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IN THE LAND COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT RANDBURG
Case number: LCC 122/2009
Case number: LCC 129/2012
Before: The Honourable Acting Judge Montzinger
Hearing: 10 September 2025
Delivered: 13 November 2025
In the matter between:
CHRISTOFFEL FARAO
[Representative of the Farao Family]
Applicant
and
THE REGIONAL LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONER First Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☒
Date: 13 November 2025
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THE CHIEF LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONER Second Respondent
THE SARON LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONER Third Respondent
______________________________________________________________
Summary: Rule 12 of the Land Court Rules - Application by a beneficiary-
family of a Community land claim, to intervene in two extant applications with
case numbers (LCC 122/2009; LCC 129/2012) – The extant applications were
stayed by a prior order of the court and not capable of being proceeded with
absent leave of the Judge President – applicant failed to show that the extant
applications were pending proceedings open to intervention - even assuming that
the stay was uplifted, the proposed intervention sought different relief from the
relief in the extant matters and was brought without a mandate from the duly
elected s 10(4) of the Restitution Act Committee – intervention application
dismissed - no order as to costs.
ORDER
1. The application to intervene in matters with case numbers LCC 122/2009
and LCC 129/2012 is dismissed.
2. No order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
Montzinger AJ:
Introduction
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[1] On 5 May 2025 Mr Christoffel Farao 1, describing himself as the “Family
representative for the Farao family”, launched an application to intervene in the
matters with case numbers LCC 122/2009 and LCC 129/2012 (the “extant
applications”).
[2] Mr Farao claims to represent the Farao family who are all alleged to be
beneficiaries in an existing land restoration claim by the Saron Community. The
claim was lodged during August 1998 and is still not finalised.
[3] The relief sought, in essence, is leave to intervene in the extant applications,
and an order directing that certain disputes be referred to mediation in terms of
section 13 (d) of the Restitution Act
2 read with section 29 and 35A of the Land
Court Act3 further read with rules 13(2)(b), 26(1)(d) and 72(2)(b) of the Land Court
Rules. In the replying affidavit and the heads of argument the relief was expanded
to include a request for legal representation.
[4] The Regional and Chief Land Claims Commissioners (the “Commissioners”)
were joined as the first and second respondents respectively. Both opposed the
application but instead of an answering affidavit, filed an explanatory affidavit.
The Commissioners’ main objections are: (i) that the extant applications no longer
present live issues and cannot be the subject of intervention, (ii) the applicant or
the Farao family lacks standing to pursue the intervention application , and (iii) if
the Farao family disputes the finding in the Chief Commissioner’s research report
or the work of the verification service provider, in respect of the verification and
1 The notice of motion cites only Mr Farao (in his personal designation as the “family
representative”) and does not cite the “Farao family” as a party. It is not clear who is the real
application (i.e. Mr. Faroa in his representative capacity or the Farao family represented Mr Farao.
2 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.
3 Land Court Act 6 of 2023.
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extend of the Saron Community’s land claim, the proper remedy is for the Farao
family or the Saron Community to launch a review under PAJA 4, not an
intervention application. Furthermore, the Commissioners assert that Mr Farao’s
family can still participate in the ongoing verification process, which is currently
being finalised, implying that any issue the family may have can be raised in that
process.
[5] The matter initially came before me under judicial case management. A case
management conference was held with the parties
5 on 15 August 2025. At the
conclusion of the conference, I issued directions regulating the further conduct of
the matter and in particular service on the Saron Land Claims Committee, the
third respondent.
[6] The intervention application was argued on 10 September 2025. At the
hearing Mr Pieter George Frantz (“Pieter Frantz”) also appeared on behalf of the
Saron Community as a representative of the Saron Land Claims Committee . He
filed an affidavit in his personal capacity as well and the Saron Land Claims
Committee. Pieter Frantz is not to be confused with Mr Christopher Charles
Frantz (“Charles Frantz”) who featured prominently in the court papers of the
extant applications. In his affidavit, Pieter Frantz explains that he is the duly
elected chairperson of the Saron Land Claims Committee that was elected in
terms of section 10(4) of the Restitution Act by the Saron Community on 23
August 2018 under the auspices of the Regional Commissioner. He stressed his
4 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
5 The third respondent did not participate in the case management conference.
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continuing commitment to bringing the Saron Community’s land claim to finality
for the benefit of all of the legitimate beneficiaries.
[7] Having regard to the record, I am required to decide whether the litigation
previously conducted under the case numbers of the extant applications
6 remain
live, and if so, susceptible to intervention. If the answers to those questions are
negative, it would mean the end of the matter. If answered in the affirmative, then
the next issue for determination is whether the applicant, Mr Farao, acting as
“family representative for the Farao family”, has standing to intervene in his own
capacity or on behalf of the “Farao family” to seek to intervention in the extant
applications having regard to the relief the Farao family is seeking. Lastly, I have
to decide what the appropriate order should be regarding costs.
A Brief history of the litigation involving the land claim
7
[8] The Saron Community lodged two land claims. Mr Charles Frantz, referenced
earlier, lodged the claims on behalf of the community. The first claim was lodged
in August 1998 and concerned a list of farms including Saron Farm No. 40, and
a second claim in December 1998 described as “Foot of the Cape, Twenty-Four
Rivers …” in the Tulbagh, Western Cape district.
[9] Multiple court proceedings followed the institution of the Saron Community’s
land claim. The extent and outcome of those court proceedings were all referred
6 LCC 122/2009 and LCC 129/2012
7 The factual and procedural history of the Saron Community’s restitution claim has already been
traversed at length in a series of judgments, both in this Court and in the Western Cape Division.
It is sufficient to refer to Acting Judge Canca’s judgment of 15 June 2020 under case numbers
LCC 122/2009 and LCC 129/2012, which records the chronology and antecedent litigation, and
to the judgment of Bozalek J delivered on 5 March 2019. In light of those comprehensive
to the judgment of Bozalek J delivered on 5 March 2019. In light of those comprehensive
accounts, I do not repeat the full narrative here. What is set out is an attempt at a concise overview
to contextualise the present application. T o the extent that this summary is incomplete, this
judgment should be read with reference to the Canca J and Bozalek J judgments.
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to and summarised by Canca J in a 2020 judgment of this court 8 in Frantz and
Another v Sanlucar De Hoek (Pty) Ltd and Others LCC 122/2009; LCC 129/2012
[2020] ZALCC 27 9 (“Canca judgment”). While the merits of the multiple court
proceedings are not before me, it is necessary for me to briefly record the
chronology that includes the extend of each court application as it relates to the
finding of whether Mr Farao and his family may intervene in the extant
applications.
[10] During 2009, and prior to the conclusion of the Regional Commissioner’s
investigation of the Saron Land claim and the finalisation of the final report on the
validity of the community’s claim the ‘Saron Forum’ launched an application under
case number LCC 122/2009, seeking to review certain actions taken by the
Regional Commissioner
10. Christo Frantz, in turn, during 2012 also launched an
application seeking to review certain actions taken by the Regional Commissioner
under case number LCC 129/2012.
[11] However, on 15 November 2013 Davis J of the Western Cape Division,
under case number 2483/2012, granted a judgment against Christo Frantz ,
effectively declaring him a vexatious litigant. The relief was granted on request
by the Drakenstein Municipality to declare him a vexatious litigant in response to
court proceedings in which he sought relief against the Municipality. Christo
Frantz had apparently done the same in many unsuccessful applications prior to
the Davis J judgment.
8 As it then was, i.e. the Land Claims Court.
9 The ‘Frantz’ referred to in the heading of the judgment is a reference to Mr. Christo Frantz.
10 Paras 2 and 12 Canca judgment.
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[12] During June 2014, the Regional Commissioner published its Research
Report in accordance with Rules 3 and 5 of the Commission 11. The report
concluded that restitution was feasible only in respect of Farm No. 40, Saron and
not in respect of the farms Hoeree No. 176 and the non-existent farms called
Arnim, Lilyvale and Morrison, which were all rejected. The claim in respect of the
sixty-five Tulbagh farms did not meet the Commissioner’s acceptance criteria and
was also rejected.
[13] After the research report identified Farm No. 40 as the only land the Saron
Community could lay claim to, the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and
Rural Development appointed a verification service provider to conduct
verification of the beneficiaries of the Saron Community’s claim. This beneficiary
verification process is still ongoing.
[14] While the verification process, was presumably ongoing, on 11 June 2015
Rodgers J (as he then was) of the Western Cape Division, under case number
4881/2014, also granted a judgment against Christo Frantz, who apparently
instituted that application in his representative capacity on behalf of the Provincial
House of the First Indigenous Leaders. The respondents in that application
instituted a counter-application seeking to declare Christo Frantz a vexatious
litigant, which was granted by Rodgers J.
[15] During July 2016, the Saron Community under the auspices of the ‘Saron
Forum’ launched a second application under the extant applications’ case
11 The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights.
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numbers seeking an order for the restoration of the claimed farms to a traditional
authority.
[16] However, it seems that during 2016 there appeared to have been some
issue regarding the committee who should or could represent the Saron
Community in pursuing its restoration claim. This also resulted in litigation as an
order was issued by Bertelsmann J of the Western Cape Division
12 directing the
Chief Land Claims Commissioner to promulgate rules under section 10(4) of the
Restitution Act. I have not had sight of Bertelman J’s judgment, but it is not in
dispute that the judge issued a directive and his directive resulted in the
publication of the election rules in the Government Gazette during December
2016
13. This had the ultimate effect that on 23 April 2017 a section 10(4)
committee was elected under the auspices of the Regional Commissioner to
represent the Saron community for purposes of its claims.
[17] On 5 March 2019, Bozalek J, of the Western Cape Division, dismissed an
application brought by Christo Frantz and confirmed the restrictions previously
imposed on him by the judgment of Davis and Rogers J in declaring him a
vexatious litigant.
[18] Despite the Bozalek J judgment, Christo Frantz was not deterred and during
August 2019 he launched another application, again under the same case
numbers as the extant applications in this court, seeking to certify the restitution
claim as a Class Action with certain ancillary relief. It appears that in response to
this application the owners of the land that is subject to the Saron Community’s
12 as is it now known.
13 Government Gazette 40480, General Notice 866 of 9 December 2016
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land claim and the Regional Land Claims Commissioner launched two
applications14 of their own, in this court. These applications both sought to declare
Christo Frantz being in contempt of the Rodgers J order and to once again
declared him a vexatious litigant with certain consequential relief.
[19] Canca J delivered his judgment on 15 May 2020. In his judgment he also
navigated his way through all the interrelated litigation an in the end issued
various orders. However, relevant for the intervention application before me is his
order declaring that the elected section 10(4) Committee to be the body entitled
to represent the Saron Community for the purposes of its two land claims. Canca
J further ordered the stay of all applications under case numbers LCC 122/2009
and LCC 129/2012, holding that those proceedings “may not be proceeded with
unless written leave is obtained from the Judge President”. Certain relief was also
directed against Charles Frantz that related to his status as a vexatious litigant.
[20] By virtue of the May 2020 order by Canca J, when the intervention
application came before me under the same case numbers as the extant
applications, the status of the extant applications was that they are stayed and
could not be proceeded with until the Judge President of this court grants written
leave in accordance with the terms of the Canca J order of May 2020.
Are the extant applications under case numbers LCC 122/2009 and 129/2012
“alive” and capable of intervention?
[21] Rule 13 of the Land Court Rules provides that: “[a]ny person whose rights
may be affected by the relief claimed in a case and who is not a party may, within
14 The owners and Regional Commissioner must have launched two counter-applications as their
applications have the same case numbers as the extant applications.
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a reasonable time after becoming aware of the case, apply to the Court for leave
to intervene in the case”, and permits the Court to grant such leave on appropriate
conditions.
[22] The Land Court Rules is analogous to Uniform Rule 12 that in turn provides
that an intervening party must demonstrate a direct and substantial interest in the
subject matter and the order to be made, i.e., a legal interest that may be
prejudicially affected by the judgment.
[23] The legal position is that a party seeking to intervene must seek the leave
of the court
15 and show: (i) a concern regarding the issue under consideration; (ii)
the matter is of common interest; and (iii) that the issues pursued by the third-
party application are the same as the issues in the matter sought to be intervened
in. Essentially, the party seeking to intervene must show a direct and substantial
interest in the subject matter of the extant court proceedings. As per United Watch
& Diamond Co16 the court exercise a discretion whether to grant an intervention
by a third party.
[24] However, in this matter before I consider whether the applicant has made
out the jurisdictional requirements to be allowed to intervene in the extant
applications, I must first consider whether a party can be granted leave to join
proceedings that have been stayed by a related order of court that has set out
conditions for the reactivation of the stayed proceedings. Essentially, I must
consider what is the status of a matter that has been stayed by a court order.
15 Fisheries Development Corp of SA Ltd v Jorgensen, Fisheries Development Corp of SA Ltd v
AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 1331 (W).
16 United Watch and Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels Ltd 1972 (4) SA 409 (C).
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[25] Having regard to how Rule 13 of the rules of this court is framed I conclude
that intervention presupposes a pending case into which a third party may be
admitted. I accept that notionally a stay does not pe se terminate litigation as it
holds that very matter in abeyance, with the practical effect that no further steps
may be taken in the stayed matter until the impediment is removed or the stay is
lifted. However, an intervention application will be premature by definition,
because it invites the Court to “proceed” in a matter that the same Court has
already ordered not to proceed.
[26] While a court has the power to regulate its own proceedings, that power is
restricted where an existing court order has laid down requirements to reactivate
a stayed matter and the party wanting to intervene has not sought to rescind the
stay order.
[27] I therefore find that until the 2020 stay ordered by Canca J is uplifted there
are no extant applications under case numbers LCC 122/2009 or LCC 129/2012
into which anyone can intervene. The extant applications are kept in abeyance
and it “lives” only in the sense that it can be revived upon compliance by Christo
Frantz with the Canca J order, but it is procedurally closed to further steps ,
including joinder or intervention, while the stay endures.
[28] The Farao’s family’s first obstacle is therefore insurmountable. There is no
leave from the Judge President uplifting the stay. There is no application to uplift
or vary the stay order before me. Consequently, there are no extant applications
into which the Farao family may intervene. The application to intervene must
therefore fail.
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Does the Farao family have standing to pursue the application
[29] Even assuming the stay in respect of the extant applications were uplifted,
the Farao family has not satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for intervention.
Measured against the requirements to be allowed to intervene, the application by
the Farao family fails on its own terms. First, the extant applications (LCC
122/2009 and LCC 129/2012) are PAJA review applications directed at the
lawfulness of steps taken by the Regional Land Claims Commissioner in
processing the Saron community’s claims. By contrast, the relief now sought by
the Farao family in the intervention application is to procure court-ordered
mediation and legal representation. These are therefore different disputes with
different remedies. Intervention would therefore have failed on this basis.
[30] There is another reason why the intervention application does not get out
of the starting blocks. Again, assuming the stay impediment could be overcome.
Representation of the Saron community concerning its land claims lies, by statute
and the order of the Canca J judgment, with the section 10(4) committee elected
in terms of the Restitution Act. That committee is the only body entitled to act for
the Saron Community in relation to its restoration claims. The applicant in the
intervention application is not that committee, nor does Mr Farao act on the
strength of the mandate of that committee.
[31] Accordingly, even assuming the stay in respect of the extant applications
were lifted and they were procedurally “alive,” the Farao family has not shown (a)
that the issues they would pursue are the same as those in the reviews; (b) that
they possess the requisite direct and substantial interest in the orders sought in
those reviews; or (c) that they are properly authorised to represent the Saron
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Community for purposes of this litigation. The jurisdictional threshold for
intervention is therefore not met, and the application would have failed on this
basis as well.
[32] While it may well be that Mr Farao, or the family he purports to represent
as beneficiaries, could in principle seek to vindicate their individual or familial
interests in having the Saron community land claim properly finalised they can do
so by formally raising their grievances with the section 10(4) committee, or,
should that process fail, by approaching a competent court for appropriate relief.
However, that is not the case presently before this Court. What is before me is
an application to intervene in litigation that no longer presents a live issue.
Conclusion
[33] For all the reasons foreshadowed the intervention application must fail.
[34] However, nothing in this judgment prevents Mr Farao, as well as the rest of
the family, in their capacities as lawful beneficiaries from approaching the
Commissioner regarding mediation under section 13 of the Restitution Act, or to
institute appropriate review proceedings, if a review is still viable and if they have
standing apart from the section 10(4) committee, should they wish to challenge
any administrative decisions affecting their claim.
[35] In respect of costs, although the application is ill-conceived procedurally
and legally, I am not persuaded that it is vexatious. The members of the Farao
family are on the face of it all lawful beneficiaries seeking finality regarding the
Saron restoration claim. The litigation was driven on their behalf by Mr. Farao
who is by all account a layperson. While lay status does not immunise a litigant