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[2025] ZALCCT 116
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SAPU obo Terblanche v Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (C176/2022) [2025] ZALCCT 116 (25 November 2025)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Not Reportable
Case
No: C176/2022
In
the matter between:
SAPU
obo L TERBLANCHE
Applicant
and
THE
SAFETY AND SECURITY SECTORAL
First Respondent
BARGAINING
COUNCIL
TREVOR
WILKES N.O.
Second Respondent
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
Third Respondent
Heard
:
14 August 2025
Delivered
:
25 November 2025
JUDGMENT
MacKENZIE
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This review
against the Second Respondent’s award concerns the fairness of
the Third Respondent’s refusal to promote
Ms L Terblanche
pursuant to her application for promotion.
[1]
At its base, it turns upon the proper construction of the written
stated case agreed to between the parties.
[2]
The Third Respondent opposes the matter. It also seeks condonation
for the late filing of its answering affidavit. That
application is
unopposed. There is no prejudice. The matter is ripe for hearing.
There is no reason why condonation should not
be granted.
[3]
Both parties were represented by counsel who made both written and
oral arguments. The Court is indebted to them for their
helpful
submissions.
Factual background
[4]
Pursuant to an advertisement under post 18/2018, Ms Terblanche
applied for the position of Staff Officer: Divisional Commissioner:
Technology Management Services at the rank of colonel. She was
shortlisted, interviewed, and recommended for promotion. However,
the
Third Respondent subsequently considered that Ms Terblanche’s
qualification ‘
is not a NQF6 qualification but only
constitutes 145 credits towards a NQF qualification and therefore
does not satisfy the post
requirements as advertised …
’
[5]
A dispute ensued, and the matter eventually proceeded to arbitration.
[6]
At a virtual pre-arbitration meeting, the parties agreed in principle
to proceed by way of a stated case. The parties
subsequently signed
and submitted a written stated case. Accordingly, no oral evidence
was led.
[7]
In addition to the stated case, the arbitrator considered a bundle of
documents compiled by the Applicant.
[8]
Both parties filed written submissions, a reply, and agreed that the
matter be determined on those papers alone.
The
stated case
[9]
The stated case comprises four paragraphs over four pages.
[10]
The first paragraph consists of 14 subparagraphs, each recording an
agreed fact.
[11]
The second paragraph records the Third Respondent’s contention
that it has always required a three-year NQF Level
6 qualification
and that the ‘
current advertisements have been amended to
provide clarification on the interpretation
’.
[12]
The third paragraph – which is the crux of this matter –
frames the dispute for determination:
‘
The arbitrator
is required to decide whether the qualification of the Applicant
satisfies the requirements as per the advertisement,
the SSSBC
promotion policy as well as the relevant National Instruction
.’
[13]
The fourth and final paragraph frames the relief sought by the
Applicant.
The
Applicant’s bundle of documents
[14]
The Applicant submitted a bundle of sixteen documents to the
arbitrator, including,
inter alia
, the post advertisement in
question, National Instruction 10/2017 (‘
the National
Instruction’
) which sets out the requirements for post
advertisements, the Applicant’s qualification and an overview
of the Applicant’s
qualification by the South African
Qualifications Authority (SAQA).
The
parties’ written arguments before the arbitrator
[15]
The Applicant argued that the dispute turned upon the crisp question
as to whether the Applicant’s qualification
satisfied ‘
the
post requirements of an applicable
NQF6 qualification
as per the advertisement’
(emphasis added).
[16]
The Third Respondent, on the other hand, framed the dispute as to
whether the Applicant had met ‘
the requirements of the post
in question,
in terms of the qualifications required
’
(emphasis added). However, it went on to clarify that the
‘
specific issue to be decided is whether the Applicant
was in possession of an NQF qualification
, as at the
closing date of the advertisement
…’ (emphasis
added). The Third Respondent made two core contentions. Firstly, the
Applicant’s qualification
is not an NQF Level 6 qualification.
Secondly, her qualification is, at any rate, not relevant to the
post.
[17]
The Applicant argued that the Third Respondent was precluded from
arguing that the Applicant’s qualification was
not an NQF Level
6 qualification considering the content of paragraphs 1.5–1.7
of the stated case:
‘
1.5
The said qualification
[sc. the Applicant’s qualification]
is registered in the NQF on Level 6.
1.6
According to SAQA, the qualification is an NQF level 6 qualification
with 145 credits, although it is not
a 3 (three) year degree or
diploma.
1.7
The post requirements as per the advertisements required a Senior
Certificate plus applicable NQF6 qualification
.’
[18]
The Applicant argued, further, that it was untenable and
impermissible as it was raised for the first time in heads of
argument,
ex post facto
and without a factual basis for that
contention. The Applicant argued further that the Third Respondent
had not, in any of the
preceding correspondence, ever stated that the
Applicant’s application was rejected on the basis that her
qualification was
not applicable or relevant.
The
award
[19]
The arbitrator’s award is helpfully succinct, spanning only
nine pages.
[20]
In paragraph 5, the arbitrator framed the broad question for
determination as ‘
whether the Applicant has been subjected
to an unfair act or omission of the
[Third Respondent]
involving
unfair conduct by the
[Third Respondent]
relating to the
promotion of the Applicant.
’
[21]
The arbitrator started by considering whether Ms Terblanche’s
qualification was indeed an NQF Level 6 qualification.
His analysis
on this issue takes up the lion’s share of the award. On this
issue, the arbitrator held in the Applicant’s
favour. He
concluded that if SAQA had confirmed the qualification’s NQF
Level 6 status, it logically followed that it was
indeed such.
[22]
The arbitrator then moved on to the relevancy issue. Given the wide
ambit of paragraph 3 in the stated case, he considered
that the
dispute was ‘
not limited to whether the certificate is on a
level NQF6 but whether it meets the requirements of the advertised
post
’.
[23]
He also noted that the Applicant had failed to address the relevancy
issue despite having agreed to paragraph 3 of the
stated case.
Significantly, he noted that:
‘
[b]ecause the
Applicant has not addressed the issue fully, the
Applicant
has not provided any basis on which the Certificate she holds is
relevant to the core functions of the post
. For this
reason, I have considered the Certificate and SAQA indications
thereto because this has been what the Applicant relies
upon
.’
(emphasis added)
[24]
The arbitrator considered the title of Ms Terblanche’s
certificate. He also considered the purpose thereof as stated
by
SAQA, namely ‘
competencies across all the educational
training and development roles
’. He emphasised that among
its specialisations are ‘
strategic management
’
which qualifies Ms Terblanche to ‘
facilitate and manage
skills development in an Organisation
’.
[25]
Thereafter, the arbitrator concluded, without more, as follows:
‘
The
respondent’s reliance on the advertisement sets out the core
functions and I was persuaded that these are of an “administrative”
and not a “training or educational nature”.
’
[26]
Accordingly, he found against the Applicant on the relevancy issue,
and dismissed the Applicant’s case.
The
Applicant’s case on review
[27]
The Applicant argues that the arbitrator committed a gross
irregularity, misdirection and an error in law ‘
which
resulted in a failure of justice’
thereby rendering the
award one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.
[28]
It is not clear whether the Applicant’s three grounds are
sought in the alternative. However, I proceed on that
assumption.
[29]
The thrust of the Applicant’s case is that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers by straying outside the stated case
by
determining a dispute that the parties had not submitted to
arbitration. Moreover, the Applicant argues that there are no facts
in the stated case upon which the arbitrator could have properly
determined the relevancy issue.
The applicable legal
principles
Proceeding by way of
stated case in a statutory arbitration
[30]
There is
nothing in the First Respondent’s rules regarding proceeding by
way of a stated case. Nor is there any provision
in the LRA that
governs or provides whether the parties can proceed via a stated
case. That is unsurprising considering that
section 138(1)
of the
Labour Relations Act, 1995
empowers a commissioner to ‘
conduct
the arbitration in a manner that the commissioner considers
appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly
’
provided that the commissioner ‘
must
deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of
legal formalities.
’
There can therefore be no doubt that parties may proceed by way of a
stated case for purposes of a statutory arbitration
such as those
proceeding before the arbitrator
in
casu
.
[2]
[31]
Since there are no prescribed formalities as to what such a stated
case should contain, it is helpful to draw guidance
from, firstly,
rule 33 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, and secondly,
section
20
of the
Arbitration Act, 1965
.
[32]
As the former,
rule 33
, in relevant part, provides as follows:
‘
(1) The parties
to any dispute may, after institution of proceedings,
agree
upon a written statement of facts in the form of a special case for
the adjudication of the court
.
(2) (a)
Such statement shall set forth the facts agreed upon, the
questions of law in dispute between the parties and their contentions
thereon
…
…
(3)
At the hearing thereof the court and the parties may refer to the
whole of the contents of such documents
and
the court may draw any
inference of fact or of law from the facts and documents as if proved
at a trial
.
…
(5)
When giving its decision upon any question in terms of this rule the
court may give such judgment as
may upon such decision be appropriate
and
may give any direction with regard to the hearing of any other
issues in the proceeding which may be necessary for the final
disposal
thereof
.
(6)
If the question in dispute is one of law and the parties
are agreed upon the facts, the facts may be admitted and recorded at
the
trial and the court may give judgment without hearing any
evidence
.’ (emphasis added)
[33]
As to the latter,
section 20
, in relevant part, provides as follows:
‘
(1)
An arbitration tribunal may
, on the application
of any party to the reference and shall, if the court, on the
application of any such party, so directs, or
if the
parties to the reference so agree, at any stage before making a final
award state any question of law arising in the course
of the
reference in the form of a special case
for the opinion of
the court or for the opinion of counsel
.’ (emphasis added)
[34]
The
excerpts above bear out that a stated case envisages at least two
material requirements. Firstly, the question for determination
must
be stated. Secondly, the facts must be stated upon which that
question must be determined. It is implicit that those facts
must be
agreed.
[3]
The test on review
[35]
It is common cause that this matter concerns an unfair labour
practice in the form of a refusal of an application for
a promotion.
[36]
While the
onus in such a dispute rests on the employee,
[4]
the test on review, as far as the merits are concerned, remains the
same, namely whether the decision reached by the commissioner
is one
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.
[5]
There must be a rational connection between the outcome and the facts
upon which it is based.
[6]
A
rational decision is one that is logically borne out by the
evidence.
[7]
[37]
In
Goldfields
Mining SA (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation & Arbitration & others
,
[8]
the Labour Appeal Court summarised the test succinctly:
‘
In short: A
review court must ascertain whether the arbitrator considered the
principal issue before him/her; evaluated the facts
presented at the
hearing and came to a conclusion which was reasonable to justify the
decisions he or she arrived at
.’
Analysis
[38]
Mr Van Eedveldt, who appeared for the Applicant, submitted, in
essence, that this matter turns upon two issues. Firstly,
whether the
arbitrator was limited to a determination of only the NQF issue and,
secondly, whether there were any facts in the
stated case upon which
he could determine the relevancy issue.
[39]
I refer to them as the first and second questions, respectively.
[40]
The answer
to both questions turns upon the correct construction of the stated
case. In doing so, I am mindful of the correct approach
to the proper
construction of documents. The process is not simply an objective
exercise, but rather a unitary process in which
one must take account
of both textual and extratextual aspects.
[9]
The first question
[41]
The first question concerns jurisdictional rationality, namely the
arbitrator’s interpretive reasonableness of
the stated case
leading to his conclusion that he had jurisdiction.
[42]
To begin with, paragraph 3 in the stated case frames the dispute
between the parties in wide and ambiguous terms:
‘
The arbitrator
is required to decide whether the qualification of the Applicant
satisfies the requirements as per the advertisement,
the SSSBC
promotion policy as well as the relevant National Instruction
.’
[43]
The Applicant’s argument is that the arbitrator was confined to
only a determination of the first question. That
is so, the Applicant
argued, since paragraph 1.13 of the stated case records that the
Third Respondent:
‘
indicated
that the qualification submitted by the Applicant is not a NQF6
qualification but only constitute 145 credits towards
a NQF
qualification and therefore does not satisfy the post requirements as
advertised
…’.
[44]
That, argued Mr Van Eedveldt, is further borne out by paragraph 4.2
of the Third Respondent’s heads of argument
before the
arbitrator:
‘
The specific
issue to be decided is whether the Applicant was in possession of an
NQF qualification
…’
[45]
On the
other side, Mr Abrahams, who appeared from the Third Respondent,
stressed the wide ambit of paragraph 3 of the stated case.
He also
relied upon the decision of the late Appellate Division in
Paddock
Motors
where,
at 24B–C, Jansen JA held:
[10]
‘
If … the
parties were to overlook a question of law arising from the facts
agreed upon, a question fundamental to the issues
they have discerned
and stated, the Court could hardly be bound to ignore the fundamental
problem and only decide the secondary
and dependent issues actually
mentioned in the special case. This would be a fruitless exercise,
divorced from reality, and may
lead to a wrong decision
.’
[46]
In other words, the fact that an issue was not properly, or at all,
stated does not preclude its determination lest it
give rise to a
wrong decision.
[47]
In my view, the dispute as framed in the stated case, on both a
textual and contextual level, indeed encompassed both
the first and
second questions. I say so for these reasons.
[48]
Firstly, the plain and unambiguous wording of the stated case bears
out a rational connection between the first and second
questions.
[49]
Secondly, in the virtual pre-arbitration meeting, the arbitrator
framed his understanding of the dispute as follows:
‘
Alright so I
think that sounds like it is common course
(sic)
so there is a
difference … Colonel Terblanche has an NQF6 qualification.
Dispute is going to be about what the intent was of the
advert
and maybe other … arguments that will be
available to the Applicant as well so I think this could well be
dispersed (sic)
with by a stated case
(sic)’ (emphasis
added).
[50]
Thirdly – and significantly – the words ‘
NQF
Level 6 qualification
’ do not feature in paragraph 3 of the
stated case. One would have expected them to appear to qualify, or
narrow, the ambit
of the issue for determination. On this, Mr
Abrahams’ reliance on
Paddock Motors
is well-founded. An
arbitrator, like a Court, should be astute to determining a
fundamental question that might have been overlooked
by the parties.
[51]
Fourthly, the Applicant’s reliance upon paragraph 1.13 is
misplaced. Whilst it certainly relates to the issue for
determination, paragraph 1.13 neither defines nor limits the issue
for determination; paragraph 3 of the stated case fulfils that
purpose. Nevertheless, it might be fairly suggested that paragraph
1.13 could, at the very least, serve to inform the proper
construction
of paragraph 3. However, that approach unduly narrows
the clause which the parties agreed would define the ambit of their
dispute.
[52]
Fifthly, if indeed, the parties intended to only submit the question
concerning fulfilment of the NQF Level 6 requirement,
it begs the
question why the parties did not simply frame the question more
succinctly along the following lines: ‘
does the Applicant’s
qualification constitute an NQF Level 6 qualification as required by
the advertisement
?’ Instead, the parties framed the dispute
in wider terms as to whether the Applicant’s qualification
‘
satisfies the requirements as per the advertisement, SSSBC
promotion policy as well as the relevant National Instruction’
.
That indicates that the dispute was not as narrow as the Applicant
suggests. Moreover, it is significant that the Applicant signed
the
stated case in those terms.
[53]
Sixthly, whilst it is so that the Third Respondent had never stated
that Ms Terblanche’s qualification was not
applicable or
relevant, that fact is only a further contextual indicator. It is
subsumed by the wide wording of paragraph 3 of
the stated case.
[54]
Finally – and somewhat ironically – the Applicant’s
contention in its heads of argument before the
arbitrator that the
Third Respondent was precluded from arguing that Ms Terblanche’s
qualification was not an NQF Level 6
qualification since it had
conceded that fact in the stated case, would mean that the Third
Respondent had, in effect, conceded
the very issue submitted for
determination by the arbitrator. The Applicant’s argument is at
odds with the object of the
stated case. It means that the
arbitration served no purpose.
[55]
It is trite
that an arbitrator commits a reviewable irregularity where they
exceed their jurisdiction by exercising a power they
do not have.
[11]
The test is an objective one of correctness.
[12]
With that in mind, it cannot be said
in
casu
that the arbitrator’s construction of the stated case lacked an
objective rational connection to the issues framed in the
stated
case.
[56]
Accordingly, in my view, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, or
jurisdiction, when he considered himself called
upon to determine
both questions. His conclusion on the first question is one that a
reasonable decision-maker could reach.
The second question
[57]
The second question concerns a matter of substantive rationality,
namely the existence of sufficient facts in the stated
case in order
to arrive at a rational outcome.
[58]
Mr Van Eedveldt submitted that the second question was factual in
nature, but that the stated case contained no facts
upon which it
could be determined. He argued further that the Third Respondent
advanced factual statements not in the stated case
and could thus not
have been considered by the arbitrator, namely the following:
58.1
The National Instruction 10/2017 regulates
the advertising of posts
in the service;
58.2
That the post is of an administrative nature;
58.3
The reference to a collective agreement;
58.4
The post of staff officer is not a ‘
training Officer Post’
and therefore not relevant.
[59]
Marshalling
support from the decision in
Mboweni,
[13]
Mr Van Eedveldt argued that the arbitrator should not have embarked
upon a determination of an issue in the stated case without
facts
upon which he could do so.
[60]
I agree that the second question is a factual one. After all, it
requires factual evidence regarding the content of each
qualification
in order to properly compare them and thus determine whether Ms
Terblanche’s qualification is relevant, or
applicable, to the
advertised post. I did not understand Mr Abrahams to dispute that
submission. He argued rather that the arbitrator’s
conclusion
on the second question was rationally linked to the facts before him,
both in the stated case and documents.
[61]
The logical point of departure is to consider the agreed facts framed
in the stated case:
‘
1.1
The Applicant was the recommended candidate for post 18/2018: Staff
Officer: Divisional Commissioner: Technology
Management Services.
1.2
The only reason for her non-appointment is due to the non-recognition
of her qualification as the requisite
qualification as per the post
advertisement.
1.3
The Applicant is in possession of a National Certificate:
Occupationally Directed Education, Training and
Development
Practices.
1.4
The said qualification is an NQF Level 6 with 145 credits.
1.5
The said qualification is registered in the NQF on Level 6.
1.6
According to SAQA, the qualification is an NQF level 6 qualification
with 145 credits, although it is not
a 3 (three) year degree or
diploma.
1.7
The post requirements as per the advertisements required a Senior
Certificate plus applicable NQF6 qualification
.
1
.
8
The promotion requirements from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel as per
SSSBC Agreement 3/2011 is at least
an NQF6 qualification.
1.9
National Instruction 1/2004 defined a NQF6 qualification as a
relevant three-year degree or diploma
accredited by SAQA to be on an
NQF Level 6.
1.10
National Instruction 1/2004 was replaced with National Instruction 3
of 2015 w.e.f 2015-09-28.
1.11
National Instruction 3 of 2015 defines NQF qualification as a
qualification accredited by SAQA to be on the
required NQF level.
1.12
In a letter dated 2019-03-28, the Respondent indicated that the
Applicant is in possession of a qualification
confirmed to be on NQF
Level 6, 145 credits. Par 3 of the said letter further indicated that
with all the posts advertised in the SAPS thus far, the NQF6
requirement refers to at least a fully-fledged Diploma with a minimum
of 240 credits.
1.13
In a letter dated 2019-10-24 the Respondent indicated that the
qualification submitted by the Applicant is
not a NQF 6 qualification
but only constitutes 145 credits towards a NQF 6 qualification and
therefore does not satisfy the post
requirements as advertised.
1.14
No appointment was made into the post, as the post was withdrawn.’
[62]
On the face of it, there are no facts which expressly refer or speak
directly to the ‘
relevancy’
of the Applicant’s
qualification to the advertised post. However, I do not lose sight of
the fact that the arbitrator also
had the benefit of the Applicant’s
bundle of documents, including the advertisement and the National
Instruction.
[63]
In developing his argument that there is enough in the stated case to
determine the second question, Mr Abrahams submitted
that paragraph
1.2 of the stated case refers to a ‘
requisite qualification
as per the post advertisement’
and paragraph 1.7 refers to
an ‘
applicable NQF6 qualification’
. He argued that
the words ‘
requisite’
and ‘
applicable’
must mean something and cannot be appraised
in vacuo
. That
meaning, he argued further, is to be gleaned from the ‘
core
functions’
as described in the advertisement and the
definitions of ‘
competence
’, ‘
core
functions
’ and ‘
relevant qualification
’
in the National Instruction.
[64]
I accept that the words ‘
requisite’
and
‘
applicable’
as used in paragraph 1.2 of the
stated case must hold some meaning. I accept, further, that the
logical meaning attributable to
those words is that the required
qualification must at least comply with the competencies specified in
the post advertisement and
National Instruction.
[65]
However, in my view, that does not elevate those words and their
meaning to
facts
bearing upon the determination of the second
question.
[66]
It appears that the arbitrator conducted an
in vacuo
evaluation of the Applicant’s qualification, against the
competencies required by the post advertisement and National
Instruction.
In other words, he simply compared the wording of the
former to the latter – essentially a textual comparison between
the
two documents, without any contextual factual foundation.
However, the arbitrator appears to have overlooked that the
interpretative
process entails both textual and extratextual aspects.
Thus, facts were required in order to properly contextualise the
similarities
and differences between Applicant’s qualifications
against competencies set out in the post advertisement and National
Instruction.
This is the more so since, on a cursory appraisal
thereof, there is an appreciable
prima facie
conceptual
overlap between the core functions in the post advertisement with the
competencies of Ms Terblanche’s qualification
as recorded in
the SAQA document, namely the following:
66.1
Managing administrative systems
, stakeholder consultations,
personnel performance
, and financial controls (as stated in
the advertisement) which overlaps with
strategic management
,
skills development facilitation, and
evaluating human resource
development (HRD) interventions
(as stated in the SAQA document);
66.2
Quality control of reporting
, compliance with regulations, and
grievance handling
(as stated in the advertisement), which
overlaps with
quality assurance
, defining/evaluating
standards, and
evaluation of HRD interventions
(as stated in
the in the SAQA document);
66.3
Performance management of personnel, handling grievances, and
managing human resources
(as stated in the advertisement), which
overlaps with facilitation of learning,
managing skills
development, and evaluation of HRD/people-focused initiatives
(as
stated in the in the SAQA document).
[67]
The point is not that the Court undertakes a fresh factual
assessment, but to demonstrate that even the documents alone
reveal
an appreciable overlap sufficient to demand reasoned treatment,
grounded in evidence. By failing to engage with those apparent
intersections, and by providing no cognisable reasoning for his
conclusion, the arbitrator misconceived the enquiry regarding the
relevancy question. Exacerbating matters is the fact that the
arbitrator offered no cognisable reasoning for his conclusion on
the
second question.
[68]
In short, the arbitrator committed a reviewable irregularity in his
determination of the second question. The error is
not only one of
reasoning but also one of process. The arbitrator misconceived the
nature of the enquiry by deciding a factual
issue absent an agreed or
proven factual basis. Consequently, the arbitrator’s decision
on this question is unmoored from
any cognisable facts before him.
Accordingly, the arbitrator’s decision on the second question
bears no rational link to
the facts that were before him.
Conclusion on the award
[69]
While his conclusion on the first question is reasonable and
rational, the arbitrator’s conclusion on the second
question is
not.
[70]
It follows that the award falls to be reviewed and set aside.
Appropriate
remedy
The
Applicant seeks that the matter proceed
de novo
before a
different arbitrator. Given the lack of facts to determine a vital
issue, I consider that an appropriate remedy in the
circumstances.
Costs
[71]
It is trite
that in this Court costs do not follow the result as a matter of
course
[14]
but are awarded
only where the requirements of law and fairness so demand. The Court
must strike a balance between discouraging
frivolous or abusive
litigation and not deterring parties from pursuing genuine
disputes.
[15]
[72]
In all the circumstances, I consider it fair that each party should
pay its own costs. This the more so since the irregularity
tainting
the award was as a result of a deficiency in the stated case agreed
by the parties.
Order
[73]
In the result, the following order is made:
1. The late filing
of the Third Respondent’s answering affidavit is condoned.
2. The award of the
Second Respondent dated 21 February 2022 under case number PSSS53 of
20/21, is reviewed and set aside.
3. The matter is
remitted to the First Respondent for hearing
de novo
before a
new arbitrator.
4. Each party shall
pay its own costs.
PS
MacKENZIE
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
C van Eetveldt
Instructed
by:
Magoma Attorneys
For
the Respondent: R
Abrahams
Instructed
by:
State Attorney (C Bailey)
[1]
I refer to the Applicant and Ms Terblanche interchangeably.
[2]
See:
PSA
obo Van Wyk / Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
[2004] 8 BALR 1024 (GPSSBC).
[3]
Minister
of Police v Mboweni
2014 (6) SA 256
(SCA) at para 7;
Claassen’s
Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases,
June 2025 update, the meaning of ‘
special
case’
.
[4]
Department
of Justice v CCMA & others
[2004] 4 BLLR 297
(LAC) at para 73.
[5]
Sidumo &
Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others
(2007)
28 ILJ 2405 (CC) at para 110.
[6]
Mashaba
v University of Johannesburg & others
(2023)
44 ILJ 156 (LAC) at para 19
.
[7]
Carephone
(Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO
1999 (3) SA 304
(LAC) at para 37.
[8]
(2014)
35 ILJ 943 (LAC)
at
para 16.
[9]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA) at para 18;
Bothma-Batho
Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk
2014
(2) SA 494
(SCA) at para 12.
[10]
Paddock
Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund
1976 (3) SA 16 (A).
[11]
Telcordia
Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 112
;
2007 (3) SA 266
(SCA) at para 52.
[12]
SA
Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA Rugby
(Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & another
[2008] ZALAC 3
;
[2008] 9 BLLR 845
(LAC)
at
para 41.
[13]
Minister
of Police v Mboweni
2014 (6) SA 256
(SCA) at para 15.
[14]
Union
for Police Security and Corrections Organisation v South African
Custodial Management (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2021]
12 BLLR 1173
(CC).
[15]
MEC for
Finance: Kwazulu-Natal and Another v Dorkin NO and Another
[2008] 6 BLLR 540
(LAC) at para 19.