IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
DELETE W HIC HE V ER IS N O T A PPLICA BLE
(1) REPORTABLE : YES /NO
(2) O F INTEREST TO O THE R JU D GES : YES /NO
RE V ISED
24 November 2025
DATE
In the matter between:
SIGNAT U RE
MAX LAW GAUTENG NORTH (PTY) LTD
MAX GROUP (PTY) LTD
MAX LAW GROUP (PTY ) LTD
and
QOURA HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
MBALI KUNENE
PREMIER MALULEKE
SIMANGALISO MTEMBU
BUNTO MBLASHWA
ORA TILE MMADIRA
ABDUL KOLA
THOMAS MATLEBJANE
STHANDWA SHWALA
LINDIWE NGUSE
TINY MALOPE
KOKETSO MATLABJANE
Case No : 2025/207104
First Applicant
Second Applicant
Third Applicant
First Responden t
Second Responden t
Third Responden t
Fourth Responden t
Fifth Responden t
S ixth Responden t
Seventh Responden t
Eighth Responden t
Ninth Responden t
Tenth Responden t
Eleventh Responden t
Tw elfth Responden t
Page 2 of 17
VUSI MAHLANGU Thirteenth Respondent
BONGIWE SIBIYA Fourteenth Respondent
SIPHO SESANA Fifteenth Respondent
JACQUELINE MATHE Sixteenth Respondent
ADAH MATSHIKA Seventeenth Respondent
NOZIPHO MTSWENI Eighteenth Respondent
LESEGO MASANGO Nineteenth Respondent
NKELE MALULEKE Twentieth Respondent
GCINILE HLOPHE Twenty First Respondent
RITO MATHONSI Twenty Second Respondent
JULIET MAKGOBA Twenty Third Respondent
KELEBOGILE MATOBOSANE Twenty Fourth Respondent
PORTHIA LETSUMA Twenty Fifth Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
VAN DER MERWE AJ
INTRODUCTION
1. The Applicants approached this Court on a very urgent basis to enforce a
restraint of trade and confidentiality undertakings as contained in various
contracts of employment entered into between the Applicants and the Second to
Twenty Fifth Respondents.
2. The matter was enrolled for hearing on the 18 th November 2025 and was heard
on 19 November 2025. The matter was only opposed by the First Respondent.
The application was not properly served on the Second to the Twenty Fifth
Respondents. I will address this issue later in the judgment.
3. The Applicants also filed a joinder application on 15 November 2025, wherein
Page 3 of 17
Applicants seek to join Quora Finance (Pty) Ltd with registration number
2022/589812/07 as Twenty Sixth Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT
4. The Applicants approached the Court for relief to enforce the restraint -of-trade
provisions against twenty -five former employees, together with an interim
interdict against the First Respondent to prevent it from recruiting or attempting
to recruit any of the Applicants’ current employees or any individuals employed
by the Applicants within the 18 months preceding the offers of employment, and
from utilising any proprietary or confidential information, business practices,
client-engagement methods, training techniques, standard operating procedures,
client lists or leads belonging to the Applicants. The Applicants further seek to
restrain the First Respondent from approaching or incentivising the Applicants’
employees in any manner to terminate their employm ent. In Part B of the
application, the Applicants seek a final interdict enforcing the restraint of trade
against the Second to Twenty -Fifth Respondents, preventing them from being
employed or engaged by the First Respondent or any competitor operating within
the same industry as the Applicants for the periods specified in the notice of
motion. The Applicants additionally seek to prevent the former employees from
utilising, disseminating or sharing any confidential information or proprietary
techniques of t he Applicants or their clients or potential clients for their own
benefit or that of any third party, including the First Respondent, and to restrain
all Respondents from recruiting, enticing, employing, offering to employ, causing
to employ or soliciting any of the Applicants’ employees, or otherwise inducing
them to terminate their employment with the Applicants.
5. The Respondents opposed the application, challenging it on the basis of urgency,
Page 4 of 17
and further raised a point of misjoinder on the grounds that they do not employ
any of the Respondents cited in the application.
6. Since the matter has been placed on the urgent roll, the Applicants must satisfy
the Court that the matter is urgent before the merits of the matter is entertained.
URGENCY
The applicable legal principles
7. The provisions of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court accordingly apply, and
it is well established that an applicant who approaches the Court on an urgent
basis seeks an indulgence and requests preferential allocation on the Court’s roll
in order to avert prejudice or irreparable harm that may arise or persist if the
impugned conduct continues. The Court’s primary enquiry in assessing urgency
is whether the applicant has, in the founding affidavit, explicitly set out the
circumstances giving rise to the urgency and demonstrated why substantial relief
cannot be obtained at a hearing in the ordinary course. It is therefore incumbent
upon the applicant to articulate fully and satisfactorily the grounds upon which
urgency is invoked and to provide cogent reasons for the necessity of immediate
relief. Although a delay in instituting proceedings is not, in itself, determinative of
the question of urgency, the Court must consider such delay in the context of the
explanation furnished and the broader circumstan ces of the matter. Ultimately,
the decisive issue is whether the applicant would be deprived of substantial
redress at a hearing in due course, and while a delay may indicate that the matter
is not as inherently urgent as alleged, it is the totality of the circumstances that
Page 5 of 17
guides the Court’s discretion.1
8. Conversely, a delay may be justified where the applicant has made bona fide
attempts to resolve the dispute amicably or has required additional time to gather
and verify the relevant facts underpinning the relief sought. 2
9. The principles governing urgency have been extensively developed and
consistently applied by the Courts, which have held that urgency of the
applicant’s own making self-created urgency will not be entertained, as the Court
will not a fford preference to matters rendered urgent by the applicant’s own
actions.
10. In National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa v Bumatech Calcium
Aluminates3 the Court held that:
“Urgency must not be self -created by an applicant, as a consequence of the
applicant not having brought the application at the first available opportunity in
other words, the more immediate a reaction by the litigant to remedy the situation
by way of instituting litigation the better it is for establishing urgency. But the longer
if takes from the date of the event giving rise to the proceedings, the more urgency
is diminished. In short the applicant must come to Court immediately, or risk the
lack of urgency”. In Collins t/a Waterkloof Farm v Bernickow N.O. & Another the
Court held that:
“If the applicants seek this Court to come to its assistance it must come to the Court
at the very first opportunity. It cannot stand back and do nothing and some days
later seek the Court’s assistance as a matter of urgency.”
11. In National Police Services Union & Others v First National Negotiating
1 See East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and
Others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011)
2 See Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw 2004 (2) SA 81(SE) 94C-D;
Stock v Minister of Housing 2007 (2) S A 9 (C12U-13 A); Eastrock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v
Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others (JR 315-13) 2013 [ZALCJAB 34] (12 March 2013
at para 12
at para 12
3 (2016) 37 ILJ 2862 (LC)
Page 6 of 17
Forum & Others4 The Court held that the latitude ordinarily afforded to parties
to dispense with the Rules of Court in circumstances of urgency is not available
to those who are so dilatory that their own inactivity gives rise to the very harm
upon which they seek to rely for relief.
12. The requirements for urgency in restraint of trade applications are no different
from those in other urgent applications and have been consistently confirmed in
numerous authorities.
13. In Vumatel (Pty) Ltd v Majra and Others 5 the Court confirmed that:
“I accept that the restraints of trade have an inherent quality of urgency. This
position comes from following dictum in Mozart Ice Cream Classic Franchises (Pty)
Ltd v Davidoff and Another where Court held :
‘I accept that breaches of restraint of trade have an inherent quality of urgency.’ ”
14. This inherent quality of urgency is often abused as a basis for jumping the queue,
so to speak, without satisfying the ordinary requirements of urgency. To adopt
this kind of approach is ill -conceived. An urgent restraint of trade application is
still nothing but an urgent application, just like any other urgent application where
final relief is sought. The ordinary requirements applicable to such urgent
applications must find application. The fact that one is dealing with a restraint of
trade is not some kind of licence that in itself establishes urgency, to the exclusion
of all other considerations. This was recognized by the Court in Ecolab (Pty) Ltd
v Thoabola & Another6 where the Court said the following, with which I agree:
“To summarise then, parties alleging breaches of restraint of trade agreements are
not indemnified from satisfying the requirements in terms of rule 8. Thus, a mere
4 (1999) 20 ILJ 1081 (LC)
5 (2018) 39 ILJ 2771 (LC) at paras 4 and 5
66 (2017) 38 ILJ 2741(LC)
Page 7 of 17
contention that the enforcement of a restraint of trade is inherently urgent and
therefore must be t reated as such by this court without any further consideration
cannot by all accounts be sustainable. The fact that these disputes may have an
inherent quality of urgency cannot be equated to a free pass to urgent relief on the
already overburdened urgent roll in this court. Like all other urgent matters more
than a mere allegation that a matter is urgent is required. This therefore implies
inter alia that the court must be placed in a position where it must appreciate that
indeed a matter is urgent, and also that an applicant in the face of a threat to it or
its interest had acted with the necessary haste to mitigate the effects of that threat.”
BACKGROUND FACTS AND GROUNDS FOR URGENCY
15. The Applicants aver that the matter is brought on an urgent basis in accordance
with the grounds of urgency set out in their founding affidavit and amplified in
their replying affidavit.
16. The Applicants request reprieve in terms of service against the former employees
of which they only served by means of WhatsApp mess enger. It is to be
mentioned that they did instruct the sheriff to serve at the First Respondent’s
premises, but it proved to be unsuccessful.
17. The Applicants aver that, within a period of seven months, the First Respondent
has employed twenty -five of the Applicants’ former employees, all of whom
voluntarily terminated their employment with the Applicants shortly before
accepting positions with the First Respondent. It is further averred that all twenty-
five employees are in breach of the restraint of trade provisions contained in their
employment contracts and had access to the Applicants’ confidential, protected,
and proprietary information. The proprietary information in question comprises
the following, and constitutes a protectable interest in terms of established legal
authority on the basis that restraint of trade provisions serve to protect such
authority on the basis that restraint of trade provisions serve to protect such
legitimate business interests, being:
Page 8 of 17
17.1 Industry specific knowledge of where and how the Applicants acquire the
leads on which they rely for on the business; and
17.2 The specific detail of the said leads as have already been provided to them
in the scope of their employment; and
17.3 The information inherent in the leads themselves, constitut ing personal
and specific details of individuals and pertaining to their credit and financial
information; and
17.4 The proprietary techniques and methods utili zed by the Applicants in
engaging with prospective clients in securing their business (the so-called
soft) skills as taught to the employees during their mandatory training with
the Applicants.
18. The Applicants seek urgent relief to enforce restraint -of-trade undertakings
against twenty-five former employees who, within the past seven months, have
taken up employment with the First Respondent, a direct competitor. These
individuals enjoyed access t o the Applicants’ confidential and proprietary
information, and the Applicants reasonably apprehend that such information will
be disclosed to, or utilised by, the First Respondent to secure an unlawful
competitive advantage. It is claimed that the risk of such disclosure increases
with each passing day, and once confidential information is compromised, the
resultant harm is irreversible and incapable of adequate redress in due course.
The Applicants aver that the urgency of this matter is not self-created but arises
from the operational realities facing the Applicants, including multiple branch
operations, high staff turnover, informal and irregular resignations, and the time
reasonably required to detect and inves tigate the emerging pattern of
Page 9 of 17
coordinated departures. It is claimed that the prejudice the Applicants stand to
suffer in the absence of immediate relief outweighs any potential prejudice to the
Respondents, particularly given that the Respondents have been afforded
sufficient opportunity to respond. The Applicants accordingly contend that, in light
of the direct and ongoing threat to their legitimate business interests, the matter
warrants the Court’s urgent intervention.
19. The Applicants confirm that, during the period between April 2025 and October
2025, all of the employees in question voluntarily resigned from their employment
with the Applicants and, shortly thereafter, took up employment with the First
Respondent. However, aside from attributing the delay to the high staff turnover
inherent in a call-centre environment, the Applicants provide no clear or detailed
account of the steps taken during the intervening seven -month period to
investigate, monitor, or address the employees’ departures.
20. What is conspicuously absent from the founding affidavit is any indication of the
date on which the Applicants became aware that the employees had taken up
employment with the First Respondent. In the absence of such averments, the
Court is constrained to infer that the Applicants only became alert to this fact on
or about October 2025, when letters of demand were addressed to the Second
to Twenty-Fifth Respondents, placing them on terms in respect of their restraint-
of-trade obligations. In those letters, the employees were requested to resign
from the First Respondent and were offered reinstatement with the Applicants.
21. On 8 October 2025 the Applicants informed the First Respondent that several of
its employees were still bound by 18-month restraint-of-trade agreements, which
prohibited them from working for a competitor, using confidential information, or
recruiting the Applicants’ staff. The Applicants stated that these individuals had
Page 10 of 17
been recruited directly from their employment and were therefore in breach of
their restraints, and that the First Respondent was participating in these
breaches. The Applicants offered to verify whether any of the First Respondent’s
current or future empl oyees were subject to restraints. They demanded that all
restrained employees cease their employment with the First Respondent by 10
October 2025, failing which legal action would follow. They also drew attention to
an escape clause allowing the First Resp ondent to pay 300% of an employee’s
annualised salary to release them from the restraint (excluding confidentiality).
The Applicants warned that non -compliance would result in High Court
proceedings and possible cost and damages orders. No responses were
received from the Respondents and no undertakings were forthcoming. This
letter of demand was peculiarly not attached to the founding affidavit, but only in
reply. Steps to launch this application were only seemingly taken on the 3 rd
November 2025 when the application was launched. The delay is not explained.
DISCUSSION
22. The Applicants contend that they launched the application as soon as they
became aware that the employees who had resigned over the preceding seven-
month period had taken up employment with the First Respondent, and that no
undertaking to comply with the r estraint obligations would be forthcoming. This
argument, in support of urgency , cannot be accepted. In Ecolab (Pty) Ltd v
Thoabala and Another7 (Ecolab):
‘In consideration of these factors, inclusive of the fact that at the hearing of the
matter Thoabala would have been in the employ of the second respondent for just
over three months. I am satisfied that the urgency claim in this case is clearly self-
created and this is even more so based on the applicant’s assertions that it did not
7 2017 (38) ILJ 2741 LC at par 28
Page 11 of 17
matter how long the breach had taken place and that it was not obliged to proffer
a substantial explanation for its dilatoriness. Of course , it matters how long the
breach went on and that the breach is the very essence of this urgent application.
Furthermore, an applicant is obliged to place substantive reasons before this court
as to why its matter deserves urgent attention.’ ”
23. The same principles set out in Ecolab apply in this matter.
24. It was already apparent by early October 2025 that no undertaking would be
forthcoming from the First Respondent. Once it becomes evident that the
Applicants’ interests are under threat, it is incumbent upon them to take
immediate and proactive steps to protect those interests.8
25. Subsequent to receipt of the Answering Affidavit, the Applicants conducted
further investigations into the precise identity of the employer of the Second to
Twenty-Fifth Respondents. These investigations revealed that the First
Respondent employed at least some of the former employees and the Applicants
also identified a second entity, Quora Finance (Pty) Ltd, which shares directors,
registered address, and business premises with the First Respondent, and may
be the actual employer of certain of the respondents. The Applicants’ original
investigation had been prompted by a poster displayed at the First Respondent’s
premises identifying the employer as Quora Holdings (Pty) Ltd and salary
payments referencing Qfinance, supporting their initial assumption that Qfinance
was a trading name of the First Respondent. The Applicants are silent on when
this poster was obtained or discovered.
26. It was stated by the Applicants that confirmatory affidavits from former
employees, who initially identified the First Respondent as their employer, would
8 Red Sun Hortitech (Pty) Ltd v de Villiers and Others (J 577/2021) [2021] ZALCJHB 138 (2
July 2021) at par 74
Page 12 of 17
be provided to the Court. However, these affidavits were not furnished, and no
dates were provided as to when the employees allegedly conveyed this
information. The Applicants now seek to supplement their case substantially in
the replying affidavit by specifically attaching the letters of demand and the poster
setting out employment conditions. The Applicants aver that the documents were
omitted as it was not deemed relevant at the time. Such supplementation further
undermines the Applicants’ argument regarding urgency, as it demonstrates that
critical information relied upon to justify immediate relief was not included in the
founding papers.
27. In view of the Applicants’ inaction, despite being, at the very least, acutely
suspicious or alternatively aware of the Respondents’ conduct and business
activities, I am unable to accept their assertion that they suffered harm, or
reasonably apprehended h arm, on a daily basis and that such prejudice would
persist absent urgent relief. The Applicants appeared content to tolerate the
alleged harm and the departure of more than twenty -five employees, remaining
disengaged from what was occurring within their o wn business for several
months. A considerable period of time passed before they elected to take any
steps, which significantly undermines their claim of urgency and ongoing
prejudice. Their explanation for failing to act earlier is inadequate, as no clear
evidence is provided as to when they became aware of the alleged breaches.
Consequently, the Court must draw its own inferences, particularly from the
letters of demand dated October 2025, which appear to be the first documented
indication that the Applic ants appreciated the extent of the alleged
contraventions. Once it became, or reasonably should have become apparent
that the Applicants’ interests were threatened, it was incumbent upon them to act
promptly. Their prolonged inaction over the seven-month period during which the
Page 13 of 17
employees resigned and commenced employment with the First Respondent
undermines the contention that they faced ongoing or imminent harm
necessitating urgent intervention. This conduct suggests complacency or
indifference, which substantially weakens their claim to urgency.
28. In my view, the Applicants should have had sufficient evidence to approach this
Court earlier and should have conducted their investigations sooner if they
genuinely considered the matter urgent and harm would ensue.
29. While the Court has recognized that breaches of restraint of trade may, by their
very nature, possess an inherent quality of urgency9, given their limited duration
and the fundamental rights at stake , requiring prompt determination , there are
nonetheless limits beyond which such urgency becomes self-created.10
30. The question of urgency is determined by the specific facts and circumstances of
each case. A matter cannot be deemed urgent solely because the Applicants
assert it to be so, or the contention that all restraint -of-trade matters carry an
inherent urgency. It is expected that in order for any arguments on urgency to be
sustained is that the Applicants must have acted with due haste when knowledge
of the Respondents’ prejudicial behaviour or actions are gained. They are silent
on when these actions came to the fore.
31. Having regard to the facts, I am not persuaded that the Applicants have shown
that their application merits preferential treatment. They have failed to comply
with the requirements of Rule 6(12) of the Rules of Court and the well-established
principles in case law.
9 Mozart Ice Cream Classic Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff & Another 2009 (3) SA 78 (C)
(1 December 2008)
10 Red Sun Hortitech ibid at par 78
Page 14 of 17
32. It is clear from the events that the Applicants were slow in asserting their rights.
Over a period of seven months, during which twenty -five Respondents resigned
and took up employment with the First Respondent, the Applicants took no
immediate steps to en force the restraint of trade, despite presumably being
aware of the alleged breaches, the precise timing of which remains unspecified.
33. It is not enough for a party seeking urgent relief to rely solely on the assertion
that it is entitled to priority or that it would suffer prejudice if the application is not
granted. An applicant must show that it acted diligently and with the promptness
warranted by the circumstances. In this case, the Applicants have, in my view,
materially failed to meet that standard.
34. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, only after receiving the
Answering Affidavit, the Applicants appear to have discovered that some of the
former employees may have been employed not by the First Respondent but by
a separate entity, Quora Finance (Pty) Ltd, which they now seek to join in the
proceedings. This revelation further undermines the basis for claiming urgency.
35. Although a breach of a restraint -of-trade agreement may have serious
consequences, it was the Applicants’ duty to take swift and diligent action to
mitigate any potential harm. They failed to do so, instead delaying unreasonably
before instituting proceedi ngs. The prejudice or harm the Applicants claim to
have suffered, or may suffe r, i s therefore largely self -inflicted, and a delayed
attempt to enforce their rights does not render the application urgent. Even
assuming some measure of urgency exists, it is of the Applicants’ own making,
and self-created urgency should not be entertained. Therefore, I conclude that
the matter is not urgent. I have not considered the merits of the application.
Page 15 of 17
SERVICE OF THE APPLICATION
36. The matter is further compounded by the Applicants’ failure to properly serve the
Second to Twenty-Fifth Respondents. Service was attempted only via WhatsApp,
which the Court does not regard as sufficient given the contractual relief sought.
The return of service shows a single attempt, yet the Applicants considered this
method adequate to enforce the restraint -of-trade obligations, a position the
Court finds unacceptable.
37. This approach overlooks the procedural requirement that a party must be
properly served to ensure it is given a fair opportunity to respond. The Applicants,
in their service affidavit regarding the joinder application, assert that the steps
taken are sufficient to support substantive relief in the main application against a
party that has not yet been formally joined in these proceedings. The following is
stated in the service affidavit:
“(e) Fortunately, in casu the First and Twenty Sixth Respondents share a
director and principal place of business;
(f) As such, service of the main application would have resulted in also
being served on the Twenty Sixth Respondent. “
40. This averment is entirely without merit and demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of the procedural requirements of service. It is untenable, as
substantive relief cannot be granted against a party that has not been properly
joined before the Court. To suggest otherwise is not only baseless but borders
on being absurd, as it disregards the essential principles of service and j oinder
that ensure a party’s right to be heard is respected.
Page 16 of 17
41. The possibility of an order for substituted service was discussed in Court and the
Applicant provided an order providing for alternative means of service on the
other Respondents. The Court does not deem such an order appropriate, and
therefore the Applicants need to effect service of the application and the
application for joinder in terms of the provisions of Rule 4 of the Uniform Rules of
Court.
In the premises I make the following order:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency;
2. The costs are reserved.
__________________________
VAN DER MERWE AJ
Acting Judge High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Appearances:
On behalf of Applicants: Adv L Hennop
Instructed by: Frik van Schalwyk Attorneys Incorporated
On behalf of Respondents: Adv A Mabensela
Instructed by: ES Kgaka Attorneys.
Page 17 of 17
HEARD ON: 19 November 2025.
DELIVERED: 21 November 2025.