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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION PIETERMARITZBURG


CASE NO: 804/2023P
805/2023P

Before: Honourable Ncube J
Heard on: 19 May 2025
Delivered on: 24 November 2025

In the matter between:
BULELANI ZOLANI BANGANI Applicant

and

THE STANDARD BANK OF SA LTD Respondent
and
BULELANI ZOLANI BANGANI N.O. First Applicant
NOBUHLE BEAUTY MAKHANYA N.O Second Applicant
and
THE STANDARD BANK OF SA LTD Respondent

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ORDER
In the result I make the following order:
1. The Application for Leave to Appeal is dismissed with costs.


JUDGMENT: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL



NCUBE J

Introduction

[1] This is an application for leave to appeal. I shall refer to the parties as they
were referred to in the original hearing. The respondents seek leave to appeal to the
Full Court of this Division against the whole judgment and order of this court handed
down on 20 September 2024.

Principals on Application for Leave to Appeal
[2] The starting point of exercise is section 17 of the Superior Courts Act 1 which
provides:

“17 Leave to appeal
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that -----------
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success;
or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the
matter under consideration;

1 Act 10 of 2013

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(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of
section 16(2)(a); and;
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all
the issues in the ca se, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt
resolution of the real issues between the parties”

[3] Commenting on the aspect of reasonable prospect of success, In MEC Health
Earstern Cape v Mkhitha2 Scheepers AJA (as he then was), expressed himself in the
following terms :
‘’ An applicant for leave to appeal must convince this court on proper grounds that
there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of success on appeal. A mere
possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless, is not enough.
There must be sound rational basis to conclude that there is reasonable prospect of
success on appeal.’’

[4] In Smith v S3 Plasket JA said the following :

‘’What the test of reasonable prospect of success postulates is a dispassionate
decision based on the facts and the law that a court of appeal could reasonably
arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court. In order to succeed
therefore, the appellant must convince this court on proper grounds that he has
prospects of success on appeal and that those prospects are not remote, but have a
realistic chance of succeeding.’’


[5] In the past, the test applied by courts in the determination of an application
for leave to appeal, was whether there was a reasonable prospect that another court
may come to a different conclusion to the one reached by the the court a quo4. With
the coming into operation of section 17 above, the threshold to grant leave to appeal
has been raised. In Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 Others5, it was held:


2 (1221/2015) (2016) ZASCA 176 ( 25 November 2016) Para 17
3 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA) para 7
4 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Tuck 1989(4) SA 888(T) at 890-B
5 (LCC14R/2014) [2014] ZA LCC 20(3 November 2014)

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“It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against the
judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test
whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that
another court might come at a different conclusion see Van Heerden v
Cronwright and Others 1985(2) SA 342 (T) at 343 H. The use of the word
‘would’ in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court
will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.
This new standard is applied by section 37(4)(b) of the Restitution of Land
Rights Act 22 of 1994 to this Court’s duty to consider the prospects of an
intended appeal”

(6) In Notshokovu v S6 it was said that an appellant faces a higher and stringent
threshold under the Superior Courts Act. Therefore, in terms of section 17 the
enquiry is not whether another court “may” come to a different conclusion, but
“would” indeed come to a different conclusion.

[7] In Four Wheel Drive CC v Leshni Rattan NO7 Schippers JA expressed himself
in the following terms:

“There is a further principle that the court a quo seems to have overlooked-
leave to appeal should be granted only when there is a sound, rational basis
for the conclusion that there are prospects of success in appeal? In the light f
its finding that the plaintiff failed to prove locus standi or the conclusion of the
agreement, I do not think that there was reasonable prospect of an appeal to
this court succeeding or that there was a compelling reason to hear an
appeal”

Brief Background
[8] The application for leave to appeal arises from this court’s order of 20
September 2024, effectively, and finally sequestrating the estate of the respondent
Bulelani Zolani Bangani (“Mr Bangani”) as well as the final sequestration of the
Bangani Family Trust (“the Trust”) of which Mr Bangani and one Nobuhle Beauty
Makhanya (“Miss Makhanya”) were trustees.

Makhanya (“Miss Makhanya”) were trustees.

6 (157/15) [2016] ZASCA (7 September 2016)
7 2019(3) SA 451 (SCA) para 34

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[9] On 15 April 2019, the Standard Bank obtained judgment against the entity
known as “ Xesibe Construction CC and against Mr Bangani in his personal capacity.
Standard Bank also obtained judgment against Mr Bangani and Miss Makhanya in
their capacity as trustees of the Bangani Family Trust. The judgment was for the
payment of the sum if R2 149 992.00 and R6 373 221.62 with interest. Mr Bangani
and the Trust failed to satisfy the judgment debt.

[10] On 7 December 2022, the Sheriff personally served Mr Bangani with a
Warrant of Execution and demanded satisfaction of the warrant of execution. Mr
Bangani informed the Sheriff that he could not make payment in terms of the Warrant
The Sheriff demanded movable property to attach and searched for it but could not
find any. Therefore, the return was one of Nulla Bona. The Nulla Bona return
indicates that Mr Bangani did not advise the Sheriff of any other methods which the
debt could be settled despite the fact that Mr Bangani was obliged to do so. On his
own version, Mr Bangani states:
“ The response I gave the sheriff is that the trust has no money in liquid cash to settle
the amount demanded”
Grounds of Appeal
[11] Initially the Respondent listed five(5) grounds of appeal. When the
application for leave to appeal was argued, Mr Ntlokoana, Counsel for the
Respondents, withdrew the fourth ground and he abandoned ground number 5.
That leaves us with only three(3) grounds.

[12]
Ground 1 On this ground the Respondent contends that this court erred in
interpreting paragraph 3 of the Execution Order against immovable property as
money order and that this court did not deal with the paragraphs of the original court
order which deal with the money order.

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This ground is vague and does not make sense. At paragraph 3 and 7 of this court’s
judgment, I did in fact find that a money judgment was made against Respondents.
The ground is considered and dismissed.
Ground no 2
[13] On this ground the Respondents state
“ On the nulla bona return, where the veracity of its contents are contested, the
version of Mr Bangani, on how it was served has not been challenged by an
affidavit from sheriff disputing Mr Bangani’s version. On this ground alone
another court would have come to a different conclusion than the one reached
by this Honourable Court”
I can only repeat what Mr Bangani says in his answering affidavit where he says:
“the response I gave to the sheriff is that the trust has no money in liquid cash to
settle the amount demanded”
The onus was therefore on Mr Bangani to inform the sheriff about other assets which
were available and where such assets were to be found8. He did not do so. This
ground is considered and it is dismissed.
Ground No 3
[14] On this ground the Respondents state:
“Further to the above, it is submitted that given the two contrasting versions from
the nulla bono return and from Mr Bangani the Honourable Court misdirected
itself in concluding that there are no disputes of fact. It is submitted that another
court might come to a different conclusion on this issue”

Not every dispute a fact is relevant. There must be a real, material or genuine
dispute of fact. Mr Bangani himself told the sheriff that the Trust had no money to
satisfy the debt and he did not indicate that there were other assets which could be
realized towards the settlement of the debt owed to Standard Bank. On the date of
the sequestration judgment, the debt owed to Standard Bank was still outstanding,

8 See Wilken and Others NHO v Reichonberg 1999(1) SA 852 (W) at 856 C-E

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despite Mr Bangani saying he has sufficient assets to satisfy the warrant of
execution.
This ground is considered and it is dismissed.
All grounds are considered and dismissed.
Finding
[15] I find that there is no reasonable prospect of success on appeal and there are
no compelling reasons why appeal should be heard.

Order
[16] In the result, I make the following order:
1. The Application for Leave to Appeal is dismissed with costs.


_________________
NCUBE MT
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
PIETERMARITZBURG

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APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Mr V Ntlokwana
Instructed by: Ntlokwana & Associate Inc

For the Respondent: Mr T.Q. Reddy
Instructed by: Drake Flemmer & Osmond Attorneys