1
SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2025-054800
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
_______________________ 13 November 2025
In the matter between:
LADY T PROTECTION SERVICES PTY LTD Applicant
(Registration No: 2004/013398/07)
and
BONGLEZ PTY LTD t/a BONGLEZ ACCOUNTANTS First Respondent
AND TAX CONSULTANTS
(Registration No: 2014/110484/07)
BONGANI WALTAS DLAMINI Second Respondent
(Identity Number: 8[…])
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS Third Respondent
(NPO Registration No: 020-050-NPO)
CHARTERED INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS ACCOUNTANTS Fourth Respondent
SOUTHERN AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS ACCOUNTANTS Fifth Respondent
__________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________________
Mdalana-Mayisela J
2
Introduction
[1] This is the return date of a rule nisi granted by this court on 25 April 2025. The applicant
seeks to have the interim order , which restrains the first and second respondents from
dealing with their assets , made final. The respondents seek the discharge of the rul e
nisi and the dismissal of the application with costs.
[2] The application has a protracted history, marked by voluminous and often contentious
affidavits. The core of the dispute is a payment of R 1,101,919.47 made by the applicant
to the first and second respondents. The applicant cont ends that this was an advance
for a specific purpos e to settle its tax liabilities with the South African Revenue Service
(“SARS”), which was misappropriated. The first and second respondents contend it was
a deposit for professional fees for accounting and t ax services, which they d uly
rendered.
Background
[3] The applicant, a security services company, engaged the first and second respondents
as its accountants and tax practitioners around April 2023. The mandate included
month-to-month bookkeeping, resolving long- standing tax issues with SARS, and
negotiating a payment plan for tax debts.
[4] On 12 May 2023, the second respondent sent a “Commitment letter” to the applicant
stating, “Please provide us with proof of deposit payment of an amount of
R1,101,919.47… to start with , providing you this service for debt management.” The
applicant paid the amount on 15 May 2023.
[5] The applicant alleges that after this payment, communication from the respondents
dwindled and they eventually ceased performing their duties, leaving the applicant non-
compliant with SARS . The applicant further alleges that upon demanding a refund, the
respondents offered a convoluted explanation involving a third-party associate, a “Ms J
Brink”, w ho purportedly held the funds in a trust account and was subsequently
unavailable due to international travel.
3
[6] The Applicant launched the urgent ex-parte application, obtaining an interim interdict that
freezes the respondents' assets, particularly a specified bank account at First National
Bank.
[7] The respondents filed an answering affidavit on 29 May 2025. In it, they denied
misappropriation and presented a detailed account of services rendered. Critically, in
several paragraphs (notably paragraphs 13, 16, and 28), they acknowledged that
arrangements were being made to refund the money, citing the unavailability of their
associate, Ms Brink.
[8] Following a letter from the applicant's attorneys on 26 June 2025, which highlighted
these admissions, the respondents brought an application for leave to file a
supplementary answering affidavit . In this subsequent affidavit, filed on 10 July 2025,
they made a complete reversal, unequivocally denying any liability to refund the money
and asserting that the entire sum was earned as fees for professional services
rendered.
Issues
[9] Two primary issues fall for determination:
[9.1] Whether the respondents should be granted leave to file their supplementary answering
affidavit.
[9.2] Whether the applicant has met the requirements of a final interdict.
Leave to file the supplementary answering affidavit
[10] Rule 6(5)(e) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that further affidavits may only be
filed with the leave of the court . This is not a right , but an indulgence granted judicially .
Parties seeking leave must provide a satisfactory explanation for the late filing and
demonstrate that it is in the interests of justice to permit it.
[11] The respondents ’ explanation is that the supplementary affidavit is necessary to clarify
and further supplement their opposition and to provide a more comprehensive
articulation of their position after further consultation with legal representatives.
4
[12] I find this explanation to be unsatisfactory. The shift between the two affidavits is not one
of mere clarification or amplification; it is a fundamental and material contradiction. The
first affidavit contained repeated admissions of an obligation to refund, coupled with
explanations for the delay . This second affidavit denies that any such obligation exists
and presents a completely different defence, that the money was fully earned.
[13] The timing is highly suspect. The complete reversal occurred immediately after the
applicant’s attorneys, in their letter of 26 June 2025, pointed out the inescapable
admissions in the first affidavit . This suggests that this supplementary affidavit is not a
bona fide attempt to assist the court, but a tactical maneuver to disavow a version that
has become untenable. It is, in essence, a “second bite at the cherry”.
[14] Allowing such a radical shift at this late stage, without a compelling explanation for the
initial admissions, would be prejudicial to the applicant and would undermine the finality
of litigation. The respondents had a full and fair opportunity to present their case in the
answering affidavit . Their failure to do so coherently at the first instance cannot be
remedied by simply filing a new contradictory version.
[15] Consequently, the application for leave to file the supplementary answering affidavit is
refused. The matter will be decided on the founding, answering, and replying affidavits.
The requirements for a final interdict
[16] The requirements for a final interdict are trite1:
(a) a clear right of the applicant, which must be proven on a balance of probabilities;
(b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and
(c) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.
[17] In application proceedings where disputes of fact arise, the court generally applies the
rule in Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 2, which dictates that
rule in Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 2, which dictates that
final relief can be granted only if the facts as stated by the respondent s, together with
1 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227; Hotz and Others v UCT 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) para [29]; Equistock Properties
8 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Oosthuizen and Others [2025] ZASCA 6 para [17].
2 (53/84) [1984] ZASCA51; [1984] 2 ALL SA 366 (A); 1984 (3) SA 620 paras 7-9.
5
the admitted facts in the applicant's affidavit, justify such an order. A bare or
uncreditworthy denial is not sufficient to create a real dispute of fact.
Clear right
[18] The applicant's case is that it has a clear right to the return of R1,101,919.47, as the
money was paid for a specific purpose that was not fulfilled. The respondents’ own
“Commitment Letter” of 12 May 2023 strongly supports this, explicitly linking the
payment to the commencement of “debt management” services with SARS.
[19] The respondents’ defence in the answering affidavit is fatally compromised by their own
admissions. They did not, in that affidavit, seriously contest that the money was
intended for the SARS debt. Instead, they acknowledged an obligation to repay it.
Paragraph 13 of the answering affidavit states they were “surprised” the applicant only
requested R1 million back, and in paragraph 16 , they admit they “agreed to repay the
funds.” Paragraph 28 details efforts to obtain the applicant’s banking details to effect the
refund.
[20] In the face of these admissions, the respondents’ belated attempt in the supplementary
affidavit to recast the payment as a simple deposit for general fees is unconvincing and,
as I have found, inadmissible. Even if it were considered, a version that emerges only
after an adversary points out the flaws in the original version is inherently suspect.
[21] On the papers properly before me, the applicant has established a clear right, which is
strengthened considerably by the respondents ’ own initial concessions, to the return of
the funds.
Injury committed or reasonably apprehended
[22] The injury is self -evident: the applicant is out of pocket to the tune of over R1.1 million.
Furthermore, there is a reasonable apprehension that if the interdict is not made final ,
the remaining funds will be dissipated, leaving the applicant with a hollow judgment .
The respondents ’ shifting and evasive conduct , including the story of the unavailable
The respondents ’ shifting and evasive conduct , including the story of the unavailable
third party holding the funds, only serves to heighten this apprehension.
[23] The respondents argued that the freezing of their accounts is causing them operational
harm. While this may be the case, the harm must be weighed against the applicant's
6
right to secure the funds it claims . In this case, the respondents' hardship is a direct
consequence of their own failure to account for or ret urn the funds, despite their initial
admissions. The balance on this point favors the applicant.
Absence of an alternative remedy
[24] The applicant has undertaken to institute a main action for the recovery of the money . A
claim for damages is, in theory, an alternative remedy. However, a damages claim is an
inadequate remedy if there is a real risk that by the time judgment is obtained, there will
be no assets against which to execute. Given the circumstances and the respondent's
conduct, the apprehension of dissipation is reasonable. A preservation order , such as
this, is the only practical remedy to ensure that the status quo is maintained and the
main action is not rendered nugatory.
Conclusion
[25] The applicant has successfully met the requirements for a final interdict . The
respondents’ initial answering affidavit , read with the applicant's founding papers,
justifies the relief sought. The respondents' version, insofar as it sought to explain away
the admissions, is so fraught with contradiction and opportunism as to be deemed not
genuinely disputing the core facts as presented by the applicant.
[26] Regarding costs, the applicant has argued for punitive costs. The respondents’ conduct,
particularly the stark reversal in their affidavits following the applicant’s letter, appears to
be a deliberate effort to deceive the court and frustrate the process. This justifies a mark
of the court’s displeasure. However, the applicant has not prayed for punitive costs in
the notice of motion.
ORDER
[27] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The first and second respondents' application for leave to file a supplementary
answering affidavit is dismissed.
2. The rule nisi granted on 25 April 2025 and amended on 8 May 2025 by Joubert AJ is
confirmed and made final.
7
3. The first and second respondents are hereby restrained, pending the final outcome of
an action to be instituted by the applicant against them for the recovery of
R1,101,919.47 (main action), from dealing in any way (including selling, alienating,
encumbering, or removing from the Republic of South Africa) with any of their present
or future assets, including, but not limited to, any funds held in the First National Bank
account number 6[…].
4. This order shall not prevent any bank , building society , or financial institution from
honoring any obligations to third parties which were incurred prior to such institution
receiving service of this order, including exercising any right of set -off which such bank,
building society, or financial institution may have in respect of loan facilities made
available to the first and second respondents prior to being served with this order.
5. The applicant is directed to institute the main action on or before 31 January 2026,
failing which this order shall lapse.
6. The first and second respondents, jointly and severally , the one paying the other to
be absolved, are ordered to pay the costs of this application.
________________________
MMP Mdalana-Mayisela
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Digitally delivered by uploading to Caselines and emailing to the parties.
Date of delivery: 13 November 2025
8
Appearances:
On behalf of the applicant: Adv P Jagganath
Instructed by: Juglal Ramkussan Incorporated
On behalf of respondents: Adv L Makhoba
Instructed by: Nhlamulo Mabunda Attorneys