to ascertain his state of mind at that moment.
[36] Here too, there are useful inferences to be drawn from the proved facts. The
objective factors to be considered include the type of weapon used, the ser iousness
of the injury and depth of the wound, the part of the body which was wounded as
well as the objective probabilities of the case and general human experience.9 These
are all useful aids employed to answer the ultimate question. In deciding to stab the
deceased as he did with the knife, on her body and applying a downward motion,
while both were intoxicated, I am satisfied that Mr Liesing subjectively foresaw that
there was a possibility of a mortal wound being inflicted. Considering the dangerous
nature of the weapon, the likely force with which it was wielded and the location of
nature of the weapon, the likely force with which it was wielded and the location of
the stab on the body, the deceased’s death was not only a remote possibility. He
reconciled himself to this concrete risk and persisted in his conduct reckless as to
the consequences, so that his culpability has been established. The state has, in my
view, proved both dimensions of dolus eventualis beyond reasonable doubt.
8 Cf S v Burger and Others 2010 (2) SACR 1 (SCA) para 30. Also see DT Zeffertt and AP Paizes
Essential Evidence (2nd Ed) (2020) at 35.
9 CR Snyman Criminal Law (7th Ed) (2020) at 169.
[37] The third and final issue to be determined stems from Mr Liesing’s plea
explanation. This conveyed the impression that Mr Liesing had been drinking for a
continuous, extended period for a day and night, that he had passed out only to be
woken by Mr Adams’ hooting. He had then proceeded with him but continued
drinking, returned and passed out immediately be fore awaking to the deceased’s
screams. That version is unsupported by the evidence, particularly considering Mr
Liesing’s conduct before and after the incident, as detailed above, and his own
assessment of his level of sobriety.
[38] It is accepted that it is only in highly exceptional cases that it will be found that
the effect of intoxication is such as to exclude an accused’s capacity to know that
what they are doing is unlawful, or so as to result in a lack of capacity due to a
‘fundamental disintegratio n of the accused’s inhibitions’. 10 Even the fact that a
drunken person does not remember afterwards what he did or intended to do does
not necessarily mean that he lacked criminal capacity when he committed the
wrongful act.
[39] This is not such an instance and there is little evidence, if any, as to the actual
effect of liquor on Mr Liesing’s state of mind at the time. 11 The evidence of his
actions before, at the time of and after the incident, as appears from the evidence, is
crucial in assessing the point. 12 It must also be noted that, despite the additional
alcohol brought to Ms Mantayi’s home that morning, her evidence that Mr Liesing
only partook of a portion of the available liquor is uncontested. It is important that he
was able to monitor the time so that he could meet Mr Adams, converse normally
with him, proceed to the cash loans business and sign for money received, as he
confirmed during his evidence. Considering all the circumstances, Mr Liesing’s
conduct prior to and in the immediate aftermath of the incident supports the finding
conduct prior to and in the immediate aftermath of the incident supports the finding
that he was in control of his faculties and it may be inferred that he well knew what
he was doing when he stabbed the deceased. He had certainly consumed a large
quantity of alcohol spread across the preceding 24 hours o r so, in between some
hours of sleep, various time spent walking outside and accompanying Mr Adams.
10 Snyman above n 9 at 197.
11 See S v Saaiman 1967 (4) SA 440 (A).
12 See S v Lombard 1981 (3) SA 198 (A).
But it does not follow that this constitutes a defence, particularly when the evidence
suggests that he knew what he was doing when he decided to stab the d eceased,
with intention in the form of dolus eventualis. On my assessment, Mr Liesing cannot
be said to be so drunk that he could not and did not have the intention to stab the
deceased.13 Disinhibition is, as Strydom notes, not a defence.14
[40] Considering t he outcome in respect of each of the three key issues, and
having considered the evidence in its totality, it is apparent that the state has proved
each of the requisite elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. 15 Mr Liesing’s
version of events is inh erently improbable to the extent that it may be said to be not
reasonably possibly true in substance and must be rejected.
Order
[41] The accused, Fabian Romeo Liesing, is found guilty of murder as charged.
_________________________
A GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard: 24–27 November 2025
Delivered: 28 November 2025
Appearances:
For the State: Adv F Bosman
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions
13 See S v Masia 1962 (2) SA 541 (A) at 547.
14 Strydom above n 9 at 198.
15 R v De Villiers 1944 (AD) 493 at 508–509.
For the Respondent: Adv H McCallum
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa