THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
JOHANNESBURG
Of interest to other judges
In the matter between:
CASE NO: 2025-168041
MADONSELA ZANDILE
and
Applicant
LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL First Respondent
NZUZA CHARITY Second Respondent
BRIEL IGNATIUS
Third Respondent
SISOL LABOUR PROJECTS Fourth Respondent
MAGOBATLOU SOLOMON
Fifth Respondent
TOKISO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (PTY) LTD
Sixth Respondent
AHMED CACHALIA Seventh Respondent
ASMALL FAATHIMA
Eighth Respondent
RW ATTORNEYS Ninth Respondent
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ADV PULE SELEKA SC
Tenth Respondent
ADV LUZELLE ADAMS Eleventh Respondent
Heard: 21 October 2025
Delivered: 19 November 2025
Summary: (Urgent – Application for reconsideration of an urgent order
granted in the respondent’s absence – High Court Rule 6(12)(c) – Principles
applicable to granting such relief considered – previous order set aside and
replaced with an order dismissing the original application - Costs)
JUDGMENT ON RECONSIDERATION
LAGRANGE, J
Nature of the application
[1] This is an application brought on an urgent basis in term s of rule 71 of the
Labour Court Rules read with rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court,
in which the LPC seeks to substitute a default order granted on 19
September 2025 with an order dismissing the applicant’s urgent
application with costs . In the absence of an equivalent rule in the Labour
Court Rules the provisions of Rule 6(12)(c) which provide for an urgent
order to be reconsidered without having to follow the normal procedure for
launching a rescission application.
[2] The order sought to be reconsidered reads:
“1. THAT the forms and service provided in the Labour Court
Rules; Labour Court Directives; the Labour Court Practice
Manual and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended)
are dispensed with and the matter is treated as one of urgency in
terms of Rule 38 of the Labour Court Rules;
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2. THAT the First to the Eleventh Respondents are interdicted
with proceeding with any disciplinary processes under the
auspices of the First, Sixth and Seventh Respondent under Cla;
and any further subsequent appeal processes;
3. THAT the First to the Eleventh Respondents are interdicted
from proceeding with enforcing the taxed costs or obtaining a
writ of execution under LC CASE NO:2025- 043836 or
enforcement of the said court order of the 14th day of April 2025
pending the finalisation of appeal processes under CCT149/2025
and LC CASE NO: 2025-043836 any further subsequent appeal
processes;
4. THAT the First to the Eleventh Respondents pay the costs of
this application on an attorney and client scale, each
Respondent paying for the other to be absolved.”
[3] For the sake of elucidation, the case numbers in the order above refer to
the following matters, which are elaborated upon in more detail later in the
judgment:
3.1 TCR015442 is the internal disciplinary enquiry reference number
used by the LPC/Tokiso for Ms Madonsela’s disciplinary hearing.
3.2 CCT149/2025 is the Constitutional Court matter number for
Madonsela’s direct-access or alternatively leave-to-appeal bid arising
from the earlier Labour Court judgment against her.
3.3 Case number 2025-043836 the Labour Court case number of the
earlier (first) urgent application before Tlhotlhalemaje J , in which
judgment was delivered on 14 April 2025, dismissing the application
and granting costs. The present urgent interdict and later processes
(including the conditional leave application mentioned below) are
framed pending the application for leave to appeal under this case.
Background
[4] It is necessary to contextualise this application which occurs in the context
of a seemingly interminable litigious wrangle the parties are engaged in.
The origins of the saga lie in the institution of serious disciplinary charges
against the applicant Ms Z Madonsela (‘ Madonsela’), who is the
against the applicant Ms Z Madonsela (‘ Madonsela’), who is the
respondent in this reconsideration application, and her employer, the
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Legal Practice Council (‘the LPC’), which is applying for the
reconsideration of the default judgment.
[5] Madonsela is the Secretary of the LPC’s Curator’s Unit and is currently
facing several charges of serious counts of gross misconduct, including
fraudulently issuing Fidelity Fund Certificates to the LPC’s members
and/or fraudulently falsifying members trust account audits, in exchange
for money.
[6] The enquiry first sat on 27 January 2025, but since then was postponed
on 7 different occasions without the applicant yet having pleaded to the
charges. The ensuing litigation, mostly on an urgent basis is outlined
below.
[7] The first urgent application was launched in March 2025 by Madonsela
seeking a declaration that the LPC’s disciplinary proceedings were
unlawful, unconstitutional, and a breach of contract. On 14 April 2025, this
was dismissed with costs , by Thlothlalemaje J, primarily on the basis that
she had failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting court
intervention in incomplete disciplinary proceedings.
[8] On 15 May 2025, Madonsela attempted to appeal directly against the
judgment to the Labour Appeal Court , but the following day was directed
by the Judge President to apply for leave to appeal to Tlhotlhalemaje J.
[9] Undaunted, on 6 June 2025, Madonsela applied for direct access to
appeal to the Constitutional Court. It appears no decision has been made
on this application yet but, on 3 September 2025, the Constitutional Court
Registrar directed Madonsela to reissue her application for direct access
to that court under a new case number.
[10] On 16 July 2025, the LPC decided to dismiss Madonsela, notwithstanding
the stalled and incomplete disciplinary proceedings, claiming she had
delayed the enquiry and was engaging in what it characterised as
vexatious litigation.
[11] Madonsela had launched a second urgent application on 19 July 2025, to
stay disciplinary proceedings and the execution of the costs order from
stay disciplinary proceedings and the execution of the costs order from
first judgment , pending the outcome of the Constitutional Court
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application. This was dismissed by Daniels J on 24 July 2025, on the basis
that at that stage there was no valid appeal pending, and direct access to
Constitutional Court was impermissible.
[12] By 21 August 2025, Madonsela had filed a third urgent application,
seeking a declaration that the LPC’s termination of her employment on 16
July was unlawful and in breach of contract. On 2 September 2025,
Makhura J, handed down an order to the effect that her employment
contract remained in force and ordered the LPC to reinstate her and pay
outstanding salary and benefits. Madonsela was awarded her costs as
well.
[13] On 28 August 2025, Madonsela belatedly filed what might be
characterized as a ‘ conditional’ application for leave to appeal against the
May judgment of Tlhotlhalemaje J . The application is conditional in the
sense that she will not proceed with that if she obtains leave to appeal
directly to the Constitutional Court.
[14] After Madonsela had been reinstated, the LPC reinstituted the disciplinary
proceedings. This led to Madonsela launching her fourth urgent
application on 17 September 2025, to stay the proceedings, pending
compliance with the reinstatement order, the finalisation of her
applications for leave to appeal the judgment of Tlhotlhalemaje J in the
Constitutional Court or Labour Court.
[15] On 19 September Baloyi AJ granted Madonsela relief, which is
reproduced above in paragraph 2 of this judgement. She was also
awarded her costs on a punitive scale. It is this judgment which is the
subject matter of the application for reconsideration.
Principles
[16] An application for reconsideration, in essence, is a procedure for promptly
trying to rescind an order handed down in urgent proceedings. Rule 6(12)
of the Uniform Rules of the High Court provides:
“(12) (a) In urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense
with the forms and service provided for in these rules and may
dispose of such matter at such time and place and in such
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manner and in accordance with such procedure (which shall as
far as practicable be in terms of these rules) as it deems fit. d
place and in such manner and in accordance with such
procedure (which shall as far as practicable be in terms of these
rules) as it deems fit.
(b) In every affidavit filed in support of any application under
paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant shall set forth
explicitly the circumstances which it is averred render the matter
urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that applicant
could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due
course.
(c) A person against whom an order was granted in such
person’s absence in an urgent application may by notice set
down the matter for reconsideration of the order.”
(emphasis added)
[17] Rule 71 of the Labour Court permits this court to adopt any procedure it
deems appropriate, if the Labour Court Rules do not address a situation
which arises and, in doing so, may have regard to the Uniform Rules. It is
in accordance with this provision that Uniform Rule 6(12)(c) can be
invoked in the absence of such a provision in the court’s own rules. The
following principles have been identified as ones that a court will take into
account in exercising its discretion to reconsider an order granted in
urgent proceedings:
“Under the subrule, the court has a wide discretion and the
factors which may determine whether an order falls to be
reconsidered, include the reasons for the absence, the nature of
the order granted and the period during which it has remained
operative. Other factors to be taken into consideration will be
whether an imbalance, oppression or injustice has resulted, and,
if so, the nature and extent thereof, and whether alternative
remedies are available. The convenience of the parties is
another factor to be taken into consideration.”
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[18] It has been observed by the High Court that:
“[10] The purpose of Rule 6(12)(c) is to afford a respondent who
“[10] The purpose of Rule 6(12)(c) is to afford a respondent who
was [10] An exposé of the vital considerations which underlie a
1 Erasmus: Superior Court Practice, Van Loggerenberg, RS 25, 2024,
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Rule 6(12)(c) application is to be found in the case of ISDN
Solutions (Pty) Ltd v CSDN Solutions CC and Others 1996 (4)
SA 484 (W) ([1996] 4 All SA 58) at 486H - 487B (SA) where
Faber AJ commented as follows:
'The Rule has been widely formulated. It permits an aggrieved
person against whom an order was granted in an urgent
application to have that order reconsidered, provided only that it
was granted in his absence. The underlying pivot to which the
exercise of the power is coupled is the absence of the aggrieved
party at the time of the grant of the order.
Given this, the dominant purpose of the Rule seems relatively
plain. It affords to an aggrieved party a mechanism designed to
redress imbalances in, and injustices and oppression flowing
from, an order granted as a matter of urgency in his absence. In
circumstances of urgency where an affected party is not present,
factors which might conceivably impact on the content and form
of an order may not be known to either the applicant for urgent
relief or the Judge required to determine it. The order in question
may be either interim or final in its operation. Reconsideration
may involve a deletion of the order, either in whole or in part, or
the engraftment of additions thereto.
The framers of the Rule have not sought to delineate the factors
which might legitimately be taken into reckoning in determining
whether I any particular order falls to be reconsidered. What is
plain is that a wide discretion is intended.' ” 2
Evaluation
[19] I am satisfied that, even though there was some delay in bringing this
reconsideration application, that the LPC acted promptly when it learnt of
the judgment of Baloyi AJ. It is also important for it to able to deal with the
merits of Madonsela’s application which resulted in a further delay of what
are already unduly protracted enquiry proceedings, in which the alleged
misconduct pertains to a core regulatory function of the LPC.
misconduct pertains to a core regulatory function of the LPC.
[20] The LPC’s core rationale for non- attendance at the hearing and failure to
oppose the application is that Madonsela had not initiated the urgent
2 Scott v Hough 2007 (3) SA 425 (O)
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application on the CourtOnline system, nor had it granted access to the
LPC to a bundle of the case on Caselines. It places considerable reliance
on a directive issued by the Judge President relating to the initiation of
urgent applications using Caselines . The Judge President’s Directive 1 of
2024 stated amongst other things:
“2. Initiating urgent applications
2.1 All urgent applications must be initiated on the Court Online
Portal and must be marked as “urgent.”
2.2 All urgent applications must comply with the provisions of
Rule 38 of the Rules of the Labour Court2.
2.3 All restraint of trade urgent applications must comply with
Rule 39 of the Rules of the Labour Court.”
[21] It is not disputed that Madonsela’s application was not properly initiated on
the system and it did not invite the LPC to view the application bundle on
Caselines. In the circumstances, the LPC decided not to take any steps to
oppose the application nor to appear at court on 19 September because it
assumed that in the absence of the application being properly initiated the
application could not proceed. As soon as it learned of the default order, it
took steps to launch the current application for urgent reconsideration of
the order.
[22] This is not a case where the LPC was unaware of the application. On 17
September 2025, Ms Madonsela served her urgent Notice of Motion
electronically at 11:22 AM. The application was set down for hearing on 19
September 2025 at 10:00 AM. The notice of motion listed RW Attorneys
as the LPC’s attorneys and included their email address for service. This
was the basis for the email service that followed. Later on 17 September,
the urgent application was served by email on RW Attorneys using the
addresses provided in the Notice of Motion. The LPC does not dispute that
this email was received. On 18 September, according to the LPC, its
representatives were informed by the applicant’s team that Caselines was
representatives were informed by the applicant’s team that Caselines was
offline and that access to the case file could not be granted. The LPC says
this reinforced its belief that the matter would not proceed.
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[23] On 19 September, the applicant uploaded supporting documents to Court
Online only at 11:25 AM after the hearing was due to be heard. In any
event, the urgent application was called in court at 10:00 AM, but in the
absence of a representative of the LPC or any indication it intended to
oppose the application the court granted the urgent order by default.
[24] Albeit that the use of Caselines in urgent applications is somewhat novel,
why the LPC took such a narrow view of the basis for determining if an
urgent application had been launched is difficult to understand. Paragraph
5 of the same directive states:
“5. Service of urgent applications
5.1 Service of process in all urgent matters is to comply with the
Rules of the Labour Court.”
[25] Madonsela served the application by email on the LPC’s attorneys and
they received it. Accordingly, LPC had been properly served with the
application, so it was apprised of the nature of the relief sought and when
it would be enrolled for hearing. What the LPC failed to consider was that
even if the application had not been properly uploaded that did not mean it
had not been properly served with the application. It should not have been
so sanguine about its own opinion that it could ignore the application it had
received by email simply on account of the fact that it did not appear on
Caselines, particularly where it was aware that M 1’s representatives were
having difficulties uploading the pleading bundle on the system.
[26] Nonetheless, it appears to have been a bona fide, if mistaken belief on the
part of the LPC , that the application could be ignored unless it was
uploaded in a digital form in accordance with the directive. Accordingly, its
failure to oppose the application was not an act of wilful indifference but
based on a genuine misinterpretation of the status of the application in
circumstances where the applicant was unsuccessfully attempting to
upload the bundle.
circumstances where the applicant was unsuccessfully attempting to
upload the bundle.
[27] On the prospects of success, the LPC has addressed the issue of
Madonsela not receiving her salary following her reinstatement. In fact, it
had notified her in the process of rectifying it before the application was
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heard on 19 September. I t had also advised her it could not reinstate the
medical benefits unless she signed certain forms relating to her
readmission to the scheme. At the reconsideration hearing, i t was argued
from the bar that th e reinstatement of her medical aid membership could
not be resolved by signing the forms because she would not be placed in
the same position vis -à-vis the medical scheme at the time she was
dismissed. I accept that this might be an arguable issue but, even if true,
this alone did not warrant granting relief on such an urgent basis. On the
question of enforcing the cost order of the May judgment, the LPC has
undertaken not to pursue this pending the outcome of the application for
leave to appeal against that judgment, so this issue is not pressing.
[28] Lastly, the suspension of the disciplinary proceedings pending the
outcome of various leave to appeal applications does appear to be based
on a mistaken perception on the part of Madonsela that staying the effect
of Thlothlalemaje J’s decision to dismiss her application for declaratory
relief to halt the disciplinary enquiry, somehow establishes a right be
treated as if she had been successful pending the outcome of the leave to
appeal applications. But preserving the status quo ante the decision of the
learned judge did not confer any right not to be disciplined, In the Supreme
Court of Appeal decision in MV Snow Delta v Discount Tonnage Ltd
3 the
court held:
“…an order of absolution from the instance or dismissal of a
claim or application is not suspended pending an appeal, simply
because there is nothing that can operate or upon which
execution can be levied.”
(emphasis added)
3 2002 (4) SA 746 (SCA) at para 6
Page 18 of 24
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Accordingly, there is no right to the main relief sought, which as things
currently stand is probably also res judicata owing to the present status of
Thlothlalemaje’s judgment.
[29] Be that as it may, I am satisfied that the LPC would have formally opposed
Madonsela’s application if it had received confirmation that it had been
initiated in accordance with the Judge President’s directive. It acted in
conformity with this belief by seeking confirmation about the application’s
Caselines status from the court. Even if the LPC should have taken a
broader view on whether it was required to formally oppose the application
solely because it had not been uploaded, I accept that this was a bona fide
error and it was not in wilful default. Considering the substantive merits of
its opposition to the application, which are discussed above, it is
appropriate to set aside the previous ruling of Baloyi AJ and substitute it
with an order dismissing the application. As the matter is decided on the
substantive merits of the application, it unnecessary to separately address
the urgency of Madonsela ’s application, save to note that it is possible it
might have been struck off the roll on that basis.
[30] On the question of costs, it would not be proper to award the LPT its costs,
because it is a result of its failure to properly oppose the original
application in the first place that necessitated this application being
launched.
Order
1. The application in accordance with Rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform Rules of the
High Court is heard as a matter of urgency in terms of Rule 38 of the Labour
Court Rules, and any non-compliance with the Labour Court rules relating to
time limits and service is condoned.
2. The default order of Baloyi AJ in this matter, handed down on 19 September
2025 is set aside.
3. The default order of 19 September 2025 is replaced with an order that:
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3.1 The Applicant’s application for urgent relief is dismissed.
3.2 No order is made as to costs.
_______________________
R Lagrange
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For the Applicant:
M Kufa instructed by
Machaba Attorneys
For the First Respondent: M Naidoo instructed by
RW Attorneys