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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2020-42224
DATE: 14 November 2025
(1) NOT REPORTABLE
(2) NOT OF INTREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In the matter between:
NDIITWANI GRACE NNDWAMMBI N O First Applicant
DITLHARE CASTALIA MOLOI N O Second Applicant
SEWKUMAR ASHENDRA CHATHURY N O Third Applicant
ALEXANDRA JOHANNA RUSSELL N O Fourth Applicant
HOLGER MAUL N O Fifth Applicant
MARTIN SEBASTIAN SOLOMON N O Sixth Applicant
BRENDA BAIJNATH N O Seventh Applicant
LEBELO ISAAC LUKHELE N O Eighth Applicant
(Being the Trustees for the time being of the
SASOL SIYAKHA ENTERPRISE AND SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT TRUST)
and
SEMATRA (PTY) LIMITED First Respondent
TSELANE MARIA MALATJI Second Respondent
YINGISANI HOPE MABASA Third Respondent
Neutral Citation: Nndwammbi N O and Others v Sematra and Others (2020-
42224) [2025] ZAGPJHC --- (14 November 2025)
2
Coram: Adams J
Heard: 13 November 2025
Delivered: 14 November 2025 – This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the par ties' representatives by
email, by being uploaded to CaseLines and by release to SAFLII.
The date and time for hand- down is deemed to be 1 0:30 on
14 November 2025.
Summary: Application for leave to appeal – s 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013 – an applicant now faces a higher and a more stringent
threshold –
Leave to appeal granted to the Full Court –
3
ORDER
(1) The first, second and third respondents ’ application for leave to appeal
succeeds.
(2) The respondents are granted leave to appeal to the Full Court of this
Division.
(3) The costs of this application for leave to appeal shall be costs in the
appeal.
JUDGMENT [APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL]
Adams J:
[1]. I shall refer to the parties as referred to in the original opposed
Application by the applicants for inter alia an order perfect ing the security the
Sasol Siyakha Trust has over movable property owned by the first respondent
(Sematra). The applicants are the Trustees for the time being of the said Trust,
who I shall collectively refer to as ‘the Sasol Siyakha Trust’ or simply as ‘the
Trust’, as was done in the judgment a quo. The first, second and third
respondents are the applicants in this application for leave to appeal and the
respondents herein were the applicants in the main application. On 25
September 2025, I granted the applicants’ application and ordered a perfection
of the security held by the applicants over the first respondent’s property as per
and in terms of the Special Notarial Bond registered in the Pretoria Deeds
Office on 11 September 2020 under number B […] (‘the Special Notarial Bond’).
I also granted a costs order in favour of the applicants against the respondents.
[2]. The respondents apply for leave to appeal the whole of my judgment and
the aforesaid order of 25 September 2025, as well as the reasons therefor. And
the application for leave to appeal is based on the provisions of sub- section (i)
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of section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which reads as
follows: -
‘17 Leave to appeal
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of
the opinion that –
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) … … …;’
[3]. The application for leave to appeal is against my factual and legal
findings that the applicants have satisfied the requirements for a perfection of
the said security. I erred and misdirected myself, so the respondents contend, in
my application of the law by my failure to deal with the respondents’ legal points
in limine. In particular, so the contention on behalf of the respondents goes, I
erred in not finding that the applicants lacked the necessary locus standi to
have launched the main application. The respondents furthermore submit that
the court a quo erred and misdirected itself in refusing to grant the respondents’
application for a postponement of the main application and in finding that the
interlocutory application by the respondents to join Sasol South Africa in these
proceedings as a fourth respondent is ill -conceived, ill-advised and equally bad
in law. In refusing the application for a postponement, so the argument
continues, I failed to exercise my discretion judicially.
[4]. On the merits of the main application, the respondents contend that I
ought to have found, as alleged by them, that it was agreed between the Trust
and Sematra that repayment of the loan amount would be made from the
proceeds of the work allocated to Sematra by the Sasol Group of Companies .
I should have had regard, so the respondents contend, to the engagement
between the parties at the relevant time, which, according to the respondents,
confirm the aforegoing agreement, as do the subsequent discussions between
the parties. In that regard, it is alleged by the respondents that t he arrangement
was to the effect that before Sasol South Africa Limited could process payments
was to the effect that before Sasol South Africa Limited could process payments
to Sematra, it would first consult the Trust to enable a determination on how the
amount should be split between Sematra and the Trust. This arrangement has
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allegedly been in place for the past three to four years and, during this period,
the Trust has been receiving payment on a monthly basis.
[5]. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that I erred in finding
that there is no nexus established from the evidence of the respondents
between the loan agreement and the conclusion that the loan amount was
repayable only in the event of SSA utilising the services of Sematra from which
engagement the latter company would service the loan account.
[6]. Nothing new has been raised by the respondent s in this application for
leave to appeal. In my original written judgment, I have dealt with most, if not all
of the issues raised by the respondent s in this application for leave to appeal
and it is not necessary for me to repeat those in full. Suffice to restate what I
say in the judgment, namely that the written agreement between the parties, in
particular the express wording, completely defeats the case on behalf of the
respondents. Not only does the agreement not contain the provisions
contended for by the respondents, but the clauses also provide for exactly the
opposite to what the respondents contend the agreement was.
[7]. As regards the point in limine raised by the respondents in relation to the
authorisation of the proceedings by all of the applicants, there is, in my view, no
merit in that point. The fact that the court a quo granted the relief sought by the
applicants implies that the point was rejected. In any event, the principles
enunciated in Eskom v Soweto Town Council
1 find application herein. It is trite
that, when an attorney who acts on behalf of a party is authorised so to act,
there is no need for any other person to be additionally authorised. Moreover,
this legal point is one that would have been before the court which dealt with
part ‘A’ of the application. That court granted an order by agreement between
the parties, which means that the point is no longer extant.
the parties, which means that the point is no longer extant.
1 Eskom v Soweto Town Council 1992 (2) SA 703 (W).
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[8]. The traditional test in deciding whether leave to appeal should be
granted was whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court may
come to a different conclusion to that reached by me in my judgment. This
approach has now been codified in s 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013, which came into operation on the 23
rd of August 2013, and which
provides that leave to appeal may only be given where the judge concerned is
of the opinion that ‘the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success’.
[9]. In Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another 2, the
SCA held that the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates a
dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law that a court of appeal
‘could’ reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court. These
prospects of success must not be remote, but there must exist a reasonable
chance of succeeding. An applicant who applies for leave to appeal must show
that there is a sound and rational basis for the conclusion that there are
prospects of success.
[10]. The ratio in Ramakatsa simply followed S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA), [2011] ZASCA 15, in which Plasket AJA (Cloete JA and Maya JA
concurring), held as follows at para 7:
‘What the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate decision, based
on the facts and the law that the Court of Appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion
different to that of the trial court. In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince this
Court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal and that those prospects
are not remote, but have a realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established
than that there is a mere possibility of success. That the case is arguable on appeal or that the
case cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must, in other words, be a sound, rational basis
for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.’
for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.’
[11]. In Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen 3, the Land Claims Court held (in
an obiter dictum) that the wording of this subsection raised the bar of the test
2 Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another (724/2019) [2021] ZASCA 31 (31
March 2021);
3 Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen, LCC 14R/2014 (unreported).
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that now has to be applied to the merits of the proposed appeal before leave
should be granted. I agree with that view, which has also now been endorsed
by the SCA in an unreported judgment in Notshokovu v S 4. In that matter the
SCA remarked that an appellant now faces a higher and a more stringent
threshold, in terms of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 compared to that under
the provisions of the repealed Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. The applicable
legal principle as enunciated in Mont Chevaux has also now been endorsed by
the Full Court of the Gauteng Division of the High Court in Pretoria in Acting
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance In
Re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and
Others
5.
[12]. I am persuaded that the issues raised by the respondent s in this
application for leave to appeal are issues in respect of which another court is
likely to reach conclusions different to those reached by me. I am therefore of
the view that there are reasonable prospects of another court making factual
findings and coming to legal conclusions at variance with my factual findings
and legal conclusions. The appeal, therefore, in my view, does have a
reasonable prospect of success.
[13]. Leave to appeal should therefore be granted.
Order
[14]. In the circumstances, the following order is made:
(1) The first, second and third respondents’ application for leave to appeal
succeeds.
(2) The respondent s are granted leave to appeal to the Full Court of this
Division.
4 Notshokovu v S, case no: 157/2015 [2016] ZASCA 112 (7 September 2016).
5 Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance In Re: Democratic
Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (19577/09) [2016] ZAGPPHC
489 (24 June 2016).
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(3) The costs of this application for leave to appeal shall be costs in the
appeal.
_________________________________
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
HEARD ON: 13 November 2025
JUDGMENT DATE: 14 November 2025 – Judgment handed
down electronically
FOR THE APPLICANTS: T Chavalala
INSTRUCTED BY:
Mathopo Moshimane Mulangaphuma
Incorporated t/a DM5 Incorporated,
Illovo, Sandton
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: K J Maleka
INSTRUCTED BY: Leshilo Incorporated Attorneys, Pretoria