Scott v National Credit Regulator and Others (Leave to Appeal) (105915/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1218 (24 November 2025)

80 Reportability
Banking and Finance

Brief Summary

Leave to appeal — Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal — Full Court's judgment declaring that an application for debt review does not purge the default of the original credit agreement under section 103(5) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 — Respondents (BASA) seeking leave to appeal, arguing public interest and implications for credit providers — Court finding reasonable prospects of success on appeal and compelling reasons for the appeal to be heard — Leave to appeal granted.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
(FULL COURT)
Case Number : 105915/2023
1. REPORTABLE : YES / NO
2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : YES /NO
3. REVISED : ¥ES/NO
24 November 2025
DATE
In the matter between:
CHANTELLE SCOTT
and
- -
SIGNATURE
THE NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
THE BANKING ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE DEBT COUNSELLORS' ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA
STANDARD BANK OF SA LIMITED
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
1

2

FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED Sixth Respondent

NEDBANK LIMITED Seventh Respondent

ABSA BANK LIMITED Eighth Respondent

CAPITEC BANK HOLDINGS LIMITED Ninth Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
The matter was heard virtually. The judgment is handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email and uploading to the electronic
file of this matter on Caselines. The date of the judgment and order is deemed to be
24 November 2025.
___________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
LEAVE TO APPEAL APPLICATION
___________________________________________________________________
Mazibuko AJ (Janse van Nieuwenhuizen et Mali JJ concurring)

INTRODUCTION
[1] The third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents (hereinafter
referred to as “BASA”) seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
(“the SCA”) against the whole judgment and the order of this Full Court
delivered on 12 May 2025, where the Full Court granted an order in favour of
the applicant, (hereinafter referred to as “Scott”) declaring that an application
for debt review and or a debt review order does not purge or cure the default of
the original credit agreement for the purposes contemplated in section 103(5)
of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“the NCA”).

[2] Aggrieved by the Full Court’s decision, BASA has now approached this Full

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Court for leave to appeal to the SCA against the judgment and order. The
application for leave to appeal is opposed, and no cross-appeal has been filed.

[3] BASA argues that there are compelling reasons why they ought to be granted
leave to appeal, as the judgment affects consumers and credit providers
nationwide. Its implications reach far beyond the immediate interests of the
parties. Credit providers will need to adjust their systems and software to
account for the judgment. It is further argued that there are compelling reasons,
in the public interest, for the SCA to hear the appeal, and there are reasonable
prospects of success on appeal.

[4] Notwithstanding its concession that the judgment’s implications reach far
beyond the immediate interests of the parties, Scott argues that BASA has not
shown that there are reasonable prospects of success on appeal.

[5] Leave to appeal may be granted where a judge is of the opinion that the appeal
would have a reasonable prospect of success or there are compelling reasons
which exist why the appeal should be heard, such as the interests of justice. In
the matter of Caratco (Pty) Limited v Independent Advisory (Pty) Limited,
1
it was pointed out that if the court is unpersuaded that there are prospects of
success, it must still enquire into whether there is a compelling reason to
entertain the appeal. Compelling reasons would include an important point of
law or an issue of public importance that will have an effect on future disputes
in our courts. The court also emphasised that the merits remain vitally important
and are often decisive.

[6] The test laid down in Section 17 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2023, is now
a subjective one and no longer an objective test. There must be a measure of
certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought

1 2020 (5) SA 35 (SCA).

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to be appealed against. 2 The court held in the case of The Mont Chevaux
Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others (supra) that:
“It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of
a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to
appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might
come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cornwright & Others 1985
(2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word “would” in the new statute indicates
a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose
judgment is sought to be appealed against.”

[7] In MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and Another,
3 the Supreme
Court of Appeal held that:
"An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper grounds
that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of success on appeal. A
mere possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless is not
enough. There must be a sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a
reasonable prospect of success on appeal."

[8] Having read the application for leave to appeal and considered the submissions
by counsel for BASA and Scott, I am persuaded that the issues raised by both
parties are of public interest and have significant implications for participants in
the credit industry, in which another court is likely to reach legal conclusions
that dissent from mine. Those issues include my interpretation of section 103
of the NCA. There are reasonable prospects of the Supreme Court of Appeal
reaching a legal conclusion dissent from mine. Leave to appeal has reasonable
prospect of success and should be granted.

[9] In the circumstances, I propose the following order:
ORDER:
[9.1] The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is

2 The Mont Cheveaux Trust (IT2012/28) v Tina Goosen & 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 at para [6].
3 (1221/2015) (2016) ZASCA 176 (25 November 2016).

I agree
granted.
[9.2} The costs of this application for leave to appeal shall be costs in the
appeal.
N G M MAZIBUKO
ACT ING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
/
N MALI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETOR IA
I agree, and it is so ordered I I
I
------------
I
N JANSE VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRE TOR IA
5

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Date of hearing: 18 November 2025
Judgment delivered: 24 November 2025

Appearances:
For the applicant: Adv N G Louw
Attorneys for the applicant: Jennings Inc

For first, second, fourth and tenth respondents: No appearance

For third, fifth to ninth respondents: Adv A Cockrell SC
Attorneys for third, fifth to ninth respondents: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc