NOT REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, EAST LONDON CIRCUIT COURT)
CASE NO. 2025-187763
In the matter between:
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS
YOUTH COMMAND First Applicant
SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENT CONGRESS Second Applicant
PAN AFRICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT
OF AZANIA Third Respondent
YOUNG BRIGHTEST MOTIVATED MINDS Fourth Applicant
and
THE UNVERSITY OF FORT HARE First Respondent
THE VICE CHANCELLOR
PROFESSOR SAKHELE BUHLUNGU Second Respondent
THE REGISTRAR, GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL Third Respondent
BRIEF REASONS FOR GRANT OF INTERIM
RELIEF AND RULING IN RESPECT
OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
HARTLE J
[1] The applicants, as their citing’s indicate, are politically affiliated student
organisations. It is common cause that they are represented on campuses of the
first respondent (“ the University”) through its Student Representative Council
(“SRC”). The two campuses concerned, for pr esent purposes, are those at Alice
and in East London.
[2] The applicants issued out an application on an urgent basis, allegedly on
behalf of member students, seeking, inter alia, to interdict the respondents from
summarily evicting them from their residence s located on the two campuses
concerned.
[3] It is common cause that following certain discord between the general
student community and the University on contentious issues, which gave rise to
protests, the respondent on 8 October 2025 issued a directive that the students
should vacate all the campuses by 9 October 2025 at 17h00.1
[4] The applicants sought legal advice on the lawfulness of the directive. The
guidance given to them was to urgently interdict the respondents from evicting
their member students on the basis of the University’s directive aforesaid.
1 It would later transpire, with reference to the answering affidavit filed on the respondents’ behalf, that they did
so, according to them, for safety concerns after “closing” the University.
[5] A certificate of urgency according with such advice, prepared and
submitted to the duty judge, was issued in line with the standard practice of this
court in urgent applications. It was unu sual though in that it urged upon the
duty Judge to permit the applicants, given the extreme urgency contended for, to
come give oral testimony in support of their proposed application, including the
basis upon which their locus standi would be established.
[6] If oral evidence had been led, one is by implication to assume from the
certificate that this would have established that the applicants are not random
organizations in relation to the University, but political formations recognized
by it because they c ontest elections and in the ordinary course enjoy
institutional representation through the SRC. Branches of these organizations
exist on the University’s campuses. Each applicant through the SRC leads
constituencies of students whose interests they repres ent. In this instance they
stood poised to vindicate the breach of their respective member student’s rights
not to be arbitrarily evicted from their residences on the University’s campuses
following the issue of the directive aforesaid.
[7] Additionally, the certificate also purported to explain that those
purporting to represent the applicants in the present application are “ political
heads” of the relevant “ formations” (student bodies) who would have had the
requisite legal authority to bring the present application on each applicant’s
behalf and depose to the necessary affidavits, or to have led viva voce evidence
if that had been permitted.
[8] This evidence was however , as it turned out, not adduced because
contrary to the applicants’ hope that they might be heard by the deadline
indicated in the respondents’ directive (which may have justified the giving of
oral evidence), Zilwa J gave directions that the application be heard at 12h30 on
Friday, 10 October 2025, at the East London Circuit Court. The applicants were
further expected, in accordance with Zilwa J’s directive, to have issued and
served the application, supported by affidavits instead, before 19h00 on 9
October 2025.
[9] 12h30 came and went on the Friday. No papers surfaced and there was no
appearance in court at the designated time, except by Mr. Mati, who had been
instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents on the strength only of a notice
of motion. (T he applicants would later explain that the anticipated notice of
motion had been uploaded merely as a means to an end to get a case number
allocated on the new Court Online system.)2
[10] Zilwa J struck the matter from the roll and ordered the applicants to pay
the wasted costs of the proceedings that they were ostensibly intent upon
pursuing but were unable to galvanize in time.
[11] At 16h00 on 10 October 2025 I came on duty and I was apprised of the
applicants’ intention to pursue the application after all. A fter reading a revised
certificate of urgency, that did not flinch at disclosing the failed attempt earlier
that afternoon to get the matter onto the urgent court roll, I issued a directive
that required the applicants, inter alia , to speak to the “ logistical problems ”
referenced in the new certificate because of their non -appearance at the putative
hearing before Zilwa J. The directive provided as follows:
“1. I was informed by Zilwa J earlier today that papers were not received in accordance
with the di rective issued by him so I need to be brought up to speed about the
logistical difficulties that made it impossible for the matter to be heard when he said it
should, and why the applicants imagine that it is imperative for the application to be
heard tonight.
2. An application for condonation will be necessary.
2 The impression one gains from the fleeting explanation tendere d on behalf of the applicants is that they were
not expecting any formal court appearance because they had been unable to meet the terms of Zilwa J’s
directive on time. Indeed no application had by then been issued at all.
3. The registrar may issue the main application on the basis of the claimed urgency.
4. The matter may be called at the Tribunal at 20h00.
5. Service must be effected in accordance with the Uniform Rules of Court.
6. The applicants are to liaise with the Registrar to ensure that the papers are uploaded to
the Court Online system.
7. It is suggested that the Notice of Motion be adapted to make provision for interim or
temporary relief pending the hearing of the application should the respondents
indicate their intention to oppose. The respondents must be suitably placed on terms
to indicate by when they must file such notice to oppose and to file papers initially to
deal only with the interim relief sought.
8. Further directives may be issued tonight depending on the respondents’ attitude to the
intended relief.”
[12] As a prelude to the discussion that follows below in this judgment on the
subject of locus standi , I mention that the certificate that serv ed before me
repeated that the applicants are student organisations of the University with
constituencies at its various campuses. Also emphasized was the fact that the
applicants in their perception represented “ all students ” of the University and
that the students, all of them, had been issued the instruction (perceived to be
unlawful) that they must immediately vacate their residences. It is this harm
that was sought to be redressed by the proposed urgent application in which the
applicants would seek interdictory and ancillary relief, ostensibly on behalf of
their member students.
[13] The application was duly issued by the Registrar on the Friday evening
but under a new case number, in my view through no fault on the part of the
applicants. The anticipate d notice of motion was revised to seek interim relief
and condonation was also prayed for as per my directive. The applicants
explained in the founding affidavit that they had experienced technical
explained in the founding affidavit that they had experienced technical
difficulties in getting the application issued in time un der the auspices of the
new Court Online regime that applies to applications issued out of the courts of
this Division. The deponent to the founding affidavit also explained that their
counsel was out of town and the students scatted across different camp uses,
which had made it difficult to consult with those concerned and to get the
application issued out in time on the basis of Zilwa J’s directive, especially
because they were now expected to make out their case on affidavit.
[14] When the matter was called before me late on Friday night, Mr. Mati,
roused from his sleep upon being advised that the matter had been resuscitated,
appeared on the respondents’ behalf. The papers were not served on the
respondents but uploaded to Court Online. Although no an swering affidavit had
been filed by then, he sought to make out a case from the Bar that I should
dismiss the application for various technical reasons, 3 although a lack of legal
standing or a challenge to the authority of the applicants to litigate on be half of
the students were not among those.
[15] I accordingly proceeded to hear the applicants’ case for interim relief on
the prima facie belief held that their authority to litigate and locus standi to
interpose themselves on behalf of their member students had been adequately
accounted for, or was at least not contentious.
[16] After hearing argument, I issued the following order:
“1. A Rule nisi hereby issues calling upon the Respondents to show cause on 14
October 2025 at 09h30 why the following final order should not be granted:
1.1 Interdicting and restraining the Respondents, their members or anyone acting
as their agent or under thei r direction or instruction from evicting the
Applicants and their members who are registered students of the UFH at their
residences located in the EL and Alice campuses respectively.
3 The objections raised concerne d the applicants’ non -compliance with the judges’ urgent directives, a claim of
Lis pendens, the applicants’ failure to have meaningfully sought condonation and their failure to have served the
application papers in terms of the rules of court. For the rest, Mr. Mati argued, as best he could on the
applicants’ papers, that they had failed to make out a case for the grant of interim relief.
1.2 Directing the Respondents to allow the students who were evicted on 09 th
October 2025 to be allowed back to the campuses.
1.3 Interdicting and restraining the respondents, their members or anyone acting
as their agents or under their direction or instruction from intimidating,
harassing, threatening, injuring or harming the stud ents presently at the
university on both campuses.
1.4 Directing the respondents to pay the costs of the application jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
2. Prayers 1.1 and 1.3 above shall operate as an interim interdict pending the
finalisation of the application.
3. Reasons for this court’s order may be requested in writing within 10 days.”
[17] I am constrained to mention that a similar urgent application served
before me that night issued out by three students of the University and the
SAWLA Student Chapter against the respondents in effect seeking the same
relief against the University arising from the evictions that had and or were
being carried out under the guise of the University’s directive aforesaid. The
obvious difference in that application in relation to the present one was that the
interim relief claimed was confined to vindicating the rights of students who
were members of that student organisation. The other significant variances that I
need mention are that the students also approached the court acting in their own
interests, and were accommodated in residences in East London.4
[18] That application was not opposed, or at least Mr. Mati who was co -
incidentally present at court to represent the interests of the University in the
4 In the present application it was alleged that the affected students were also on campus in Alice. It was evident
from media reports that the latter campus had erupted into pandemonium as a result of student protests.
Critically buildings were on fire and acts of violence were being perpetrated. The East London residents were
not in the thick of the chaos.
present matter, confirmed that he had no instructions to contest the relief prayed
for in the SAWLA application.5
[19] Since I was subsequent to granting the interim relief in the present matter
requested to furnish reasons for my decision i n such respect, I wish to elaborate
herein as well why I issued the interim relief which I did.
[20] In my view the applicants had established all the requirements for the
grant of an interim interdict.6
[21] The applicants alleged a prima facie right of the members “ not to be
(arbitrarily) evicted”. Whether the students’ entitlement to be accommodated
on campus is based in contract, or statute, or the University’s prospectus (they
seemed to have cast the net wider to include the right to access the library a nd
internet resources as if a right to education was implicated), their predicament
essentially was premised on their lawful entitlement not to be arbitrarily evicted
without a court order, thus referencing the breach of a jealously guarded
constitutional right.7 The dangerous repercussions that they explained might
flow from the members being put out of their residences and off campus that
night with no place to go and no means to make alternative arrangements
convinced me that there was a reasonable ap prehension of irreparable harm if
the interim relief sought was not granted.
[22] I was reminded that some of the students are minors (in respect of whom
this court is the upper guardian) who are under the care of the University. I was
concerned that students would be outside of their places of safety that they
5 In the related matter I made provision in the interim order for the University to seek a reconsideration of its
terms if so advised. I was on duty for the week (10 – 17 October 2025), but no challenge was forthcoming.
6 An application for an interim interdict m ust establish a prima facie right; a well grounded apprehension of
irreparable harm if the relief is not granted; the balance of convenience must favour the granting of an interim
interdict; and another satisfactory remedy should be absent. These requirem ents are trite. Since the grant of an
interim interdict is discretionary, the requisites are not considered in isolation.
7 See Section 26 of the Constitution, which prohibits arbitrary evictions.
regard as “ home”, albeit temporarily, and forced to seek shelter somewhere
other than on campus if they could not afford to travel home, and in the process
be exposed to the risk of harm. At some stage during the course of discussions
in chambers to facilitate the granting of consensual relief, an undertaking was
sought by the applicants’ counsel that students would not be evicted by the
University from their residences pending the hearing of the matter after a full
exchange of papers, but this was not forthcoming.8
[23] There was no comfort offered that the students would be protected
pending the hearing of the matter on the ensuing Tuesday on the unopposed
motion court roll. Thus I concluded that there w as no adequate remedy that
availed the students to counter the situation that pertained at that moment,
which is that the University would continue to give effect to its directive, the
claimed lawfulness of which seemed to me to be doubtful.
[24] Finally, I considered that the balance of convenience favoured the
limited, interim protection which my order would afford to the applicants’
members pending the shortest return date. If I granted no order, I reckoned with
the reasonable concern that certain harm mi ght befall the students exposed to
the elements. That risk and potential prejudice to the students forced to leave
campus in effect just before midnight, which was when I granted the interim
order, and extending over the weekend, was to my mind far greate r than the
respondents having to back off in continuing to implement the directive even
though at that moment I did not know the basis for their opposition to the
application without them having been afforded an opportunity to consult and
file opposing papers. It also appeared to me to be in the broader public interest
that this court does not permit what seemed on the face of it to be an arbitrary
eviction of students who had no place to go in the middle of the night.
eviction of students who had no place to go in the middle of the night.
8 An undertaking may negate the reasonable apprehension o f harm. See AfriForum v City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality & Others [2012] JOL 29111 (GNP) at [13].
[25] I should clarify one aspect of the i nterim order which the applicants
appear to have misinterpreted. I was only constrained, in the interim, to
interdict the University from continuing with the evictions. I reckoned that
those students who had responded to the University’s contentious directive were
already off campus and not requiring the court’s protection in the short term, or
at least the applicants’ papers did not make out a case for that category of
students to be afforded interim relief. 9 I was merely concerned to remediate
what was going on on campus at that juncture and to have in place an interim
arrangement over the weekend and until the application could be properly heard
once there had been a full exchange of affidavits.10
[26] By the time the matter was called before me on the re turn date, the
respondents had delivered their answering affidavit in which an objection to the
legal authority of those representing the applicants, and their respective standing
to litigate, was for the first time articulated. The respondents also repeat ed an
objection of Lis pendens that Mr. Mati had orally raised on the Friday night
already on the basis that the present application is a repetition of the matter that
served before Zilwa J and was struck off but still alive as it were. If I may
dispel this complaint, I indicated to the parties at their first appearance before
me already that I was satisfied that we are dealing with one and the same
application which is a continuation of the matter that had initially served before
9 Van der Merwe N.O. and others v Drenched Boxing (Pty) Ltd and Others [2021] 3 All SA 281 (WCC). A
court will not grant an interdict restraining an act that has already been committed. The injury must be a
continuing one.
10 The interim relief indicated in prayer 3.1 was added on the basis of the applicants’ claim that the University
had called in the assistance of the Police and private security w ho had treated the students resistant to the
execution of its directive inhumanely, in a “barbaric manner”, and in a way displaying “brutality”. Although the
respondents had not at that juncture had the opportunity to controvert these allegations, I consid ered that the
balance of convenience in the meantime favoured the inclusion of such a prayer coupled with the main
injunction that the evictions not be carried forth.
Zilwa J. This is indeed w hy I directed that the applicants should seek
condonation in the first place.11
[27] The further objection, somewhat related, concerns the applicants failure
to have complied with the letter of my and my colleague’s urgent directives, the
respondents contendin g that the applicants had succeeded in obtaining an
interim order which they were not entitled to and in spite of the fact that they
had not honoured the judges’ directives even as a basic premise.
[28] I have stated above why I granted the interim relief under the compelling
circumstances that prevailed.
[29] Urgent applications are invariably messy and perfection is often
sacrificed for the greater objective of getting such matters before the court to
remediate those concerns brought under the immediate spotlight. Whilst this
may influence ultimate success and where the costs should lie after the fact, I
was not inclined to non -suit the applicants on the supposed basis that they were
in wilful default of the judges’ directives. Indeed, having overseen their
supposed non-compliance, I am not in agreement that the applicants were being
disrespectful of the court process or seeking any strategic advantage.12
[30] Having accounted for the immediate perceived cris is facing the
applicants’ members, I turn now to focus on the legal authority and locus standi
objections that this court has been called upon to decide. These objections are
11 My views do not bind a court hearing the application in respect of the final relief. I t was a rough and ready
answer to the problem and arguments facing me on the night of the 10 th. Reading between the lines the
respondents were particularly aggrieved by the fact (in their perception) that the applicants could not be
bothered to come to co urt on Friday at 12h30, yet purported to come in through the back door as it were, again,
with a new application, before a different judge, after court hours, and without serving them with papers. The
applicants however tendered a plausible explanation for their perceived abuse of the court process.
12 I did not include a prayer of condonation. In my view it followed by the mere fact that I allowed the matter to
be heard before me on the night of the 10 th, that I was prepared to accept the applications’ c laims of the
logistical difficulties that had dogged their earlier attempt to bring their concerns before the court.
related, but not to be conflated. Authorization, as indicated by Erasmus,13
concerns the question whether a party is properly before the court in legal
proceedings. The issue of locus standi materially concerns the direct interest of
a party in the relief sought in legal proceedings.14
[31] On 13 October 2025 the respondents filed a notice in terms of Rule 7 (1).
The notice filed contemporaneously with the respondents’ answering affidavit
and notice to oppose the application on the return date, read as follows:
“1. Whereas the Applicants (have) instituted an application on an urgen t basis in
terms wherein they (essentially) seek interdictory and ancillary relief on behalf
of students enrolled in the University of Fort Fare.
2. And whereas the deponents to the affidavit have not alleged that the applicants
are juristic persons or tha t they have been authorized to launch the applications
for and on behalf of the applicants.
3. And whereas the deponents have not attached any resolution that they have been
authorized to launch the applications on behalf of the applicants.
4. Now therefore resp ondents disputes the authority of attorneys MM SOMNISO
ATTORNEYS to act and represent the Applicants in the application and requires
the said attorneys to satisfy the court that they also authorized.”
[32] Concerning the claimed interest of the applicants in t he present
application to vindicate the rights of their member students, the respondents’
objection to their locus standi was pleaded as follows in the answering affidavit:
“17. The Deponent in the introductory parts to the Founding Affidavit alleges to
have been duly authorized to depose to the Founding Affidavit by virtue of the
position they occupy with the First Applicant.
13 Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, 2nd Edition.
14 Erasmus, at D1 – 96.
18. Ex Facie and on the papers presented before Court, no factual basis has been
presented to substantiate the Deponent s claim to either bring the litigation on
behalf of the First Applicant or any of the Applicants.
19. The respondents Legal Representatives have on Monday 13 October 2025
requested a power of attorney from the Applicants’ representatives to at the
very least evince the authority by which they have instituted this application.”
(sic)
[33] As a result of the challenge to the applicants’ authority to represent the
students whose rights were evidently sought to be protected by the grant of the
interdict, Mr. Zimema , who appeared on behalf of the applicants together with
Mr. Mhlanti, requested a postponement to enable them to consult with the
applicants, file a replying affidavit and respond to the respondents’ notice in
terms of Rule 7 (1).
[34] This request was resiste d by the respondents. Mr. Mati urged upon the
court to dismiss the application out of hand because as far as his clients were
concerned, they were technically the only parties before the court.
[35] I ultimately granted the application to postpone, but only to the following
day and on terms as to when the replying papers had to be served. Costs were
reserved. I also extended the rule nisi on the basis that the balance of
convenience continued to favou r the students whose rights not to be arbitrarily
evicted fell to be protected pending the hearing of the main application even
though by then it appeared to be the case, according to the respondents
answering papers, that the University had suspended the evictions on the 8 th
already at 18h00.
[36] On 15 October 2025 the matter again served before me at 15h00. By now
the applicants’ attorneys had filed powers of attorney and replying papers, but
the respondents stood firm that these did not adequately address the issue of the
attorney’s and applicants’ authorisation and their standing respectively. Mr Mati
again urged upon the court to dismiss the application.
[37] In arguing the preliminary point before the court, it became noticeable
that the factual underpinning for the applicants’ standing on behalf of its
members may not have been fully engaged with by the respondents. This is
because, when the founding papers were uploaded to Court Online, there was a
page missing. I had alerted the parties to this fact on th e night of the 10 th
already, and although the court had been provided with a hard copy of the
papers to supplement the deficiency after the fact, it appeared that the
respondents had not been shown the same courtesy.
[38] I was also concerned that the court w as in essence dealing with critical
constitutional rights (viz-a-viz the students on whose behalf the applicants were
evidently seeking to interpose themselves) which it had already found on a
prima facie basis had been infringed by the University. On the basis of the
approach adopted in a matter concerning the wholesale eviction of residents at
Airport Park,15 who I considered to have been in a similar predicament to the
applicants in relation to the challenge to their authority and legal standing to
vindicate their rights not to be arbitrarily evicted, I issued an order standing the
matter down to 9h00 on 17 October 2025 for the applicants to supplement their
response to the respondents’ Rule 7 (1) notice and to file a supplementary
15 Residents of Farm Greydell (Airport Park) and Another v National Department of Public Works and Another
(EL 738/2020) [2020] ZAECELLC 20 (21 September 2020); Fani and Others (collectively referred to as
"Residents of Farm G reydell (Airport Park)") v National Department of Public Works and Another (EL
738/2020) [2020] ZAECELLC 1 (29 October 2020) ; National Department of Public Works v Fani and 77
Others, unreported judgment (Case No. EL 738/2020);and National Department of Public Works v Fani and 77
Others [Collectively referred to as Residents of Farm Greydell (Airport Park] and Another (090/2021) [2024]
ZASCA 43 (8 April 2024). I have referenced the collection of judgments to record the trajectory that the matter
took. When the matter first came before me, I was concerned that whereas the infringement of a constitutional
right was at stake, the aspect of locus standi had been poorly pleaded. In fact, the pleadings were woefully
deficient, but it appeared counterintuitiv e not to have afforded the applicants an opportunity to amplify the basis
upon which they hoped the court might intervene.
affidavit to deal wit h the allegations in the founding affidavit that had gone
unanswered before.
[39] In referencing the Airport Park matters I had hoped that the applicants
might seek creatively to qualify their standing with reference to the provisions
of section 38 (b), (c) or (e) of the Constitution if not on the basis of their being
distinct legal persons acting within the parameters of their universitates
personarum concerning their entitlement to sue in order to vindicate the breach
of rights of their members in the peculiar circumstances.16
[40] Apart from the expected supplementation of their founding papers on the
subject of their capacity to sue, the provisions of rule 7 (1) especially confer the
power on a court to adjourn the hearing of an application in order to enable a
party served with a Rule 7 (1) notice to satisfy the court that he/she/it does
indeed have the necessary authority to act or is so empowered.17
[41] In essence, as is emphasized by Erasmus, the proposed power of attorney
is to establish the mandate of the at torney concerned and “ to prevent a person
whose name is being used throughout the process from afterwards repudiating
the process altogether and saying he had given no authority and to prevent
persons bringing an action in the name of a person who never authorised it”.18
[42] The provision of the sub -rule are applied when the authority of anyone
acting on behalf of a person is challenged and is not limited to the challenge to
the authority of attorneys to act only.19
16 Section 38 of the Constitution endorses a broad approach to standing whenever an allegation is made that a
right guaranteed by Chapter 2 of the Constitution has been infringed or is threatened.
17 Erasmus, Supra, at D1 – 96B.
18 Erasmus Supra at D1 - 93, including the authorities cited in support of the principle. Here the concern raised
by implication is that the persons who had initiated the application were not authorized by the applicants
themselves to have brought the application.
19 Erasmus, Supra at D1 – 96. Eskom v Soweto City Council 1992 (2) SA 703 (W); Unlawful Occupiers, School
Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA).
[43] Again I extended the rule nisi in the purported interests of the applicants’
member students pending the hearing of the application. The costs were
reserved.
[44] The preliminary objections, which Mr. Mati is confident is dispositive of
the application, were ultimately argued on Friday morning the 17th at 09h00.
[45] Before I deal with the legal position, it is necessary to traverse what the
applicants did or didn’t say about their authority and legal standing in the
present application.
[46] Who the applicants are and in what capacity they litigate and why in
relation to the relief claimed or the right to claim the relief they say they have an
interest, is vital to a consideration of the preliminary issues which this court
must determine. If not a direct -interest party, the further question of who holds
the empowerment to litigate, and on the strength of what authority, is an
important one.
[47] The primary deponent, Mr. Somila Tendana, in the founding affidavit,
alleged that he is a student at the University and the “ Secretary General” of the
first applicant (“EFFYC”). He claimed that by virtue of this position, he was
duly authorized to depose to the founding affidavit on the organisation’s behalf.
[48] He did not say that he, or any of the other applicants for that matt er, had
also been authorised by their respective organisations to bring the application or
indeed why the mere fact of their being student bodies with student
constituencies on the University’s campuses afforded them the necessary locus
standi or capacity to litigate in place of the students themselves who self -
evidently hold the legally enforceable rights to vindicate their own unfortunate
positions.20
[49] He minimally averred that the applicants are student bodies that have
student constituency in all the University’s campuses, but how far does that
really take the matter in relation to the students’ eviction and their personal
rights sought to be protected by the court through the granting of an interdict?
[50] Do student organizations have a direct interest in vindicating the rights of
their members concerning issues that do not naturally resort under the ambit of
matters of student governance, which appears to be the primary concern for
which they may be “recognized” by the university.21
[51] Mr Tendana mentioned (co -incidentally, because this explanation really
went to justify the essential reason why the students were protesting on campus)
that the applicants had in effect become disenfranchised by virtue of the fact
that a new SRC has not yet been elected because the management of the
University had sought irregularly, improperly, and unilaterally, to draft the
terms of reference that will govern or regulate that process. He informed the
court that this top -down approach had been rejected by the students who
consider that Institutional Student Parliament, through which all students are
represented through their respective student organisations in a duly electe d
SRC, was being denied to them.
[52] If this was meant to suggest that the SRC might have been the structure
through which a concern for the students’ safety under the present
circumstances would otherwise have been voiced to the management of the
University but for the claimed disenfranchisement, this was not pertinently said.
20 Confirmatory affidavits were deposed to on behalf of only the third and fourth applicants, but these d o not
deal with any of the organizations’ authority to litigate on behalf of their members.
deal with any of the organizations’ authority to litigate on behalf of their members.
21 See sections 72 and 73 of the Statute of the University of Fort Hare, GN 506 of 2020), published in
Government Gazette No. 43288 on 8 May 2020.
It is doubtful though that issues of governance, that would afford the applicants
the statutory “ recognition” with the University contended for, would also
automatically clothe studen t organizations having student constituencies
through the structure of the SRC with the capacity to litigate in a matter such as
the present on behalf of the students seeking to vindicate the violation of
personal rights as opposed to collective rights nat urally resorting under the
mantle of governance issues.
[53] With hindsight and proper reflection of the case made out in the initiating
papers,22 there is nothing in them that helpfully speaks to the issue of the
applicants’ locus standi. Much is left to assumption and speculation. Mr. Mati
submitted that this is fatal to the application.
[54] Importantly, as I began to explain above, legal standing is not only a
procedural question but also one of substance. As Harmse23 indicates. It
concerns the sufficiency and directness of a litigant’s interest in the proceedings
which warrants his or her title to prosecute the clam asserted. The applicant has
to show that it is the rights -bearing entity, or is acting on the authority of the
entity, or has acquired its rights.
[55] None of this is simply assumed from the mere allegation that the
applicants are student bodies having student constituency. As Mr. Mati fairly
asked, what is a student constituency and its relevance in the present context of
the relief claimed and the applicants’ right to prosecute the claim?
[56] If I am being uncharitable concerning the applicants’ standing, they are
also required to establish that they are properly before this court.
22 It is for the pa rty instituting proceedings to allege and prove that he has standing and to make out such a case
in the founding papers. See Harmse Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts at A6, 1 and the cases cited in
footnotes 5 and 7 in relation to the trite principle.
23 Supra at A6.1
[57] One Mr. Thabo Zide put up a confirmatory affidavit but this does not
speak to his organisation’s interest in the proceedings. He is a registered
student at the University residing at a university residence i n Southernwood,
East London. He asserted that he is “ a secretary ” of the fourth applicant
(“YBMM”), which is a “ political formation ” that is recognized by the
University as one contesting elections. He claimed to have the requisite legal
authority to depos e to the affidavit confirming support for the first applicant’s
cause and complaint in the present application (presumably in respect of the
YBMM’s own members) by virtue of his position in the organisation.
[58] Ms. Unam Tyhalithi put up a similar confirmato ry affidavit without
expounding on the nature of her organisation’s interest in the litigation. She
also resides on the Southernwood campus, is a registered student, and claims to
be the chairperson of the third applicant (“PASMA”). The latter according to
her affidavit is also a political formation recognized by the University as one
contesting elections on the SRC. She claimed to have the requisite legal
authority to depose to the affidavit by virtue of her position in the organisation.
[59] I should mention that none of these deponents, although they would each
have an interest in their own right, asserted such right in relation to the present
debacle.
[60] As outlined above, the respondents in their answering affidavit raised the
preliminary objection of a la ck of locus standi on the part of the applicants,
going to both substance and procedure.
[61] They also took the point that no powers of attorney had been filed despite
the filing of their notice in terms of Rule 7 (1) on the 13 th already, and that no
confirmatory affidavit had been put up on behalf of the second applicant
(“SASCO”).24
[62] In the replying affidavit Mr. Tendana merely denied that he, as opposed
to the first applicant, did not have the necessary locus standi.25 In order to vouch
for his authority to represent the EFFYC, he attached a copy of a “ resolution”
passed by it permitting him both to litigate on the first applicant’s behalf an d to
depose to the replying affidavit.
[63] The resolution concerned appears rather to be a general notice dated 9
October 2025 addressed by Commissar Naledi Chirwa -Mpungose in her
capacity as EFF Youth Command CYILC Coordinator to all “Fighters”. On the
face of it, it concerns the “ Formal Authorisation And Mandate To Represent
The EFFYC In Legal and Administrative Matters ” and it purports to serve as
“an official and binding confirmation issued under the authority and directive
of the National Coordinator of the Economic Freedom Fighters Youth
Command(EFFYC), acing in accordance with the constitutional provisions,
policies and resolutions of the organisation” . It states that the following
authorisation is made and shall have full legal force and effect:
“Fighter/ Mr. Somila Tendana, in his capacity as a duly elected Branch Chairperson
of the Economic Freedom Fighters Youth Command (EFFYC) at the University of
Fort Hare, is hereby expressly authorized and mandated to act on behalf of the
EFFYC in all judic ial, quasi - judicial, and administrative proceedings relating to
matters concerning the University of Fort Hare and its students.”
[64] Such authorization is said to include the signing and execution of
affidavits, statements, pleadings or any other legal or administrative instruments
and the submission of documents, correspondence or applications to any court,
24 This defect was however cured on 16 October 2025.
25 Quite clearly this is a mistake.
tribunal, or competent authority. It confirms that acts performed by Mr.
Tendana in pursuance of his mandate shall be deemed to have been lawfully
done with the full consent and authority of the national office of the EFFYC. It
also appoints and confirms Professor Somniso as the legal representative and
attorney of record for the Command. (It is common cause that the attorney’s
firm with which Professor Somniso is associated is MM Somniso Attorneys
Inc.)
[65] Finally, it bears a signature that purports to be that of the Commissar,
who despite this title, has identified herself in the “ resolution” as the EFFYC
CYILC coordinator.
[66] No resolution of the second, third or fourth applicants were put up
together with the replying affidavit. (These were offered from the Bar by Mr.
Zimema, but objected to by Mr. Mati.)
[67] Four special powers of attorney, each given at the hand of the office
bearers of each applicant in favour of “MM Somniso Inc”, were attached to Mr.
Tendana’s replying affidavit. These are dated 9 October 2025 and uniformly
confer authority on the said legal firm to act on behalf of each organization “ in
the matter between (them) and the University of Fo rt Hare ”. The authority
given is, however, by the individuals themselves as opposed to the applicants.
[68] When the matter was called before me on the 15th it was argued on behalf
of the respondents that the applicants’ supposed reply to their notice in terms of
rule 7 (1) was wholly inadequate and that each of the deponents who had
purported to suggest that they represented the respective applicants had failed to
prove as much.
[69] Mr. Mati challenged the validity of the purported resolution of the
EFFYC in the absence of any constitution stating who had the requisite
authority to provide it as well as the absence of any confirmatory affidavit by
Ms. Chirwa -Mpungose. He further pointed out that Mr. Tendana’s averment
that he was the secretary general of the first applicant was inconsistent with the
so-called resolution that conferred the requisite authority on him as the branch
chairperson instead.26
[70] As for the uniform powers of attorney he submitted that they fell short of
the standard expressly required in Rule 7 (4).
[71] I digress to set forth the peremptory requirements in this respect. Rule 7
(1) and (4) provide as follows:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of subrules (2) and (3) a power of attorney to act
need not be filed, but the authority of anyone acting on behalf of a party may,
within 10 days after it has come to the notice of a party that such person is so
acting, or with the leave of the court on good cause shown at any time before
judgment, be disputed, whereafter such person may no longer act unless he
satisfied the court that he is authorised so to act, and to enable him to do so the
court may postpone the hearing of the action or application.
(2) …
(3) …
(4) Every power of attorney filed by an attorney shall be signed by or on behalf of
the party giving it, and shall otherwise be duly executed according to law;
provided that where a power of attorney is signed on behalf of the party giv ing
it, proof of authority to sign on behalf of such party shall be produced to the
registrar who shall note that fact on the said power.”
26 In the later supplementary affidavit put up by him, he identified himself only as “ the representative” of the
first applicant.
[72] Mr. Zimema submitted that the resolution was enough (well at least in
respect of the EFFYC) and that the absence of a confirmatory affidavit by its
coordinator who had signed it was not fatal.
[73] He further purported to explain, as best he could with reference to the
papers which had been filed at that juncture, that the applicants before court do
not exist for the purpos es of litigating, but for the express purposes of
championing the rights of their members who are students at the University.
Therein lies the rub because the applicants’ interests in this narrow context
indeed appear to me to be be confined to promoting p arochial institutional
student concerns within the context of the SRC being a structure through which
student organizations recognized by the University play an accepted role. 27
27 The SRC is a legal construct of the Higher Education Act No 101 of 1997. Its composition, constitution,
functions and elections are determined by institutional statutes. As the governing body for students, SRCs have
a significant leadership role to play a nd this includes transformation. The SRC has jurisdiction, subject to
Council, over certain student matters . In terms of the Higher Education Act, the main institutional governance
structures are council; the senate; the institutional forum and the Student Representative Council (SRC). The
council is the highest decision -making body and is responsible for ensuring good governance of the institution
subject to the Higher Education Act and relevant institutional statutes. The senate is accountable to the coun cil
with regard to academic and research functions of an institution. The institutional forum advises the council on
issues affecting the institution as stipulated in the Act. Senates and SRCs also exercise their primary governance
role through their membe rship of university councils as provided for by the Higher Education Act. The
governance relationship between the councils and senates; between councils and SRCs; and between councils
and institutional forums is set out in the Higher Education Act, Act 101 of 1997, amended. The relevant
provisions in the Act set out in which cases council can only act after having consulted these three structures and
in which cases such consultation takes the form of non -binding ‘after consultation’ or binding ‘in consultat ion’.
It is required that councils must follow these prescriptions meticulously as part of good governance practices in
their institutions. See: https://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/feeshet/docs/2015-HESummit-Annexure15.pdf;
https://www.dhet.gov.za/Institutional%20Governance%20Policy%20D ocuments/Guidelines%20on%20Good%
20Governance.pdf. See also: Hall, M., Symes, A. & Luescher, T.M. (2004). The Culture of Governance in
South African Higher Education. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management. 26(1): 91 -107.
Institutional Statutes are expected to focus on the practice of governance at institutional level. It would be the
key purpose of any student organisation that has student constituency to focus on the express objects of the
Higher Education Act. Whilst it is not inconceivable that student organizations having representation through
the SRC might extend their founding constitutions beyond this objective to protect the interests of students
generally, the second, third and fourth applicants (who have constitutions) do not appear to have such a
mandate.
[74] As far as he was concerned the first applicant at least had established,
with reference to the resolution put up, which was all that was necessary in his
view to give Mr. Tendana permission to act, that he was authorised to litigate on
behalf of the EFFYC who , as the designated person so authorised, had in turn
signed a special power of attorney in favour of their attorneys of record.
[75] As for the authority of the remaining applicants, he purported to hand up
resolutions from the Bar which the respondents objected to. It was at this point
that the matter was postponed to Friday, the 17 th to afford the applicants an
opportunity to supplement their responses to the respondents’ notice in terms of
rule 7 (1).
[76] The applicants filed a supplementary affidavit on 16 October 2025 in
which the three additional resolutions were introduced a nd given context, and
amplified special power of attorneys in favour of MM Somniso Attorneys Inc.
were introduced.
[77] The respondents objected to the manner of supplementation, by way of
affidavit without seeking condonation, but self -evidently some explanation was
necessary in order to convince or satisfy the court on the basis envisaged by rule
7 (1) that each of them are authorised to act and why they say so.28
[78] In a bid to allay the procedural challenge, Mr. Tendana explained that the
EFFYC was new, havi ng been formed by reason of a resolution of the EFF
National People’s assembly in December 2024. Since it was in its formative
stages, no constitution was yet in place, but it operated under the auspices of the
28 My order dated 15 October 2025 was confined to directing the applicants an opportunity “ to supplement their
powers of attorney or to cure the existing four that were filed in the matter ”. The existing four were in the
names of Mr. Tendana, Ms. Tyhalithi, Ms. Mgqibela and Mr. Zide respectively, but evidently not in their
representative capacities. With hindsight I should have been more explicit in crafting my order to require the
applicants to especially amplify the basis upon l egal standing was hoped to be established. I had prevailed upon
counsel why I thought this essential, especially with reference to the fact that a claimed breach of critical
constitutional rights was at the core of the matter.
EFF as its “ mother body ”, to which it deferre d, according to the principle of
democratic centralism. This means, according to the deponent, that decisions of
upper structures are binding to lower structures.
[79] He explained that when the University issued its “ letter of eviction”, such
“challenge” was escalated to the National Office for Intervention, the highest
authority and/or decision -making body of the organization, whereupon the
National Coordinator issued the resolution concerned authorising him to bring
the proceedings and to appoint MM Somniso Attorneys Inc. to represent it.
[80] Regarding SASCO, he asserted that Ms. Yolelwa Mgqibela, had been
given full authority by SASCO, in her capacity as chairperson at the University,
East London Branch, to litigate on its behalf in these proceedings and to appoint
MM Somniso to represent it as well. This followed a resolution of the National
Executive Committee (“NEC”) of SASCO.
[81] He explained that whilst the constitution of SASCO does not expressly
indicate who has the authority to litigat e on the organization’s behalf, the NEC
is regarded as the highest decision -making body of the organisation through
which strategic and decisions of consequence are taken.
[82] The “ resolution” put up, dated 16 October 2025, is on a SASCO
letterhead evidently emanating from the “(o)ffice of the Secretary General ” in
Johannesburg. It is ostensibly authored and signed by the Secretary General,
Cadre Admission Monareng (co -incidentally only the court’s copy of the
supplementary affidavit included a signed page). 29 It is addressed to UFH East
London Branch Executive Committee and concerns the “ NEC Resolution on
29 This is a concern in itself where a procedural challenge to authority is under the scope. The court’s copy is
evidently an electronically signed one, but why did counsel not have the same document in their paginated
bundles? Whilst an affidavit confirmi ng a resolution may not in every instance be fatal to convince the court
that a party is authorised to act, it is vitally necessary in a scenario where not everyone has been furnished with
the same copy thereof.
Legal Action Regarding Student Evictions at the University of Fort Hare ”. It
states that a special National Executive Committee was convened following
interactions with the University’s SASCO branches regarding the eviction of the
students whereupon it was resolved to give Ms. Mgqibela full authority to act
on SASCO’s behalf in any legal proceedings arising therefrom as advised by
legal counsel which she was also given authority to seek and take as per the
resolution, and to take subsequent steps to remedy the problem.
[83] The letter explains that SASCO as a student movement has the authority
to litigate in its own name duly represented by anyone who is appointed by the
NEC.
[84] Concerning PASMA, Mr. Tendana confirmed that the organization in the
instant proceedings is represented by Ms. Tyhalithi, its chairperson at the East
London branch of the University. He explained that the constitution of PASMA
does not expressly indicate which official can litigate on behalf of the
organization but noted that it placed the duty on the National Executive Council
under section F,XV1 to provide legal assistance to members on matters
affecting them and students. He assured the court that Ms. Tyhalithi had been
granted full authority by the NEC to litigate on behalf of the organization.
Acting in accordance with the resolution, she has also signed a special power of
attorney appointing the attorneys of record and has done so in line with the NEC
resolution.
[85] The purported resolution put up appears to be an original letter, but it is
unsigned and undated, and was seemingly prepared by its President General,
Ms. Zandiswe Nopa, addressed to no recipient in particular. 30 It evidently
concerns a “ EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION - APPOINTMENT OF UNAM
30 A different name appears on the top of the letterhead, which is “Nopa Nyimbana”.
TYHALITHI” and serves to confirm that after deliberations with members of the
NEC it had been resolved that the appointee assists students at the University by
engaging the services of legal practitioner “to consider available avenues and to
subsequently take all steps necessary to remedy the ordeal of students, which
includes court or any relevant bodies which are leg islated to assist .” (The
ordeal may not be the same one we are here concerned with given the lack of a
date.)
[86] Regarding the YBMM, it is recorded that the applicant is a student
organization represented in these proceedings by Mr. Zide who is the fourth
applicant’s branch secretary. He explained that it does not have a national
structure as it only exists at the University. However, he repeated the assertion
that it is a formation recognized by the University as one that contests elections
and deploys members to the SRC.
[87] Its constitution, under section 9, does provide that it can sue and be sued
in its own name, but it does not nominate a person who is authorised to do so.
The special resolution was thus passed by its executive. Based on this
authority, Mr. Zide has signed a special power of attorney instructing MM
Somniso Attorneys to issue the application on it and its members behalf.
[88] In support of the averment that Mr. Zide is duly authorised, a copy of an
executive resolution has been put up. It records that a resolution was passed at a
meeting of the East London’s Branch Executive Committee held on 9 October
2025 in which it was resolved that Mr. Zide “ is authorised to act on behalf of
the YBMM EL Branch in all court proceedings ” and to sign legal processes.
Also minuted is that Professor Somniso is duly authorised to act as the
applicants’ legal representative “in all court-related matters”. The resolution is
signed by both Mr. Zide, as chairperson, and by one Sibonelo Thwala as
secretary.
[89] The amplified special power of attorney’s dated 16 October 2025 indicate
uniformly that each appointee now acts with delegated authority to appoint MM
Somniso Attorneys, to act on each organisation’s behalf “in the eviction matter”
against the University and, inter alia, to institute legal proceedings against the
institution (the University) and its functionaries.
[90] As for the applicants’ supposed interest in the relief sought, there was an
attempt by Mr. Tendana to amplify the factual premise for the organisati ons’
standing.
[91] Again the suggestion was made that the organizations are expected to
step into the breach by the absence of a duly elected SRC but also repeated is
that each applicant is a recognized student body at the institution which
somehow confers a direct interest in the present quandary of the students. The
amended premise though is that they are expected to vindicate the rights of the
students who are members, because they have been affected by “ the decision”
of the first respondent.
[92] This is an entirely different right than the prima facie one relied on on
Friday the 10th. In my view this cannot be said to be “ the subject of the instant
application”. (I imagine though that this purported to be a response to the
challenge put to the applicants in the respondents’ answering affidavit that they
had not sought a review of the University’s decision to have closed the
University campus under the emergency situation contended for, and therefore
cannot impute to the University an act of unlawful eviction thereby.)
[93] Mr. Mati, even after the filing of the supplementary affidavits, yet
maintained that the applicants were still not properly before the court. I regret
that I have to agree with him, but there is little point in holding up the purp orted
authorization to the standard that is required in court when the premise for the
applicants’ interest in the relief and the right to claim such relief has not in my
view been adequately established. That is the real failing in this matter.
[94] As I indi cated elsewhere, I had hoped that the applicants would have
grasped the nettle and amplified the papers to deal with this primary objection.
Here in my view was a class action in the making and waiting to be properly
pleaded even if only on the basis that it was impractical to round up the students
affected by the threatened continuing evictions being executed on the campuses
at the time. The shortcoming in standing might also have been ameliorated by
the simple act of the deponents, all students themselve s and evidently affected
by the University’s directive, qualifying themselves as having such an interest.
[95] It is regrettable that I must conclude that the applicants have failed on
their papers before me to establish locus standi.
[96] I am inclined to agree with Mr. Mati that the applicants were given more
than enough of an opportunity to amplify their case, each time to the prejudice
of the University and at its great expense in a week when it was constrained
itself to seek an interdict against students who were causing damage to its
property.
[97] Whilst one has sympathy for students caught up in the turmoil on campus
who are innocent of any wrongdoing and merely wanting to get on with their
education, it seems to me to be appropriate in the circumstances for th e rule nisi
to be finally discharged bringing an end to the ill -fated litigation. The concern
that motivated me to come to the assistance of the students under the threat of
eviction on Friday, 10 October 2025, seems in any event to have become
academic.
[98] On the subject of costs, the purported applicants do exist and tried by all
means to clothe the deponents with authority to represent them. The fact they
fell short in doing so is not the primary reason for discharging the interim order.
[99] They should th erefore be held liable for the costs of the putative
application.
[100] In the result I issue the following order:
1. The respondents’ locus standi objection is upheld.
2. The rule nisi issued on 10 October 2025 is discharged.
3. The applicants are liable, jointly and severally, for the costs of the
application, including the reserved costs of 14 and 15 October 2025.
4. The costs will be on Scale B.
_________________
B HARTLE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE OF HEARING : 10, 14, 15 & 17 October 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 10 November 2025
Appearances:
For the applicants: Mr. S Zimema & Mr. M Mhlanti instructed by MM Somniso Attorneys,
East London (ref. Mr Somniso)
For the respondents: Mr. L Mati instructed by Enzo Meyers Attorneys, East London (ref. Mr.
Meyers).