IN THE HIGH CO URT OF SO UTH AFRI C A
GA U TENG DIV ISION, PRETORIA
(1) REPORTAB LE: NO
(2) OF INTERES T TO OTH ER JUDGES : NO
(3) REV ISED :
4 November 2025
DATE SIGNATURE
Case No. 068889/25
In the m atter between:
CEPPWAWU Intervening Party
In re:
CHEMICAL, ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING, WOOD,
AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION First Applicant
SIPHO ERIC SONO, N.O Second App licant
and
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA First Respondent
REGISTRAR OF LABOUR RELATIONS Second Respondent
1
2
__________________________________________________________________
NEUKIRCHER J:
1] On 14 May 2025, the applicants1 launched the main application in which they
seek the appointment of three trustees to the CEPPWAWU Development Trust (the
Trust) in terms of certain provisions of the Trust’s Deed of Trust and a court order
dated 14 May 2024.
2] The main application is opposed by the second respondent who is the Registrar
of Labour Relations (the Registrar).
3] On 12 June 2025 CEPPWAWU Investments (Pty) Ltd ( CI) launched an
application for leave to intervene as the third respondent in the main application . It
argues that it has an interest in the outcome of the main application and that its interest
is, inter alia, rooted in an order granted by Van Der Schyff J and the following which is
contained in her judgment:
“The application (the Union and the then Administrator Ms TN Mashanda) atta ck the
nineteenth respondent’s (CI ) locus standi in the relief it seeks in the appeal. The
applicant’s conceded the nineteenth respondent’s interest in the litigation when it was
cited as a respondent in the main application. Although the nineteenth respondent is
not empowered to appoint Union trustees, it has an interest in whether the Union
trustees are lawfully appointed . The nineteenth respondent [consequently] has the
necessary locus standi to apply for leave to appeal” (my emphasis)
4] The leave to intervene is opposed by the applicants. They argue that the
1 Who are a trade union (the Union) and its appointed Administrator (Sono)
3
appointment of the three trustees is a power conferred upon them solely and in terms
of the Deed of Trust, that CI has does not need to be consulted nor its approval sought
in respect of these appointments, and that CI has no direct and substantial interest in
the main application. It is for this reason that CI is not cited as a party in the main
application. They argue that this leave to intervene application must therefore be
refused.
5] It is this leave to intervene that stands to be adjudicated.
The Background
6] The Union is a registered trade union in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66
of 1995. It was placed under administration in terms of an order dated 4 June 2020, at
the instance and request of the Registrar 2. Apart from the original order that placed
the Union in administration, another three orders have subsequently been granted.
7] In terms of the order of 4 June 2020, Ms TN Mas handa was appointed as the
administrator of the Union and she was given wide and extensive powers in terms of
that order. In effect, Ms Mashanda fully stepped into the shoes of the Union and the
Union’s national structures. As a result, the Union’s national structures – in the form of
its the National Office bearers and the National Executive Committee - were divested
of all administration powers. These powers then vested in Ms Mashanda.
2 It was placed under administration for, inter alia, failing to submit its audited financial statements for
approximately four years.
4
8] On 14 May 2024, Molotsi AJ3 varied the original administration order and
granted an extension of powers to the Administrator to include the following:
“3.1.7 The powers
i) to revoke the appoint ments of any persons appointed to serve as the
second applicant’s designated Union trustees of the CEPPWAWU
Development Trust by the second applicant’s national executive
committee on 25 July 2019.
ii) in consultation with the Registrar of Labour Relations, to appoint any
person he con siders suitable as union trustees of CEPPWAWU
Development Trust, provided that any person so appointed must be
independent and accredited and/or registered with the relevant
organisation; and
iii) to revoke any appointed made in terms of (ii) above or any subsequent
appointments and to appoint other persons to replace such appointees.
iv) once the Union is no longer under administration, the powers to appoint
Union truste es in accordance with the deed of trust of CE PPWAWU
Development Trust will revert and vest to the National Executive
Committee of the second respondent.”
9] The CEPPWAWU Development Trust (the Trust) was established as a vehicle
to hold investments4 to the benefit of the Union. The Trust’s sole beneficiary is, in fact,
the Union.
10] In terms of the Deed of Trust there are seven trustees:
3 In the Labour Court
4 As at 28 February 2019 the value was R 1, 5 billion
5
a) three are union trustees appointed by the Union ( and now by Sono as
appointed administrator);
b) two lnvestco trustees appointed by the Board of Directors of the holding
companies of the ventures established by the Trust. To date, CI is the
sole venture established by the Trust and therefore CI appoints two
trustees;
c) two professional trustees from professional bodies and/or a business
person appointed jointly at a sitting off the Trustees at a meeting.
11] According to Sono, the Trust has been dysfunctional since approximately 2011
because its Trustees fell below the minimum threshold of five, which resulted in
inquorate meetings5. He states that, to date, this is still the position. He states that the
appointment of the three Union trustees will enable it to operate “so that it can fulfil the
role for which it was established by managing its asset portfolio for the ultimate benefit of the
Union and its members ” as the dysfunction of the Trust means CI effectively has a
shareholder that is powerless to dictate the investment objectives of CI and , among
other things, to influence the strategic direction of CI.
12] But Ms Mashanda’s powers to appoint, and revoke the appointment, of Union
trustees was challenged in the application that served before Van Der Schyff J. I have
already referred to the fact that CI was the nineteenth respondent in that application.
Although the court set out the basis upon which it found that CI had locus standi, the
applicants in casu argue that they have abandoned the relief upon which CI relies for
its argument that its interest is established.
5 Which is denied by CI in its replying affidavit in the intervention application
6
13] The following are the portions of the order granted by Van Der Schyff J which
are relevant to the present issue:
1. The following persons are declared to be duly appointed trustees to the
CEPPWAWU Development Trust in accordance with the provisions of section
6(1) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, read with the Trust Deed of
the CEPPWAWU Development Trust, and the Labour Court Order granted on
4 June 2020 in case number: J289/18
1.1 Thulisile Njapa-Mashanda, in terms of clause 5.3.1 of the Trust Deed
1.2 Thabo Sindisa Kwinana, in terms of clause 5.3.1 of the Trust Deed
1.3 Bongani Manzi, in terms of clause 5.3.1 of the Trust Deed
1.4 Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka, in terms of clause 5.3.1 of the Trust Deed
1.5 Lancelord Ndumiso Luthuli, in terms of clause 5.3.1 of the Trust Deed
2. The Master of the High Court is directed to appoint two professional trustees in
terms of section 7 (1) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 within 15
(fifteen) days of this Order being served on it. The Master of the High Court is
directed to consult with representatives of the first applicant and the 19 th
respondent, and any other party it deems to have an interest in the appointment
of the professional trustees, prior to the appointments being made;
3. The Master of the High Court is directed to authorise in writing, in terms of
section 6(1) Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 , and within seven (7)
business days from the date of appointing the two professional trustees in terms
of paragraph 2 of this Order, the persons declared to be duly appointed trustees
of the CEPPWAWU Development Trust in paragraph 1 of this Order and the
persons appointed as professional trustees of the CEPPWAWU Development
Trust in terms of paragraph 2 of this Order, to act as Trustees of CEPPWAWU
Development Trust;
7
4. The persons mentioned in paragraph 1 above and appointed in terms of
paragraph 2 above are exempted from furnishing security to the Master of the
High Court in terms of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, in accordance
with the Trust Deed;
5. The first meeting of the trustees of the CEPPWAWU Development Trust must
be held within ten (10) business days from receipt of the letters of authority from
the Master issued in terms of paragraph 3 of this Order…
6. Each party is to pay its own costs incurred in relation to the main application.
Fifty percent (50%) of the costs of suit of the counter application, including costs
of senior and junior counsel, is to be paid by the first applicant.”
14] On 23 August 2021, Van Der Schyff J granted CI leave to appeal on the basis
that it had locus standi6. The leave to appeal was limited to paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,
paragraph 3 and paragraph 8 of her order. A petition filed by CI in the SCA in respect
of paragraph 2 of the order was successful and the order granting leave to appeal is
dated 12 November 2021.
15] The appeal is presently pending before the Supreme Court of Appeal.
16] On 7 August 2024, the present applicants filed a Notice to Abandon paragraphs
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 of Van Der Schyff J’s order. The appeal therefore remained extant in
respect of paragraphs 2, 3 and 8 of her order.
17] On 7 February 2025, the applicants filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Oppositi on
to paragraphs 2, 3, and 8 of the order.
6 See paragraph 3 supra
8
18] The applicants argue that, as a result of this, there is no lis that require s
adjudication by the Supreme Court of Appeal and that the Master is free to issue the
letters of Authority to the applicant s three nominated trustees. However, the Master
has yet to do so.
19] But, as stated, the issue is not quite as simple as this. It is common cause that
the Administrator (presently Mr Sono), can only appoint the three trustees nominated
“in consultation with” the Registrar. It is the Regis trar’s argument in the main
application that Mr Sono did not consult with him and that the main application was
launched in an effort to side-step him.
20] Even though applicants did not join CI as a respondent to the main application,
they served the application on it. In the Founding Affidavit the applicants state:
“[13] In paragraph 35 of the Founding Affidavit Sono disingenuously asserts that
“with the Labour Court having ordered that CI neither has locus standi on the
ssue of the appointment of Union Trustees nor will its interest be prejudiced
thereof (sic), CI will most likely approach this court to seek to intervene and
oppose the application and hoping to maintain the status quo of the
dysfunctionality of CDT.” Sono goes on to “implore this Honourable Court to
discourage and not allow the abuse of its due processes for nefarious reasons.
Any CI intervention and opposition will be exactly meddling herein.”
21] But CI argues that this view is misleading: the Labour Court was not concerned
at all with the appointment of the Union’s trustees – its sole adjudicative function was
to pronounce on the powers of the Administrator. This is not an issue wi th which CI
9
concerns itself, nor does it have the power to do so as it has no direct and substantial
interest in that application7. In fact, it concedes and it argues that
“15.4 CI did not seek to intervene in those proceedings, and did not contend that it
had locus standi to do so, but merely filed an affidavit as a person whose
interests may be affected, in order that such interests may be considered by
the Court before deciding whether or not to grant the order;
15.5 hence clause 2 of the order granted, held “ CI interest which the Court
considered will not be prejudiced by the current application”.” (emphasis
provided)
22] However, the issue of the legality of the appointments of the Union’s trustees is
of concern to CI.
23] CI alleges in the interlocutory application that:
“It is this very interest in whether the Union Trustees are lawfully appointed (amongst
other interests dealt with hereunder), that Judge van der Schyff held CI does indeed
have. I am advised that the determination by Judge van der Schyff of this issue and
the affirmation of CI’s interest in the legality of the appointments of Union designated
Trustees, is final and binding on the basis of issue estoppel. This will be fully addressed
in legal argument at the hearing of this CI application to intervene. This constitutes a
direct and substantial interest CI has in the subject matter of the main application in
which CI is seeking leave to intervene, which interest would be subverted and
prejudiced by the Order sought by the second Applicant in the main applicat ion. The
lack of merit of such application by Sono will be dealt with fully in the answering affidavit
to be filed by CI once this Honourable Court has granted the joinder of CI as the Third
Respondent in the main application.”
7 Which was ruled by the Labour Court
10
24] CI argues further that its direct and substantial interest extends to its rights and
interests which stand to be adversely affected should appointments of trustees not be
lawfully made, or whilst the appeal pending in the Supreme Court of Appeal has yet to
be determined.
25] It argues that the issues in the appeal remain live issues, the withdrawal of
some paragraphs of the order, and abandonment of others, notwithstanding. It argues
that the appeal is not rendered moot simply because applicants are not opposing it
and that until the order of Van Der Schyff J is upheld, substituted or amended by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, the order, albeit suspended, remains valid – it is simply not
enforceable by virtue of the pending appeal.
26] What is significant is that, by virtue of applicants’ withdrawal from the appeal, it
is clear that it takes no issue with the orders that flowed from the finding that CI has
an interest in whether the Union trustees are lawfully appointed.”
27] The reason for this according to CI is that:
“[7] As such the question of the validity of the appointment of Prof. de Koker as a
professional trustee of the CEPPWAWU Development Trust , as ruled upon by
the court a quo on a point of law, having interpreted the trust deed and section
6(1) of the Trust Pro perty Control Act in this regard in order to arrive at its
finding, still need to be finally determined and pronounced upon by the SCA,
and the appeal thus remains very much alive and pending, until such time that
the SCA ruled on the Appellant’s appeal and has determined whether the Court
a quo’s Order is indeed to be set aside and substituted by the Amended Order
as prayed for by the Appellant.
11
[8] Furthermore, depending on the outcome of the appeal in regard to the validity
of the appointment of Prof. de Koker as trustee, the SCA will also have to rule
on whether the process as set out in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Amended Order
sought by the Appellant, or the process as set out in original Order of the Court
a quo, will have to be followed by the Master of the High Court and the parties
concerned. The Appellant is pursuing the appeal to this end as well.”
The case law
28] Rule 12 states:
“Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as defendant in any action
may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to
intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant. The court may upon such application make such
order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to further procedure
in the action as to it may seem meet.”
29] Our case law has crystalised the principles to be applied to joinder applications
as the following:
a) the applicant must meet the direct and substantial in terest test in order
to succeed:
“[9] What constitutes a direct and substantial interest is the legal interest in
the subject matter of the case which could be prejudicial affected by the
order of the Court. This means that the applicant must show that it has
a right adversely affected or likely to be affected by the order sought.
But the applicant does not have to satisfy the court at the stage of
intervention that it will succeed. It is sufficient for such applicant to make
allegations which, if proved, would entitle it to relief.
12
[10] If the applicant shows that it has same right which is affected by the
order issued, permission to intervene must be granted…”8
b) In Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Grayvenouw CC 9 the
court stated:
“In addition, when, as in this matter, the applicants base their claim to intervene
on a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the dispute, the court
has no discretion: it must allow them to intervene because it should not proceed
in the absence of parties having such legally recognized interests.”
30] CI argues that, in addition to Rule 12, it can also be joined under the common
law on grounds of convenience, equity, the saving of costs and the avoidance of
multiplicity of actions.10
31] In this matter the issue is not whether CI has a say in who the Administrator
appoints as trustees – that was conc eded by Mr Wessels in argument - but the
argument is that CI has an interest in the process by which the Union’s trustees are
appointed. The argument is further that CI has an interest in the legitimacy of the
appointments.
32] CI argues that, in any event, the interest has already been decided by Van Der
Schyff J and the re-argument of the issue amounts to no more than issue estoppel.
8 SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner 2017 (5) SA 1 (CC)
9 2004 (20 SA 81 (SE) at para 9 and as quoted with approval in SA Riding School (supra)
10 Ex parte Suderhavid (Pty) Ltd: In re Namibia Marine Resources (Pty) v Ferina (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA
737 (NM) at 741 E-F; Morgan v Salisbury Municipality 1935 AD 167 at 171
13
33] The applicants argue that the only issue before this court in the main application
is the appointment of the three trustees nominated by the Union. They argue that this
is not an issue that is the subject matter of the Supreme Court of Appeal – that appeal
concerns the appointment of the professional trustee and that, as CI does not
challenge his appointment, the appointment of the Union trustees will have no impact
on that issue.
34] But in my view this argument is not correct: there are two independent trustees.
They are appointed by the three Union trustees and CI’s two appointed trustees. It is
common cause that one of the two independent trustees has passed away. Thus, the
five other trustees must still appoint the second independent trustee. Furthermore, the
Trustees are together tasked with administering the Trust which owns the share in CI
which is the investment arm of the Union. CI therefore has an interest in ensuring that
the Union trustees are properly q ualified and properly appointed. Its direct and
substantial interest stems directly from the Trust Deed and proper administration of its
assets all of which are administered by the appointed Trustees.
35] The Registrar has taken a point of non -joinder in the main application.
According to the Registrar:
“[33] As mentioned by Mr Sono in his founding affidavit, the whole purpose of this
application is to appoint trustees in order to operationalize CDT so that it may
obtain funds from CI for the benefit of union members. As such, the Union
and/or its members are the ultimate beneficial owners of the funds of CI yet CI
has not been joined to the proceedings. It is quite clear that CI has a direct and
substantial interest in the matter of trustees to the Union. Mr Sono might well
argue that CI does not have a s ay in the appointment of Union Trustees but
14
should this be the case, it does not detract from CI’s interest in who gets
appointed as a trustee of CDT as CI would have to declare its dividends to CDT
as managed by the relevant trustees.
[34] CI accordingly has a direct and substantial interest in who it will be handing
funds over and should therefore have been joined to these proceedings.”
36] Furthermore, Van Der Schyff J has already ruled on the direct and substantial
interest that CI has in the issue of the appointment of trustees. That order is subject to
confirmation or variation by the SCA. It matters not that the appeal is unopposed – the
SCA has yet to rule on the issue.
37] In my view, all of the above demonstrate CI’s direct and substantial interest in
the outcome of the main application. Given this, the interlocutory application must be
granted.
Costs
38] Mr Wessels originally moved for a de bonis propriis order against Mr Sono. He,
however, conceded in argument that there was insufficient evidence before court to
show that Mr Sono was vexatious or his conduct of such a nature that it warrants
censure from the court. He instead moved for costs on Scale C.
39] In my view, costs on Scale B are appropriate. The application is not so complex
or the issues so involved that Scale C is warranted. The fact that the parties both
briefed Senior Counsel also is simply demonstrative of the fact that the parties view
the matter as one of importance. But that is simply one of the factors a court weights
when determining costs.
ORDER:
1. C EPPWAWU Investments (Pty) Ltd, is granted leave to intervene, and is hereby
joined, as third respondent in the above application ("Main Application")
2. The third respondent is granted leave to file its answ ering affidavit in the Main
Application w ithin 15 days of the grant of this order.
3. The costs of the joinder application are to be paid by the applicants in the main
application, w hich costs shall include the costs consequent upon the
employmen t of a senior counsel and are to be taxed in accordance w ith Scale
B .
NEUKIRCHER J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
This judgment w as prepared and authored by the judge w hose name is reflected, and
is handed dow n electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives
by ema il and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines. The
date for hand-dow n is deemed to be 4 November 2025.
15
16
Appearances
For the appellant : Adv Wessels SC
Instructed by : Mendelow Jacobs Attorneys
For the respondent : Adv Sikhakhane SC, with him Adv Mndebele
Instructed by : KMNS Inc
Matter heard on : 22 August 2025
Judgment date : 4 November 2025