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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
In the matter between:
RYNETTE PIETERS N.O.
(In her capacity as the liquidator of King Financial
Holdings Limited, formerly Biz Africa 1332 (Pty) Ltd
(in liquidation) ("KFH ")
and
DEON JOHAN PIENAAR
ELSABE ELISABETH PIENAAR
Coram:
Heard on :
Delivered on:
Summary:
DASILVA SALIE, J
18 November 2025
18 November 2025
Not Reportable
Case No: 15691/2023
Applicant
1 st Respondent
2nd Respondent
Interlocutory applications (intervention, Rule 45A, oral evidence) dismissed for lack of
standing, irrelevance, and abuse; respondent's whistleblower and collateral
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allegations held not to constitute special circumstances under s 12; matters long res
judicata; provisional sequestration confirmed and final order granted.
ORDER
1. The rule nisi issued on 27 February 2025 and extended on 15 April is made
absolute and the estate of the first respondent is placed under final sequestration.
2. The costs of the sequestration application, including the costs of the first return
day on 15 April 2025, are costs in the sequestration, including costs of counsel on
scale B.
3. Adrian Warren King's application for leave to intervene in the above
sequestration application is dismissed with costs, including costs of counsel on scale
B.
4. The first respondent's application in terms of Uniform Rule of Court 45A to
suspend order of the Court and application to adduce oral evidence is dismissed with
costs, including costs of counsel on scale B.
JUDGMENT
DASILVA $ALIE J:
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Introduction
[1] This is the application for the final sequestration of the estate of the first
respondent, Mr. Deon Johan Pienaar ("Mr. Pienaar"). The application for the
provisional sequestration of Pienaar's estate was heard in November 2024
simultaneously with:
(a) An application to declare Mr. Pienaar a vexatious litigant (case no
16769/23), and
(b) An application for rescission of the order of Justice Binns-Ward of 13
February 2013 ("the Binns-Ward judgment") and of Acting Justice
Sievers of 30 November 2018 ("the Sievers judgment"). In the Sievers
judgment (also referred to as Mr. Pienaar's first rescission application)
he sought to rescind the Binns-Ward judgment which application was
dismissed with costs. Attempts to appeal this finding was dismissed by
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court with costs.
The rescission application before Acting Justice Van Zyl is referred to
herein as the second rescission application, and
(c) An application to declare Mr. Pienaar a vexatious litigant.
[2] On 27 February 2025, Acting Justice Van Zyl delivered judgment in respect of
which the following orders were made:
(a) Provisionally sequestrating Mr. Pienaar's estate, and
(b) Dismissing the second rescission application, and
(c) Declared Mr. Pienaar a vexatious litigant.
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PART A: INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS:
[3] This is the return day of the provisional sequestration order. Before I consider
whether the provisional sequestration order should be made final, it is necessary to
determine the three (3) interlocutory applications presently before this Court:
(a) an intervention application brought by Mr Adrian Warren King in terms
of Rule 12, and
(b) an application by the first respondent ("Mr Pienaar") in terms of Rule 45A
seeking to suspend the operation of various judgments delivered by Van Zyl
AJ, and
(c) an application by Mr Pienaar for leave to adduce oral evidence.
[4] Both Mr Pienaar and Mr King appeared in person. The applicant was
represented by counsel. The Financial Sector Conduct Authority ("FSCA", formerly the
Financial Services Board) is not a party to the sequestration but has delivered notices
in terms of Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) and correspondence placing on record its objections,
particularly in relation to non-joinder and the irrelevance of the allegations levelled
against it. Counsel for the FSCA was present.
The Intervention Application (Mr King)
(5) Rule 12 requires an applicant for intervention to demonstrate a direct and
substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which may be affected by the
Court's order.
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[6] Mr King does not assert that he is a creditor, nor that he holds any financial or
proprietary interest capable of being affected by the sequestration.
[7] Rather, his papers seek to revisit numerous judgments relating to the King
Group, spanning multiple years and involving multiple courts. A sequestration Court
has no jurisdiction to revisit, reconsider, or suspend such judgments.
[8] In his oral submissions, Mr King confirmed that he does not assert a direct and
substantial interest in the sequestration, nor any legal right of his that would be affected
by the granting or refusal of a final order. His stated basis for seeking intervention was
his personal gratitude for what he termed lengthy legal struggles, and his desire to
stand "in solidarity" with Mr. Pienaar. These motivations, however genuine, do not
establish a legal interest capable of grounding intervention under Rule 12 or at
common law.
[9] The application further suffers from material non-joinder, as many of the
persons whose rights Mr King contends are implicated are not before the Court.
[10] The intervention application is therefore incompetent and must be dismissed.
Rule 45A Application (Mr Pienaar)
[11] Mr Pienaar seeks to suspend the judgments of 27 February 2025, including the
dismissal of his rescission application and the granting of a vexatious litigant order.
[12] Rule 45A empowers a Court to suspend execution of an order. None of the
orders that Mr Pienaar seeks to suspend are capable of execution, nor do they call for
execution. The dismissal of an application is not executable.
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[13] Rule 45A may not be used to frustrate appeal processes or to mount collateral
challenges to final judgments.
[14] In any event, the Court found that Mr Pienaar lacked locus standi in the
rescission application. He cannot now assert standing to suspend a judgment in
proceedings where he had none.
[15] The Rule 45A application is devoid of merit and must be dismissed.
Application to Adduce Oral Evidence (Mr Pienaar)
[16] Mr Pienaar seeks leave to lead oral evidence, including from Mr Anderson, a
former employee of the FSCA. The FSCA 's correspondence records that neither it nor
Mr Anderson has been cited or joined, and it asserts that the allegations raised in
relation to them are irrelevant, improper, and vexatious.
[17] Oral evidence is permitted in motion proceedings only where a genuine,
material dispute of fact exists that cannot be resolved on the papers. It is clear from
the papers that no such dispute has been identified. The proposed evidence concerns
historic disputes involving the FSCA and the King Group. These issues bear no
relevance to the statutory requirements relating to sequestration.
[18] The application also suffers from non-joinder and appears to continue the
vexatious litigation pattern previously identified by this Court.
[19] The application must therefore be dismissed.
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[20] For the reasons set out above, the interlocutory applications must fail with
costs.
PART B: RETURN DAY OF THE PROVISIONAL SEQUESTRATION
Background
[21] On 27 February 2025, Van Zyl AJ granted a provisional sequestration order
against the first respondent. The judgment found prima facie that the applicant is a
judgment creditor for R351 329.34 plus interest; that the debt is liquidated, due, and
payable; that a nu/la bona return had been issued; that the respondent is hopelessly
insolvent; and that there exists a reasonable prospect of advantage to creditors. On
that basis, she held that a proper case had been made out and granted the provisional
sequestration order.
[22] The test for a final order of sequestration is different. In an application for final
relief, the applicant must establish its case on a balance of probabilities, that being: (i)
a liquidated claim against the debtor for not less than R 100; (ii) the debtor has
committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and (iii) there is reason to believe that
it will be to the advantage of creditor of the debtor is the estate is sequestrated. Where
facts are disputed, the Court does not determine the balance of probabilities on the
affidavits but must instead apply the Plascon-Evans rule.
[23] Whilst Mr. Pienaar raised several issues, in line with his narratives of fraud and
corruption in respect of which he has been a "whilsteblower", these averments do not
address the require ments for final sequestratio n. The application is based on common
cause facts and so too, facts wh ich were placed before the Court by the respondents.
In other words, there are no disputes regarding the jurisdictional requirements which
requires resolve via Plascon-Evans.
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[24] The jurisdictional requirements herein are met on the common cause facts,
briefly stated as follows:
(a) The applicant's claim is in respect of three (3) taxed bills of costs totalling
R351 329-34 plus accruing interest.
(b) Mr. Pienaar is also indebted to PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. ("PwC ") in
the amount of R3 919 588-31 plus interest arising form PwC's taxed costs
under case number 12511/13.
(c) Mr. Pienaar does not deny his owns costs accumulated in his own
circular to readers of 7 March 2023, in excess of R50 million.
(d) Mr. Pienaar is factually insolvent. The claims of judgment debts against
him exceed R6.5 million.
(e) His only asset is a half share in the house situate at Parow, co-owned
with his wife who delivered an affidavit confirming their co-ownership. The
forced sale value is estimated to be R3 250 000 and his nett half share in the
region of R 1,8 million.
(f) The sheriff made a return of nulla bona after attempted execution upon
Mr. Pienaar with no indication that his position had improved since then.
(g) There is sufficient free residue in the property to cover the costs of
sequestration and provide a small divided to concurrent creditors.
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Applicable Principles after jurisdiction requirements are met:
[25] Once the requirements of section 12(1 )(a)-(c) of the Insolvency Act are met,
the Court retains a discretion whether to grant a final order. That discretion is judicial
and must be exercised on proper grounds.
[26] "Special circumstances" must be exceptional, relevant, and supported by
evidence.
Have Special Circumstances Been Shown?
[27] Mr Pienaar has shown no improvement in his financial position since the
provisional order. He has not discharged any portion of his indebtedness. No new
asset or arrangement has been disclosed.
[28] Instead, he reiterates allegations relating to the FSCA , PwC , KFH , and others
which are matters long determined by courts at various levels, and wholly irrelevant to
the question of insolvency.
[29] None of his submissions establish special or unusual circumstances under
section 12.
Discretion Under Section 12
[30] The Court's discretion under section 12 is not unfettered, but once the statutory
requirements for final sequestration are established, a final order should ordinarily
follow unless special or compelling considerations dictate otherwise. No such
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considerations arise here. The first respondent's continued pattern of obstructive
litigation, persistent collateral challenges, and failure to satisfy his admitted debts
underscores the need for the sequestration to proceed to finality for the protection of
creditors and the integrity of the insolvency process.
Mr Pienaar's "Whistleblower'' Submissions as a special circumstance:
[31] Mr Pie~aar emphasised that he regards himself as a whistleblower in what he
describes as a myriad of fraudulent schemes which allegedly resulted in the loss of
billions of rand to investors. He contends that, once the Companies and Intellectual
Property Commission ("CIPC ") finalises its investigation under section 41 of the
Constitution, his position will be vindicated. On this basis he requested that the Court
exercise its discretion to suspend the final determination of this sequestration
application. Even if his narrative had any merit, it falls outside his estate and cannot
be a discretionary factor in relation to a final sequestration order.
[32] These assertions do not meet the definition or requirements of a protected
disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. The Act does not afford
blanket protection, nor does it confer standing to resist sequestration or to delay
insolvency proceedings. His self-characterisation as a whistleblower, even if sincerely
held, does not constitute a special circumstance under section 12.
[33] In any event, the issues he raises are res judicata. They have been the subject
of extensive litigation, including judgments of this Division, consideration by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, and applications to the Constitutional Court, all of which
were unsuccessful. His subsequent rescission application (the second rescission
application) was dismissed by Acting Justice Van Zyl. These matters cannot be
revived in sequestration proceedings, nor can they obstruct the granting of a final
order.
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Conclusion on the Merits
[34] No special or unusual circumstances have been shown. All the jurisdictional
requirements for final sequestration remain satisfied, and the Court's discretion must
be exercised in favour of confirming the order.
ORDER
[35] In the premise and for the reasons aforesaid I order as follows:
1. The rule nisi issued on 27 February 2025 and extended on 15 April is
made absolute and the estate of the first respondent is placed under final
sequestration.
2. The costs of the sequestration application, including the costs of the first
return day on 15 April 2025, are costs in the sequestration, including costs of
counsel on scale B .
3. Adrian Warren King's application for leave to intervene in the above
sequestration application is dismissed with costs, including costs of counsel on
scale B.
4. The first respondent's application in terms of Uniform Rule of Court 45A
to suspend order of the Court and application to adduce oral
dismissed with costs, including costs of counsel on scale B.
WESTERN CAPE
Appearances
For Applicant:
Instructed by:
For Respondents:
Adv. C M organ
E N S Inc.
M r D P ienaar (In Person)
For Intervening Application: Mr King (In Person)
For FSCA: Bisset Boehmke McBlain
For SARB : Gildenhuys Malatji Inc.
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