SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 182405/2025
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE: 04 NOVEMBER 2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:-
LIFESENSE DISEASE MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD First Applicant
[Registration number: 1999/008159/07]
V
LIFESENSE GROUP (PTY) LTD First Respondent
[Registration number: 1999/005168/07]
LIFEQUBE (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
[Registration number: 2022/682315/07]
ANGUS KEI ROWE Third Respondent
[Identity number: 6[...]]
Heard on: 14 October 2025
Delivered: 04 November 2025 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded to
the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The date and
time for hand-down is deemed to be 16:00 on 04 November 2025.
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
It is ordered that:-
1. This application be heard as an urgent application and that the necessary
condonation be granted to the applicant in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court in respect of the non-compliance with the prescribed time limit
and forms;
2. The first respondent is ordered to host and/or allow the applicant’s data and
management (via the LifeQube system) on the first respondent’s server facility
/ hosting environment (with immediate effect) for a period ending on the last
date of November 2025;
3. The first respondent is ordered to allow the applicant access to its Company
Data and Patient Data f or purposes of its day to day business and allow the
applicant (or any authorised representative nominated by the applicant) to
download/extract/migrate/copy any of the applicant’s data from the first
respondent’s server/hosting environment;
4. The second respondent is to comply with its contractual obligations in terms of
the Licence, Maintenance and Support Agreement (including to the extent
necessary the provision of an environment for the hosting of the system as
provided for in clause 3.2.1) with immediate effect;
5. the applicant is ordered to pay the amount of R70 000 plus VAT for the month
of November 2025 into the respondent’s attorneys trust account for the
hosting environment services;
6. the respondents are jointly and severely liable, the one paying the other to be
absolved, for the costs of this application.
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
KOOVERJIE J
[1] In this urgent application the applicant seeks in essence relief to the following
effect:
1.1 to allow the applicant unfettered access to the applicant’s company data
and patient data, which is essential for the efficient running of its business
and provisions of critical medical services to patients living with HIV Aids;
1.2 for specific performance of the first and/or second respondents’ contractual
obligations in respect of licence and hosting services;
1.3 for an interdict against the respondents, interdicting them from unlawfully
interfering with the business of the applicant.
[2] The relief sought in terms of the notice of motion reads:
“1. that this application be heard as an urgent application and that the necessary
condonation be granted to the applicant in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court in respect of the non -compliance with the prescribed time limit
and forms;
2. that t he first respondent be ordered and directed to host and/or allow the
applicant’s data and management (via the LifeQube system) on the first
respondent’s server facility / hosting environment (with immediate effect) for a
period ending on the last dat e of November 2025 on condition the applicant
pays an amount of R70 000.00 plus VAT per month (October and November
2025) for the service / facility into the trust account of the first respondent’s
attorney as provided for in prayer 5;
3. that the first responde nt be ordered to allow the applicant to have unfettered
access to its Company Data and Patient Data for purposes of its day to day
business and to allow the applicant (or any authorised representative
nominated by the applicant) to download/extract/migrate /copy any of the
applicant’s data from the first respondent’s server/hosting environment;
4. that the second respondent be ordered to execute and comply with its
contractual obligations in terms of the Licence, Maintenance and Support
Agreement (including to the extent necessary the provision of an environment
for the hosting of the system as provide for in clause 3.2.1) with immediate
effect and assist the applicant in accordance with the terms of its agreement
to allow the applicant to resume and conduct its business and resume its
patient care obligations;
5. that the applicant be ordered to pay the amount of R70 000.00 plus VAT per
month for the months of October 2025 and November 2025 into the
respondents’ attorney’s trust account from where payment to the first
alternatively second respondent can be made for the provision of the
server/hosting environment of the first and/or second respondent for the
months of October 2025 and November 2025 as and when the amounts fall
due;
6. that the respondents jointly and severally be interdicted from interfering with
the business of the applicant or to conduct its/themselves, directly or indirectly
in any fashion which may jeopardise or unlawfully interfere in the business or
rendering of the medical services to patients of the applicant.”
[3] The respondents opposes this application on both urgency and on the merits.
The third respondent, Mr Rowe, is a director of the first respondent, “Lifesense
Group” and the sole director of the second respondent, “LifeQube” and attests to
the affidavit on behalf of the respondents.
URGENCY
[4] The first hurdle that the applicant has to overcome is whether this matter warrants
the urgent attention of this court. At this juncture it is convenient to set out the
timelines in which this application was instituted:
4.1 the application was served on the respondents’ attorneys via email, on 6
October 2025 at 12h48 to be heard on the 14 October 2025;
4.2 the respondents were required to oppose the applicant’s application by
11h00 on 7 October 2025 and to file their answering affidavit by 16h00 on
8 October 2025. Before the respondents could file their answering papers,
the applicant served a further supplementary affidavit via email on 9
October 2025, at 11h53;
4.3 the answering affidavit was filed 3 days later, on Saturday, 11 October
2025, at 08h57 and was served to the applicant via email late on 10
October 2025. Consequently the respondents sought condonation for the
late filing of their answering affidavit. The applicant’s replying affidavit was
prepared thereafter and was served on Monday, 13 October 2025 just
before 11 AM;
4.4 the respondents delivered their heads of argument without having sight of
the applicant’s replying affidavit. Consequently, on the morning of the
hearing I was presented with their supplemented heads of argument.
[5] In opposing urgency, the following submissions were made on behalf of the
respondents that:
5.1 the manner in which the applicant has instituted the application offends the
well-established principles pertaining to urgent applications;
5.2 the applicant should have given proper consideration to the degree of
urgency and to tailor the notice of motion in accordance therewith;
5.3 the respondents have been prejudiced. The applicant could not have
reasonably expected the respondents to deliver an answering affidavit
within the timeframe afforded to them due to the extent of the issues
involved;
5.4 the court was reminded that a prior winding-up application was instituted
by the first respondent which has yet not been finalized;
5.5 the court was further inconvenienced in that papers and heads of
argument are still being filed after the Thursday on which the applications
should have been finalized. Clearly the matter was not ripe for hearing by
12:00 Thursday, 9 October 2025.
[6] The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the matter warrants urgent
attention. The application was necessitated on urgency due to the fact that the
applicant’s access to its data was terminated on 30 September 2025 and further
that it was exited from the hosting environment in which its data was housed.
[7] The applicant indicated that its intention was to migrate its data to an independent
hosting environment and consequently terminate its contract with the
respondents.
[8] The applicant indicated that it had extended its hand several times in order to
resolve the dispute between the p[arties, but it was to no avail. Consequently,
this urgent application became necessary. It explained:
8.1 Since it was unable to render services to its clients and patients from 1
October 2025, it directed an urgent letter to the respondent. Prior thereto it
was already in a process of preparing an urgent application, due to Mr
Rowe’s response. Mr Rowe informed the applicant on 2 October 2025 that
he would not allow the applicant access to its own data;
8.2 The applicant continued with the preparation of the urgent application
during the weekend of 4 and 5 October 2025. The applicant’s main issue
is that any interruption in its business affects its ability to serve patients
and would result in irreparable harm to both, the patients and the
applicant, its reputation, as well as its commercial relationship with the
medical schemes.
[9] The applicant submitted that it would not attain substantial redress in the normal
course and the truncation of time periods was commensurate with the degree of
urgency.
[10] It persists with the urgent resolution of the matter. It explained that although the
“old” data has been handed over, it requires continued access to its live data to be
able to properly comply with its obligations.
[11] The thrust of the respondents’ case is that this is self-created urgency in that:
11.1 the applicant was aware months ago that it required continuous hosting
services. When the respondent made an offer to provide a managed
hosting agreement, the applicant declined the offer as it intended to
migrate to its own alternative platform, “STM”;
11.2 the applicant was further aware that the agreement between the applicant
and the first respondent (Lifesense Group), in terms of the shared services
agreement would terminate on 30 September 2025;
11.3 furthermore the applicant’s data was released on 2 October 2025;
11.4 there is no life critical interruption, hence no urgency whilst the applicant
migrates its data to its own chosen new platform, STM. The respondents
suggested that the applicant can manually migrate its data to its own
alternative platform during the temporary short-term interruption. The
respondents claim that during the short-term interruption the prescribed
minimum benefit treatment plans would be in place, namely there will be
continuity of the designated service providers, the bridging packs, out of
network reimbursements, hospital dispensing.
[12] At this juncture I find it apt to reiterate the often quoted extract from the Several
Matters on the Urgent Court Roll, 2013 (1) SA 549 (GSJ) matter where the
court warned the parties as to which matters deserve urgency. At paragraph [15]
the court stated:
“[15] Further, if a matter becomes opposed in the urgent court and the papers
become voluminous there must be exceptional reasons why the matter is not
to be removed to the ordinary motion roll. ‘The urgent court is not geared to
dealing with the matter which is not only voluminous but clearly includes some
complexity and even some novel points of law.’ See Digital Printers v Riso
Africa (Pty) Ltd case number 17318/02, an unreported judgment of Cachalia J
delivered in this Division…”
Paragraph 18 reads:
“[18] Urgency is a matter of degree. See Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v
Makin (t/a Makins Furniture Manufacturers) 1977 (4) SA 135 (W). Some
applicants who abused the court process should be penalised and the matters
should simply be struck off the roll with cost s for lack of urgency. Those
matters that justify a postponement to allow the respondents to file affidavits
should in my view similarly be removed from the roll so that the parties can set
them down on the ordinary opposed roll when they are ripe for hea ring, with
costs reserved.”
[13] Insofar as placing an obligation on the applicant to ensure that the matter is properly
before court and that the truncated time periods are appropriate, I refer to Harvey v
Niland and Others 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG) where the court stated:
“[19] While it is so that an applicant has the right to determine time periods in
urgent applications, and the respondent must simply do the best he or she can
to comply with them, the applicant must give proper consideration to those
time periods. In Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin & another
(t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers), Coetzee JP said:
‘Practitioners should carefully analyse the facts of each case to determine, for
the purposes of setting the case down for hearing, whether a greater or l esser
degree of relaxation of the Rules and of the ordinary practice of the Court is
required. The degree of relaxation should not be greater than the exigency of
the case demands. It must be commensurate therewith’…
[22] I accordingly find that a proper case for urgency has been made out. It may,
however, be apposite nonetheless to say that an applicant who brings an
however, be apposite nonetheless to say that an applicant who brings an
urgent application should, generally speaking, err on the side of affording a
respondent more, rather than less, time. Not only is th at fair but it also makes
for the smooth running of the matter.”
[14] Ultimately the issue for determination is whether the applicant can attain substantial
redress at a hearing in due course. The applicant has to show prejudice for the matter
to be urgent1.
[15] Having considered the facts in this matter as well as the argument proffered by both
parties it cannot be disputed that the applicant was shut out from the respondents’
hosting platform at very short notice.
[16] The applicant highlighted the unenviable circumstances that it was placed under
namely:
16.1 at all relevant times were the respondents aware that the applicant intended to
migrate to its own independent hosting service provider and that it sought
hosting services for a temporary period until it fully migrates to its new service
provider;
1 In Mogalakwena Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and Others 2016 (4) SA 99 (GP) the
following was stated:
“[64] It seems to me that when urgency is in issue the primary investigation should be to determine
whether the applicant will be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. If the
applicant cannot establish prejudice in this sense, the application cannot be urgent.
Once such prejudice is established, other factors come into consideration. These factors
include (but are not limited to): whether the respondents can adequately present their cases in
the time available between notice of the application to them and the actual hearing, other
prejudice to the respondents and the administration of justice, the strength of the case m ade by
the applicant and any delay by the applicant in asserting its rights. This last factor is often
called, usually by counsel acting for respondents, self-created urgency.”
16.2 Mr Rowe persisted in forcing the applicant into a two year contract that it did
not want to enter into. Mr Rowe presented an agreement for hosting services
for a period of two years at a certain rate of R70 000.00 per month. He
refused to consider an y interim arrangement until t he applicant was able to
fully migrate to another hosting environment;
16.3 Mr Rowe further demanded that the applicant pay the outstanding amount
alleging that it owes in terms of the shared service s agreement. This debt
remains in dispute between the parties and is the subject of the liquidation
application by the respondent.
[17] I further wish to point out that an amicable arrangement could have been mediated
upon s ince the applicant sought relief for an interim period only. I engaged with
counsel to consider an interim proposal until the applicant is fully with its independent
hosting service provider. Both counsel, after a short adjournment advised that no
agreement could be reached. The core issue for determination is whether the
applicant has made out a case for urgency and whether it can succeed in its claim for
specific performance.
[18] The respondents, on the other hand, argued that there is no basis for the relief sought
as there exists no contractual relationship between the parties.
[19] In determining urgency, one of the factors for consideration is to determine whether
the non-access of the respondent’s services is critical to patient care.
[20] Mr Rowe seemed to have changed his opinion on this issue. His version now is that
there is no urgency in the matter and t he disruption of services would not affect
patient care.
[21] However previously, in his correspondence dated 4 August 2025 he held a different
view, where he expressed that disruption of services provided to the applicant would
be critical to patient care and moreso, the respondents guard their reputation and
moral obligations by ensuring the systems remain in place, particularly when there is
non-payment. The extract from the letter reads:
“As an organisation with over 25 years of delivering healthcare services of the highest
quality across South Africa and Africa – both directly and through our subsidiaries –
LSG holds patient care as its paramount concern.
Although LDM has not fulfilled its contractual obligations under the shared
services arrangement, LSG has determined that it will not discontinue any
services classified as critical to patient wellbeing at this stage. The
potential risk of service disrup tion to patient care weighs heavily, and
we believe strongly that ethical responsibility must take precedence
over financial enforcement in such contexts.
We further note the reputational and moral implications of allowing critical
systems to fall due to non-opayment, and we wish to make clear that LSG will
not permit its name to be associated with any breakdown in care continuity .
This continuation is strictly without prejudice and will be terminated without further
notice should any risk to LSG’s own viability or regulatory position arise”.2
[22] It cannot be disputed that the core of the applicant’s business was to manage
patients’ wellbeing. There can be no doubt that disruption of services and no access
to data compromises patient care. Mr Rowe , in fact, indicated that disputes should
2 My emphasis
not be a reason to interrupt services. His latter change in stance does not assist him.
Consequently, in my view this matter deserves urgent attention . Patient care is
critically dependent on the applicant doing its job.
[23] I will proceed to deal with whether the applicant has made out a case for the relief it
sought.
The Hosting Services
[24] It is common cause that LifeQube released the applicant’s data on 2 October 2025.
This included both the company and patient data which the applicant submitted was
mostly on a server owned, managed and operated by the respondents.
[25] It is also common cause that the applicant was shut out the hosting environment at
midnight on 30 September 2023, thereby also not having access to its data.
[26] In its papers, the applicant alleged that it was always under the impression that the
hosting services were provided by LifeQube. This is evident from its correspondence
on 11 August 2025 where the applicants alleged:
“In the SLA with LQ, there was no disclosure of L Q having to outsource any
hardware requirements to LSG , or any other third party , and thus I have
clearly been under the impression that LQ had its own hardware and
infrastructure in order to supply a bespoke software programme to LDM”
[27] Upon being advised that this was not the case, the applicant contended that the first
respondent, Lifesense Group, was bound to provide such services by virtue of the
licence agreement, which is still in existence.
[28] The respondents contend otherwise. The y argued that the hosting services were
provided in terms of the Shared Services Agreement that was in place between the
applicant and the first respondent, Lifesense Group. Simply put, the Lifesense
Group, provided the hosting services. Consequently since the Shared Services
Agreement terminated on 30 September 2025, the hosting services are also
terminated.
[29] They argued that the applicant is disingenuous. At all relevant times it was aware
that the hosting services was not always provided by the first respondent.
[30] In this regard, it referred to the applicant’s version in the founding affidavit when it
alleged that according to the arrangement/agreement between the applicant and
Lifesense Group, the data would be hosted and managed for as long as the LifeQube
Agreement is in existence or until terminated with reasonable notice.
[31] The respondent points out that there are further disputes of fact which should have
been foreseen by the applicant. The dispute regarding the Shared Services
Agreement persists; hence the liquidation proceedings are relevant to determine the
nature of the relationship between the parties.
[32] I was advised that the Share Services Agreement was not concluded in writing. It
was a tacit agreement between the parties. The applicant contended that if hosting
services were provided in terms of the said agreement then it should have been listed
as an item on the invoices issued to the applicant. No such fee was recorded.
[33] In my view, the applicant’s version has credence. It is aligned to the terms set out in
the licence agreement as well as the context in which the parties corresponded. As
late as August 2025 , the applicant informed Mr. Ro we that it understood that
LifeQube provided the hosting services.
[34] It is common cause that LifeQube entered into a contract with the applicant on 8 July
2024. The agreement is titled “Licence Maintenance and Support Agreement ”
(Licence Agreement). The relevant clauses are.
34.1. The term “hosting” is defined in the agreement as:
“1.18 Hosting means any and all costs in respect of the hosting of the Alcu
Chronic Disease Management System in a physical environment. This
includes but is not limited to any hardware costs (service etc) storage,
transaction costs, bandwidth costs, software licences, fees outside the
LD Chronic Desease Management System (example Microsoft Office
exchanges, SQL Server and Management/Support, costs in respect of
the physical server environment).”
34.2. Clause 3 reads:
“3. GRANT OF LICENCE
3.1 Grant: LifeQube hereby grants a lincense to the licencee, strictly in
accordance with the terms set out in this agreement. Notwithstanding
that the licence is non-exclusive.
3.2 Restriction: Any rights not expressly granted in terms of this
agreement are hereby reserved without derogating from the generality
of the foregoing, except to the extent committed by law or expressly
under its agreement, the licencee may not:
3.2.1 host the system in any environment other than provided by
LifeQube as defined in 1.18 above “hosting”.”
Clause 2.1 states that:
“2.1 LifeQube is the owner, developer and licensor of the system and
renders related services.
2.3 LifeQube agrees to grant the licence to the licencee upon the terms
and conditions in this agreement.”3
[35] In summary, the applicant submitted that:
35.1 LifeQube granted the licence strict ly in accordance with the licenc e
agreement);
35.2 the licence was restricted in that the applicant could not host the system in
any other hosting environment other than that provided by LifeQube:
35.3 LifeQube is the owner, developer and licensor of the system and agreed to
grant the licence in terms of the agreement.
[36] In terms of the aforesaid provisions, the applicant’s understanding is not
unreasonable. The only reference of hosting services was set out in the agreement
which in particular stated that the hosting environment was provided by LifeeQube.
[37] When the applicant was advised by Mr Rowe that it was in fact the first respondent,
the Lifesense Group, that provided the hosting services in terms of the licence
agreement, the applicant persisted with its reasoning that for as long as the licence
agreement is in place, the hosting services must be provided, hence the relief sought
against the first respondent.
3 My emphasis
[38] The applicant sought the hosting on the “chroniqube system” until it fully m igrated to
the new service provider. It is crucial to consider this matter in context. Shortly before
the hosting services was terminated, the nature of the communication between the
parties was as follows:
38.1 on 26 September 2020 t he applicant requested that the respondents provide
STM (the new service provider ) with interim patient data in order for STM to
download and map the data field so that there is no interruption of patient
management once hosting has been discontinued;
38.2 in response Mr. Rowe, advised that the Lifesense Group can continue with the
hosting services if the contract is renewed since the Shared Services
Agreement will terminate on 30 September 2025;
38.3 he further advised that Lifesense Group is not a party to the agreement
between the applicants and LifeQube, hence it cannot provide any indication
regarding the download or transfer of patient data . He advised that the
applicant approach LifeQube directly;
38.4 shortly thereafter on 1 October 2025 Mr Rowe cornered the applicant. He
demanded payment of the alleged outstanding amount due in terms of the
shared services agreement and further that the applicant enter into a one year
contract, and advance payment of fees for the entire year. It was on this basis
that Mr Rowe agreed to continue providing hosting services;
38.5 on the 1 October 2025 , LifeQube undertook to provide the data and expedite
the extra ction process of all the data accumulated up to and including 30
September 2025 for all the active applicants’ clients. It alleged that it would do
so on ex gratia basis even though it was not contractually obligated to do so;
38.6 on 2 October the data was placed in the Google shared folder and provided to
the applicant, LifeQube further undertook to provide the next quarterly active
client data post 31 December 2025;
38.7 on 3 October 2025 , Mr Rowe informed the applicant that it will not have
access to the hosting environment due to the termination of the shared
services agreement;
[39] The applicant explained it is crucial to have access to the hosting environment . The
data captured and provided to it is of little value without the hosting system .
Moreover, for it to comply with its contractual obligations with its clients , it requires
access to live data on a hosting platform.
[40] It has not been disputed that as things stand the licence agreement is extant. It was
not terminated by any of the parties , that is the applicant or LifeQube. There is
therefore no reason why LifeQube should derogate from continuing with its services
in terms of the agreement, particularly the continuation of hosting services , albeit
through the Lifesense Group.
[41] Moreover there is no provision in the license agreement that the Lifesense Group
provided the hosting platform. Even if this is the case , the applicant maintains that
such services were rendered in terms of the licence agreement which remains in
existence. The relief sought is for a transitional period, presently for a period of one
month, that is until the end of November 2025.
[42] In applying the established test for interpreting contracts , starting point is the
language used in the contract . The Supreme Court of appeal in Endumeni4 settled
the approach to be followed when interpreting inter alia contracts. Wallis JA said:
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a
document…. Having regard to the context provided by reading that particular
provision in light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant on its
coming into existence . Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be
given to the language used in light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, The
context in which the provision appears, the apparent purpose to which it is directed
and the material known to those responsible for its production ….. The process is
objective, not subjective. A sensib le meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to
insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the
document …. The inevitable point of departure is the language in the provision itself ,
read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision.….:
[43] In applying the said test objectively the interpretation that I arrive at by having regard
to the language in the contract and the context of the contract as a whole , is that the
hosting services was to be provided in terms of the licence agreement
THE RELIEF SOUGHT
[44] The respondents argued that the relief in respect of the prayers remains incompetent
for the reasons they advanced. I will address these contentions:
4 Natal Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA S93 SCA at paragraph 18
44.1 I find the relief in prayer 2 is competent. The applicant has made out a case
that Lifesense Group is directed to allow the applicants data and management
via the LifeQube system on its hosting environment until 30 November 2025;
44.2 With regard to prayer 3, it is noted that LifeQube had provided the historic
data to the applicant and has further undertaken to provide same on a
quarterly basis. The applicant’s concern is that it does not have access to the
live data which it requires to carry out its obligations in respect of patient care
protocols. In the premises I find the relief is competent Insofar as the live data
is concerned and should be given access thereto until 30 November 2025;
44.3 In respect to prayer 4, the licence agreement is in existence and LifeQube is
required to comply with its contractual obligations until the migration to the end
of November 2025 is complete;
44.4 In respect prayer 5, the applicant make provision for the first respondent not to
be out of pocket for providing the hosting services. The respondent is at liberty
to accept payment if is so advised . The amount of R70 000 per month was
offered which is in accordance with what Mr Rowe proposed in the event of
the new hosting management agreement being entered. There would be no
prejudice to the respondents if this relief is granted;
44.5 with regard to prayer 6, I am not inclined to grant this relief as it is vague.
Ultimately the respondents have been directed to comply with their obligations
in terms of the licence agreement.
[45] In the premises, I find that the applicant is entitled to the relief sought until the end of
November 2025.
COSTS
[46] In exercising my judicial discretion , I find that the successful party, being the
applicant, should be entitled to the costs. The costs follow the results.
_____________________________
H. KOOVERJIE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances:
Counsel for the applicant: Adv. E Kromhout
Instructed by: Van der Merwe & Associates
Counsel for the respondents: Adv. Hollander
Instructed by: HBG Scindlers Attorneys
Date heard: 14 October 2025
Date of Judgment: 04 November 2025