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YES I NO
YES I NO
YES I NO
YES I NO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
In the matter between:
BAREND JACOBUS LIEBENBERG
and
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LTD
(Registration number: 1962/000738/06)
DONOVAN THEODORE MAJIEDT N.O.
LEDWABA MPONY ANA LAZARUS N.O.
(in their capacities as provisional Trustees of the
Insolvent Estate of Barend Jacobus Liebenberg,
Estate No: K30/2024)
MASTER OF THE IDGH COURT, KIMBERLEY
Coram: MAMOSEBO J
Heard: 22/08/2025.
Delivered: 14/11/2025.
Case no: 1913/2024
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Re spondent
Third Re spondent
Fourth Respondent

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Summary: Insolvency - Applicant finally sequestrated - Application for
rescission of the final sequestration order - The onus lies with the applicant to
prove that the requirements in rule 42(l)(a) for rescission are met: that the order
sought to be rescinded was erroneously sought or granted in his absence -
Applicant electing not to oppose final sequestration despite being served with the
application, the provisional sequestration order, and further being aware of the
return date - Applicant failing to demonstrate that the order was erroneously
sought or granted - No case made for rescission of final sequestration order.
ORDER
1. The application for the rescission of the judgment and order dated
11 October 2024, as well as for the condonation of the late filing thereof,
is dismissed with costs which costs shall include counsel fees on Scale B
of Rule 69(7).
JUDGMENT
MamoseboJ
[1] The applicant, Mr Barend Jacobus Liebenberg, was finally sequestrated
on 11 October 2024 in terms of a sequestration order granted by default
under Case No 1913/2024. On 10 December 2024, he launched an
application for the rescission of the sequestration order and the
condonation of the late filing of the said rescission application. The
applicant subsequently sought a postponement of the rescission
application. The application is opposed by the first respondent, Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd ("Standard Bank").

3
[2] In light of the chronology of events in this case, I shall deal first with the
purported postponement of the rescission application, followed by the
rescission application including the condonation thereof.
Postponement application
[3] The applicant filed his Notice of Motion in the rescission application on
10 December 2024. The notice reads that in the absence of opposition, the
matter be enrolled to be heard on 20 December 2024 which was scratched
out and the date of 03 January 2025 appears above. The notice was signed
by the applicant and seemingly served on the respondent's attorney. The
respondents filed their opposing papers, however, it appears that the
applicant did nothing to move the matter forward. Mr Els, appearing for
the first respondent, submitted that Standard Bank set the matter down on
11 June 2025 after the applicant failed to file a replying affidavit. The
applicant subsequently filed a replying affidavit and a supplementary
affidavit.
[4] On the date of the hearing, 22 August 2025, the applicant sought to have
the hearing postponed without having filed a substantive application for
postponement. Notwithstanding that, he was afforded ample chance to
explain his postponement application from the bar. He argued that he had
new evidence, he needed more time to appoint a legal representative as he
would be prejudiced· unrepresented, and would be ready to. proceed in a
few weeks. Standard Bank opposed the application for postponement.
[5] These are the reasons furnished by Mr Els to substantiate the Bank's
opposition to the postponement. The second and third respondents are
appointed by the Master of the High Court, Kimberley as the Trustees in
the appJicant's estate. Even though dates were already set, 31 July and

4
0 I August 2025 for the enquiry in terms of s 152(2) of the Insolvency Act1
to be conducted, Mr Liebenberg did not attend. He was aware that the
rescission application was set down for 22 August 2025 and on the day
before the hearing, Standard Bank got wind that a postponement
application was looming. It perceived Mr Liebenberg as being
opportunistic because he had addressed a letter to the Master of the High
Court dated 30 July 2025 where he pleaded at paragraph 5 as follows:
'It is imperative to bring to your attention that I, Barend Jacobus Liebenberg, in good
faith and on sound legal grounds, launched an application for the rescission of the final
sequestration order. This rescission application, under High Court Case Number:
1913/2024 bas been duly set down for hearing on 22 August 2025.'
On the first paragraph of the last page, he wrote:
'It is respectfully requested that the Section 152(2) inquiry be postponed to a date
subsequent to 22 August 2025, allowing for the High Court's detennination of the
rescission application.'
[6] Postponements are an indulgence granted by the courts after a substantive
application has been launched. A court retains the discretion, to be
exercised judiciously, as to whether to grant or refuse a postponement.2 In
Myburgh Transport v Botha t/a SA Truck Bodies3 the following principles
were outlined:
1 24 of 1936. Section 152(2) stipulates that: 'If at any time after the sequestration of the estate of a debtor and
before his rehabilitation, the M aster is of the opinion that the insolvent or the trustee of that estate or any other
person is able to give any information which the Master considers desirable to obtain, concerning the insolvent,
or concerning his estate or the administration of the estate or concerning any claim or demand made against the
estate, he may by notice in writing delivered to the insolvent or the trustee or such other person summon him to

appear before the Master or before a magistrate or an officer in the public service men tioned in such notice, at
the place and on the date and hour stated in such notice, and to furnish the Master or other officer before whom
he is summoned to appear with all the information within his knowledge concerning the insolvent or concerning
the insolvent's estate or the administration of the estate.'
2 Leko/wane and An other v Minister of Justice and ConstituJional Development [2006] ZACC 19 (CC); 2006 JDR
0897 (CC); 2007 (3) BCLR 280 (CC ) para 17; see also Majakathata Long Distance Taxi Association and Another
v MECfor Police, Road and Transport, Free State Province and Others [2019) JOL 44884 (FB) para 5.
3 1991 (3) SA 310 (NmS) at 314F - 315J.

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' I. The trial Judge has a discretion as to whether an application for a
postponement should be granted or refused (R v Zackey 1945 AD 505).
2. That discretion must be exercised judicially. It should not be exercised
capriciously or upon any wrong principle, but for substantial reasons. (R v
Zackey (supra); Madnitsky v Rosenberg 1949 (2) SA 392 (A) at 398 - 9;
Joshua v Joshua 1961 (1) SA 455 (GW) at 457D.)
3. An appeal Court is not entitled to set aside the decision of a trial Court
granting or refusing a postponement in the exercise of its discretion merely
on the ground that if the members of the Court ofappeal had been sitting as a
trial Court they would have exercised their discretion differently.
4.
5. A Court should be slow to refuse a postponement where the true reason for a
party's non-preparedness has been fully explained, where his unreadiness to
proceed is not due to delaying tactics and where justice demands that he
should have further time for the purpose of presenting his case. Madnitsky v
Rosenberg (supra at 398 -9).
6. An application for a postponement must be made timeously, as soon as the
circumstances which might justify such an application become known to the
applicant. Greyvenstein v Neethling 1952 (1) SA 463 (C). Where, however,
fundamental fairness and justice justifies a postponement, the Court may in
an appropriate case allow such an application for postponement, even if the
application was not so timeously made. Greyvenstein v Neethling (supra at
467F).
7. An application for postponement must always be bona fide and not used
simply as a tactical manoeuvre for the purposes of obtaining an advantage to
which the applicant is not legitimately entitled.
8. Considerations of prejudice will ordinarily constitute the dominant
component of the total structure in terms of which the discretion of a Court
will be exercised. What the Court has primarily to consider is whether any
prejudice caused by a postponement to the adversary of the applicant for a

prejudice caused by a postponement to the adversary of the applicant for a
postponement can fairly be compensated by an appropriate order of costs or
any other ancillary mechanisms. (Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil
Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa 3rd ed at 453.)

6
9. The Court should weigh the prejudice which will be caused to the respondent
in such an application if the postponement is granted against the prejudice
which will be caused to the applicant if it is not.
10. Where the applicant for a postponement has not made his application
timeously, or is otherwise to blame with respect to the procedure which he
has followed, but justice nevertheless justifies a postponement in the
particular circumstances of a case, the Court in its discretion might allow the
postponement but direct the applicant in a suitable case to pay the wasted
costs of the respondent occasioned to such a respondent on the scale of
attorney and client. Such an applicant might even be directed to pay the costs
of his adversary before he is allowed to proceed with his action or defence in
the action, as the case may be. Van Dyk v Conradie and Another 1963 (2) SA
413 (C) at 418; Tarry & Co Ltd v Matatiele Municipality 1965 (3) SA 131
(E) at 137.'
[7] It is inexplicable how the applicant can renege to seek to postpone the
rescission application for which he had earlier requested the office of the
Master to allow to be prioritised. Strangely, during the application for the
postponement of the rescission application, he not only attempted to
disavow his own signature appearing at the bottom of the letter, but the
letter as well. He, however, reluctantly confirmed the details appearing
below the signature as his and his wife's.
[8] The sought postponement has numerous problems. First, as already said
in paragraph 4 above, the applicant did not make a substantive application
for postponement. 4 Second, the application made from the bar was not
timeous. Third, the reasons meant to justify the postponement sought fall
short of doing that, especially in light of the nature of the impugned order
in the proceedings the applicant sought to postpone. In sequestration
matters, even the slightest of delays has significant repercussions.

matters, even the slightest of delays has significant repercussions.
4 See Absa Bank Limited v Nosworthy and Another [2017) JOL 37247 (EC P) para I; see also Mahlangu and
Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd [2024) JOL 66261 (GP) para 7.

7
[9] The postponement seems more like a tactical manoeuvre to obtain an
advantage that the applicant is not entitled to. This is clear from his
conduct in the rescission proceedings, ranging from failing to timeously
file his replying affidavit; to him filing a notice to oppose the set down of
the rescission application; and the self-conflicted argument that he be
afforded some time to appoint a legal representative as he would be
prejudiced unrepresented.
[1 O] The argument on legal representation is the most burdened. In May 2025,
the applicant had addressed a letter to this Court asking that he be afforded
some time to seek assistance from Legal Aid or counsel pro bono. On
22 August 2025, he argued that he had secured legal assistance but
experienced 'unforeseen circumstances' which resulted in him being
unable to pay same. The applicant persisted that he be given more time to
appoint another legal representative, of which it is not clear how he would
deal with the finance issues that purportedly arose with the previous legal
representative. Not to mention that he makes all these submissions while
also arguing that he has a terrible memory and cannot remember certain
events as he tried to deny his signature on the letter he had addressed to
the Ma ster. I hold the view that this is one of those cases where prejudice
caused by a postponement cannot simply be fairly compensated by an
appropriate cost order. The application for a postponement was
accordingly refused and the hearing proceeded.
Re scission application
[ 11] As already stated, the final sequestration order was granted on 11 October
2024 and the application for the rescission thereof was instituted on
10 December 2024, about two months later. The applicant's explanation

8
for the delay is that he needed to gather information to demonstrate to this
Court that: he was not in wilful default when the final sequestration order
was granted; and there are exceptional circumstances warranting the
rescission of the sequestration order. The main argument is that the
applicant was a victim of fraud orchestrated through some group called
'You are Law' and its named agents.
[12] The applicant submits that upon becoming aware of the final sequestration
order, he attempted to contact 'You are law' to enquire about the state of
affairs since they had given him the impression that they were actively
opposing the sequestration application. 'You are law' and its agents were
nowhere to be found. He subsequently obtained a legal opinion on
11 November 2024 which confirmed that the sequestration application
was not opposed and he was a victim of fraud. He was also advised to seek
rescission and he did so by launching the application for rescission a
month after such advice.
[ 13] In relation to the merits of the rescission application, the applicant submits
that he was not in wilful default when the sequestration order was granted.
The explanation for the applicant's defence is that he was wrongly
influenced by the group 'You are law'. The said group had allegedly
instructed him not to honour his obligations of repaying his debts as it was
assisting him to be emancipated from this country's laws. The group is
also said to have claimed to be assisting him to oppose the sequestration
application, hence he was at all times under the impression that the
sequestration application was being actively opposed.
[ 14] Further, the applicant submits that the sequestration order should not have
been granted because his estate is not insolvent as his assets exceed his
liabilities. It seems as though it is in this regard that the applicant

9
maintained that this Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to entertain
the sequestration application. His failure to pay his debts is attributed to
the 'You are law' group and related advisors which led him to believe that
his debts were being settled through a Trust created for this purpose. He
was given copies of purported 'Bonded Bills of Exchange' and told that
his debts were all settled whilst he made payment to those advisors. The
main argument is that the Sheriff who executed the orders that preceded
the sequestration application did not properly do so. That had the warrant
of execution been properly effected, it would have been clear that the
applicant has equity to satisfy his debts. Standard Bank knew that he had
and still has enough equity to satisfy his debts and, therefore, the
application for his sequestration was driven by an ulterior motive, so the
argument went. Finally, the applicant further submits that he has since
been promised a possibility of a loan to settle his entire debt.
[15] On the other hand, Standard Bank submits that the applicant's default was
wilful as he chose to believe that he was emancipated from this country's
laws. The Bank is adamant that the warrant of execution was properly
executed and the Bank was entitled to seek sequestration as the applicant
had committed an act of insolvency. It is further argued that, had the
applicant been solvent and prepared to settle his debts, he would have done
so a long time ago. The Bank raises the fact that the applicant chose to pay
'You are law' advisors instead of paying his debts. A reasonable person
could not have honestly followed the path the applicant followed.
[16] Mr Els contended on behalf of Standard Bank that Mr Liebenberg's
submission, that he is close to obtaining funds to settle his debts, is only
mentioned now during this application but he lacks a bona fide defence.
Despite his awareness of the return date for the final sequestration, and

despite all affidavits having been filed in the sequestration application, he
chose not to oppose that application.
[17] The principles pertaining to condonation are trite. Condonation is not to
be had merely for the asking.5 The Constitutional Court in Van Wyk v
Unitas Hospital and Another (Open Democratic Advice Centre as Amicus
Curiae}6 enunciated:
'This court has held that the standard for considering an application for condonation is
the interests of justice. Whether it is in the interests of justice to grant condonation
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Factors that are relevant to this
enquiry include but are not limited to the nature of the relief sought, the extent and
cause of the delay, the effect of the delay on the administration of justice and other
litigants, the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay, the importance of the
issue to be raised in the intended appeal and the prospects of success'. 7
'An applicant for condonation must give a full explanation for the delay. In addition,
the explanation must cover the entire period of delay. And, what is more, the
explanation given mu st be reasonable. '8
[18] It is trite law that a resc1ss1on application must be brought within
reasonable time after the order sought to be rescinded was granted. That
this is more so for sequestration orders is highlighted by Engelbrecht AJ
in Sekgala v Body Corporate of Petra Nera (Leave to Appeal}9:
'When a party learns that a default judgm ent has been granted against him or her and
that party believes there are grounds upon which to rescind it, it is imperative that such
5 Uitenhage Transitional Local Co uncil v South African Revenue Service 2004 (1) SA 292 (SCA) para 6.
6 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC).
7 Ibid para 20.
8 Ibid para 22.
9 2023 JDR 2393 (GJ) para 10.

11
a party acts promptly. Not only does a judgment have consequences for the parties
immediately involved, but it may also affect third parties (as is the case with
provisional and final sequestration). That is why there is a requirement that rescission
applications be instituted within a reasonable time. In the present case, there was a
very real and practical consequence of the delay: Mr Sekgala's estate has been finally
sequestrated. The order sought to be undone was variously extended, revived and
ultimately served as the jurisdictional prerequisite for the grant of the final order. The
effects of the delay in the particular circumstances of the case has had significant
consequences.'
[19] The requirements for a rescission of a judgment either in terms of rule
42(1 )(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court or the common law were well
enunciated by the Constitutional Court in Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial
Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and
Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others (Council
for the Advancement of the South African Constitution and Another as
amici curiae)10 ("Zuma"):
'It should be pointed out that once an applicant has met the requirements for rescission,
a court is merely endowed with a discretion to rescind its order. The precise wording
of rule 42, after all, postulates that a court "may'', not "must", rescind or vary its order
- the rule is merely an "empowering section and does not compel the court" to set
aside or rescind anything. This discretion must be exercised judicially.' 11
' ... However, the words "granted in the absence of any party affected thereby", as they
exist in rule 42(1)(a), exist to protect litigants whose presence was precluded, not those
whose absence was elected. Those words do not create a ground of rescission for
litigants who, afforded procedurally regular judicial process, opt to be absent. '12
10 [2021] ZACC 28 (CC); 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC).
11 /bidpara53.
12 Ibid para 56.

12
[20] The following instructive remarks by the Constitutional Court in Zuma 13
bear repeating:
' ... Our jurisprudence is clear: where a litigant, given notice of the case against him
and given sufficient opportunities to participate, elects to be absent, this absence does
not fall within the scope of the requirement of rule 42(l)(a). And , it certainly cannot
have the effect of turning the order granted in absentia, into one erroneously granted.'
[21] Mr Liebenberg, affected by the final sequestration order, was of course
entitled to seek a rescission of that order. However , the hurdle. that he
stood to climb was discharging the onus of proving whether he has met
the requirements for rescission. First, that the order sought to be rescinded
was granted in his absence and that it was erroneously granted or sought. 14
[22] The applicant failed on all levels to sway this Court to hold in his favour.
Mr Liebenberg's default is not covered by rule 42(1)(a), for he simply
elected not to oppose the sequestration for which he now attributes the
blame to his previous legal advisors. His election not to oppose the
sequestration despite having been served with the provisional
sequestration order with a return date, was done deliberately,
intentionally, and out of his own volition. The fact that the sequestration
order was granted in his absence does not render the order rescindable. It
follows that on this first leg, he stands to fail.
[23] Standard Bank launched the sequestration application in terms of
s 149(I)(a) of the Insolvency Act, and the challenge to this Court's
jurisdiction was devoid of merit. In relation to the assets the applicant
vehemently argued to have despite not utilising same to pay his debts, it
13 Ibid para 61.
14 Rule 42(1)(a) of the Uoifonn Rules of Court.

13
is understandable that he may wish to retain them for various reasons.
However, it is unclear how the applicant would receive a loan as an
unrehabilitated insolvent. The order was therefore not erroneously sought
or granted. It is impermissible for Mr Liebenberg to endeavour to seek a
rescission just to get a rehearing of the sequestration application. The
Trustees have already been appointed and are apparently struggling to
gain access to the Farm resultantly frustrating the process.
[24] Mr Liebenberg's reliance on the purported fraud does not take his case
any further under the circumstances. His conduct in these proceedings
leave more questions than providing the necessary justification for the
relief sought. More problematic is the fact that the applicant seems to have
specifically attempted to be absolved from his debts without paying them.
The purported fraud, although unfortunate, would appear to have been
well timed to meet a mind ready to join forces for a common purpose of
not paying one's debts. Further, from the reading of the letter addressed to
the Master, particularly the terminology and vocabulary used, more so that
Mr Liebenberg is Afrikaans speaking, it is evident that there may be a
person with a legal background or an attorney assisting him in the
background who is not on record.
[25] Regard being had to the submissions made and the authorities referred to
above, I am not persuaded that the applicant has met the requirements for
a rescission of the order granted by this Court. The applicant has also not
shown the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the rescission
of the order. Without any prospects of success in the rescission
application; and given the nature of the impugned order the rescission is
sought against; as well as the prejudice the respondents will suffer, the
application for the condonation of the late filing of the rescission
application must also fail. The applicant has not shown this Court any

Order
14
good cause why it should condone the lateness and I am not satisfied that
he explained any of the factors to sway the Court to find in his favour. On
the question of costs, there is no reason why costs should not follow the
result.
[26] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The application for the rescission of the judgment and order dated
11 October 2024, as well as for the condonation of the late filing
thereof, is dismissed with costs which costs shall include counsel
fees on Scale B of Rule 69(7).
Appearances
For the applicant:
For the first respondent:
Instructed by:
MCMAMOSEBO
DG F THE HIGH COURT
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION
In person
Adv. J. Els
Phatshoane Henney Attorneys
c/o Van de Wall Attorneys Inc