THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case no: 2025 – 202752
In the matter between:
NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS OF
SOUTH AFRICA obo MEMBERS Applicant
and
STEEL TRADING (PTY) LTD First Respondent
SIBANYE RUSTENBURG PLATINUM
MINES (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
Heard: 11 November 2025
Delivered: 19 November 2025
This judgment / reasons w as handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email. The date and time for hand- down is
deemed to be 19 November 2025.
Summary: S 189A(13) – only applicable once s 189A finds application –
determining when s 189A applies entails complying with the qualifying
provisions in s 189A (1) – applicant failing to prove that s 189A applies –
2
requirements for application of section not met – Court having no jurisdiction
to consider applicant’s s 189A(13) application
S 18A(13) – applicant contends that section may be applied to any challenge of
procedural unfairness in the case of all operational requirements dismissals –
applicant relied on judgment in Solidarity obo Members v Barloworld
Equipment Southern Africa – applicant’s case wrong and misdirected – s
189A(13) only applies where s 189A applies – where s 189A does not apply
procedural unfairness may be changed in the ordinary course of unfair
dismissal dispute under s 191 of LRA – not competent to approach Court
directly on the basis of urgency under s 189A(13)
Jurisdiction – applicant seeking relief against party that is not employer – no
basis under the LRA to grant relief against party not the employer – applicant
failing to make out any basis for relief against second respondent – Court
having no jurisdiction to entertain relief sought by applicant against second
respondent
Jurisdiction – s 158(1)(a) considered – section does not confer jurisdiction but
only conveys powers on Court – jurisdiction must be conferred on other
provisions under LRA for s 158(1)(a) to apply – applicant’s reliance on s
158(1)(a) misplaced – section cannot be used to provide jurisdiction to
consider applicant’s application
Jurisdiction – Court having no jurisdiction to consider applicant’s application –
application dismissed for want of jurisdiction
Costs – application constitutes an abuse of process and hopeless – application
should never have been pursued and / or persisted with – principles relating to
punitive costs considered – punitive costs awarded
JUDGMENT: REASONS
SNYMAN, AJ
3
Introduction:
[1] In the current matter , the applicant brought an urgent application on 27
October 2025 against the first and second respondents . The applicant seeks
several items of interdictory relief against both respondents, as well as an
order reinstating four individual applicants that were dismissed by the first
respondent for operational requirements on 17 October 2025. The applicant
has pleaded reliance on section 189A(13) and section 158(1)(a) of the Labour
Relations Act (LRA) 1, as basis for the relief it seeks. The application was
opposed by both the first and second respondents, who filed answering
affidavits. The applicant also filed replying affidavits to these answers.
[2] Because the applicant sought final relief in motion proceedings, it was
necessary for the applicant to show : (a) the existence of a clear right; (b) an
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (c) the absence of
any other satisfactory remedy. 2 Also, and w here it comes to resolving factual
disputes in such cases, the principles enunciated in the well- known judgment
of Plascon Evans Paints v Van Riebeeck Paints 3 find application. In short, it
follows that it is the admitted or undenied facts together with the facts as
stated by the respondent s that must be utilized in deciding this matter. The
only exception would be if the respondent s simply offer a bald denial, or the
facts as stated by the first respondent are patently false, absurd or fanciful.
4
Insofar as the applicant relies on section 189A(13) , the application of such
1 Act 66 of 1995 (as amended)
2 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227; V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v
Helicopter and Marine Services (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 252 (SCA) at para 20. In particular,
and in respect of section 189A(13) proceedings, see Communication Workers Union v Telkom SA
SOC Ltd and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 360 (LC) at para 6.
SOC Ltd and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 360 (LC) at para 6.
3 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E -635C, where the Court said: ‘ … in proceedings on notice of motion
disputes of fact have arisen on the affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict or some other
form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits which have been
admitted by the respondent, together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order
…’. See also Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others 2005
(2) SA 359 (CC) at para 53; Jooste v Staatspresident en Andere 1988 (4) SA 224 (A) at 259C – 263D;
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) paras 26 – 27; Gbenga-
Oluwatoye v Reckitt Benckiser SA (Pty) Ltd and Another (2016) 37 ILJ 902 (LAC) at para 16; Molapo
Technology (Pty) Ltd v Schreuder and Others (2002) 23 ILJ 2031 (LAC) para 38.
4 See Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and others v Tshifhango and Another [2019] 7
BLLR 627 (LAC) at para 26; TIBMS (Pty) Ltd t/a Halo Underground Lighting Systems v Knight and
Another (2017) 38 ILJ 2721 (LAC) at para 29; SA Football Association v Mangope (2013) 34 ILJ 311
(LAC) at para 12.
4
section does not detract from the application of these Plascon Evans
principles.5
[3] Having considered all the facts in this matter, as it emanated from the
affidavits and by virtue of application of the Plascon Evans principles as set
out above, and having heard submissions on behalf of both the applicant and
respondents, it was clearly apparent to me that the application brought by the
applicant was doomed to fail and was actually hopeless. This is because the
Labour Court simply does not have jurisdiction to entertain the application
brought by the applicant, based on its case as pleaded.
6 As a consequence, I
made the following order on 11 November 2025:
1. The applicant’s application is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the first and second respondents’ costs on the
scale as between attorney and client.
3. Written reasons for this order will be handed down on 19 November 2025.
[4] This judgment now cons titutes the written reasons referred to in paragraph 3
of my order, above.
Background facts
[5] In setting out the background fact s in this matter, below, I will limit my
exposition in this regard only to those facts that are pertinent and relevant in
deciding the issue of jurisdiction. I do not propose to deal with any of the facts
relating to the merits of the applicant’s application, because if this Court has
no jurisdiction, then there is no point to do so. The backgrounds facts relating
to jurisdiction are straight forward, and fortunately, largely uncontested. For
ease of reference, I will refer to the applicant union as ‘ NUMSA’, the first
5 See Communication Workers Union (supra) at para 6; Banks and another v Coca -Cola SA - A
Division of Coca-Cola Africa (Pty) Ltd (2007) 28 ILJ 2748 (LC) at para 14; Insurance and Banking Staff
Association and Another v Old Mutual Services and Technology Administration and Another (2006) 27
ILJ 1026 (LC) at para 24.
ILJ 1026 (LC) at para 24.
6 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 296 (CC) at para 75; Mbatha
v University of Zululand (2014) 35 ILJ 349 (CC) at para 157; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v SA
Municipal Workers Union on behalf of Members (2015) 36 ILJ 624 (LAC) at para 21; Moodley v
Department of National Treasury and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 1098 (LAC) at para 37; Mohlomi v
Ventersdorp/Tlokwe Municipality and Another (2018) 39 ILJ 1096 (LC) at para 42; Public Servants
Association on behalf of Members v Minister of Health and Others (2019) 40 ILJ 193 (LC) at para 15.
5
respondent as ‘ Steel Trading’ and the second respondent as ‘ Sibanye’ in this
judgment.
[6] Steel Trading and Sibanye have a commercial relationship by virtue of a
service level agreement concluded between them as far back as January 2014
(the SLA). In terms of the SLA, Steel Trading r enders services to Sibanye in
the form of providing engineering work , which work primarily takes place
underground. Steel Trading employs approximately 27 0 employees on site at
Sibanye. As said, these employees work primarily underground installing
conveyor and mining steel plant structures and bulk transfer structures. Steel
Trading also instals underground ventilation fans.
[7] It was common cause that all the members of NUMSA on site at Sibanye,
which includes the four individual members (individual applicants) to which the
current matter relates, are employed by Steel Trading and not Sibanye. No
employment relationship ever existed between these individual employees of
Steel Trading and Sibanye.
[8] As a result of dissatisfaction with the outcome of demarcation proceedings
brought by Steel Trading against NUMSA and the MEIBC, pertaining to its
operations at Sibanye, as coupled with a number of other grievances
employees had against Steel Trading as their employer , the members of
NUMSA employed by Steel T rading at Sibanye's Kwezi Shaft in Rustenburg,
embarked upon unprotected strike action on 25 September 2025. The strike
lasted for a period of seven days until an order interdicting the strike was
granted by Makhura J in this Court on 2 October 2025.
[9] NUMSA and Steel Trading engaged in settlement discussions following the
granting of the Labour Court order , in order to resolve the underlying issues
that gave rise to the strike. This culminated in the conclusion of an agreement
called a ‘ Substantive Wage Agreement ’ on 4 October 2025 (the agreement),
resolving the underlying grievances and disputes. The agreement would apply
resolving the underlying grievances and disputes. The agreement would apply
for a three year period. In terms of the agreement, the employees would
receive year end incentives, back pay in the form of hardship allowances,
annual increases and all employees that participated in the strike would receive
6
final written warnings valid for 12 months . Also, three employees that been
dismissed for intimidation would be reinstated with final written warnings.
[10] According to Sibanye , it was unaware of the dealings between NUMSA and
Steel Trading with regard to the employees that embarked upon the
unprotected strike action and the employees that had been dismissed. In fact,
and according to Sib anye, it was only told by Steel T rading that all these
employees would be subjected to disciplinary action. The next Sibanye knew
of what happened, after these disciplinary proceedings, was when the
individual applicants (together with the other employees of Steel Trading)
arrived on site at the Kwezi shaft to resume their duties , and this then led to
the events below.
[11] On 6 October 2025, all the employees reported for duty at the Kwezi shaft .
However, and when seeking to report for work, the four individual employees
in this case were refused site entry by Sibanye and they were required by
Sibanye to report at the Steel Trading offices . These four employees were W
Makhuru, J T Ngomane, L D Motswane and J W Moyo. These employees then
reported at Steel Trading’s offices, where they were instructed not to report for
work but remain home, until called back by Steel Trading.
[12] What happened which caused the above event was that Sibanye informed
Steel Trading on 6 October 2025, in terms of the SLA between these two
parties, that the four employees will not be allowed back at work on any
Sibanye s ite. T his instruction was then confirmed in writing in a letter by
Gravett Mckenzie, the HR manager of Sibanye, sent to Pieter Bezuidenhout,
the group HR manager of Steel Trading, on 10 October 2025, which letter
reflected the following:
‘We refer to your correspondence dated 6 October 2025 and note Steel
Trading’s decision regarding the reversal of the termination of the four (4)
employees listed.
Notwithstanding Steel Trading decision, we confirm that these four (4)
employees listed.
Notwithstanding Steel Trading decision, we confirm that these four (4)
employees will not be granted access to the shafts or any of Sibanye Stillwater
("the Company”) operational areas.
7
The Company bears a statutory obligation. including under the Mine Health
and Safety Act, to provide and maintain a working environment that is safe
and without risk to the health of employees. Permitting the return of these
individuals would amount to non-compliance with the Company's operational
standards and safety protocols designed to protect its property and safeguard
the rights, wellbeing, and safety of all persons on Site. Their presence would
expose the Company's employees and operations to unneces sary and entirely
avoidable health and safety risk. and such presence would negatively impact
on the harmonious workplace environment the Company seeks to maintain
.
Directing these employees to return to Site in the current circumstances
would, in our view, fall short of the standard of care and diligence expected of
a contractor such as Steel Trading when performing services on the
Company's premises …’
[13] According to Steel Trading, it had no choice but to comply with this instruction
from Sibanye, and as a result, was no longer able to utilise the services of
these four employees. Steel Trading then decided to initiate proceedings in
respect of these employees relating to operational requirements.
[14] On 13 October 2025, Steel Trading then issue d the four employees each with
a notice of contemplated retrenchment in terms of section 189(3) of the LRA.
The notice recorded that the reason for embarking upon this process was
because Sibanye refused these employee access to site going forward,
meaning that the employees would no longer work . Important to the case in
casu, the notice recorded that only these four employees were affected by the
contemplated retrenchment, and that Steel T rading had not dismissed any
employees during the preceding 12 months for operational requirements. And
lastly, the notice recorded that Steel Trading employs 270 employees on the
Sibanye sites. This notice was also sent to NUMSA, and it was invited to
Sibanye sites. This notice was also sent to NUMSA, and it was invited to
attend consultations due to take place on 13 October 2025, 15 October 2025
and 17 October 2025.
[15] As to what happened in the course of these consultations , whether NUMSA
and the employees were properly consulted as contemplated by section 189 of
the LRA, and what transpired with regard to several items of correspondence
that passed between the parties, is an issue that relates to the merits of the
case, and will not be dealt with further. Suffice it to say, and on 17 October
8
2025, all four the employees received letters of retrenchment, terminating their
services due to operational requirements, as a result of the events as set out
above.
[16] On 20 October 2025, the attorneys for NUMSA wrote to Steel Trading,
requesting information concerning the process that led to the retrenchment of
the fou r employees on 17 October 2025, and threatened legal action if this
information was not forthcoming. On 29 October 2025, Steel T rading
answered the attorneys for NUMSA, and inter al ia stated that as far as it was
concerned, the retrenchment process had been concluded, and the
employees’ employment had been finally terminated on 17 October 2025. But
by that time, the current application had already been brought.
Urgency
[17] I intend to first deal with the issue of urgency. The four employees were
retrenched on 17 October 2025, and the application followed just more than a
week later, after NUMSA’s attorneys had received no response to their letter
to Steel Trading on 20 October 2025. I consider this action to be sufficiently
expeditious to satisfy urgency . Steel Trading and Sibanye were afforded
sufficient opportunity to oppose and answer the application. And when the
matter was argued, urgency was not really placed in issue. In line with the
principles set out in Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and
Others v Northam Platinum Ltd and Another
7, I will accept that NUMSA took
sufficiently prompt and urgent action, satisfied the requirement that the
application was in effect brought at the earliest appropriate opportunity, and
that this is not a case of self -created urgency. It is in any event in my view
important that this matter be disposed of on the merits, considering that it
concerns an issue of jurisdiction.
Analysis
[18] As I have touched on above, NUMSA faces two insurmountable hurdles in this
application, concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to grant it the relief sought.
application, concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to grant it the relief sought.
7 (2016) 37 ILJ 2840 (LC) at paras 21 – 26. See also Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) at para 18; Transport and Allied
Workers Union of SA v Algoa Bus Co (Pty) Ltd and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 2148 (LC) at para 11.
9
In fact, and in my view, these jurisdictional difficulties are obvious and trite,
and it is simply an untenable proposition for NUMSA to have brought the
application in the first place. I am of the view that what happened in this case
is nothing short of an abuse of process, but I will deal with this later in this
judgment, when addressing the issue of costs.
[19] I will start with the first jurisdictional problem faced by NUMSA . NUMSA pins
its application squarely on section 189A(13) of the LRA, which allows for
urgent intervention by this Court in retrenchment proceedings where section
189A finds application.
8 But does section 189A even find application in this
case? The answer must be a firm no. This is because section 189A(1)
specifically defines when section 189A applies , which would obviously include
when section 189A(13) applies , being part and parcel of section 189A as a
whole. Section 189A(1) reads:
‘(1) This section applies to employers employing more than 50 employees if-
(a) the employer contemplates dismissing by reason of the
employer's operational requirements, at least-
(i) 10 employees, if the employer employs up to 200 employees;
(ii) 20 employees, if the employer employs more than 200, but not more than
300, employees;
(iii) 30 employees, if the employer employs more than 300, but not more than
400, employees;
(iv) 40 employees, if the employer employs more than 400, but not more than
500, employees; or
(v) 50 employees, if the employer employs more than 500 employees; or
(b) the number of employees that the employer contemplates dismissing
together with the number of employees that have been dismissed by reason of
the employer's operational requirements in the 12 months prior to the
employer issuing a notice in terms of section 189 (3), is equal to or exceeds
8 Section 189A(13) reads: ‘ If an employer does not comply with a fair procedure, a consulting party
may approach the Labour Court by way of an application for an order - (a) compelling the employer to
comply with a fair procedure; (b) interdicting or restraining the employer from dismissing
an employee prior to complying with a fair procedure; (c) directing the employer to reinstate
an employee until it has complied with a fair procedure; (d) make an award of compensation, if an
order in terms of paragraphs (a) to (c) is not appropriate’. Further, section 189A(17) reads: ‘(a) An
application in terms of subsection (13) must be brought not later than 30 days after the employer has
given notice to terminate the employee's services or, if notice is not given, the date on which
the employees are dismissed …’.
10
the relevant number specified in paragraph (a).’
[20] The issue of when section 189A(13) can be relied on was specifically dealt
with by the Constitutional Court (CC) in Regenesys Management (Pty) Ltd t/a
Regenesys v Ilunga and Others9, where the Court held:
‘… It is convenient to start with the issue of the circumstances under which the
orders under subsection (13) may be granted. It is important to address right
at the outset the question of the circumstances in which s 189A applies. That
is to be found in s 189A(1).
58] It is clear from this provision that s 189A applies to dismissals for
operational requirements by employers who employ more than 50 employees
when they contemplate dismissing certain numbers of employees in their
workforce for operational requirements. …’ (emphasis added)
The Court pertinently concluded:10
‘The procedure and remedies provided for in ss 13 only apply to employees
whose employer is subject to s 189A, namely employers who employ more
than 50 employees. Employees employed or formerly employed by an
employer who employed less than 50 employees cannot utilise s 189A(13).
Those may use s 191 of the LRA to get their disputes about the procedural
fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements resolved.
’
[21] In Solidarity on Behalf of Members v Humansdorpse Landbou Koöperasie
Ltd11 the Court similarly decided, where the Court held as follows:
‘This case largely turns on whether or not the respondent should have dealt
with the retrenchment process in terms of s 189A and not solely in terms of s
189 as it has done. The jurisdictional factors for the applicant to approach this
court in terms of s 189A which in its terms provides various remedies to
employees falling in a certain category are provided for in s
189A(1).’ (emphasis added)
9 (2024) 45 ILJ 1723 (CC) at paras 57 – 58.
10 Id at para 217
11 (2023) 44 ILJ 2039 (LC) at para 12.
11
[22] On the undisputed facts in casu: (1) Steel Trading employs 270 employees at
Sibanye; (2) it has not dismissed any employees in the preceding 12 months
due to operational requirements; and (3) the retrenchment proceedings only
applied to the four individual employees in this case, and they were the only
four employees then dismissed for operational requirements. These being the
facts, there is simply untenable to say that Section 189A applies. Yes, it is true
that Steel Trading employs more than 50 employees , as it employs 270
employees. But that is only half of what must be considered in determining if
section 189A applies . Considering that Steel T rading employs between 200
and 300 employees , the retrenchment process must at least apply to a
minimum of 20 employees, for section 189A to find application. The
retrenchment process, as said, only applied to the four individual employees in
casu. And that must be the end of it. Section 189A, and with it section
189A(13), simply does not find application. If it does not find application, then
this Court has no jurisdiction to grant the applicant the relief it seeks against
Steel Trading on this basis.
[23] A pertinent comparable example can be found in National Union for All
Sectors and Others v 3sixty Life (Pty) Ltd and Others
12. In that case, the
employer employed 66 employees but only four employees were affected by
the retrenchment process and one further employee had been dismissed for
operational requirements in the preceding 12 months.13 Based on these facts,
the Court found that section 189A did not apply, and thus section 189A(13)
could not be relied on, with the Court reasoning:14
‘Section 189A applies to large-scale retrenchments and it is evident from
subsection (1)(a) that an employer who employs at least 50 employees and up
to 200 employees must contemplate retrenching at least ten employees,
including those retrenched in the preceding 12 months, for the provision to
apply. …
including those retrenched in the preceding 12 months, for the provision to
apply. …
The further requirement is that such employer with between 50 employees
and up to 200 employees must contemplate retrenching at least ten
12 (2024) 45 ILJ 1841 (LC).
13 Id at para 28.
14 Id at paras 30 – 32.
12
employees. Therefore, if such employer contemplates retrenching less than
ten employees, s 189A does not apply to the contemplated retrenchments.
Applicants did not put up a version contesting the first respondent’s version
that it intended to retrench a total of four employees and that it had retrenched
one employee in the preceding 12 months. These figures are disclosed in the
s 189 notices issued to the applicant employees. Therefore, the applicants
cannot utilise s 189A(13) to obtain relief from this court in circumstances
where s 189A did not apply to the retrenchment process embarked upon by
the first respondent …
’
[24] The requirements for section 189A to apply and then for section 189A(13) to
be able to be utilised, are in my view patently obvious, especially when the
undisputed facts are applied to the numerical requirements set out therein. It
must be the easiest thing in the world for NUMSA and its attorneys to simply
do a count, considering that they always had these facts and information
available to them. This count shows that there are 270 employees , however
only four are affected. The application should thus never have been brought,
was simply completely lacking in merit, and actually hopeless.
[25] Undeterred, the attorney for NUMSA, despite being confronted with these
clear statutory prescripts, forcefully argued that no matter what section
189A(1) may provide for, section 189A(13) can always be applied to any
retrenchment, because that is what was purportedly held by the CC in
Solidarity obo Members v Barloworld Equipment Southern Africa 15. I must
confess that I am mystified how this judgment can assist NUMSA or that it
even says what NUMSA contended for . Barloworld does not deal with the
question when section 189A applies, which is the question pertinently dealt
with by the CC two years later in Regenesys supra. In Barloworld, it was never
in contention that there was a mass retrenchment as contemplated by section
in contention that there was a mass retrenchment as contemplated by section
189A and that section 189A(13) in fact applied. In Barloworld , the Court
decided how section 189A( 13) should be interpreted and applied, and not
when it should be applied. But according to the attorney for NUMSA, the
15 (2022) 43 ILJ 1757 (CC).
13
following dictum in Barloworld supported the proposition that section 189A(13)
can be applied in any retrenchment:16
‘It follows from this jurisprudence that, in order for the Labour Court to
adjudicate a claim of the unfairness of a procedure in dismissals for
operational requirements, the court must be approached in terms of s
189A(13) on the basis of non-compliance with the procedures prescribed by s
189 or 189A of the LRA. …
’
[26] However, this reliance by NUMSA on the various dicta in Barloworld is entirely
misplaced. The Court was only dealing with retrenchments where section
189A actually applied. There was no finding that section 189A(13) can be
applied in all retrenchments even where section 189A did not apply , on the
basis that the Court was precluded from deciding procedural fairness in a
retrenchment without section 189A(13) being followed, which is in essence
what NUMSA is suggesting. If there is any doubt about this, the reasoning in
Barloworld was specifically considered by the CC in Regenesys supra, where
the Court held:17
‘The Labour Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes about the procedural
fairness of dismissals for operational requirements to which s 189A does not
apply and which are referred to it for adjudication in terms of s 191(5) (b)(ii) is
not ousted by subsection (18). That jurisdiction remains intact and the Labour
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes.’
The Court in Regenesys then referred to the reasoning in Barloworld , and
said:18
‘The essence of this court’s judgment in CC Barloworld was that, by virtue of
subsection (18), the Labour Court no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes about the procedural fairness of dismissals for operational
requirements referred to it in terms of s 191(5) (b)(ii) but that it did have
16 Id at para 68. See also para 71, where the Court said: ‘ Firstly, the power of the Labour Court to
adjudicate the procedural fairness of retrenchment consultations is limited to the ‘fair procedure’ that is
prescribed in ss 189 and 189A, which give effect to s 188. Secondly, it is evident that a party seeking
the Labour Court’s intervention when an employer fails to follow a fair procedure during retrenchment
consultations must approach the court for relief in terms of s 189A(13). This is because the Labour
Court is barred from determining the procedural fairness of a dismissal based on operational
requirements when it is approached in terms of s 191(5)(b)(ii).’.
17 Id at para 146(c).
18 Id at para 183.
14
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes about the procedural fairness in dismissals
for operational requirements to which s 189A applied if they were brought by
way of applications in terms of subsection (13). While the second part of this
statement correctly reflects the legal position, the first part does not, in my
respectful view, reflect the correct interpretation of subsection (18). This is so
because the Labour Court still has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes about the
procedural fairness of dismissal s based on the employer’s operational
requirements of employees to whose employer s 189A does not apply and the
first part of that statement says the opposite.’
[27] Therefore, and contrary to what is said by NUMSA, any case concerning
procedural unfairness relating to the dismissal of the four employees for
operational requirements, can be dealt with in the ordinary course in an unfair
dismissal dispute pursued under section 191 of the LRA. That dispute would
ultimately be referred to this Court in terms of section 191(5)(b)( ii) of the LRA,
and when deciding such a case, the Court would be entitled to consider and
decide the issue of procedural fairness, precisely because section 189A does
not apply . But this Court simply does not have jurisdiction to decide this
question directly, by way of applying section 189A(13).
[28] In summary, and because NUMSA based its application for relief against Steel
Trading squarely on section 189A(13) of the LRA, in circumstances where that
section does not find application, this Court simply has no jurisdiction to afford
NUMSA the relief sought. The application against Steel T rading must b e
dismissed on this basis alone.
[29] I now turn to the application for relief against Sibanye. I believe it faces the
same fate. What NUMSA asks for, against Sibanye, is that it should be
interdicted ‘ … from unlawfully violating the Applicants members’ rights to
employment as embedded in their contracts of employment with the 1 st
employment as embedded in their contracts of employment with the 1 st
Respondent …’, the first respondent being Steel T rading. On what basis this
Court would have any jurisdiction to grant such an order against Sibanye it
unclear.
[30] First and foremost, it must be emphasised that Sibanye is not the employer of
NUMSA’s members (and the four employees) and never was. There exists no
employment relationship between such members and Sibanye. The
15
relationship between Sibanye and Steel Trading is purely a commercial one, in
the form of Steel Trading being a service provider to Sibanye. Neither NUMSA
nor its members are a party to such relationship.
[31] The above being the undeniable facts, where does the jurisdiction of this Court
then lie? The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is defined in section 157 of the
LRA. It is critical to appreciate that section 157(1) does not establish a general
jurisdiction that the Labour Court can exercise, in all instances where a
litigating party approaches the Labour Court and pleads the dispute is one
related to an employment law matter.
19 In order for the Labour Court to have
jurisdiction, the issue for determination must be specifically provided for in the
LRA, or in any other related employment law, such as for example the
Employment Equity Act (EEA)
20 or Basic Conditions of Employment Act
(BCEA)21, to be decided by the Labour Court. The applicant must also indicate
on what provision in any of these items of legislation the applicant relies.22
[32] The whole issue of the lack of general justification of the Labour Court in what
may be termed any employment related dispute was recently revisited in
Cibane and Another v Premier of Province of Kwazulu- Natal
23, where the
Court pertinently held, in the context of the Labour Court intervening in
incomplete disciplinary proceedings in an employer:
‘In the absence of any statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the Labour
Court both in respect of employer conduct alleged to be unlawful and in
employment-related matters generally, there can thus be no general rule, as
the judgment in Booysen might be construed, to the effect that the Labour
Court has jurisdiction to intervene in medias res to restrain any alleged
illegalities, irregularities or unfairness in incomplete disciplinary proceedings.’
19 In Baloyi v Public Protector and Others (2021) 42 ILJ 961 (CC) at para 24, it was held: ‘… Crucially,
s 157(1) does not afford the Labour Court general jurisdiction in employment matters … ’ See also
Soobedar and Another v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Another (2021) 42
ILJ 1761 (LC) at para 12; Booysen v Beaufort West Municipality and Another (2021) 42 ILJ 2415 (LC)
at para 5.
20 Act 55 of 1998 (as amended).
21 Act 75 of 1997 (as amended).
22 In SA Medical Association Trade Union on Behalf of Rikhotso v Member of the Executive Council,
Department of Health, Limpopo Province and Others (2023) 44 ILJ 1779 (LC) at para 6, the Court
said: ‘… an applicant must necessarily identify the statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the
court …’. In Booysen (supra) at para 5, it was held that: ‘… A party referring a dispute to this court for
adjudication must thus point to a provision of the LRA or some other law to establish that the matter is
one over which this court has jurisdiction …’. See also Shezi v SA Police Service and Others (2021)
42 ILJ 184 (LC) at para 10.
23 [2025] 10 BLLR 1004 (LAC) at para 27.
16
The same, in my view, clearly applies to any situation where urgent
intervention by the Labour Court is sought under section 158(1) (a) of the LRA,
which is what NUMSA, from what it has said in its founding affidavit, appears
to do.
[33] T urning then to section 158(1) itself, it is the section that deals with the powers
of the Labour Court. It has been recognised that there are in essence two
categories of powers envisaged by section 158(1). The first category is those
powers that can only be exercised if it is first found that the Labour Court has
jurisdiction on another basis. The second category is what can be described
as jurisdiction conferring powers, meaning that the power itself establishes
jurisdiction. This was made clear in South African Municipal Workers Union
and Others v Mokgatla and Others
24, as follows : ‘… While s 157(1) and (2)
relate, broadly, to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, s 158(1) both lists
specific remedial powers and provides substantive jurisdictional bases of that
court. …’ The same was said in Du Plessis v Public Protector and Others :25
‘This then only leaves s 158. Even though this provision on face value appears
to deal with powers that are conveyed to the Labour Court only once
jurisdiction is first established to exist, this section must be read in conjunction
with s 157 as a source of jurisdiction as well …’.
[34] The nature of the powers of the Labour Court under section 158(1), was
pertinently dealt with in Merafong City Local Municipality v SA Municipal
Workers Union and Another
26. In that judgment, the Court accepted that
section 157 is the primary provision in the LRA which deals with the Labour
Court's jurisdiction,
27 however the Court added that section 157(1): ‘… directs
the reader of that section to the sources of the Labour Court's exclusive
jurisdiction, albeit in very vague and general terms … ’. Because of this, the
Court expressed the view that:28 ‘… As a result, the interpreter is saddled with
Court expressed the view that:28 ‘… As a result, the interpreter is saddled with
the difficult task of having, for example, to distinguish purely jurisdictional
provisions from general empowerment provisions. This difficulty is
exacerbated by sections which purport to contain mere empowerment
24 2016 (5) SA 89 (SCA) at para 11.
25 (2020) 41 ILJ 919 (LC) at para 24.
26 (2016) 37 ILJ 1857 (LAC).
27 Id at para 28.
28 Id at para 30.
17
provisions, whereas they, on proper construction, also actually contain
provisions which are sources of the Labour Court's jurisdiction’. That all being
said, the Court then concluded:
29
‘Section 158 is such a section. Its introductory wording specifically states that
it deals with the powers of the Labour Court. Because the introductory words
of the previous section, that is s 157, state that it deals with the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court, the immediate expectation is that s 158 is not a source of
jurisdiction, but merely contains provisions defining the powers of the Labour
Court in respect of matters, which, in terms of some other provision in that Act,
fall under the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. However, a close reading of the
entire s 158 dispels that initial notion. It does deal with powers (post
jurisdiction), but also with powers which cannot but be construed and
understood as sources of jurisdiction.’
[35] The Court in Merafong supra provided examples of provisions found in section
158(1) that conferred jurisdiction, as opposed to those that could only be
exercised if jurisdiction was first established elsewhere under the LRA. In this
regard, the Court said:
30 ‘Section 158(1)(a) is clearly an example of the
powers the Labour Court may exercise in respect of a matter falling within its
jurisdiction, and it does not purport to grant the Labour Court jurisdiction, in the
sense of the power to hear and determine the matter in the first place. On the
other hand, s 158(1)(i) clearly bestows on the Labour Court jurisdiction in the
latter sense’. The Court also referred to section 158(1)(h) as being a source of
conferring jurisdiction and then empowering the Labour Court to hear and
determine applications to review any decisions taken or acts performed by the
State in its capacity as employer.
31
[36] It follows that each individual provision in section 158(1) must be carefully
scrutinised in order to ascertain whether the provision confers jurisdiction on
scrutinised in order to ascertain whether the provision confers jurisdiction on
the Labour Court in addition to providing it with the power, or is only a
provision providing the Labour Court with powers to exercise once it has
jurisdiction established by other means in the first place. In this regard, the
Court in Merafong supra has clearly said that the powers in terms of section
158(1)(a) do not serve to confer jurisdiction, and can only be exercised if
29 Id at para 31.
30 Id at para 33.
31 Id at para 34.
18
jurisdiction exists in the first place. Using a simple example relevant to the
case in casu , the Labour Court has the power to grant an interdict under
section 158(1)(a)(ii), but can only exercise this power if it already has
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.
[37] It must follow that the reliance of NUMSA on section 158(1)(a) as a source of
jurisdiction is ill-founded. This is not a jurisdiction conferring provision. It is a
provision providing certain powers to the Labour Court, only once jurisdiction
is conferred from another source. And in casu, there is no such source.
[38] According to NUMSA, Steel Trading is in essence working under instruction of
Sibanye, as it is beholden to Sibanye. The argument goes that if it was not for
the instruction given by Sibanye, the four employees would still be working
and would not have been retrenched by Steel Trading. Therefore, it is
contended that Sibanye is unlawfully interfering in the employment relationship
between the members of NUMSA (the four employees) and Steel Trading, and
fairness dictates that it should be interdicted from doing so.
[39] None of the aforesaid can however serve to confer jurisdiction on this Court to
grant relief against Sibanye. Sibanye owes no duty to the employees of Steel
Trading, under the LRA, because, in short, it is not their employer. If Steel
Trading may accede to unlawful demands by Sibanye and dismiss employees
as a result, that should be challenged as an unfair dismissal against Steel
Trading, on the basis that there exists no fair reason for dismissal. This
situation is commonly known as dismissal at the behest of a third party , and
may be found to be a fair or an unfair dismissal by the employer itself .
32 But it
does not make the third party to also be a party to any unfair dismissal case
and that it must somehow be regarded as an employer for the purposes of the
application of the LRA. What NUMSA is in essence asking for is that I regard
application of the LRA. What NUMSA is in essence asking for is that I regard
Sibanye as some sort of employer in equity, but no such thing exists . As said
in Buffalo Signs Co Ltd and Others v De Castro and Another
33: ‘… a person
either falls within the definition of employer or he does not. There is
32 See for example Kroeger v Visual Marketing (2003) 24 ILJ 1979 (LC) ; Nape v INTCS Corporate
Solutions (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2120 (LC).
33 (1999) 20 ILJ 1501 (LAC) at para 16.
19
no employer in equity …’. In Dawn Ltd and Others v Molefe and Others 34 the
Court pertinently said:
‘It follows that it was not competent nor permissible for the second respondent
to extend the relief he awarded to Polanofield because he may have
considered it just and equitable to do so, and because he believed it as a
group holding company should be liable for the debts of its subsidiaries. The
reasons for this simply are that there was no case made out to justify the
piercing of the corporate veil. In fact, that was not even asked for. Secondly,
and in terms of the LRA in the case of unfair dismissal disputes, relief can only
be made against an employer. There is no such thing as a fictional employer,
or an employer in equity, which is what the approach of the second
respondent would have to contemplate, as Polanofield was never the actual
employer of the first respondent.
’
[40] Another avenue to perhaps render Sibanye liable would be to pierce the
corporate veil as it may exist between Steel Trading and Sibanye 35, but no
such case was ever pleaded or proven. Or reliance can be placed on section
200B of the LRA 36, but once again, no such case was pleaded or even made
out in the founding affidavit. But in any event, and considering the nature of
the case the applicant is actually pursuing, reliance on section 200B would not
be competent, having regard to what the Court held in Masoga and Another v
Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd and Others37, as follows:
‘The effect of s 200B, while crucial, is merely to fix or extend the liability that
would ordinarily be that of the employer, as per the traditional tests, to another
or others, who carry on an associated or related activity or business by or
through an employer. They are regarded as employers for the purposes of
liability. But it is only if they are in an associated or related business with the
employer which is intended to defeat, or has the effect of defeating, the
employer which is intended to defeat, or has the effect of defeating, the
purposes of the LRA or any other employment law, either directly or indirectly,
that they would be treated as the employer. The purpose for this is clear from
s 200B(2). They are regarded or treated as such for the purposes of liability —
34 (JR2114/21) [2024] ZALCJHB 111 (4 March 2024) at para 50.
35 See Footwear Trading CC v Mdlalose (2005) 26 ILJ 443 (LAC) at paras 36 – 39.
36 Section 200B(1) re ads: ‘ For the purposes of this Act and any other employment
law, 'employer' includes one or more persons who carry on associated or related activity or business
by or through an employer if the intent or effect of their doing so is or has been to directly or indirectly
defeat the purposes of this Act or any other employment law’.
37 (2019) 40 ILJ 2707 (LAC) at para 47.
20
they are held jointly and severally liable for a failure to comply with the
obligations of an employer in terms of the LRA or any other employment law.
In other words, s 200B(1) defines ‘employer’ for a very specific purpose and
that purpose is found in s 200B(1) read with s 200B(2). The section cannot be
utilised generally for making persons or entities the employer(s) of others .’
(emphasis added)
[41] Therefore, this Court simply has no jurisdiction to grant NUMSA the relief it
seeks against Sibanye. There is no source for such ju risdiction to be found in
the LRA or any other employment law for that matter, for the simple reason
that Sibanye is not the employer of the employees in this case and there exists
no employment relationship between such parties. The application against
Sibanye falls to be dismissed on this basis alone.
Costs
[42] This then only leaves the issue of costs. I am fully aware of the principles
applicable to costs in employment disputes as articulated by the Court in
Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu- Natal and Others 38. However,
Zungu is not a blanket immunity against costs orders. The fact is that this
Court always retains a discretion, as contemplated by section 162(1) of the
LRA, to make a costs award against a party. In Union for Police Security and
Corrections Organisation v SA Custodial Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 39
the Court said:
‘In the labour context, the judicial exercise of a court’s discretion to award
costs requires, at the very least, that the court must do two things. First, it
must give reasons for doing so and must account for its departure from the
ordinary rule that costs should not be ordered. Second, it must apply its mind
to the dictates of the fairness standard in s 162, and the constitutional and
statutory imperatives that underpin it …’
[43] Sibanye has complained that NUMSA saw it fit to cite Sibanye as a party to
these proceedings and to compel it to defend an urgent application that was,
these proceedings and to compel it to defend an urgent application that was,
even on its face, legally incompetent and devoid of any factual or jurisdictional
38 (2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at para 24.
39 (2021) 42 ILJ 2371 (CC) at para 35.
21
basis against Sibanye. This resulted in it having to incur unnecessary costs in
opposing an application which it should never have been a party to in the first
place, which application was in any event misguided and frivolous. Sibanye
sought punitive costs.
[44] Steel Trading followed suit where it came to the making submissions on the
issue of costs. It was especially critical of the that it was patently obvious that
section 189A did not apply, and that by attempting the current course of
action, NUMSA was effectively trying to bypass the ordinary dispute resolution
proceedings under the LRA and gain an undue advantage. It also sought
costs on a punitive scale.
[45] In my view, there is force in the contentions raised by Steel Tr ading and
Sibanye. NUMSA brought an application to this Court when it should not have
done so in the first place. It must have been clear that the requirements of
Section 189A simply did not apply in this case, and that no relief could ever be
competent against Sibanye as it was not the employer. I am also convinced
that the reliance by NUMSA on the judgment in Barloworld was deliberately
misconstrued to suit a particular narrative which was simply unsustainable.
The case was, for all intents and purposes , hopeless. In Children’s Resource
Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others 40 the Court had
the following to say:
‘Whether a case is hopeless has two aspects. It is hopeless if it is advanced
on a basis that is legally untenable. It is also hopeless if it is advanced in the
absence of any credible evidence to support it. These are categories that have
long been recognised in our law and practice. A case is legally hopeless if it
could be the subject of a successful exception. It is factually hopeless if the
evidence available and potentially available after discovery and other steps
directed at procuring evidence will not sustain the cause of action on which the
claim is based. …’
claim is based. …’
[46] But it is what NUMSA did after being confronted with what Steel Trading and
Sibanye had to say in their answering affidavits that is particularly concerning.
It surely then must have been clear that there is simply no way in which
section 189A(13) could apply or that any kind of relief against Sibanye would
40 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) at para 35. See also Mashishi v Mdladla NO and Others (2018) 39 ILJ 1607
(LC) at para 14.
22
be competent. At that point, NUMSA should have carefully considered it s
options, and should have explored how the application could be abandoned. If
perhaps NUMSA had thrown in the towel at that point, it may have escaped a
costs order. But it doggedly persisted with the application, and in reply did not
even deal with what it has been confronted with, simply baldly saying that
section 189A (13) applied and that Sibanye should be liable because Steel
Trading was operating under its ‘ instructions’. I take guidance from the
following dictum in Sepheka v Du Pont Pioneer (Pty) Ltd 41, in a case where
the Court was actually dealing with costs in the context of a punitive costs
order:
‘Punitive costs will also be justified where a litigant adopts what is called an
‘unconscionable stance’, or conducts him/herself in an unacceptable manner
in the course of the proceedings. Punitive costs also serve as a mark of a
court’s displeasure. …’
[47] Considering that, in my view, a costs order against NUMSA is certainly earned
and justified, the next question is whet her punitive costs are justified and
appropriate. In Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 42 the Court
succinctly said:
‘More than 100 years ago, Innes CJ stated the principle that costs on an
attorney and client scale are awarded when a court wishes to mark its
disapproval of the conduct of a litigant. Since then this principle has been
endorsed and applied in a long line of cases and remains applicable. …
’
[48] As to when punitive costs may be considered to be appropriate, the Court in
Stainbank v SA Apartheid Museum at Freedom Park and A nother43 held as
follows:
‘Punitive costs have been granted when a practitioner instituted proceedings
in a haphazard manner; wilfully ignored Court procedure or rules; presented a
case in a misleading manner; and forwarded an application that was plainly
misconceived and frivolous. …’
misconceived and frivolous. …’
41 (2019) 40 ILJ 613 (LC) at para 42. See also Mukanda v South African Legal Practice Council 2021
(4) SA 292 (GP) at para 13.
42 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) at para 223.
43 2011 JDR 0706 (CC) at para 53.
23
[49] The Court in Sephaka supra also set out circumstances in which a punitive
costs order may be appropriate, as follows:44
‘Punitive costs will also be justified where a litigant adopts what is called an
‘unconscionable stance’, or conducts him/herself in an unacceptable manner
in the course of the proceedings. Punitive costs also serve as a mark of a
court’s displeasure. The failure to maintain a reasonable standard of
workmanship and skill in the drafting of documents and bringing of a case to
court may also justify a punitive costs award, where the ultimate cause fails as
a result of this failure.’
And Geerdts v Multichoice Africa (Pty) Ltd 45 it was said:
‘In awarding costs on the attorney and client scale, the court has a discretion,
to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the facts. As between
the parties, it is a matter of fairness to both sides. Vexatious, unscrupulous,
dilatory or mendacious conduct on the part of an unsuccessful litigant may
render it unfair for his opponent to be out of pocket in the matter of his own
attorney and client costs.’
[50] It has been held that where is case is persisted with when it must have been
apparent, by way of the exercise of due care an diligence, that the case should
never be persisted with, it could serve as a basis for punitive costs. 46 For
example, in the case of a litigant opposing an appeal where it was apparent
that it should not have done so, the Court Madzunye and Another v Road
Accident Fund47 had the following to say:
‘Regarding the costs of the appeal it was submitted on the appellants' behalf
that the Court a quo's judgment was so clearly wrong that the respondent
should never have opposed the appeal. It was accordingly argued that, as the
respondent had acted unreasonably and irresponsibly by opposing the appeal,
particularly considering its special status, it should bear the costs of the
appeal on the scale as between attorney and own client, alternatively on the
appeal on the scale as between attorney and own client, alternatively on the
attorney and client scale. Mindful of this Court's general disinclination to use
hindsight in assessing a party's conduct in considering punitive costs awards
44 Id at para 42.
45 [1998] ZALAC 10 (29 June 1998) at para 48.
46 See NCP Chlorchem (Pty) Ltd v National Energy Regulator and Others 2017 (6) SA 158 (GJ) at
para 55.
47 2007 (1) SA 165 (SCA) at para 16.
24
(AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd v Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd 2000 (1) SA 639
(SCA) in para [20]), I am, however, inclined to agree with the appellants'
sentiment.’
[51] Also, and in the case of frivolous litigation embarked upon by a litigant when it
is clear that the Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, such
conduct could be equally deserving of punitive costs orders.48
[52] All the above considered, I believe that this is a case where a where a punitive
costs order against NUMSA is unfortunately justified and warranted. NUMSA
is an experienced trade union, well versed in the LRA and the legal
proceedings associated with it , and has been a party to many precedent
setting pieces of litigation. It was at all times legally assisted. It should have
known better, and then worse, should have rather abandoned a course of
action that was patently obviously doomed to fail, rather than persisting with it.
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Members v BMW (SA)
(Pty) Ltd 49 the Court held, specifically in the context of NUMSA pursuing an
urgent application it never should have:
‘NUMSA was legally assisted throughout these proceedings, and is itself an
experienced and well -resourced trade union, fully familiar with litigation in this
Court concerning LRA disputes. NUMSA should thus have known, from the
outset, that its application was doomed to fail. I also consider that NUMSA in
fact deliberately designed the current application to try and effectively scupper
the disciplinary proceedings, with the view to compelling BMW to negotiate
some alternative resolution to the matters with it rather than dismissing its
members. … This kind of behaviour of bringing applications to achieve ulterior
purposes is not conducive to the fundamental requirement of the expeditious
resolution of employment disputes, would be an abuse of the scarce
resources of this Court, and should be frowned upon.’
resources of this Court, and should be frowned upon.’
[53] The continuous failure by litigants to heed the numerous warnings by this
Court where it comes to these kinds of applications , which is effectively what
NUMSA has done in this instance, must be visited with adverse
48 See Du Plessis v Public Protector and Others (2020) 41 ILJ 919 (LC) at para 48; Democratic
Nursing Organisation of SA on behalf of Ramaroane v Member of the Executive Council for Health,
Gauteng Province and O thers (2019) 40 ILJ 2533 (LC) at para 20; Sihlali and O thers v City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another (2017) 38 ILJ 1692 (LC) at para 29.
49 (2025) 46 ILJ 2712 (LC) at para 67 . See also Ngobeni v Passenger Rail Agency of SA Corporate
Real Estate Solutions and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 1704 (LC) at para 14.
25
consequences.50 It constitutes an abuse of process to pursue a case which is
for all intents and purposes hopeless. I fully align myself with the following
dictum in Mokoena v Merafong Municipality and Others51:
‘In casu, the applicant brought a meritless application to this court and fairness
dictates that the respondents cannot be expected to endure enormous costs
defending litigation where more thought and consideration had to be put in
before approaching this court on an urgent basis. …’
[54] An apposite expression of the position, which I believe finds proper application
in casu, can be found in Minya v SA Post Office Ltd and Others52, where the
Court decided:
‘… This application ought never have seen its day in court in the light of its ill -
conceived nature, more particularly in view of the procedural complaints raised
by the applicant. The applicant’s attorneys of record and counsel ought to
have foreseen the futility of bringing this application. To reiterate, this court
ought not to be seen as a first port of call for all workplace related complaints
when these can be sufficiently dealt with internally. In the event that an
employee is still aggrieved after the internal process, such issues can properly
be addressed through the dispute-resolution framework of the LRA. This is
something of which the applicant, being legally represented, ought to have
been made aware. In the circumstances, I therefore agree that the
requirements of law and fairness dictate that a punitive costs order should
follow. …
’
[55] For all the aforesaid reasons, I thus believe it is appropriate to exercise my
discretion with regard to costs by making a punitive costs order against
NUMSA, on the scale as between attorney and client.
Order
[56] It is for all the reasons set out in this judgment that I made the order as set out
in paragraph 3 of this judgment, supra.
50 See, for example, Magoda v Director -General of Rural Development and Land Reform & another
(2017) 38 ILJ 2795 (LC) at para 20; Botes v City of Joburg Property Company SOC Ltd and Another
(2021) 42 ILJ 530 (LC) at para 50; Shikwane and Another v Bojanala Platinum District Municipality and
Others (J 774/20) [2020] ZALCJHB 191 (29 August 2020) at para 64; BMW (supra) at para 68.
51 (2020) 41 ILJ 234 (LC) at para 36.
52 (2021) 42 ILJ 141 (LC) at para 29.
26
____________________
S Snyman
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Mr T Manasoe of Letsholo Manasoe Inc Attorneys
For the First Respondent: Advocate D Groenewalt
Instructed by: Serfontein Viljoen & Swart Attorneys
For the Second Respondent: Mr J Kent of Solomon Holmes Inc Attorneys