SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

CASE NUMBER: 48230/2021

(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO

24 November 2025

In the matter between:

THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Applicant


and

ANASTASSIS CHRISTOPHOROU N.O. First Respondent
ANASTASIOS PANYOTIS ZERVOS N.O. Second Respondent
CATHERINE ZERVOS Third Respondent
PANAYOTIS CHRISOVALANTOS ZERVOS Fourth Respondent


Heard: 25 August 2025
Delivered: 24 November 2025

Headnote: Suretyship – Enforcement – Missing annexures and unsigned copies of loan
agreements – Bank records admissible as prima facie proof – Dilatory defences –
Principal indebtedness undisputed – Judgment granted against remaining sureties;
claim against deceased surety postponed sine die.


JUDGMENT

WINDELL J:
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed application instituted by the Standard Bank of South Africa
Limited (“the applicant”) for judgment against the respondents, jointly and severally, as
sureties and co- principal debtors for the indebtedness of Peters Land CC (in
liquidation). The applicant seeks payment of approximately R13.7 million, together with
interest and costs. The National Credit Act does not apply to the proceedings.
1
[2] The application arises from three credit facilities concluded between the applicant
and the principal debtor, Peters Land CC, between 2003 and 2004: a first home- loan
facility (account number 2[…]); a second home-loan facility (account number 2[…]); and
a Liberator facility (account number 2[ …]). It is common cause that the facilities were
granted to finance the acquisition and development of immovable properties over which
mortgage bonds were registered. The principal debtor defaulted, and these very
facilities formed the basis of the claim advanced in the liquidation proceedings. Peters
Land CC was placed under final winding-up on 10 February 2020.

1 Act 34 of 2005.

[3] The sureties were all members of the same family. The late Mr Anastasios
Panayotis Zervos (Mr Zervos) executed an unlimited deed of suretyship; his wife, the
late Mrs Catherine Zervos, executed a limited suretyship in respect of one of the
facilities; and their son, Mr Panayotis Chrisovalantos Zervos (the fourth respondent) ,
executed a suretyship limited to R3.5 million. It later emerged that Mr Zervos had
already passed away when the application was instituted. The applicant subsequently
brought a Rule 15(2) application to substitute Mr Zervos with the executors of his estate,
who now appear as the first and second respondents.
[4] On the day of the hearing, the applicant was informed that the third respondent,
Mrs Catherine Zervos, had also passed away. The claim against her is accordingly
postponed sine die to enable the appointment of an executor. This judgment
accordingly concerns the substituted first and second respondents, in their
representative capacity as executors of the estate of the late Mr Zervos, and the fourth
respondent in his personal capacity.
Background
[5] The first home-loan facility was concluded on 11 July 2003 in the amount of R2.5
million, secured by a mortgage bond registered over Erf 2[ …], Bedfordview Extension
515 (Erf 2[…]). The signed agreement comprised the grant of loan letter dated 25 June
2003, a special conditions annexure, a disclosure annexure, a property details
annexure, an interest rate annexure and the applicant's general terms and conditions
applicable to loans secured by mortgage bonds. A complete copy of the first home loan
agreement was attached to the founding affidavit.

[6] Approximately a year later, on 30 June 2004, a further advance of R1.5 million
was granted on the first home loan and secured by a second mortgage bond over the
same property (Erf 2[ …]). Despite a diligent search, the applicant was unable to locate
certain ancillary documents relating to the first further advance, including the disclosure,
special conditions, property details and interest rate annexures. The applicant, however,
explained that, in accordance with its standard practice, a further -advance facility would
not have been opened unless the principal debtor had signed the standard- form home-
loan agreement incorporating the applicable general terms and conditions. For present
purposes, the further advance is evidenced by the letter of gr ant read with the standard
terms signed on behalf of the principal debtor.
[7] The applicant’s internal banking records and system -generated statements
confirm the existence and operation of both the first home- loan facility and the further
advance. These records, generated and maintained in the ordinary course of business,
reflect the dates of disbursements, repayments, and the registration of both mortgage
bonds over Erf 2[ …]. The annexed statements covering the period August 2003 to
November 2004, together with the account -information printout dated 26 October 2018,
further show that the R1.5 million further advance was debited in two tranches on 25
and 31 August 2004.
[8] The second home- loan facility was concluded on 24 July 2003 in the amount of
R1.1 million, secured by a mortgage bond registered over Erf 1[ …], B[…] Township (Erf
115). The documentation for this facility included a grant of loan letter, special
conditions annexure, disclosure annexure, property details annexure, interest rate
annexure and the applicant’s general terms and conditions for mortgage- backed loans.

The applicant was unable to locate the signed agreement or certain annexures despite
diligent searches. The applicant nonetheless explained that the second home- loan
facility, like the first, was concluded on its standard- form mortgage documentation. An
unsigned version of the original agreement was provided.
[9] On 19 July 2004, the principal debtor obtained a further advance of R1 million on
the second facility (the second advance) , which was secured by a second mortgage
bond over Erf 1[ …]. Unlike the primary agreement, an executed copy of the second
advance agreement was located and attached to the pleadings.
[10] The applicant annexed account statements and internal printouts reflecting the
advances, debits and repayments on the second facility. These records confirm that the
account was opened on 26 September 2003 and that mortgage bonds were registered
on 26 September 2003 and 4 August 2004. These records form part of the ordinary
business records kept within the applicant’s banking system.
[11] The Liberator facility was concluded in or about December 2004 in the amount of
R3.5 million, repayable over a 20-year term and secured by a mortgage bond registered
on 28 April 2005 over Erf 1[ …], B […] Township (Erf 1[ …]). A signed version of the
Liberator agreement could not be located, but an unsigned version was annexed to the
papers.
[12] The applicant also produced statements of account and a system printout dated
24 October 2018, which show that the Liberator loan was advanced in tranches
between April 2005 and April 2008, consistent with the structure of the facility. These
records reflect the opening date of the account, the amount advanced, and the

repayment history. They were generated and maintained in the ordinary course of the
applicant’s business. The applicant explained that, due to the age of the accounts, the
closure of the facilities and archiving of older documents, the original executed
agreements could not be located.
[13] Each of the respondents executed a deed of suretyship. The deeds contain
standard clauses providing that a certificate of balance signed by an authorised official
constitutes prima facie proof of the amount due and that the sureties’ liability is joint and
several. The authenticity and scope of the suretyships are not disputed.
[14] Peters Land CC subsequently fell into arrears on all three facilities and was
placed in final liquidation in February 2020. The liquidators disposed of the immovable
properties Erf 2 […], Erf 1 […] and Erf 1[ …]) bonded in favour of the applicant, and a
supplementary affidavit was filed setting out the progress of the transfers. A dividend of
R1.77 million was received on 18 December 2020 in respect of the Liberator facility (Erf
1[…]) and credited to that account. It is further contended—correctly, in my view —that
as additional transfers are finalised, the writ of execution may be amended to reflect the
updated outstanding balances.
[15] The applicant launched these proceedings in October 2021. At that stage it
sought judgment against the sureties for the outstanding balances, subject to the
applicable limitations of liability in the following amounts:
(a) In the sum of R4 640 983.54 together with interest thereon at the rate of the
applicant's prime lending rate (prime), minus 2.200% per annum, calculated daily
and compounded monthly in arrears, from 31 July 2021 to date of payment,

together with monthly insurance premiums in the sum of R1 783.35, (in respect
of the first home loan agreement and first further advance).
(b) In the sum of R1 678 038.62 together with interest thereon at the rate of prime
minus 2.000% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears,
from 31 July 2021 to date of payment, together with monthly insurance premiums
in the sum of R1 298.64. (in respect of the second home loan facility and second
further advance).
(c) In the sum of R3 935 647.66 together with interest thereon at the rate of prime
minus 2.06% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears,
from 31 July 2021 to date of payment, together with monthly insurance premiums
in the sum of R3 573.51 (in respect of the Liberators’ agreement).
[16] In the course of these proceedings, and shortly before the hearing, the applicant
delivered a supplementary affidavit attaching updated certificates of balance. These
certificates reflect the position as at July 2025 and take into account the passage of
time, accruing interest, and the proceeds received from the sale of the bonded
properties in the liquidation of Peters Land CC. It was argued that the updated figures
therefore represent the most accurate and current calculation of the outstanding
indebtedness.
Respondents’ Opposition
[17] In their initial answering affidavit, the respondents did not dispute the conclusion
of the facilities or the registration of the mortgage bonds. Their objections were directed

instead at Ms Bentley’s authority and personal knowledge, the missing loan documents
and interest-rate annexures, and alleged inconsistencies in the certificates of balance.
[18] Three days before the hearing, the respondents filed a supplementary answering
affidavit in which they expanded their opposition. In essence, they raised the following
additional disputes:
(a) that the applicant’s inability to produce certain original loan agreements and
annexures, particularly the interest rate annexures, renders the principal
indebtedness unproven, the suretyships unenforceable, and the particulars
insufficient to sustain a cause of action under Rule 18(6);
(b) that, without the original agreements, the applicant has failed to establish the
interest rates applicable to the facilities;
(c) that the certificates of balance are unreliable because they do not reproduce
the underlying interest-rate calculations; and
(d) that the reliance on system -generated bank records amounts to prejudicial
hearsay.
[19] The respondents accordingly contend that the applicant has not discharged its
onus of proving the existence of the indebtedness, the applicable contractual interest
rates, or the precise quantum of the claim.
Authority and personal knowledge

[20] Ms Bentley is a manager in the applicant's division known as "Business Support
and Recoveries, Business and Commercial Clients Credit". The respondents dispute
her authority and personal knowledge to depose to the founding and supplementary
founding affidavits. They submit that no documentary proof has been furnished of her
appointment, nor of her authority to institute proceedings on behalf of the applicant .
They further contend that the affidavit s contain no facts from which such authority or
personal knowledge can be inferred and that, in consequence, the application was not
properly authorised or instituted. They indicate an intention to dispatch a Rule 7(1)
notice in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court to the applicant's attorneys to dispute their
authority to act on behalf of the applicant.
[21] This challenge is misconceived. A deponent need not be authorised to depose to
an affidavit; what requires authorisation is the institution of the proceedings, not the
making of the affidavit. 2 No Rule 7(1) notice was in fact delivered to challenge the
authority of the applicant’s attorneys, and the founding papers include an internal
delegation confirming Ms Bentley’s mandate to represent the applicant. The
respondents’ argument therefore lacks both factual and procedural foundation.
[22] As to personal knowledge, Ms Bentley explained her role within the applicant, her
access to its computer systems and records, and her familiarity with the accounts in
issue. It is settled law that a bank official need not have first -hand knowledge of every
transaction in order to depose to an affidavit based on institutional records generated
and maintained in the ordinary course of business ( See Rees and Another v Investec

2 Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA) para [19].

Bank Ltd 3). Her evidence therefore constitutes admissible institutional knowledge, and
there is no basis upon which to reject it.
Existence of the agreements
[23] A conspectus of the respondents’ affidavits shows that they do not dispute that
the facilities were concluded, that the loan amounts were advanced, that the accounts
operated for many years, or that the mortgage bonds were registered as security. Their
only remaining contention under this heading is that the applicant did not identify the
specific officials who represented it when the agreements were concluded. That
complaint does not advance their case. There is nothing in the papers to suggest that
the agreements were improperly executed, that the applicant’s representatives lacked
authority, or that the transactions were irregular in any respect. In the absence of any
evidence casting doubt on the validity of the agreements themselves, this point is
without substance.
[24] The substance of the respondents’ opposition instead relates to the absence of
certain original documents and annexures, particularly older signed copies of the
agreements. The applicant, however, produced reconstructed records generated from
its internal systems together with historical statements reflecting each advance, debit
and repayment.
[25] Moreover, the loss of original documents , particularly where the facilities were
concluded more than twenty years ago, does not extinguish the underlying obligations.
Sections 29 and 30 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 permit the

3 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA) paras [13] to [15].

admission of reproductions and electronic records kept in the ordinary course of
business as prima facie proof of their contents, and the applicant produced detailed
contemporaneous statements and system -generated reports for each facility. The court
in Absa Bank v Zalvest
4 confirmed that where an agreement is lost, its terms may be
proved by secondary evidence such as unsigned copies, business records and other
reliable documentation. The respondents have adduced no evidence to challenge the
reliability or accuracy of these records.
[26] The respondents’ denials are further undermined by the fact that the winding- up
court necessarily accepted the applicant’s claims and the existence of the facilities
when granting the final winding-up order. The applicant’s claims were also proved at the
second meeting of creditors. T he existence and validity of the facilities were essential
elements of those proceedings and accordingly give rise to issue estoppel: the
respondents cannot now re-litigate matters already determined. As explained in Smith v
Porritt,
5 the doctrine applies where the same parties seek to revisit an issue of fact or
law that was fundamental to an earlier judgment:
‘Following the decision in Boshoff v Union Government 1932 TPD 345 the ambit of the exceptio
rei judicata has over the years been extended by the relaxation in appropriate cases of the
common-law requirements that the relief claimed and the cause of action be the same (eadem
res and eadem petendi causa) in both the case in question and the earlier judgment. Where the
circumstances justify the relaxation of these requirements those that remain are that the parties
must be the same (idem actor) and that the same issue (eadem quaestio) must arise. Broadly
stated, the latter involves an inquiry whether an issue of fact or law was an essential element of

4 Absa Bank Ltd v Zalvest Twenty (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (2) SA 119 (WCC).
5 2008 (6) SA 303 (SCA) para [10].

the judgment on which reliance is placed. Where the plea of res judicata is raised in the
absence of a commonality of cause of action and relief claimed it has become commonplace to
adopt the terminology of English law and to speak of issue estoppel. But, as was stressed by
Botha JA in Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Absa Bank Bpk 1995 (1) SA 653 (A) at
669D, 670J - 671B, this is not to be construed as implying an abandonment of the principles of
the common law in favour of those of English law; the defence remains one of res judicata. The
recognition of the defence in such cases will however require careful scrutiny. Each case will
depend on its own facts and any extension of the defence will be on a case-by -case basis.
(Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Absa Bank (supra) at 670E - F.) Relevant
considerations will include questions of equity and fairness not only to the parties themselves
but also to others. As pointed out by De Villiers CJ as long ago as 1893 in Bertram v Wood
(1893) 10 SC 177 at 180, 'unless carefully circumscribed, [the defence of res judicata] is
capable of producing great hardship and even positive injustice to individuals'. (Emphasis
added).
[27] No considerations of equity or fairness militate against applying issue estoppel in
this case. The first and second respondents’ legal representatives were present at the
second meeting of creditors when the applicant’s claims were proved, and no objection
was raised. Nothing suggests that holding the respondents to the earlier determinations
would cause unfairness or injustice.
[28] In the result, the respondents’ challenge to the existence and validity of the
agreements cannot succeed. The facilities were performed, secured by registered
mortgage bonds, accepted in the winding- up proceedings and proved at the creditors’
meeting. The records produced are admissible and reliable, and no contrary evidence
has been advanced. There is no basis to dispute the agreements.

Interest Rates
[29] The respondents’ principal contention concerns the alleged inability to verify the
contractual interest rates. They argue that the interest -rate annexures to certain loan
agreements are missing, that the rates reflected in some of the available agreements
differ from those in the certificates of balance, and note that the certificates issued in
2021 and again in 2025 record different rates. On this basis, they submit that the
certificates of balance are unreliable or defective.
[30] The applicant produced reconstructed rate schedules drawn f rom archival data
and cross -referenced with historical system records. These reconstructions show that
the weighted average interest rates for the first and second home- loan facilities were
13.6% and 13.8% respectively, and that the initial weighted average rate applicable to
the Liberator facility was 8.94%.
[31] The certificates of balance set out the capital, interest, and outstanding amounts
and were issued by authorised officials in accordance with the certificate clauses in the
agreements. It is well established that such certificates constitute prima facie proof of
the indebtedness. A party who disputes their correctness must place before the court
positive evidence showing error; mere assertions of uncertainty or confusion are
insufficient. In Bank of Lisbon International Ltd v Venter en ’n Ander ,
6 the Court held
that reliance on a certificate of balance becomes problematic only where “other
evidence” emerges capable of casting doubt on its correctness. The evidentiary
burden—though not the overall onus —accordingly rests on the respondent to disturb
the prima facie weight of the certificate. If no such evidence is tendered, the fact in issue

6 [1990] 2 All SA 14 (A).

must be taken as proven, and unrebutted prima facie proof becomes conclusive at the
close of the case.
[32] Measured against this standard, the respondents have adduced no evidence
capable of disturbing the prima facie proof of their indebtedness. Their denials are bald
and unaccompanied by any competing calculations, expert analysis, historical
statements, or system records. They place nothing before the court to suggest that the
capital amounts, interest calculations or applied rates reflected in the certificates are
incorrect. In the absence of such evidence, the certificates of balance stand as sufficient
proof of the amounts owing.
[33] There was some initial confusion regarding the interest rate applicable to the
Liberator facility. The most recent certificate of balance, dated 24 July, reflects an
applied rate of 8.9% from 18 February 2025. At that time, the prime lending rate was
11%, meaning that the concession applied was prime minus 2.1%. This is consistent
with the highest concession historically applicable under the Liberator agreement. Far
from prejudicing the respondents, the applied rate is in fact more favourable to them
than the alternative margin of prime minus 2.06% reflected in earlier documentation.
Their complaint regarding a beneficial interest rate is therefore without merit. Nothing in
their papers raises a genuine or bona fide dispute of fact capable of triggering a referral
to oral evidence under the principles set out in Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street
Mansions (Pty) Ltd.
7

7 1949 (3) SA 1155.

[34] The respondents further argue that the certificates of balance contradict one
another because an earlier certificate expresses the interest rate as “prime minus …”,
whereas a later certificate reflects a fixed percentage. This contention is unsustainable.
The updated certificates show that the interest rates applied correspond to the
applicant’s prime lending rate less the concession historically applicable to each facility.
The calculations reflected in the certificates are consistent with those concessions and
result in the most favourable rates to the respondents.
[35] The fixed percentage is simply the numerical result of applying the agreed
concession (“prime minus …”) at the prevailing prime rate on the date of calculation.
The two certificates therefore describe the same interest rate in different — but entirely
reconcilable — ways: one by stating the formula, the other by reflecting the resulting
percentage. The respondents have produced no evidence suggesting that either
calculation is wrong.
[36] When the reconstructed rate schedules, historical system records, and
certificates of balance are considered together, they establish the applicable interest
rates with sufficient clarity and reliability. The respondents, by contrast, have placed no
evidence before the c ourt capable of casting doubt on those rates or disturbing the
prima facie evidential weight of the certificates.
Updated Certificates of Balance and the Need for Amendment
[37] Shortly before the hearing, the applicant delivered a supplementary affidavit
attaching updated certificates of balance reflecting the indebtedness as at July 2025.
These certificates account for the passage of time since October 2021, the accrual of

interest, and the proceeds received from the sale of the mortgaged properties during the
liquidation of Peters Land CC. The respondents submit that, because the updated
amounts exceed those originally claimed in the notice of motion, the court cannot grant
judgment in the increased amounts and applicant was required to amend its notice of
motion in terms of Rule 28.
[38] That submission is unsustainable. In Rossouw and Another v Firstrand Bank Ltd
(Rossouw)
8 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that an updated certificate of balance
does not constitute new evidence for purposes of Rule 32(4). The Court explained that
such a certificate is “merely an arithmetical calculation based on facts already before
the court that the court would otherwise have to perform itself… Such calculations are
better performed by a qualified person in the employ of a financial institution…
Certificates of balance handed in at the hearing (whether a quo or on appeal) perform a
useful function and are not hit by the provisions of rule 32(4).”
[39] The same reasoning applies in motion proceedings. An updated certificate does
not alter the cause of action, introduce new contractual terms, or expand the relief
sought. It merely quantifies the outstanding indebtedness as at a later date by applying
the contractual interest rate and deducting credits that have subsequently been
received. As Rossouw makes clear, where a later certificate reflects additional credits,
this constitutes an admission in favour of the debtor —an admission that a creditor is
entitled to make without invoking Rule 28.

8 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA) para [48].

[40] This approach has been consistently followed in this Division. In Absa Bank Ltd v
Tebeila NO and Others 9 the court accepted and relied upon updated certificates of
balance attached to a supplementary affidavit. The practice is also recognised in
paragraph 10.17(4) of this Division’s Practice Manual, which expressly permits the use
of updated certificates in mortgage-enforcement matters without requiring amendment.
[41] Were the law otherwise, an applicant would be compelled to file amended
notices of motion whenever a day’s interest accrued or a liquidation dividend was
received. Such a requirement would be impractical, procedurally burdensome, and
would serve only to promote technical objections and delay. The respondents have
offered no principled basis for imposing such an obligation in this case.
[42] Accordingly, and consistently with Rossouw and Tebeila
10 the applicant was
entitled to rely on the updated certificates of balance without amending its notice of
motion. The court is therefore entitled to determine the quantum of the indebtedness on
the basis of the most recent certificates.
Liability of the Sureties
[43] The respondents rely on Dormell Properties 282 CC v Bamberger (Dormell)11 to
contend that the suretyships cannot be enforced. In Dormell, the suretyship was
accessory to a principal lease agreement that was itself invalid because it had not been
properly concluded. As the principal obligation never came into existence, the
suretyship failed.

9 2022 [2022] ZAGPJHC 945 (29 November 2022)
10 See also Firstrand Bank Ltd v Seema 2024 JDR 1726 (GP), Investec Bank Ltd v Abada 2020 JDR
0721 (GP), and SB Guarantee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd v Muhammad 2020 JDR 2472 (GJ).
11 [2015] ZASCA 89 (29 May 2015).

[44] The present matter is fundamentally different. As established above, the principal
debts unquestionably existed: the respondents do not dispute that the facilities were
concluded, advanced, operated for many years and secured by mortgage bonds. The
absence of certain annexures does not render the agreements invalid or non- existent.
The applicant has produced contemporaneous business records reflecting each
transaction, which constitute prima facie evidence under the Civil Proceedings Evidence
Act. The respondents have placed no evidence before the court to challenge those
records.
[45] Each respondent executed a deed of suretyship binding themselves as sureties
and co-principal debtors for the indebtedness of Peters Land CC. The principal debtor’s
default is undisputed, and its indebtedness was formally proved in its liquidation. The
sureties’ liability follows upon that default, in accordance with the express terms of the
suretyships.
[46] The respondents’ remaining objections —relating to the absence of certain
annexures, the unavailability of older signed agreements, and the deponent’s alleged
lack of authority —are procedural in character and do not constitute a substantive
defence. They raise no real, genuine, or bona fide dispute of fact and do not engage
with the existence, validity, or operation of the underlying loan facilities. These
objections amount to dilatory defences that do not create a triable issue. None of them
casts doubt on the indebtedness of the principal debtor or the enforceability of the
suretyships. The applicant is accordingly entitled to judgment.
[47] In the result the following order is made:

As against the first, second and fourth respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying
the other(s) to be absolved, as follows:
1. The parties' respective supplementary affidavits are admitted into the record.
2. Payment in the sum of R6 486 645.15, together with interest thereon at the
rate of prime minus 2.2% per annum, calculated daily and compounded
monthly in arrears, from 24 July 2025 to date of payment, together with
monthly insurance premiums in the sum of R2 422.33, in respect of the first
home loan account;
3. Costs of the application on the attorney and client scale; and
4. The application in regard to this claim as against the third respondent is
postponed sine die.


As against the first, second and fourth respondents, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, subject to the proviso that the fourth respondent’s
indebtedness is limited to R3 500 000.00 plus interests and costs, as follows:
1. Payment in the sum of R2 601 792.16, together with interest thereon at
the rate of prime minus 2% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly
in arrears, from 24 July 2025 to date of payment, together with monthly insurance
premiums in the sum of R2 209.94, in respect of the second home loan account;
2. Payment in the sum of R4 244 080.71, together with interest thereon at
the rate of prime minus 2.10% per annum, calculated daily and compounded
monthly in arrears, from 18 February 2025 to date of payment, in respect of the
liberator account; and
3. Costs of the application on the attorney and client scale.

_______________________________
L WINDELL
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg

Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 24 November 2025.


Appearances
For the applicant: M De Oliveira
Instructed by: LVH Attorneys
For the defendants: Petra van Niekerk
Instructed by: GJ Brits Attorneys
Date of Hearing: 25 August 2025
Further arguments filed: 10 September 2025
Date of Judgment: 24 November 2025