IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case No : 2025-090751
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) R EPO RT ABLE : ¥€S INO
(2) O F INTEREST TO OT H ER JUDG
(3) R EVISED '\/
/!-JJ-Zo25
DATE
In the matter between:
AFRIFORUM NPC
and
CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE CITY
SI
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
THE EXECUTIVE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER OF THE CITY OF
TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
THE MINISTER OF FINANCE
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
Page 2 of24
This judgment is made an order of court by the Judge whose name is reflected herein,
duly stamped by the Registrar of the Court, and is submitted electronically to the
parties/their legal representatives by email. This judgment is further uploaded to the
electronic file of this matter on Caselines by the Judge or his/her secretary. The date
of this order is deemed to be 18 November 2025.
JUDGMENT • APPLICATION IN TERMS OF SECTION 18(3) OF THE SUPERIOR
COURTS ACT 10 OF 2013
A VV AKOUMIDES, AJ
INTRODUCTION
1. This is an application brought by the applicant seeking the following relief in
its Notice of Motion:
1.1 That the operation and execution of the order of His Lordship Mr
Justice Avvakoumides {dated 31 July 2025) (this date was amended
from 27 June 2025 to 31 July 2025, without any objection by the City)
("the order'), which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA"), should not be suspended
pending the decision of the application for leave to appeal, or if it is
granted, the appeal.
1.2 That the first respondent pays attorney and clients costs, alternatively
costs that include the costs consequent upon the appointment of the
senor advocate on Scale C in terms of rule 67 A(2) and (7).
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2. The applicant submits that there are exceptional circumstances because the
City, on its own version will not suffer irreparable harm if the order is not
suspended. The applicant submits that the City's application for leave to appal
has no prospects of success.
3. Pursuant to the dismissal of the City's application for leave to appeal the main
judgment and, prior to the issuing of the City's application for leave to appeal
to the SCA, the City proceeded to charge residents for a cleansing levy and
charged such residents retrospectively. Such conduct, the applicant submits
is in defiance of this court's main judgment. (During the period after the
application for leave to appeal against the main judgment was dismissed and
the issuing of the application for leave to appeal to the SCA).
4. The applicant submits that the City charges residents who do not have a waste
account with the City and some who do have an existing account with the City.
The applicant states that this conduct is contrary to the City's version under
oath and I will deal with this submission hereunder.
5. The applicant submits that the City charges the cleansing levy to residents
who are already paying a levy through their body corporate and sectional title
schemes and this notwithstanding, the City persists in charging these
residents. These residents are charged double the cleansing levy tariff.
6. The applicant contends that ratepayers will suffer irreparable harm because
of retrospective charging of the cleansing levy in order to avoid credit control
measures.
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7. Some residents are financially unable to make payments in respect of the levy
when they are already being charged, and this will lead to residents struggling
to meet their ordinary monthly expenses.
8. It is uncertain when the SCA may decide on the C ity's application for leave to
appeal and the applicant submits that the ongoing delay and continuous
charging by the City of the cleansing levy. The applicant submits that even of
the City is granted leave to appeal, such appeal may take several months or
years to be heard and the financial burden on residents will increase.
9. The City has threatened action against residents who do not pay the levy and
explains such short message services (SMS's) as "billing issues" that are
divorced from the cleansing levy.
10. The above constitutes a brief synopsis of the main litigation between the
parties. I tum to the requirements contained in section 18(3) and to consider
whether the applicant has made out a case for the relief it seeks. The applicant
submitted that some rate payers will suffer irreparable harm because the
retrospective charging of the cleansing levy has a drastic effect on residents.
11. In the main judgment, this court found that the City had fallen foul of the
principle of legality in that it had not complied with legislation applicable to the
City. The prospects of success on appeal, given the legality issue, is an
indication that the prospects are, in my view, poor.
Page 5 of 24
THE SECTION 18 APPROACH
12. Section 18 provides an exception to the general rule that an application for
leave to appeal suspends the operation and execution of the decision.1
13. Its purpose is to regulate the interim position between the parties pending the
finalisation of the appeal process.2
14. Section 18(1) provides that the court may make such an order such 'under
exceptional circumstances,3 and Section 18(3) requires the consideration of
the parties' 'irreparable harm'. 4
15. Read together, the sub rules mention three requirements: ( 1) exceptional
circumstances; (2) that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the order is
not made ; and (3) that the party against whom the order is made will not suffer
irreparable harm if the order is made.5 How should these requirements be
approached?
1 Section 18(1) provides ""(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under
exceptional circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision which
is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended pending the
decision of the application or appeal." [Emphasis added}
2 Maughan v Zuma and Another; Downer v Zuma & Another [2023] ZAKZPHC 75 ('Maughan')
para 13.
3 Ibid.
4 Section 18(3) "(3) A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or (2),
if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, in addition proves on a balance of
probabilities that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the court does not so order and that
the other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders."
5 See Knoop NO and Another v Gupta (Execution) 2021 (3) SA 135 (SCA) ( 'Knoop') para [45]
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16. Such applications require a factual enquiry, and I will deal with such enquiry
hereunder. The overarching enquiry is whether exceptional circumstances
exist. It is not a compartmentalised, tick box-exercise.
17. In Tyte,6 the SCA examined the question whether the applicant had to
establish the mentioned three requirements as separate, distinct and self
standing requirements:7
'An important point of departure, so it seems to me, is that consideration of
each of the so-called three requirements is not a hermetically sealed enquiry
and can hardly be approached in a compartmentalised fashion.'
18. The court concluded that the applicant does not need to establish three
separate, distinct and self-standing requirements:8
'The use of the words 'in addition proves' in s 18(3) ought not to be construed
as necessarily enjoining a court to undertake a further or additional enquiry.
The overarching enquiry is whether or not exceptional circumstances subsist.
To that end, the presence or absence of irreparable harm, as the case may
be, may well be subsumed under the overarching exceptional circumstances
enquiry. As long as a court is alive to the duty cast upon it by the legislature
to enquire into, and satisfy itself in respect of, exceptional circumstances, as
6 Tyte Security Services CC v Western Cape Provincial Government and Others 2024 (6) SA
175 (SCA) ('Tyte').
7 Tyte para 10.
8 Tyte para 14.
Page 7 of24
also irreparable harm, it does not have to do so in a formulaic or hierarchical
fashion.'
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
19. The applicant submitted correctly that exceptional circumstances is a
necessary prerequisite for the exercise of the court's discretion. If the
circumstances are not exceptional, it is the end of the matter.9
20. In Tyte the following appears: Exceptional circumstances ' ... " .. .is something
out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something which is excepted in
the sense that the general rule does not apply to it; something uncommon,
rare or different" ... '. 10
IRREPARABLE HARM
21. Whether there is irreparable harm depends upon the factual situation in which
the dispute arises, and the legal principles that govern the rights and
obligations of the parties. The question of irreparable harm is closely linked to
the question of exceptional circumstances.
9 Tyte para 11.
10 Tyte para 11 to 12.
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22. The question whether the parties will suffer irreparable harm - the second and
third requirements - ' ... are perhaps more accurately to be understood as being
two sides of the same coin. 111
ONUS
23. The onus is on the applicant.12 A respondent, however, may well attract
something in the nature of an evidentiary burden, especially where the facts
relevant to its harm are peculiarly within the respondent's knowledge. In that
event it will perhaps fall to the respondent to raise those facts in an answering
affidavit to, which may invite a response from the applicant by way of a replying
affidavit.13
THE APPLICANT'S CASE
ARE THERE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES?
24. The applicant submits that there are indeed exceptional circumstances in this
case. There will no harm to the City if the order is not suspended, but members
of the public will suffer irreparable harm if the order remains suspended.
11 Tyte para 13 and 15.
12 Section 18(3).
13 Tyte para 15.
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25. Although it is not a hermetically sealed enquiry that should not be approached
in a compartmentalised fashion, 14 the reasons appear below. The enquiry
demonstrates that the circumstances are exceptional.
The City will not suffer any harm If the order is not suspended
26. The Mayor confirms that the City will not suffer harm if it is unable to collect
the cleansing levy.15 No expenses were allocated against the amount.16
Service delivery will remain unaffected.17
27. The deponent to the answering affidavit seeks to avoid this in two ways. First,
he disputes the admissibility of the news report of Cllr Ramabadu. 18 Yet, he
does not dispute the fact that the Mayor of the City stated officially and
confirmed that the City will not suffer harm if it is unable to collect the cleansing
levy.19
28. No expenses were allocated against the amount.20 Service delivery will remain
unaffected. 21
14 Tyte para 10 and 14.
15 FA , 076-13, para 15 to 16.
16 An nexure "B", 076-31, para 4.
17 Annexure "B", 076-31, para 5.
18 FA , 076-12, para 12 to 14; Annexure "A", 076-25; and AA , 079-17, para 52.
19 FA , 076-13, para 15 to 16.
20 Annexure "B", 076-31, para 4.
21 Annexure "B", 076-31, para 5.
Page 10 of24
29. The similarity in their respective statements is striking.22 Secondly, the City
puts up a new version, that there will be some interruption of 'services'. For
reasons that are now obvious, this is contradicted by the Mayor. This is also a
recent fabrication - the deponent did not put up this version in dealing with
just and equitable relief in the main application.
30. The applicant contends that the City will suffer no harm. Even if a reductron in
the budgeted surplus23 is taken to be harm, it is not irreparable. This is the one
side of the coin. The other side is that the City is threatening ratepayers, some
of whom will suffer irreparable harm if the order remains suspended, with legal
action and an interruption of service.
The City charges ratepavers and threatens service interruption and legal action,
even if they are not liable for the cleansing levy
31 . On 26 September 2025 the City acknowledged that it was incorrectly charging
ratepayers like Mr Kannemeyer, promising a 'quick resolution'.24 Less than a
22 Compare Annexure "B", 076-31, para 4 and 5, where the Mayor answers '[t]he full amount
budgeted for the Cleansing Levy was R278 052 090.00. No expenses were allocated against
this amount, which means that the removal of the levy only reduces the City's budgeted
surplus. The budget nevertheless remains fully funded .. . albeit with a reduced margin . .. It
must be reiterated that the R278 052 090.00 form the levy had no corresponding expenditure
against it. Its removal therefor reduces the surplus but does not create an immediate fiscal or
compromise service delivery"; with Annexure "A", 076-27, where Cllr Ramabodu is quoted as
saying "[t]he actual income provided for in the 2025-26 budget is R278 million ... [t[he decision
by the court to set aside the levy has therefore not materially affected the city's cash flow. The
budget remains fully funded albeit with a reduced cash surplus."
23 Annexure "B", 076-31, para 4.
23 Annexure "B", 076-31, para 4.
24 FA , para 42, 076-19; and Annexure "H", 076-48.
Page 11 of 24
month later, instead of resolving the matter quickly, the City charged him
again.25
32. Less than two weeks later, and after the deponent expressed his regret
concerning Mr Kannemeyer's circumstances in the answering affidavit, the
City sends him a message threatening service interruption and legal action.26
33. The applicant contends that there can be no doubt that the City's conduct in
the circumstances 'is something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature;
something which is excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply
to it; some thing uncommon , rare or different. 127
There are ratepayers that will suffer irreparable harm
34. The applicant, relying on evidence such as that of a pensioner, Ms du Toit,28
is that some ratepayers will suffer irreparable harm.29 This is now further
supported by the evidence concerning the case of M r Kannemeyer.30
35. Ms du Toit says that:31
25 RA , para 7 to 7.1, 80-3; and Annexure "I", 80-15.
26 RA , para 7.2, 80-3; and Annexure • J", 80-17.
27 Tyte para 11 to 12.
28 FA, 076-21, para 53 to 58; and compare with AA , 079-21, para 67 to 70.
29 FA , 076-11, para 11.6. The City does not plead to this allegation.
30 Supra.
31 Annexure "D", 076-39, para 1 to 6.
Page 12 of24
'The continued imposition of the cleansing levy will have a detrimental impact
on my limited pension income. As a pensioner, my monthly budget is fixed and
carefully allocated to essential living expenses such as medication, food, and
utilities.
The additional and unlawful levy places an undue financial strain on me and
other residents in personal circumstances, making it increasingly difficult to
meet these basic needs, and may ultimately force me to seek alternative
accommodation that I can afford. '
36. The City does not dispute any of the facts placed before the court on this
score. It now calls the uncontested detrimental effect on those ratepayers
whom the City has labelled 'freeloaders', an 'exaggeration'.32
37. Circumstances such as ratepayer Ms du T oit is evidence of irreparable harm
proven on a balance of probabilities.33 It is exceptional circumstances in every
sense of the word.
The City's disregard for the order
38. In the period between dismissal of the first application for leave to appeal and
the petition to the SCA - during which period, the order was not suspended -
the City levied the cleansing levy contrary to the order of this court. 34
32 M, 079-19, para 58.
33 See Tyte para 15 concerning the onus of proof being a balance of probabilities.
34 FA , 076-20, para 47 to 51.
Page 13 of24
39. The City does not dispute these facts. It attempts to manufacture a legal
principle that, for such a disregard for an order to be exceptional
circumstances, the applicant must prove contempt of court. There is no such
requirement, and there is no closed category of what the court can take into
account as being exceptional circumstances.
40. No court should ever view a countenance a contravention of its orders or view
it as 'normal' or 'usual'. It is exceptional in the most unconstitutional way for a
sphere of government to disregard court orders.
Prospects of success
41 . The applicant submits that prospects of success is relevant but should not be
overemphasised.
42. The applicant subm its however that, in this case, the City's prospects of
success are poor and relies on the reasoning and decision by the court in the
main judgment and the judgment in the first application for leave to appeal. 35
The grounds in the petition do not change anything. The applicant noted that
the second and fourth respondents have not joined the first applicant in the
application for leave to appeal to the SCA and submits that this is so because
they have lost hope.
35 Judgment in the first application for leave, 07 4-152.
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43. The applicant lastly submitted that the lack of merit in the City's defence and
lack of prospect of success on appeal is exceptional. There is nothing normal
about 'obfuscating issues', putting up a 'completely unmeritorious defence',
being 'mischievous' and bringing an 'unmeritorious' application for leave to
appeal.
THE CITY'S PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS
44. The City's raised issues about the procedure adopted by the applicant in
launching this application. The applicant submits that such issues, which I will
deal with hereunder, must be considered against the backdrop of the
introductory paragraph of the notice of motion.
45. The applicant left the time and date of the hearing and the process to be
followed firmly in the discretion of the court, as it should have.36 The
penultimate paragraph of the notice of motion does the same with regards to
the timelines within which affidavits had to be filed.37
46. In any event, the City does not demonstrate any prejudice.38
36 076-2.
37 076-4.
38 RA , para 23, 80-7.
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47. Section 18(3) applications are interlocutory proceedings that are incidental to
the main application. 39 They are by their very nature inherently urgent. 40
48. In Okuli, 41 the court - relying on a judgment of this court42 - held as follows
concerning an argument like that of the City:43
'The narrow interpretation presently urged upon me by the applicants would
not advance the efficient administration of justice. Decisions appealed against
may be the product of lengthy and complex litigation. What the applicants are
now suggesting is that an acting judge whose period of appointment has
expired may competently adjudicate upon an application for leave to appeal
against that decision if it has not yet been disposed of at the expiry of his/her
period of appointment; but anterior thereto the interlocutory decision,
concerning whether or not to allow the operation or execution of the decision
pending the application for leave to appeal, would have to be considered
afresh by another judge. The intention of the legislature could never have been
to fetter the administration of justice in this way.'
39 Okuli para 22.
40 Maughan para 10.
41 Okuli Security Services CC v City of Cape Town and Another; In re: Comwezi Security
Services (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another; In re: Command Security Services SA
(Ply) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another [2016] ZAWCHC 117 ('Okuli').
42 Airy v Cross-Border Road Transport Agency2001 (1) SA 737 (TPD) ('Airy'); paragraphs 13,
14and 15at741 A-F.
43 Okuli at para 16 and 19, relying on Airy and South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering
Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (AD) at 551 E - G, relying in turn on South
Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Ply) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534
(AD) at 551 E - G.
Page 16 of 24
49. The effective administration of justice is critical. Section 173 of the Constitution
provides that the court has the inherent power to protect and regulate its own
process, taking into account the interests of justice. This is what Section 18
requires, what the notice of motion called for, and what this court, through
Acting Deputy Judge President's office and the Judge seized with the matter,
directed.
APPLICANT'S CONCLUSION
50. The applicant submits that for the reasons advanced, there are exceptional
circumstances, given the facts of this case, why the order should not be
suspended and that the applicant has made out a case in terms of section 18(3).
The City will not suffer irreparable harm if the order is in operation and executed.
The public will suffer irreparable harm if the order continues to be suspended.
51 . In respect of costs the applicants submits that if an order is granted in its favour,
the costs should be borne by the City.
THE CITY'S CASE
52. The City submits that the applicant is overtly wrong [in all instances] where it
says that irreparable harm is established and therefore the existence of
exceptional circumstances has been established.
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53. Secondly, the City contends that the applicant's argument that the City will not
suffer irreparable harm because it does not need the money now , as the
cleansing activities are, for now , funded outside the amounts received from
the cleansing levy, is misplaced.
54. The City takes issue with the procedure adopted by the applicant and argued
that the procedure is not envisaged by the rules of court. The applicant
abridged the time limits and prescribed time periods without an explanation. It
is unnecessary in my view to widely debate the City's procedural complaints
because it is so that section 18 (3) applications are by their very nature and,
the argument that the application is not interlocutory by nature, is flawed. The
application for leave to appeal to the SCA is pending and it must follow that
the section 18(3) application is interlocutory to such application for leave to
appeal.
55. Insofar as the City's argument that the judge who decided the main application
ought not to preside over the section 18(3) application, I disagree. It is practice
that the judge who hears the main litigation would preside over an application
for eave to appeal and a section 18(3) application.
56. It is not an absolute rule and in the absence of the judge, for whatever reason,
a different judge assigned by the Acting Deputy Judge President may hear
either an application for leave to appeal or a section 18(3) application. When
this application was uploaded and came to my attention, I approached the
Acting Depu ty Judge President for a directive and was informed that I should
hear the application.
Page 18 of 24
57. The C ity proceeded to, in their heads of argument to re-submit their
contentions in the main application which is not helpful or necessary in the
present application. In addition, the City annexed the entire application for
leave to appeal to the SCA to its answering affidavit in the section 18(3)
application. I enquired from counsel for the City what the purpose was for
annexing such papers and the response was that I should have cognisance
thereof. I do not believe it was necessary and simply added to the papers
becom ing voluminous, without any purpose.
58. The City persisted in arguing its legal contentions in the ma in application. The
heads of argument contain several pages allocated to rehashing submissions
made in the main application.
The practical implementation of the order
59. The C ity has charged residents a cleansing levy. The residents have paid the
cleansing levy, and the practical implementation of the order would entail the
City having to refund the residents who have paid the cleansing levy, pending
the appeal.
60. The City does not disclose in this application that it charges for the cleansing
levy to residents who do not have an account with the City or who already are
paying for the waste removal through body corporates and sectional title
schemes.
Page 19 of 24
61. The City goes on to argue " ... when (my emphasis) the City's appeal
succeeds, the refunded residents would have to repay the City the refunded
levies." In my view it is an irresponsible approach by an organ of state to
conduct itself in this manner.
62. The City argues that the reality of the situation is that the ratepayers wou ld be
obliged to back-pay the cleansing levy when the appeal court substitutes an
order granted by this Court, with an order dismissing the application. The City
also argues and questions whether the applicant can competently bind
residents to repay the back-pay levies if it is successful. This is not a cogent
argument and certainly not in these proceedings.
The exceptional circumstances requirement
63. The C ity submitted that the incorrect levying of fees or rates, or an incorrect
billing by a Municipality is not an exceptional circumstance. All municipalities
across the country, and the continent, including the world over, are daily
confronted with complaints by ratepayers related to incorrect billing, or
m iscalculation of the amounts payable. This argument is flawed and ignores
the core issue in the main application.
64. The cleaning levy was found to be unlawful and to trivialise the unlawful levy
or to couple and conflate such levy with general charges of municipalities is
clear about how misguided the C ity is about the cleansing levy.
Page 20 of 24
65. The City argued that an incorrect levying of fees or rates, or an incorrect billing
by a Municipality, is not an exceptional circumstance. All municipalities across
the country, and the continent, including the world over, are daily confronted
with complaints by ratepayers related to incorrect billing, or miscalculation of
the amounts payable.
66. The City thus persisted in arguing that there are no exceptional circumstances
and relied on Ekapa Minerals, to buttress this point. 44 The city
mischaracterizes the applicant's argument case to be "because the City will
not suffer harm, therefore there exists exceptional circumstances." This is not
how I understood the applicant's case and it is in any event not correct to
conflate the unlawful cleansing levy as a billing issue.
67. The City correctly submitted that the legislature has determined that
exceptional circumstances must first established. It quotes from the Act and
argues that this much is clear from the use of the words "in addition proves" in
section 18(3).
68. It is thus difficult to understand how the City can trivialise the unlawfulness of
the cleansing levy and argue that there are no exceptional circumstances.
44 Ekapa Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Another v Sol Plaatje Local Municipality and Others 2025 (6)
SA 1 (CC).
Page 21 of 24
Irreparable harm
69. The City submitted that the applicant has not made out a case for irreparable
harm on the part of the citizens of the City. The City explains this by equating
the levying the unlawful cleansing to a monetary debt which is "reparable".
The urgent motion refuses, daily, to hear enforcement of monetary claims
because the harm associated with such claims is ameliorated with an order of
interest.
70. The City argued and submitted, incorrectly in my view, that a claim that the
applicant ( or the public it purports to represent) is therefore "throttled by the
existence of an alternative remedy".
71 . The City then emb arked on an argument dealing with claims for repayment
and claims for mora interest which the public may have if the cleansing levy is
found to be unlawful by the SCA , relying on Madibeng Local Municipality v
Public Investment Corporation Ltd [2020] ZASCA 157. This argument is not
helpful at all, and neither does it find application given the core issue in this
case.
72. Despite acknowledging that it erred in respect of Mr Ka nnemey er and stating
that is his case, the City's error was "regrettable", the City persist in submitting
that there exists no irreparable harm to the applicant or to residents of the City.
The City contended that any person entitled to repayment now would be
entitled to receive payment with interest in due course.
Page 22 of 24
CITY'S CONCLUSION
73. Harm on the side of the City falls to be assessed as against the eventuality of
a successful appeal. What is the City expected to do then? So, the C ity
argued.
7 4. The applicant eloquently talks to issues of affordability to residents. The point
made in that regard undermines any prospect that the City will obtain back
pay for the levies, in the. eventuality of a successful appeal.
ORDER AND REASONS
75. I have considered the submissions made by the applicant and the City. I
cannot align myself to the arguments put forward by the City. In my view there
are indeed exceptional circumstances warranting an order sought by the
applicant. There is indeed irreparable harm to residents of the City. The facts
speak to themselves. The City, arguably, on these facts, does not refund
residents and, only if residents lodge objections and queries, there are not
resolved and at best, credited to the residents if and when it suits the City.
76. The cleansing levy is unlawful. Whatever the City may contend on appeal
cannot change the fact that it proceeded with a resolution and cleansing tariff
and policy (2025), whilst purporting to rely on an earlier (2016) policy and tariff.
Page 23 of 24
77. Instead of desisting from imposing the cleansing levy pending the appeal to
the SCA, the City has adopted a foregone conclusion that the SCA will come
to its assistance on a question of legality which the City has flouted.
78. On the other hand, the residents continue to be levied with a cleansing levy,
irrespective whether they have a waste management account with the City or
not. Moreover, the City believes that it can charge for a cleansing levy to
citizens who already pay for waste management through their body corporates
and sectional title schemes. Under the circumstances, and given the
opposition to this application on the facts and law, the applicant is entitled to
the relief sought and the following order is made:
70.1 The operation and execution of the order of court (Avvakoumides AJ),
dated 31 July 2025, which is the subject of an application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA"), is not suspended
pending the decision of the application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal, or if it is granted, such appeal.
70.2 The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicant's costs on the
scale as between attorney and client, which costs shall include the
costs of employing senior counsel.
. T. AWAKOUMIDES, AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Representation for the parties:
For the Applicant: Counsel for the Applicant
E Botha SC
etienne@ lawcircle.co .za
083 285 7866
Instructed by: Hurter and Spies
martorie@ hurterspies.co.za; carl@ hurterspies.co.za
012 941 9239
For Respo ndents: Counsel for First to Fourth Respondents
ZZ Matebese SC
Instructed by:
matebese@ law.co.za
083 412 9403
ME Manala
manalae@law.co.za
073101 7330
Mahumani Incorporated
nviko@ mahumaniinc.co.za
012 330 0025
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