IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA
(GRAAFF-REINET CIRCUIT COURT)
NOT REPORTABLE
Case no: CC33/2025
In the matter betwee n:
THE STATE
and
FABIAN ROMEO LIESING Accused
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JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
___________________________________________________________________
Govindjee J
[1] The accused has been convicted of murder as contemplated in s 51(1) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997. 1 As the death of the victim resulted from
1 Act 105 of 1997 (the CLAA), as read with Part I of Schedule 2 of the CLAA.
physical abuse, as cont emplated in s 1 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998, 2 the
discretionary minimum sentence prescribed is imprisonment for life.3
Nature of the crimes and surrounding circumstances
[2] Mr Liesing and the deceased had lived together for eight months prior to th e
incident. They were known to be a happy couple. The two started drinking with
friends on 1 November 2024, into the night and again early the following morning.
When Mr Liesing left the deceased, she continued drinking heavily. Upon his return,
motive unk nown, he administered a single stab wound to the upper chest with an
Okapi knife. With no assistance forthcoming, this caused her to exsanguinate and
pass away. According to Dr De Beer, the deceased’s blood alcohol level
corresponded with severe intoxicati on, to the point that she may not even have
realised that she had been stabbed and would die from blood loss. Mr Liesing was
convicted of murder based on dolus eventualis. The evidence revealed that he had
consumed a large quantity of alcohol in the 24 hou r period prior to the incident and
was moderately intoxicated at the time he stabbed the deceased.
The accused
[3] Mr Liesing is 44 years of age. He left school aged 18, without matriculating
and has, through his endeavours, managed to obtain an income, mainl y as a driver
and co-owner of a taxi, for much of the time since then. He has two children aged 12
and 13, who reside with their mother and grandmother, and contributes R1000 to
their maintenance and to school uniform costs. He also supports his parents. H e has
been in custody for 13 months.
2 Act 116 of 1998.
3 S 51(1): ‘Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6) … a High Court shall
sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment
for life.’ S 51(3)( a): If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence
prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the proceedings
and must thereupon impose such lesser sentence…’. Part I of Schedule 2 includes murder, when ‘the
death of the victim resulted from physical abuse or sexual abuse , as contemplated in paragraphs ( a)
and (b) of the definition of “domestic violence” in section 1 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act
116 of 1998), by the accused who is or was in a domestic relationship, as defined in section 1 of that
Act, with the victim’.
[4] Mr Liesing is treated as a first offender, with two prior convictions both
pertaining to road traffic offences involving alcohol consumption. The evidence
revealed a sad narrative of alcohol use or abuse by many of tho se members of the
community that featured in the case. Although he demonstrated no remorse, it may
be said that Mr Liesing and the deceased’s companionable relationship has, in
effect, been ended by the scourge of alcohol abuse. The deceased has lost her l ife,
and Mr Liesing is now forced to pay the price for his conduct, which is rooted in the
lowering of his inhibitions, directly linked to his abuse of alcohol in the hours
preceding the incident.
The interests of society
[5] As Ms Bosman argued, for the stat e, society demands that stern sentences
be meted out in cases where a person’s life is extinguished through the conduct of
another. The offence of murder is extremely serious, constituting an irreversible
violation of the constitutional right to life.
[6] Importantly, society’s outrage at the senseless loss of life in the domestic
setting has translated into a prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for
conduct of this nature. The relentless plague of gender -based violence, including so-
called intimate femicide, is a cause for deep societal concern and anger. As the court
held in S v Robertson:4
‘It is so easy to glibly use the phrases and terminology of femicide and gender -based
violence, in part because of the relentless frequency of its occurrence in our society,
communities and homes, that it hardly causes anyone to bat an eyelid or to raise an
eyebrow … this disease of gender-based violence and femicide … permeates the psyche of
our country.’
[7] The Domestic Violence Act, 1998, recognises that domestic violence is a
serious social evil, that there is a high incidence of domestic violence within South
African society and that victims of domestic violence are among the most vulnerable
African society and that victims of domestic violence are among the most vulnerable
members of society.5 In S v Rohde,6 the court expressed itself as follows:
4 S v Robertson [2022] ZAWCHC 104; 2023 (2) SACR 156 (WCC) para 2.
5 Preamble to the Domestic Violence Act, 1998.
6 S v Rohde 2019 (2) SACR 422 (WCC) para 54.
‘Crime based on gender is an affliction in our society. Crimes against women are a social ill
and efforts by government and society are increasing in light of a steady increase in these
types of offence. The rate of murder of women in South Africa is alarmingly high, compared
to the global average. Attitudes to women determine how women are treated in society. It is
the lowered perception of women as human beings, all of whom are entitled to human
dignity and equality, which results in the unhealthy social paradigm that they can be victims,
and in fact end up as victims of crime because they are women. The judiciary must guard
against such perceptions and creating the impression that the lives of women are less
worthy of protection.’
[8] I must add that it appears to me to be in the interests of society that
communities, such as the one from which the witnesses in this case were drawn,
and who have attended these proceedings, must themselves introspect. Many of
those who testified had eithe r consumed alcohol the day before the incident, or
planned to do so on the day of the incident. This is suggestive of the central role
played by alcohol and begs the question whether enough is being done, within the
community itself, to educate members about the associated risks and realities.
Analysis
[9] The killing of women by intimate partners (also known as intimate female
homicide or intimate femicide) is the most extreme form and consequence of
violence against women.7 In S v Kasongo (Kasongo), expert testimony revealed that
intimate femicide was much more common in South Africa compared to other
countries.8
[10] The judiciary is obliged to play its part in ensuring that prescribed minimum
sentences, designed to reflect society’s opprobrium towards murder linked to
domestic violence, are not departed from without good reason. Prescribed minimum
sentences are intended to contribute towards the deterrence of violent crime and,
sentences are intended to contribute towards the deterrence of violent crime and,
thereby, the protection of women, communicating to society that perpetrators must
expect to face the full force of the law.
7 S Mathews et al ‘Every six hours a woman is killed by her intimate partner: A national study of
female homicide in South Africa’ MRC Policy Brief (No. 5) (June 2004). The following paragraphs are
drawn from this court’s judgment in S v HJW [2025] ZAECMKHC 7.
8 S v Kasongo [2022] ZAWCHC 224; 2023 (1) SACR 321 (WCC) (Kasongo) para 15.
[11] To determine an appropriate sentence, the court must weigh and balance the
nature and seriousness of the crime, the interests of society and the personal
circumstances of the accused carefully, without unduly emp hasising any of these
factors.9 The court must not approach its task in a spirit of anger or a deliberate
attempt to demonstrate severity or set an example to satisfy public opinion. The
object of sentencing is to serve the public interest. 10 Where possib le, and if the
circumstances justify this, the sentence must be blended with a measure of mercy.11
[12] The court must also be alive to the purposes of sentence, which, in general
terms, are retribution, prevention, deterrence and rehabilitation. 12 That being the
case, more serious cases clearly require severity with a certain moderation of
generosity where appropriate, for the appropriate balance to be struck. As alluded to
above, where minimum sentences have been prescribed by the legislature, these
should be viewed as generally appropriate for the offences concerned and are not to
be departed from lightly or for flimsy reasons, or based on misplaced pity.13
[13] It is accepted that none of the factors highlighted by Ms McCallum, for the
accused, on their own constitute a substantial and compelling circumstance justifying
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence. Although it is true that murder in
the context of domestic violence might justifiably warrant life imprisonment in most
cases, each case must be carefully analysed and treated on its own merits. 14 It
remains incumbent upon this court, before it imposes the prescribed sentence, to
assess, upon a consid eration of all the circumstances of the case, whether this
sentence is indeed proportionate to the offence.15
[14] In Sigwahla, Holmes JA noted that in considering the relevance of intoxicating
liquor to extenuating circumstances the approach of a trial court should be ‘one of
9 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) (Zinn) at 540G–H.
9 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) (Zinn) at 540G–H.
10 S v Mhlakhaza and Another [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) at 189. Also see S v M (Centre for Child Law as
amicus curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC).
11 Zinn above n 9.
12 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A).
13 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) para 23.
14 Cf Kasongo above n 8 para 37.
15 S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) paras 14–15.
perceptive understanding of the accused’s human frailties, balancing them against
the evil of his deed’. 16 Somewhat ironically, then, given the earlier remarks, the
potential exists for the alcohol consumption to serve as a mitigating fe ature when the
offender’s blameworthiness is regarded as diminished. It may be accepted that the
accused’s state of mind was affected by his consumption of alcohol. Rather than
being a premeditated act, this served as the catalyst for the single stab of hi s knife
on the body of his partner. 17 As in Sigwahla, this court may also consider the fact
that the murder was not committed with dolus directus.18 The result is that the court
has accepted that Mr Liesing had no direct intent to cause the deceased’s death. As
a full bench has explained, the concomitant thereof is that the moral turpitude of the
heinous deed was ameliorated.19 To that may be added th e accused’s clean record.
I am also mindful that he has for much of his adult life remained in employment and
seemingly contributed to the upkeep of his children, and to his parents.
[15] It is appropriate to consider the accused’s behaviour accordingly, bear ing in
mind that any factors that are not too remote or too faint or too indirectly related to
the commission of a crime, which bear upon the accused’s moral blameworthiness in
committing it, should not be ruled out from consideration. 20 Considered cumulatively,
I am satisfied that there is justification to enhance the prospect of rehabilitation by
departing from the prescribed sentence and imposing a lesser sentence.21
[16] This is not to suggest that a sentence other than a lengthy period of direct
imprisonment will suffice. The deceased’s life was extinguished through a violent act
caused by a knife applied to her body. Despite her condition, it must be accepted
that she called for help from Mr Liesing, suffering the indignity of experiencing
excessive blood loss in the sanctity of her own bathroom. And rather than assisting
excessive blood loss in the sanctity of her own bathroom. And rather than assisting
16 S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) ( Sigwahla) at 571D–E; S v Ndhlovu (2), 1965 (4) SA 692 (A) at
695–696.
17 Cf S v Peloeole 2022 (2) SACR 349 (SCA) para 24, 26. This decision may also be distinguished
based on the SCA’s rejection that the appellant was intoxicated.
18 Sigwahla above n 16 at 571H: trial courts, in their conspectus o f possible extenuating
circumstances, should not overlook the fact (if it be such) that it is a case of dolus eventualis; while it
cannot be said that this factor must necessarily be an extenuating circumstance, in many cases it may
well be so, either alone or together with other features, depending on the particular facts of the case.
19 S v Moos 2017 JDR 0300 (NCK) para 4.
20 R v Fundakubi and Others 1948 (3) SA 810 (A) at 818 cited with approval in Sigwahla above n 16
at 571H–572A. Also see S v Tafeni 2016 (2) SACR 720 (WCC) (Tafeni) para 11.
21 Tafeni above n 20 para 9 and the authorities cited there.
her in any reasonable way, Mr Liesing, albeit under the influence of alcohol, failed to
obtain any meaningful assistance for her. This is an aggravating feature in the
present circumstanc es. He also failed to take the court into his confidence. In
addition, instead of her home being a safe -haven, it became the site of the
deceased’s passing. Punishment that reflects the deterrent and retributive
dimensions of sentencing, proportionate to t he interests of society and the
circumstances of the crimes, must be imposed. As explained in Kasongo:22
‘The Judiciary should speak such that we demonstrate that we are not cold, aloof and far
removed from the contemporary challenges. Where circumstances permit, we should show
that we heed the public's constitutional call to make the punishment of crimes against
women, especially their brutal, cruel and unnecessary killing more severe as part of the
overall responsibility of the Republic of South Africa to provide a conducive environment for
women to live and love without fear of physical, psychological, economic and sexual abuse
and violence. The increase in the involvement of ex -partners, spouses, partners and
boyfriends in the woman's experience of viole nce needs effective initiatives beyond policy -
making and [calls] for the judiciary to be the leading force and voice.’
[17] These are matters of weighty concern to the court. I have considered the
period in excess of a year already spent in custody and surveye d reported cases
involving similar features, bearing in mind the dangers of doing so. 23 When all these
factors are weighed cumulatively, a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment strikes
the necessary balance between the gravity of the offence, involving do mestic
violence, and the diminished moral blameworthiness associated with the seemingly
impulsive, single -blow committed without direct intent, while under the influence of
alcohol, by a first offender.
Order
[18] The accused is sentenced as follows:
alcohol, by a first offender.
Order
[18] The accused is sentenced as follows:
The accused, Fabian Romeo Liesing, is sentenced to twelve (12) years’
imprisonment for murder.
22 Kasongo above n 8 para 36.
23 See, for example S v Moos above n 19; Jantjies v S [2014] ZASCA 153; Sighwala above n 16.
_________________________
A GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard: 28 November 2025
Delivered: 28 November 2025
Appearances:
For the State: Adv F Bosman
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions
For the Respondent: Adv H McCallum
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa