THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 502/2024

In the matter between:
JOHANNES WESSEL GREEFF APPELLANT
and
BODY CORPORATE OF
MERRIMAN COURT FIRST RESPONDENT
CLAIRE ELIZABETH BLAHA SECOND RESPONDENT
ANTONINO ROSARIO SCALABRINO THIRD RESPONDENT
CHARLES ERIC LEONG SON FOURTH RESPONDENT
WENDY-LEE DE GOEDE FIFTH RESPONDENT
ISTVAN GYONGY SIXTH RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Johannes Wessel Greeff v Body Corporate of Merriman Court
and Others (502/2024) [2025] ZASCA 176 (28 November
2025)
Coram: DAMBUZA, KATHREE-SETILOANE, SMITH and
BAARTMAN JJA and CHILI AJA
Heard: 28 August 2025
Delivered: 28 November 2025
Summary: Law of Property – requirements for the extension of a sectional unit
prescribed in Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 and Sectional Titles Schemes
Management Act 8 of 2011 not complied with – decision at an informal meeting

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not constituting approval of building plans as required in law – ratification
threshold not met for adoption of minutes of informal meeting – requirements for
declaratory relief and final interdict not established.

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ORDER


On appeal from: The Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town
(Allie, Salie and Mangcu-Lockwood JJ sitting as court of appeal):
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.


JUDGMENT


Baartman JA (Dambuza, Kathree -Setiloane, Smith JJA and Chili AJA
concurring):

Introduction
[1] On 15 September 202 1, the Western Cape Division of the High Court ,
Cape Town per Ndita J (the high court) granted the appellant , Mr Johannes
Wessel Greeff (Mr Greeff) declaratory relief to the effect that he was authorised
to implement building plans for construction o n his property, section 1 of the
Merriman Court sectional scheme located along Merriman Road in Greenpoint,
Cape Town. The order included a mandamus that the respondents consider Mr
Greeff’s request for approval of the building plans. On 13 February 2024, the full
bench of that division, per Allie, Salie and Mangcu-Lockwood JJ, (the full court),
set aside that relief. This appeal against the judgment of the full court, is with the
special leave of this Court.

[2] The background facts are the following. The third respondent, Mr
Antonino Rosario Scalabrino (Mr Scalabrino), inherited from his father a small

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block of flats (the Merriman Court), comprising six single-storey apartments, a
three-car garage, domestic staff quarters and two storeroom s, in Green Point,
Cape Town.

[3] In 1986, Mr Scalabrino converted Merriman Court into a Sectional Title
Scheme. Thereafter, various owners extended their sections into the common
property, the roof, and the common property lobbies or adjacent voids beneath
the building. An additional garage was also erected. Mr Greeff is the owner of
section 1 of the Sectional Title Scheme, the only unit located on the lower end of
the property, an 88m² flat. He is the only owner in Merriman Court who has not
yet extended his unit. He has exclusive use of a garden area around his unit (the
garden area).

[4] At the 2007 Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the first respondent, the
Body Corporate of Merriman Court (the Body Corporate), Mr Greeff requested
and obtained an ‘in principle’ approval to build a garage . No formalities were
complied with as, at that stage , a ll the owners were members of the Body
Corporate and partook in management decisions. They dealt informally with
matters without regard to legislative requirements. However, in 2013 , the Body
Corporate decided to engage relevant professionals to regularise the alterations
that had been affected at that stage. Pursuant thereto, a surveyor resurveyed the
scheme and prepared the diagrams necessary to regularise the extensions and
additions to the individual units at that stage . On 24 June 2016 , the extensions
were duly registered in the deeds office.

[5] In the high court application, Mr Greeff alleged that at the 2013 AGM, his
wife, Mrs Greeff, requested permission from the Body Corporate to extend their
unit into the garden area. Mrs Greeff , however, did not file a confirmatory
affidavit. The minutes of the 2013 meeting show that no detail, such as the extent

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and nature of the proposed extension was provided at that meeting. The relevant
part of the minutes reveal that , ‘K Jackson , proxy for J Greef f, requested
permission from the meeting for the later extension of their 2nd bedroom plus a
bathroom, even changes to the kitchen. This were unanimously approved, subject
to plan approval by the Body Corporate and the local authority–Approved’. As
such, t he request was conditionally granted. Due to work commitments, Mr
Greeff did not act on the 2013 permission.

[6] In April 2017, Mr Greeff presented building plans (the 2017 plans) to the
Body Corporate, ostensibly based on the permission obtained in 2013. As the
2017 plans form the basis of the relief sought, I deal with these in some detail.
The Body Corporate had scheduled its 2017 AGM for 28 April 2017 , and Mr
Greeff’s plans were an item on the agenda of that meeting. However, the meeting
did not proceed as planned ‘…due to the immediate resignation of the Managing
Agent (MA) at 22:00 on 27 April 2017 ’.1 The members resolved to hold an
informal meeting (the informal meeting) instead of the planned AGM. In respect
of Mr Greeff’s agenda item , the following is recorded in the minutes of th e
informal meeting:
‘Unit 1 Proposal:
- Johan [Greeff] circulated architectural drawings outlining extensions to unit 1
- Body Corporate formally accepts the plans
- Tony [Scalabrino] as the chairman will sign any document necessary
- The stairs could possibly also be used as they are exclusive use area
- Once the roof top is considered a landscaper will be appointed who will revie w the entire
blocks gardens
- Suggestion to extend into steps on the left of the building.
- Civil engineer and city council approval will be circulated to the trustees as well as building
timelines.
- Common use area at the entrance

1 This is apparent from the minutes of the informal meeting.

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- Bikes can be stored there
- Builders will use this space during the building process
Improvements:
- Quote for the stairs to be retiled after unit 1 building is complete.’
The postponed AGM was held on 7 December 2017, and the minutes of the
informal meeting were adopted.

[7] Mr Greeff did not implement the 2017 plans but instead instructed an
architect to revise the plans (the 2019 plans ). At the time, the Greeffs were
expecting their first child and needed an extra bedroom. The 2019 plans
accommodated that need and aimed to improve the aesthetics of the extension
proposed in the 2017 plans. They included a proposed extension to the section 1
flat by providing for the construction of a double storey building onto the
common property of the Body Corporate.

[8] The upper storey of the proposed extension would be a flatlet with a
wraparound veranda. Mr Greeff wanted the plans to be considered at the AGM
scheduled for 5 July 2019 (the 2019 AGM). Ahead of that meeting, he made the
plans available to the MA for circulation to members and to be placed on the
agenda. The MA obliged. At the 2019 AGM, the parties agreed that Mr Greeff’s
request should be dealt with at a Special General Meeting to be held on
26 July 2019.

[9] The agenda, circulated ahead of the 26 July 2019 Special General Meeting,
informed members of Mr Greeff’s request:
‘2 Extension of Section 1 (Application/documents attached)
3 Erection of Garage (Application/documents attached).’
Mr Greeff made revisions to the 2019 plans as late as two days before the meeting.
The respondents, did not attend the meeting as they needed more information and
time to consider Mr Greeff’s revisions. The meeting was consequently inquorate

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and could not proceed. It was reconvened on 2 August 2019. Only Mr Greeff, his
architect, Mr Scalabrino , and the chairperson, a representative of the MA,
attended the latter meeting. At that meeting, Mr Scalabrino signed off on the
‘Preliminary Plans’. In terms thereof, Mr Greeff’s unit could be extended from
88m² to 185m², essentially incorporating into his sectional unit a large portion of
the garden.

[10] The second respondent Ms Claire Elizabeth Blaha (Ms Blaha), the fourth
respondent, Mr Charles Eric Son (Mr Son), and the fifth respondent Ms Wendy-
Lee de Goede (Ms de Goede) , all owners of units in the scheme and, as such,
members of the body corporate objected to the resolution taken at the reconvened
meeting. The parties agreed to convene a Special General Meeting on 19 October
2019. The minutes of that meeting recorded a 100 per cent quorum and that the
following concerns were raised in respect of Mr Greeff’s proposed extension:
‘The extent of the extensions of exclusive use area. Current owners had done extensions only
incorporated 17 square metres.
…
Members noted that they will not be approving any plans with regards the extensions of unit 1
till such time that the owner of section 1 provides the extent of the exclusive use areas and the
value of the said extension. Members further objected to the pro posed structure that will be
erected, which will be unsightly.
…
Members noted that the permission of the erection of the garage was not brought to the attention
of all members and there seems to be a flaw on how the special resolution was passed at the
said meeting.
…
70. 17 per cent of the members present at the meeting objected to the plans for the extension to
be done on the exclusive use areas as well as the plan for the erection of the said garage.’ (Own
emphasis.)

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[11] Mr Son and Ms de Goede objected to the request for approval . They
maintained that the request was irregular because Mr Greeff sought greater rights
of extension than had been granted in respect of the other sections. Ms de Goede
refused to vote as she considered the request ille gal. The meeting adjourned
without members voting.

[12] Aggrieved, Mr Greeff approached the high court for declaratory and
interdictory relief. He further filed a rule 72 notice, which I deal with below. The
following relief was sought:
‘(a) directing the respondents to consider the applicant’s request for approval of his plans for
construction by way of the extension of section 1 of the Merriman court Sectional title Scheme
… attached to annexure JWG16 [the 2019 plans] to the founding affidavit.
(b) declaring that the applicant is in any event permitted to implement his plans for construction
by way of the extension of section 1 of the scheme which are attached as annexure JWG14 [the
2017 plans] to the founding affidavit.
(c) …costs …’

[13] In the high court , Mr Greeff relied on the permission historically granted
for the relief sought as follows: he alleged that at ‘the general meeting of
10 September 2007 the body corporate unanimously…Approved - In principle
additions for the new garage and stairway…’. And that in 2013 , the body
corporate had ‘unanimously resolved’ that he could extend [his] section. Further,
‘[a]t the special general meeting of 23 April 2014 [that] right was confirmed…’.
Additionally, that his 2017 plans were duly submitted and considered by the body
corporate at the 2017 AGM. Therefore, the body corporate is obliged to consider
[his] 2019 plans, in good faith and to grant or refuse it s approval on reasonable
grounds’.


2 In terms of the Uniform Rules of Court.

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[14] The respondents opposed the relief sought on the basis that no notice was
given that a special resolution would be sought at the 2 August 2019 meeting.
Further, that the 19 October 2019 Special General Meeting did not comply with
s 6(3) of the Sectional Title Schemes Management Act 8 of 20113 (the STSMA)
and rule 15(6) of the Management Rules.4 In addition, they alleged that they had
refused to vote at that meeting as they required ‘further information in the hope
of finding some middle ground, in the light of the fact that [Mr Greeff] refused to
concede that any decision taken at the further meeting was null and void…’.

[15] The high court held as follows: (a) ‘[I]n 2017 the body corporate approved
(Mr Greeff’s) plans by adopting the minutes of the resolution in terms of s 5(1)
of the Schemes Management Act, approving same in April 2017’. Therefore, Mr
Greeff had established ‘his right to an order entitling him to implement the 2017
plans’; (b) the 2019 plans constituted an internal configuration of the extended
apartment and that such configuration does not amount to the waiver of (Mr
Greeff’s) approval obtained in 2017’. The high court further held that the Body
Corporate was not properly before the court.

[16] On appeal , the full court held that Mr Greeff ‘has failed to prove an
adoption of a unanimous resolution in terms of s 5(1)(a) of the ST SMA, to
alienate a portion of the common property …and an adoption of a special

3 Section 6 of Sectional Title Scheme Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA), in relevant parts, provides:
‘(2) The body corporate must, at least 30 days prior to a meeting of the body corporate where a special resolution
or unanimous resolution will be taken, give all the members of the body corporate written notice specifying the
proposed resolution, except where the rules provide for shorter notice.
(3) The notice contemplated in subsection (2) must be-
(a) delivered by hand to a member;

(a) delivered by hand to a member;
(b) sent by pre-paid registered post to the address of a member's section in the relevant scheme; or
(c) sent by pre-paid registered post to a physical or postal address in the Republic of South Africa that a member
has chosen in writing for the purposes of such notice.’
4 Rule 15(6) provides: ‘Notice of a general meeting must be delivered to-
(a) members at their service addresses in terms of rule 4(5), and
(b) other persons at the most recent physical, postal, fax or email address of which they have notified the body
corporate in writing.’

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resolution to allow [Mr Greeff] to extend his unit into the common property in
terms of s 5(1)(h)’. In the absence of ‘a right of extension’, the full court set aside
the relief obtained in the high court.

[17] The finding by the full court to the effect that Mr Greef had failed to prove
the adoption of a unanimous resolution as required under s 5(1)(a) of the STSMA
was based on an understanding that the extension of Mr Greeff’s unit into the
garden would constitute alienation of the common property, requiring compliance
with s 5(1)(h). The section confers powers on the Body Corporate, on application
by a section owner, and when a special resolution has been passed by the other
owners, to approve the extension of boundaries or floor area of the applicant’s
section as provided in the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the STA).

[18] However, in December 2024, this Court in Body Corporate of San Sydney
v Singh and Others5 held that although the extension of a scheme by the erection
of further buildings on the common property affects the owners’ participation
quotas by diluting the percentage of the floor areas of the owners , it does not
constitute alienation of the common property. At the outset of the hearing of the
appeal, the respondent conceded that in the light of this decision, the full court
erred in concludi ng that Mr Greef’s proposed extensions into the common
property constituted an alienation of property requiring the unanimous approval
of the owners in terms of s 5(1)( a) of the STSMA. It accordingly did not persist
with its argument on this point in the appeal.

[19] Mr Greeff argued that despite the 2017 meeting having been informal, his
plans were validly approved by the Body Corporate. The argument is based on
the fact that the scheme comprised only six trustee owners, and they managed the

5 Body Corporate of San Sydney v Singh and Others (779/2023) [2024] ZASCA 169 (9 December 2024)
para 42.

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scheme on the basis that all owners would be actively involved in the
management of the scheme. All owners usually attended meetings and
occasionally matters would be dealt with informally but would be regularised
later.

[20] Conversely, the Body Corporate and the opposing trustees argued that the
owners who attended the informal meeting did not intend to take any binding
decisions at that meeting . They contended that, i n any event, Mr Greeff only
circulated ‘architectural sketches with very little detail’, which did not include
the garage or an indication of the extent of the proposed encroachment upon the
common property.

Discussion
[21] As stated , the issue for determination is whether Mr Greeff has , in
compliance with the relevant legislative provisions, acquired the right to extend
his section or is entitled to a declarator to that effect . Section 24 of the STA
provides that:
‘Extension of sections
(3) If an owner of a section proposes to extend the boundaries or floor area of his or her section,
he or she shall if authorised in terms of section 5 (1) (h) of the Sectional Titles Schemes
Management Act, cause the land surveyor or architect concerned to submit a draft sectional
plan of the extension to the Surveyor-General for approval.’

[22] Section 5(1)(h) of the STSMA provides that:
‘(1) In addition to the body corporate’s main functions and powers under sections 3 and 4, the
body corporate –
…
(h) must, on application by an owner and upon special resolution by the owners, approve the
extension of boundaries or floor area of a section in terms of the Sectional Titles Act.’

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[23] The Body Corporate has a duty to act in the best interests of all its
members. Section 3 of the STSMA provides that the Body Corporate must
perform the functions entrusted to it which include the power in general, to
control, manage and administer the common property for the benefit of all
owners.

[24] Mr Greeff contended that he had demonstrated a clear right to have the
2019 plans considered based on the approvals recorded in the minutes of the
19 October 2019 Special General Meeting.6 The courts have repeatedly stressed
that commercial and legal documents must be interpreted contextually and
purposively. In Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another7 the Constitutional
Court held that:
‘A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a statute must be given their
ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result in absurdity. There are three
important interrelated riders to this general principle, namely:
(a) that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively;
(b) the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and
(c) all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution, that is, where
reasonably possible, legislative provisions ought to be interpreted to preserve their
constitutional validity. This proviso to the general principle is closely related to the
purposive approach referred to in (a).’ (Citations omitted.)

[25] It is apparent from a plain reading of the relevant resolutions that Mr
Greeff’s request was considered by the owners and that they raised certain
concerns. The first concern was that the request was irregular because Mr Greeff
sought greater rights of extension than had been granted to owners of the other
sections. The second was that the permission to erect a garage was not brought to

6 See paragraph 10 above.
7 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869

(CC) para 28 . See also Natal Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13;
[2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA); 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).

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the attention of all members and there seems to be a flaw on how the special
resolution was passed at the said meeting. In addition, it is apparent from all the
resolutions that the respondents were of the view that important information, that
was essential for them to make an informed decision on the documents submitted
by Mr Greef, was missing. The approval given at the 2013 meeting was subject
to approval of the plans by the Body Corporate and the ‘l ocal authority’. The
meeting held on 27 April 2017 was informal and those in attendance only
‘accepted the plans’ submitted by Mr Greef. There is no evidence of an
unreserved approval of the proposed extensions.

[26] Mr Greeff alleges that the Body Corporate managed its affairs informally,
hence there was no need for compliance with legislative prescripts. This argument
does not assist Mr Greef. As stated, the Body Corporate is obliged to act in terms
of the law and in the interest of its members. In any event the respondents opposed
the relief sought on, amongst others, the basis that no notice was given that a
special resolution would be sought at the 2 August 2019 meeting. Further, that
the 19 October 2019 Special General Meeting did not comply with s 6(3) of the
STSMA and rule 15(6) of the Management Rules. In addition, it was not in
dispute that t he respondents refused to vote at that meeting as they required
‘further information in the hope of finding some middle g round, in the light of
the fact that [Mr Greeff] refused to concede that any decision taken at the further
meeting was null and void…’.

[27] The full minute of the informal meeting is set out in paragraph 6 above.
The minutes indicate that Mr Greeff circu lated architectural drawings at the
meeting. Since that issue was not an item on the agenda for that meeting, those
present would not have had time to consider and apply their minds to the impact
it could have on the scheme or individual owners. The architectural drawings did

it could have on the scheme or individual owners. The architectural drawings did
not reflect which portions of the common areas would be subsumed into Mr

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Greeff’s new exclusive use areas. A landscaper would still review the gardens in
the sectional scheme once the rooftop was finalised. It is also important to bear
in mind that there was general acceptance that Mr Greeff was also entitled to
extend his unit as the other owners had. At that stage, the extent of the
encroachment was a concern. Therefore, the acceptance of Mr Greeff’s drawings
at the meeting is an indication of the willingness to accommodate him rather than
the approval which Mr Greeff contends for.

[28] The adoption of the minutes of the informal meeting held on
7 December 2017 does not constitute ratification of the resolution taken at the
informal meeting, as Mr Greef argued. The adoption only signifies that the
minutes reflected correctly the discussion that took place at the informal meeting.
Mr Greeff was the only owner who had not extended his unit, and the Body
Corporate was willing to give him a reasonable opportunity to do so. That does
not mean that Mr Greeff’s plans would not be subjected to scrutiny and other
members would not be allowed to raise objections before final acceptance.

[29] The resolution taken at the informal meeting did not have any binding
force, and the adoption of the minutes on 7 December 2017 did not meet the test
for ratification. There is therefore no merit in the submission that Mr Greeff’s
claim had prescribed. The high court, in the exercise of its discreti on, did not
consider all these important facts mentioned above. Therefore, Mr Greeff did not
satisfy the requirements for a declaratory order. He did not have a claim.

[30] Nowhere in the record does Mr Greeff explain why he has not addressed
the concerns raised by the owners. Nor does he show that in terms of s 5(1)(h) of
the STSMA he has the necessary approval, in the form of a ‘special resolution’
from the owners to extend his unit as proposed.

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[31] Mr Greeff’s request was appropriately considered. It is now incumbent on
him to address the concerns raised by the owners and approach the Body
Corporate to consider his responses. Until such time that is done, there is no
obligation on the owners to reconsider his plans. Mr Greef has failed to
demonstrate that he has a clear right to the interdictory relief sought or that he
will suffer any harm if the interdictory relief is not granted.

Rule 7 notice
[32] On 27 November 2020, Mr Greeff filed a notice in terms of rule 7 of the
Uniform Rules of Court, disputing the authority of the attorneys appointed to
oppose the application on behalf of the Body Corporate. He relied, for this
objection, on a R15 000 limit on the amount in respect of the legal costs that the
trustees were permitted to incur on behalf of the Body Corporate. It was common
cause that defending the application would far exceed that amount.

[33] In response to the rule 7 application, the trustee respondents put up a
resolution, dated 4 November 2020, from which the following appears:
‘MERRIMAN COURT BODY CORPORATE TRUSTEES RESOLUTION
In terms of Prescribed Management Rules of the Sectional Titles Act, 1986 (Act 95 of 1986) .
. . we, the trustees, are raising a special levy upon the owners of . . . to pay for legal fees,
which were not included in the current budget. The body corporate is being sued in the High
Court, & has a fiduciary responsibility to defend itself, hence the special levy.

The amount of R 84, 527, 50 is to be paid by participation quota. . . per attached schedule.
…
The initial deposit of R42, 775 – which was paid out of funds due to Wendy de Goede for
various payments made on behalf of the body corporate. . .’

[34] It was common cause that Mr Greeff and Mr Scalabrino did not support
the resolution. The full court held, correctly in my view, that there was no conflict
of interest ‘when the trustees appointed an attorney for the body

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corporate…because the decision of t he trustees…was approved by the general
meeting of the body corporate, where all the members were present or
represented’. The full court further held that the Body Corporate had a substantial
and material interest and locus standi in the litigation. In the circumstances of the
matter, I cannot fault those findings nor the order setting aside the orders of the
high court.

[35] For the reasons stated above, I make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.

_________________
E D BAARTMAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

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Appearances
For the appellant: RG Patrick SC
Instructed by: Maurice Phillips Wisenberg Attorneys,
Cape Town,
Phatshoane Henney Attorneys,
Bloemfontein.

For the first, second and
fourth to sixth respondents: PA Corbett SC and DM Lubbe
Instructed by: Van Rensburg & CO. Attorneys,
Cape Town,
Symington De Kok Inc, Bloemfontein.