IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, GQEBERHA)
NOT REPORTABLE
Case no: 10/2025
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
STEPHANUS SAMSON Accused
___________________________________________________________________
SENTENCE
___________________________________________________________________
Govindjee J
[1] Mr Samson was convicted on counts of kidnapping, attempted murder and
defeating the ends of justice. On or about 2 September 2023, he unlawfully and
intentionally deprived Mr Blaauw of his freedom of movement by forcefully loading
him into a vehicle and driving him to a gravel road in the Kouga area. He then
unlawfully and intentionally attempted to kill him by shooting at him with a firearm.
While he was acquitted of the murder of Mr Bruint jies (the deceased), he was
convicted of dumping the body in the bushes and covering Mr Blaauw with branches,
in the Kouga area with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.
[2] Section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 1 (the Act) provides f or the
sentences which courts can impose. A sentencing court’s discretion must be
exercised judicially and properly, and courts are enjoined to temper the punishment
with a measure of mercy. 2 The sentencing court must attempt to achieve a balance
in its s entence and not approach its task in a spirit of anger, but in one of equity.
Hastiness, the striving after severity and misplaced pity are out of place, as are so -
called exemplary sentences designed to use the crime to set an example for others
in society .3 Still, more serious cases clearly require severity, with a certain
moderation of generosity where appropriate, for the appropriate balance to be struck.
The object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion, but to serve the public
interest.4 The well-known triad of factors to be considered consists of ‘the crime, the
offender and the interests of society’, 5 and these factors must also be applied, in
accordance with S v Malgas,6 to consider whether substantial and compelling
circumstances exist to deviate from any prescribed minimum sentence.7
Nature of the crime and surrounding circumstances
[3] Mr Samson has been convicted of serious offences. At some point on the
night of the i ncident, he decided not to report that he had shot and killed the
deceased and proceeded to dump his body. He had kidnapped Mr Blaauw and
proceeded to drop Mr him off in an isolated area. He then drove away with Mr
Mouwers, his erstwhile co -accused, before returning. He fired three shots in Mr
Blaauw’s direction from approximately ten metres away. Thinking he was dead, he
and Mr Mouwers then dragged Mr Blaauw towards a hole and placed branches on
top of his body.
[4] It is relevant that Mr Samson was found to be the senior figure in his
relationship with Mr Mouwers. During the trial, he attempted to blame Mr Mouwers
1 Act 51 of 1977 (the Act).
2 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G–H.
1 Act 51 of 1977 (the Act).
2 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G–H.
3 See S v Khulu 1975 (2) SA 518 (N) 521–522.
4 S v Mhlakhaza and Another [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) at 189. Also see S v M (Centre for Child Law as
amicus curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC).
5 S v Zinn [1969] 3 All SA 57 (A) at 540G–H.
6 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA).
7 See Radebe v The State [2019] ZAGPPHC 406 para 12.
and offered various implausible explanations for what had occurred, also adapting
his evidence to suit his narrative. He did not accept responsib ility for his actions and
showed no sign of genuine remorse during his evidence. Mr Samson kidnapped and
shot at Mr Blaauw thrice before leaving his body in a desolated spot far away from
his home. The impact of these events on Mr Blaauw was apparent during parts of his
testimony, including the resentment he feels towards Mr Samson. It may be
accepted, in Mr Samson’s favour, that his actions were not premeditated. The court
is also alive to the fact that the offences followed Mr Samson’s killing of the
deceased, who was armed with a panga and knife and intoxicated, in his home late
at night. These events would have had some effect on his state of mind at the time.
The evidence also supports the conclusion that the general criminality in the area,
the failure of law enforcement to stem rampant crime and his fear of imprisonment
impacted upon his mindset.
The accused’s circumstances and interests
[5] Mr Samson is 58 years of age and a first offender. His highest level of
education is grade 10. He is presently une mployed and financially dependent on
family members. Ms Butoi, a social worker employed by the Department of
Correctional Services, made a sworn statement in terms of s 212(4)( a) of the Act.
This was accepted into evidence. Following investigation, the soc ial worker
concluded that Mr Samson was suitable for placement under the system of
community corrections. This was primarily because he is a first offender and due to
his family support system, fixed address, prospects of finding employment and
expressed willingness to attend counselling or any other stipulated programmes. He
has been a respected member of the community who has also assisted others.
According to the social worker, the community would benefit from community service
performed by Mr Samson, wh o would be monitored strictly as a person classified as
performed by Mr Samson, wh o would be monitored strictly as a person classified as
‘high risk’ because of the nature of his crimes. Various conditions were proposed in
terms of s 52 of the Correctional Services Act, 1998.8
[6] It must also be noted that the social worker found suppor t for her
recommendation based on Mr Samson’s ‘sincere remorse’, which is considered
8 Act 111 of 1998.
below, and because a sentence of correctional supervision would contribute to the
reduction of overcrowding in a correctional centre and save on costs associated with
incarceration. A probation officer’s report accepted into evidence supports a
sentence of correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Act.
The interests of society
[7] The extent to which conviction of an attempted crime, rather than a completed
crime, is mitigatory must also be considered in the light of the legislature’s decision
to amend the minimum sentencing legislation. With effect from 5 August 2022, a
year before the current incident occurred, both Part I and II of Schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 9 (the CLAA) were amended to include
attempted murder. Of relevance for present purposes is that ‘attempted murder in
circumstances other than those referred to in Part I’, is now listed in Part II of
Schedule 2 and carries a prescribed minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period
not less than 15 years in the case of a first offender, 10 unless the court is satisfied
that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a
lesser sentence. 11 This is the same prescribed sentence applicable to cases of
murder in circumstances other than those referred to in Part I of the CLAA, reflective
of society’s views of the severity of the crime of attempted murder. Society also balks
at those who choose to take the law into their own hands. This includes acts of
kidnapping in response to a home break -in and defeating the ends of justice by
acting in a way that prevents the detection of criminal behaviour.
[8] The legislation also provides that a person conv icted of such offences is
deemed to be declared unfit to possess a firearm, unless the court determines
otherwise.12 This is indicative of the fact that the legislature views the use of firearms
in the commission of offences of this nature in a serious light.
9 Act 105 of 1997 (the CLAA).
9 Act 105 of 1997 (the CLAA).
10 S 51(2)(a)(i), read with Part II of Schedule 2 of the CLAA.
11 S 51(3)(a) of the CLAA.
12 See S v Maleka 2001 (2) SACR 366 (SCA) ( Maleka) para 8; S 103 of the Firearms Control Act,
2000 (Act 60 of 2000).
Analysis
The prescribed minimum sentence
[9] There is a dearth of jurisprudence pertaining to cases of attempted murder
after the 2022 legislative amendment to the CLAA, notably in respect of cases that
do not also involve a conviction for murder. Terblanche has noted, and I accept, that
a person convicted of an attempted crime is generally not punished as severely as a
person committing the completed crime. 13 The rationale for this appears to be that
such a perpetrator is considered less blameworthy be cause less harm has been
occasioned.14
[10] To ensure a fair trial, it is advisable and desirable that the charge sheet refer
to enhanced sanctions, contained in minimum sentence legislation, that may
possibly be imposed if the accused is convicted of a crime attracting a minimum
sentence. The state erred by not noting the potential applicability of the prescribed
minimum sentence for attempted murder in the indictment. That, however, is not on
its own and without more a basis for concluding that the prescribe d minimum
sentence has not been triggered. This is not an instance where the facts necessary
to make the minimum sentence compulsory were not established during the trial. Mr
Samson was also legally represented and the court received confirmation from his
counsel, at the time of the entry of a plea, that he had been informed of any
applicable minimum sentences related to the alleged offences. As Cameron JA held
in S v Legoa,15 the matter is one of substance and not form and there is no general
rule to support the conclusion that the state’s omission will necessarily carry such a
drastic effect. I am satisfied that the accused’s substantive fair trial right, including
his ability to answer the charges against him, was unimpaired in the circumstances
of the pr esent matter and that, in terms of the applicable legislation, a minimum
sentence was triggered.16
[11] It is unnecessary to canvas all the authorities pertaining to those instances in
[11] It is unnecessary to canvas all the authorities pertaining to those instances in
which a court might impose a prescribed minimum sentence despite the accused not
13 See SS Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (3rd Ed) (2016). Cf S v M 1997 (1) SACR
276 (WLD).
14 Terblanche above n 13 at 218–219, fn 91.
15 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 para 21.
16 Ibid paras 21, 22.
being informed of that possibility. I am persuaded that the circumstances are such
that there are substantial and compelling circumstances to deviate from a 15 –year
prescribed minimum period for a first offender guilty of attempted murder in
circumstances other than those referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 of the CLAA. 17
There are various reasons for this conclusion, including the unusual circumstances
preceding the offences and Mr Samson’s personal circumstances and genuine
prospects of rehabilitation.18 I am convinced that it would be so disproportionate that
it would constitute an injustice to impose the prescribed minimum sentence. 19 These
factors are entered onto the record and will also be considered as part of
determining an appropriate s entence. It may be added that counsel were in
agreement that the prescribed minimum sentence was applicable and that departure
from the prescribed minimum was appropriate considering all the circumstances.
Remorse
[12] Before proceeding further with the analysis, there is one dimension of both the
social worker’s and probation officer’s reports that requires proper contextualisation.
This pertains to the suggestion that Mr Samson now expresses genuine remorse for
the crimes he has committed. The definitiv e test in this regard been explained as
follows:20
‘There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might
well regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse.
Remorse is a gnawing pain of cons cience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition
can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgment of the extent of one’s error.
Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or
herself at having been c aught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the
accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the
accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the
remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must
take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens, the
genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court
17 S 51 read with Schedule 2, Part II.
18 On the night of the incident, Blaauw and Bruintjies, who were armed, broke into Mr Samson’s home
with the intention to commit theft. Mr Samson, who was armed, aided by an associate named
Mouwers, apprehended Blaauw. The deceased, likely under the influence of alcohol and armed with a
knife and panga, was shot dead when he moved towards Mr Samson while holding the panga
pointing upwards with his arm raised. The crimes perpetrated followed these dramatic events.
19 See Dyantyi v S [2010] ZAECGHC 120; 2011 (1) SACR 540 (ECG) para 14.
20 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) para 13.
can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper
appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since
provoked his or her change of heart; whether he or she does indeed have a true
appreciation of the consequences of those actions.’
[13] While Mr Samson chose not to testif y in mitigation of sentence, it is apparent
from the reports received that he now regrets his conduct. Yet he failed to take this
court into his confidence and attempted to justify his conduct during the trial based
on a fabricated version. Such attempts a t distorting the truth are contrary to genuine
acts of contrition and suggest a lack of appreciation of the extent of the wrongdoing.
Other than the impending sentence, there is also no explanation as to what has
provoked the change of heart. I am constrai ned to conclude that genuine remorse
has not been demonstrated. Applying the test, Mr Samson’s various attempts to
justify his conduct and the lack of an explanation as to what has provoked his
change of heart count against him and I am unconvinced that he has a true
appreciation of the consequences of his actions. In these circumstances, and
considering the judgment in Matyityi, it cannot be said that remorse is a valid
consideration in Mr Samson’s favour. This is because the court is unable to assess
the alleged contrition as genuine. Both reports equated Mr Samson’s expressions of
regret as genuine remorse, seemingly without due appreciation of the test for
remorse. The recommendations of correctional supervision emanating from the
reports must be understood in this light.
Correctional supervision and imprisonment in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Act
[14] Punishment must ultimately be proportional to the criminal and the crime and
be fair to society. I have given serious consideration to the submissions that
correctional supervision, or imprisonment from which a person may be placed under
correctional supervision, or imprisonment from which a person may be placed under
correctional supervision in the discretion of the Commissioner or a parole board,
would be appropriate in the circumstances. While attempted murder is clearly a very
serious crime it does not follow axiomatically that this should overshadow all other
considerations relevant to sentence in a particular case. In considering whether a
sentence of correctional supervision is an appropriate sentence for a first offender,
such as Mr Sa mson, the SCA has confirmed that the question to be answered is: 21
‘Whether the particular offender should, having regard to his personal circumstances, the
nature of his crime and the interests of society, be removed from the community.’
[15] The legislature has clearly distinguished between two types of offenders,
namely those who ought to be removed from society by means of imprisonment, and
those who, although deserving of punishment, should not be so removed. This is a
fundamental issue to be decided. 22 The SCA has held that the fact that a particular
accused is a proper candidate for correctional supervision does not necessarily
mean, if proper regard is had to other factors relevant to sentence, that a non -
custodial sentence should be imposed. 23 In Maleka, for example, despite the
presence of a number of mitigating factors, the SCA held that the seriousness of the
offence made it necessary to send out a clear message to the community at large
that resort to violence, particularly with a firearm, could not be tolerated. Even in
cases where an accused has been subject to some measure of provocation
beforehand, the imposition of a custodial sentence is, as the SCA explained, often
appropriate.
[16] As was the case in Maleka, a sentence of correctional supervisio n in terms of
s 276(1)(h) of the Act fails, in this case, to reflect the gravity of the crime and to take
account of the prevalence of violent crimes committed with firearms in this country.
To quote S v Sinden ,24 correctional supervision would cater for t he criminal but not
the crime nor the interests of society and ‘would most certainly not have sufficient
general deterrence’. I have also given serious consideration to the possibility of
imprisonment in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Act. While I accept, also on the strength of
the reports received, that Mr Samson is not considered a danger to society, bearing
in mind all the circumstances, the crime perpetrated (attempted murder) is so serious
in mind all the circumstances, the crime perpetrated (attempted murder) is so serious
that imprisonment for a period more than five years is, in my view, warranted.
21 Maleka above n 12 para 5.
22 See, for example, S v Mathe [2014] ZAKZDHC 15; 2014 (2) SACR 298 (KZD) para 32.
23 S v Maleka above n 12 para 6.
24 S v Sinden 1995 (2) SACR 704 (A) at 707 f, quoted with approval in Lorenzi v S [2025] ZASCA 58
para 20.
[17] This is the main basis for preferring a sentence of imprisonment in terms of s
276(1)(b) as opposed to correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)( h), which is
statutorily limited to a fixed period not exc eeding three years, or imprisonment from
which a person may be placed under correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)( i),
which is restricted to a maximum five -year period. 25 In addition, the proviso to s
276(3) must be noted:
‘… Provided that any punishment contemplated in this paragraph [i.e. imprisonment in terms
of s 276(1)(h) or (i)] may not be imposed in any case where the court is obliged to impose a
sentence contemplated in section 51(1) or (2) … of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997.’
According to Terblanche, the meaning of this section is that correctional supervision,
and indeed imprisonment in terms of s 276(1)(i), may not be imposed for offences for
which minimum sentences are prescribed in the CLAA. This interpretation accords
with case authority26 and supports the conclusion to which I have arrived based on
the assessment of the triad of factors.
Conclusion
[18] I have considered and balanced the various relevant dimensions and taken
due cognisance of Mr Samson’s personal circumstances, notably that he is almost
60 years of age and has a clean record. The events which transpired were unusual
and, particularly given that Mr Samson will no longer be permitted to possess a
firearm, unlikely to be repeated. Given the seriousnes s of the main offence and the
prolonged lapse of judgment on the night of the incident, however, direct
imprisonment is warranted. Applying a measure of mercy, and having decided not to
invoke s 297 of the Act, I consider a sentence of six years imprisonment in terms of s
276(1)(b) to be appropriate for the attempted murder conviction. I intend to impose
sentences of 2 years imprisonment in respect of each of the other counts that
resulted in convictions. Given the stream of events that unfolded, including their
resulted in convictions. Given the stream of events that unfolded, including their
continuous nature, each of these sentences is to run concurrently with the sentence
for attempted murder.
25 S 276A(1)(b) and s 276A(2) of the Act.
26 Terblanche above n 13 at 324. See the judgment of Spilg J in Nhlapo v S [2012] ZAGPJHC 81;
2012 (2) SACR 358 (GSJ) para 22.1. Also see S v Nel [2011] ZAGPJHC 119; 2013 (1) SACR 155
(GSJ) para 9.
Discharge in terms of s 204
[19] The court postponed the determination of Mr Blaauw’s discharge from
prosecution in terms of s 204 of the Act. Once a person has been called as a witness
for the prosecution and ‘warned’ in accordance with s 204(1)( a) of the Act, they
acquire a right to an order discharging them from prosecution for the offences
specified if, in the opinion of the court, they frankly and honestly answer all questions
put to them.27 Considering the assessment of the evidence, and the submissions of
counsel, it is apparent that Mr Blaauw indeed answered the questions put to him
frankly and honestly, to the best of his recollection. As the main judgment notes, he
made various errors of the kind that might be expected given the passage of time
and the rapidity of the events inside the house. On my assessment he qualifies for
discharge from prosecution regarding the offences specified at the c ommencement
of his testimony, and regarding any offence in respect of which a verdict of guilty
would be competent upon a charge relating to the specified offences. The discharge
is duly entered on the record of these proceedings.
Order
1. The accused is sentenced as follows:
a) 2 years imprisonment for kidnapping (count 2);
b) 6 years imprisonment for attempted murder (count 3);
c) 2 years imprisonment for defeating the ends of justice (count 4);
d) 2 years imprisonment for defeating the ends of justice (count 5).
2. The sentences for counts 2, 4 and 5 are ordered to run concurrently with the
sentence imposed for count 3.
3. Mr Renaldo Blaauw, the s 204 witness, is discharged from prosecution in
respect of the offences specified on the record by the prosecutor and for any
offence in respect of which a verdict of guilty would be competent upon a
charge relating to the offences so specified.
27 S 204(2) of the Act, read with Mahomed v Attorney -General of Natal and Others , quoted with
approval in S v Thabethe and Others 2025 (2) SACR 335 (SCA) para 82.
_________________________
A. GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard : 4 November 2025
Delivered : 7 November 2025
Appearances:
For the State: Adv Canary
Instructed by: Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Gqeberha
For Accused: Adv Van der Spuy
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa
Easetern Cape
For the s 204 witness: Adv J Coertzen
Legal Aid South Africa
Eastern Cape