SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: CC 63/2024
(1)Reportable: No.
(2) Of interest to other judges: No
(3) Revised.
Date 07 November 2025
Signature
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
ZAKHELE BENNET HONGWANA ACCUSED
JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
Munzhelele J
[1] The accused was convicted of the offence of murder of T[...] D[...] N[...], read with
the provisions of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997,
as amended. On Count 2, he was convicted of malicious damage to property,
being a competent verdict on a charge of housebreaking with intent to commit a
crime. On Count 3, the accused was convicted of pointing anything likely to lead
a person to believe that it is a firearm, in contravention of section 120(6)(b) of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.
[2] The accused elected not to testify in mitigation of sentence, and the State
likewise did not call any witnesses in aggravation thereof. The evidence
presented for purposes of sentencing emanated from a pre -sentence report
compiled by Mr. Thokhozani Mbatha, a probation officer employed by the
Department of Social Development, under the supervision of Mrs. Bosch.
The report was handed in by consent between the parties and marked as Exhibit
“D”, and its contents were admitted into evidence . It contained information
relating to the accused’s personal circumstances, family history and functioning,
interpersonal relationships, relationship with the deceased, educational
background, employment record, physical and psychological condition, and
substance abuse (specifically alcohol).
The probation officer recommended that the accused be sentenced in terms of
section 51(1)(a) of Act 105 of 1997. Which recommendation was rejected by the
defense because the court had already made a determination that the sentence
would fall under section 51(1) because the accused and the deceased were in a
domestic abuse relationship, not based on premeditated murder.
In addition, Mrs. B.P. Tunzi, a social worker employed by the Department of
Social Development, prepared a psycho-social report concerning C[...] L[...] A[...],
N[...] N[...] S[...] , and N[...] S[...] , being the deceased’s cousin and two minor
children. This report, compiled under the supervision of Mrs. Bosch, was
admitted into evidence as Exhibit “E”.
The defense counsel handed in two letters from the accused , which were
addressed to the accused ’s children and the family, apologizing for his conduct.
These letters are exhibit ‘F1’ to ‘F2’.
Furthermore, handwritten victim impact statements by Ms. L[...] M[...], Mr. N[...]
N[...], and Ms. M[...] N[...] were tendered and admitted into evidence as Exhibits
“G1” to “G3”.
[3] The personal circumstances of the accused are as follows: He is 54 years of age,
[3] The personal circumstances of the accused are as follows: He is 54 years of age,
a first offender, and has no previous convictions. He was customarily married to
the deceased, with whom he had two children, aged six and four years. He has
two additional children, aged 34 and 16, from previous relationships. All his
children were financially dependent on him.
The accused matriculated from Jafta Mahlangu High School and , in the year
2000, obtained a Diploma in Traffic Management from Boekenhoutkloof Traffic
College. He was employed as a traffic officer for 24 years until the date he
voluntarily handed himself over to the police.
According to the report, the accused had a stable upbringing. His late father
operated a dry-cleaning business that supported the family until his passing. The
accused and the deceased had been married for six years before her death.
Their two minor children currently reside with their cousin and the deceased’s
relative in Mamelodi.
The accused expressed remorse for his actions. He indicated that his
relationship with the deceased had become strained due to marital disputes and
his suspicions of infidelity, though he admitted having no concrete proof thereof.
He also acknowledged that he was abusing alcohol over the weekend when he
was stressed with his marital issues. But on the date of the offence, he was
sober. The accused stated that he has been emotionally affected by the offence,
particularly when thinking of the impact this offence has caused on his children.
[4] The social worker, Mrs. Tunzi, investigated the social circumstances of the
deceased’s family, who are direct victims of the murder. The deceased’s two
minor children and their cousin were present at the scene when the deceased
was shot and killed. Their clothes were soaked in their mother’s blood as they
desperately tried to stop her bleeding and their attempt to wake her up.
The report records that the children were found traumatized, anxious, and
frightened upon the arrival of their cousin, who had to calm them down. The
children exhibit anger towards the accused for killing their mother. They
experience insomnia, nightmares, and flashbacks of the incident. Both suffer
experience insomnia, nightmares, and flashbacks of the incident. Both suffer
from poor concentration and fatigue due to lack of sleep.
The minor child, S[...], has expressed a desire to become a doctor one day “to
save lives,” while their cousin has developed panic attacks and is undergoing
treatment. The children reportedly become frightened by loud noises and refuse
to sleep at night due to nightmares in which they dream that the accused is
coming to harm them.
The cousin, who is the primary caregiver and breadwinner for the deceased’s
children, faces challenges registering the children with her medical aid because
she ha s not yet ob tained legal guardianship, and the social worker has
undertaken to assist in this regard.
It is evident that the murder of the deceased has had a profound and enduring
psychological and emotional impact on the children and the extended family.
In her victim impact statement, L[...] C[...] L[...] expressed deep emotional pain
and loss over the deceased’s death. N[...] N[...] described experiencing persistent
anxiety, fear, and social withdrawal, leading to loss of employment and increased
alcohol consumption to cope with the trauma. M[...] N[...] stated that she has lost
hope in life, as the deceased was her source of encouragement and spiritual
strength.
[5] Counsel for the accused submitted that the Court should take into consideration
that there ha d been no prior incidents of abuse before the commission of the
offence. However, this submission is not entirely correct . The evidence before
the Court, particularly the reports of the probation officers, revealed that the
marriage between the accused and the deceased was characterized by constant
quarrels and physical altercations. As a result, the deceased , on several
occasions, left the matrimonial home with the children.
The accused himself confirmed that there were ongoing disagreements regarding
their 16 -year-old child. The deceased desired that the child should reside with
her mother, whereas the accused objected. This disagreement became a
persistent source of conflict in their marriage, which ultimately culminated in the
accused killing his wife.
Counsel for the accused further submitted that the personal circumstances of the
Counsel for the accused further submitted that the personal circumstances of the
accused should be considered cumulatively to arrive at an appropriate sentence ,
guided by the principles enunciated in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); S v
Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); S v Sikoti 2008 (1) SACR 177 (E); S v M 2007 (2)
SACR 539 (CC); S v Skenjana 1985 (3) SA 51 (A); S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382
(CC); S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA); S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552
(SCA); S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A); and S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40
(SCA).
Counsel contended that the accused has shown remorse , as he repeatedly
requested forgiveness from the deceased ’s family and wrote letters to both the
family and his children expressing his regret . It was submitted that the accused
acted out of emotion and without premeditation.
Counsel urged the Court to consider all the circumstances collectively and
cumulatively in determining whether substantial and compelling circumstances
exist to justify a deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence . It was further
submitted that the imposition of a life sentence would be disproportionate to the
circumstances of this case and would induce a sense of shock.
Counsel conceded that the death of the deceased has left deep emotional scars
on the victims, which only the passage of time may heal.
[6] The State, on the other hand, argued that there are n o substantial and
compelling circumstances present in this matter . The accused , being a law
enforcement officer , a husband , and a father , was expected to uphold the law
and protect his family . Instead, the family has suffered irreparable harm and
disintegration as a result of his conduct.
The State further submitted that the accused has not demonstrated genuine
remorse. He has shown regret for his actions. T he assertion that he sent his
sister to apologize to the deceased ’s family is not supported by evidence . The
sister's decision to approach the family was made of her own accord and not at
the instruction of the accused.
Accordingly, the State contended that in the absence of substantial and
compelling circumstances , the only appropriate sentence is that of life
compelling circumstances , the only appropriate sentence is that of life
imprisonment. It was further submitted that the sentences imposed on the
remaining counts should run concurrently with the sentence of life imprisonment.
Evaluation and Analysis
Legal framework
[7] In S v Swart 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA), the court said:
‘In our law , retribution and deterrence are proper purposes of punishment , and
they must be accorded due weight in any sentence that is imposed. Each of the
elements of punishment is not required to be accorded equal weight, but instead ,
proper weight must be accorded to each according to the circumstances. Serious
crimes will usually require that retribution and deterrence come to the fore and
that rehabilitation of the offender will consequently play a smaller role. Moreover,
as pointed out in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) , where the court finds
that it is not bound to impose a prescribed sentence, the sentence to be imposed
in lieu of the prescribed sentence should be assessed paying due regard to the
benchmark which the legislator provided.’ This has also been echoed by the
defense Counsel in his arguments.
In S v Kruger 2012 (1) SACR 369 (SCA) , Shongwe JA (Harms AP and Plaskett
AJA concurring) confirmed that punishing a convicted person should not be
likened to revenge. It must have all the element s of, and purposes of ,
punishment, prevention, retribution, individual and general deterrence , and
rehabilitation.
In the case of S v Van Wyk 1997 (1) SACR 345 (T) 366g -h and S v Voges 1975
(3) SA 88 (AD) 890E, and S v ABT 1975 (2) SA 214 (AD) 219H , it has been said
that:
“Being a first offender does not mean that such effect should override all the
other principles to be considered during the sentencing process. First offenders
are therefore not entitled to non-custodial sentences merely because they are
first offenders. So, the value of being a first offender should be considered by
the trial Court against the other factors under consideration during the sentencing
process.”
In S v Vilakazi 2009(1) SACR 552 (SCA) at para 58 , Nugent JA said that : in
cases of serious crimes as these, the personal circumstances of the offenders by
themselves will necessarily recede into the background , once it becomes clear
that the crime is deserving of a substantial period of imprisonment.
In S v Qamata 1997 (1) SACR 479 (E) 483a, it was said that:
“An appropriate sentence actually means a sentence in accordance with the
blameworthiness of every individual offender.”
Legal principles
[8] The accused has been convicted of murder read with the provisions of section
51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, as amended , because
the accused and the deceased were involved in domestic violence . The
prescribed minimum sentence for such an offence is life imprisonment, unless
the court finds the existence of substantial and compelling circumstances
justifying a deviation therefrom. The court must determine the presence of such
circumstances after considering the totality of the evidence placed before it, both
during the trial on the merits and during the sentencing proceedings.
In S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal made it
clear that “it is no longer business as usual” , the legislature intended that the
prescribed sentences be imposed unless there are truly convincing reasons for
departure. Courts are cautioned not to deviate for flimsy or speculative reasons,
as this would defeat the deterrent and retributive objectives of the minimum
sentence regime. And certainly, put the administration of justice into disrepute.
In S v Swart 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA), the court reaffirmed that retribution and
deterrence must take precedence in cases of serious crimes, while rehabilitation,
though relevant, must yield to the gravity of the offence. Similarly, S v Vilakazi
2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) held that in cases of serious violent crime, the
personal circumstances of the offender recede into the background, and society’s
personal circumstances of the offender recede into the background, and society’s
interest in safety, deterrence, and retribution takes precedence. The State and
the defense agree that the offenc e is of a serious nature, and that deterrence
should take precedence. They further concur that a custodial sentence is
appropriate, considering the application of the law to the facts, as well as the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances set out below.
Application of the law to the Facts
[9] The facts of this case disclose an extremely brutal and callous murder committed
within a domestic setting — a context that aggravates rather than mitigates. The
accused shot and killed his wife, T[...] D[...] N[...] , in the presence of their two
minor children, aged six and four. The children, innocent bystanders of a
horrifying act of violence, were found soaked in their mother’s blood as they
desperately tried to stop her bleeding. The gravity of this act and its enduring
psychological impact cannot be overstated.
The accused’s conduct reveals a profound disregard for the sanctity of human
life and for his responsibilities as a husband and father. The manner of the killing
demonstrates a level of brutality and emotional detachment inconsistent with
momentary loss of control. Instead, it reflects deliberate and violent intent to end
the life of the deceased.
Aggravating Circumstances
[10] Several aggravating features of this case stand out:
1. Commission of the offence in the presence of minor children:
This factor alone weighs heavily against the accused. The children witnessed
their mother’s murder at the hands of their father — an event that has left them
deeply traumatized, as recorded in the psycho-social report and victim impact
statements. The children now live with persistent nightmares, anxiety, and fear
that their father will return to harm them. The trauma inflicted upon them is long-
term and irreversible.
2. Violation of trust and domestic relationship:
The deceased was killed by the very person who was meant to love and protect
her. Domestic murders are an affront not only to the victim’s rights but also to the
foundational values of family and society. The Constitutional Court and the
legislature have repeatedly condemned domestic and gender-based violence as
a scourge that has reached pandemic proportions in South Africa. The courts are
enjoined to impose sentences that send a clear message of zero tolerance for
such conduct.
3. Use of a weapon and deliberate action:
The murder was spontaneous. The accused armed himself with his service pistol
and confronted the deceased, thereby showing intentional conduct to end the life
of the deceased. The use of a weapon and the deliberate infliction of fatal injuries
justify the classification of this offence as one warranting the harshest possible
sentence.
4. Absence of genuine remorse:
Although the accused claimed to feel regret, the pre-sentence report and victim
impact statements reveal that his remorse is self-centered rather than genuine.
He portrays himself as emotionally wounded rather than taking full accountability
for his actions. True remorse involves acknowledgment of wrongdoing, empathy
for the victim, and an acceptance of the need for punishment — elements absent
in this case. The accused is only showing regret for what he has done. Genuine
contrition is absent from the facts.
5. Severe and continuing impact on the victims:
The psycho-social report and victim impact statements vividly illustrate the
devastating emotional and psychological harm caused to the children and their
extended family. The trauma, fear, and social stigma that now define their lives
are direct consequences of the accused’s actions.
Mitigating Factors Considered
[11] The court has duly considered the mitigating factors advanced on behalf of the
accused:
• He is a first offender.
• He is 54 years of age.
• He has served society as a traffic officer for 24 years.
• He claims to have acted under emotional distress and suspicion of infidelity
backed by no facts.
• He has four children, two of whom are minors.
• He has been awaiting trial for a year.
However, none of these factors — whether individually or cumulatively — is of such
weight as to constitute substantial and compelling circumstances.
As it is held in S v Vilakazi (supra), in serious crimes such as murder, the personal
circumstances of the offender necessarily recede into the background. The brutality and
gravity of the offence and the severe trauma suffered by the two minor children and the
family far outweigh these considerations [personal circumstances of the accused].
The accused’s age and employment history demonstrate maturity and stability, not
vulnerability or impulsiveness. His role as a law enforcement officer, in fact, aggravates
rather than mitigates his culpability — he was expected to uphold the law, not violate it.
Alcohol consumption and marital discord cannot operate as mitigating factors. As
observed in numerous authorities, including S v Qamata 1997 (1) SACR 479 (E),
emotional tension or intoxication does not reduce moral blameworthiness where the
offender acts with intent and persistence.
The Interests of Society
[12] Society demands protection from those who commit acts of domestic violence,
especially where such acts destroy families and traumatize children. The
prevalence of femicide and intimate-partner murders in South Africa necessitates
the imposition of stern sentences to send a strong message that such conduct
will not be tolerated.
As emphasized in S v Swart (supra), deterrence and retribution must assume
prominence in sentencing for grave offences of violence. The court cannot ignore
the broader societal need to protect women and children and to reaffirm the
sanctity of human life.
Proportionality and the Purposes of Punishment
[13] Punishment must always be proportionate to the offence and the offender’s
degree of moral culpability. In this instance, the offence is among the most
serious imaginable — the taking of a human life within a domestic setting, in the
presence of children, with long-term psychological consequences.
Rehabilitation, while important, carries little practical weight here. The accused’s
conduct reflects a fundamental moral breakdown and a disregard for both legal
and moral boundaries. A lesser sentence would undermine the seriousness of
the crime and diminish public confidence in the justice system.
As held in S v Malgas ( Supra), courts should not lightly depart from the
prescribed sentences. In the absence of truly compelling factors that would
render life imprisonment disproportionate, the legislature’s benchmark must be
respected.
Conclusion
[14] Having carefully considered all the evidence, the pre -sentence report and victim
impact reports, the submissions by counsel, and the applicable legal principles,
the court finds that no substantial and compelling circumstances exist to justify a
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
The offence was committed with brutality and disregard for human dignity, in the
presence of the deceased’s minor children, causing them lifelong trauma. The
murder of a spouse within the family home represents a profound betrayal of
trust and a direct attack on the sanctity of family life.
Accordingly, the only appropriate and just sentence that reflects the gravity of the
crime, the interests of society, and the principles of proportionality and
deterrence is that of life imprisonment.
Sentence
1. On Count 1 (Murder): The accused is sentenced to life imprisonment in terms of
section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, as amended.
2. On Count 2 (Malicious damage to property): The accused is sentenced to 5
years’ imprisonment.
3. On Count 3 (Pointing of a firearm): The accused is sentenced to 2 years’
imprisonment.
4. The sentences on Counts 2 and 3 shall run concurrently with that on Count 1.
Ancillary orders
1. In terms of Section 103 (1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 , the court
makes no order. This means the accused is deemed unfit to possess a firearm.
2. In terms of Section 103 (4) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 , the court
makes an order for search and seizure of the accused’s premises for firearms,
ammunition licenses, and or competency certificates.
3. In terms of section 299A (1) of Act 51 of 1977, the court informs the complainants
that they have a right to make representations to the Commissioner of the
Correctional Services when placement of the prisoner on parole is considered, to
attend any relevant meetings of the parole board, when the accused’s parole is
to be decided. This is subject to the directive issued by the Commissioner of
Correctional Services under Section 4 of the Correctional Services Act
4. The accused has the right to appeal the conviction and sentence that was
imposed on him today. You can request legal aid attorneys or an attorney where
you pay out of your own pocket to assist you in bring ing a substantive application
for leave to appeal the conviction and sentences within 14 days of this sentence.
If your application is later than 14 days , then you should apply for the
condonation to be allowed an extension of time to file the application for leave to
appeal out of time.
M. MUNZHELELE
Judge of the High Court of South Africa
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Heard: 04 & 07 November 2025
Delivered: 07 November 2025
Counsel for the State: Adv. Tshabalala
Counsel for Accused: Mr. Rudman