IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
D ELETE W HICHEV ER IS NOT AP PLICAB LE
(1) RE PORTAB LE : NO
(2) OF INTERES T TO O TH ERS JUDG ES: N O
(3) REVISED
3 N ovem ber 2025
DATE
In the matter between:
GREGORY ARTHUR HOUGH
and
THE PRESIDENT: HEAL TH PROFESSIONS
COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE HEAL TH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF
SOUTH AFRICA ("HPCSA")
ADVOCATE D D MOGOTSI N.O.
[Member: Professional Condu ct Inquiry]
DR KN L LINDA-MAFANYA N.O.
[Membe r: Professional Conduct Committee]
DR K T NGOYI N.O.
[Member : Professional Conduct Comm ittee]
PROFESSOR W F MOLLENTZE N.O.
[Member : Professional Conduct Comm ittee]
Case number : 143815/2025
Date: 3 November 2025
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Responden t
Sixth Respondent
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MR S T MABUNDA N.O.
[Member: Professional Conduct Committee]
THE REGISTRAR: HEAL TH PROFESSIONS
COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MR T BALOYI N.0.
[Pro forma complainant]
JUDGMENT
MINNAARAJ:
Introduction:
Seventh Respondent
Eight Respondent
Ninth Respondent
[1] Initially, the applicant, who practised as a specialist endocrinologist, was
charged with seven counts of unprofessional conduct or conduct that,
when regarded in the context of his profession, is unprofessional. All
seven counts related to incidents that occurred in 2013 and 2014. The
complaints were laid in 2020 and related to allegations of various forms
of sexual assault. There were three complainants, all of whom were
female patients of the applicant.
[2] The conduct inquiry proceedings were initially scheduled for 6 and 7
September 2023. It is common cause that the applicant did not attend
on these dates.
The proceedings then proceeded on 25 October 2023. On this date, the
Conduct Committee called Dr Pillay to testify. Dr Pillay's testimony
revolved around a sick note that she issued and which was presented
on behalf of the applicant. The applicant, through Bruce Scott Attorney,
3
made an application requesting that the inquiry be stood over pending
the finalisation of an application for a permanent stay of the proceedings.
This request was dismissed, resulting in the applicant's attorneys being
obliged to withdraw.
On 27 October 2023, a new legal representative (Mr Van den Berg)
appeared on behalf of the applicant seeking a postponement as he was
unable to prepare on such short notice. The request for a postponement
was dismissed, resulting in the applicant's second legal representative
withdrawing from the record. On this day, the applicant also excused
himself from the proceedings. The inquiry proceeded in absentia, and
the charges were put to the applicant. A plea of not guilty was tendered,
and the inquiry was postponed to 22 November 2023 for further
evidence.
On 1 November 2023, the applicant, in person, delivered a complaint
against the Chairperson (the third respondent herein), which also
embodied an application for the Committee's recusal. The applicant then
reappointed Bruce Scott, Attorney (who is still representing the applicant
herein). An urgent application followed, and the matter was settled on
the basis that the inquiry would be held over pending a recusal
application and/or review thereof.
The recusal application was heard and dismissed in December 2023.
The inquiry was postponed to 31 January 2024. The applicant failed to
institute a review against the recusal order, and on 31 January 2024, a
ruling was made that the inquiry would proceed on 21 February 2024.
On 20 February 2024, the applicant issued the review application.
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A second urgent application was launched to hold over the inquiry
pending the finalisation of the review. This urgent application was struck
from the roll due to a lack of urgency.
The inquiry thus proceeded, with the review application being held in
abeyance.
[3] On 3 June 2025, the applicant was found guilty on counts 1 and 2. The
applicant was acquitted on charges 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, as these charges
were declared pro non scripto since the complainant in these charges
was not cross-examined.
[4] On 24 July 2025, in terms of section 42(1)(c) of the Health Professions
Council Act, Act 56 of 197 4 ('the Act'), the applicant's name was
removed from the register, resulting in the applicant being unable to
practise as a medical practitioner.
[5] The applicant is challenging both the conviction and the sanction
imposed on him. On 15 August 2025, the applicant lodged an internal
appeal in terms of Regulation 11 of the Regulations relating to the
Conduct of Inquiries into Alleged Unprofessional Conduct under the Act
('the internal appeal'). The applicant's review under case number
018261/2024 is also still pending. The applicant further envisages that,
should he not be successful with his internal appeal, he would institute
an appeal in terms of section 20 of the Act ('the envisaged appeal').
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[6] The applicant proceeded to approach this Court on a semi-urgent basis
to obtain an interim interdict to suspend the sanction imposed, effective
immediately, pending the pending appeal and review, as well as the
envisaged appeal.
[7] The first, second and eighth respondents (jointly referred to in this
judgment as 'the respondent') are opposing this application.
[8] In terms of the joint practice note, the following issues are not in dispute
between the parties:
a. Urgency;
b. That the applicant establishes irreparable harm; and
c. That the applicant has no other suitable remedy other than to
approach this Court.
[9] The urgency, the irreparable harm that the applicant is suffering and the
absence of another suitable remedy all revolve around the applicant's
ability to earn an income and the financial impact the sanction has on
the applicant.
[1 OJ According to the joint practice note, the following aspects are in
dispute:
a. The applicant's prospects of success in setting aside the
conviction and/or sanction in the pending appeal and/or review
and/or the envisaged appeal.
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b. The applicant's prejudice should the sanction that was imposed,
continues to operate, prohibiting him from practising as a medical
doctor;
c. Whether the applicant has shown a prima facie right; and
d. Whether the balance of convenience favours the applicant or the
respondents.
Section 42(1A) of the Act:
[11] Under 'normal' circumstances, it is usually the position that the
operation and execution of a decision, which is the subject of an appeal
process, is suspended pending the decision of the appeal.
[12] The Act, however, does not provide for 'normal' circumstances.
The Act regulates the health professions. The HPCSA is" ... a statutory
custos morum of the medical profession, the guardian of the prestige,
status and dignity of the profession and the public interest in so far as
members of the public are affected by the conduct of members of the
profession to whom they had stood in a professional relationship."1
[13] The Court is bound to consider this application in terms of the
provision of section 42(1A) of the Act, which reads: "If an appeal is
lodged against a penalty of erasure or suspension from practice, such
penalty shall remain effective until the appeal is finalised."
1 Veriava v President, South African Medical and Dental Council 1985 (2) SA 293 (T) at 307B
7
[14] Section 42(1A) is clear: irrespective of an appeal against a
penalty of erasure or suspension from practice, such a penalty shall
remain in place. In applications of the nature as the one before this
Court, we are therefore not faced with 'normal' circumstances.
[15] The purpose of section 42(1A) is to protect the public against a
medical practitioner, exercising his or her rights of appeal and/or review.
In effect, section 42(1A) closes the door of practice for a medical
practitioner whose name was removed from the register.
[16] Although section 42(1A) speaks of an appeal, there is nothing to
indicate that it would not also cater for review proceedings.
[17] Under 'normal' circumstances, an applicant who applies for an
interim interdict pending a review application has to satisfy the court that
there are good prospects of success in the application. This can be
demonstrated by showing that the review is based on strong grounds
that are likely to succeed.2
[18] The test to be applied in the application of the Act would be more
stringent, and the applicant must show exceptional circumstances
before an interim interdict will be granted.3 This is because the applicant
seeks to intervene in a statutory provision that an appeal (and by
2 Cf. Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan and Others 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC) at para (42]
3 Pretorius v HPCSA 2024 JDR 2599 GP at par (45]
8
implication a review) would not impose or suspend the effect of the
sanction.
[19] It is trite that the courts should recognise the separation of powers
afforded to functionaries. In Bato Fishing (Ply) Ltd v Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 48, the
Constitutional Court stated that: "In treating the decisions of
administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a Court is
recognising the proper role of the Executive within the Constitution. In
doing so a Court should be careful not to attribute to itself superior
wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of government.
A Court should thus give due weight to findings of fact and policy
decisions made by those with special expertise and experience in the
field. The extent to which a Court should give weight to these
considerations will depend upon the character of the decision itself, as
well as on the identity of the decision-maker. A decision that requires an
equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or
considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with
specific expertise in that area must be shown respect by the Courts.
Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, but will not dictate which
route should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a
Court should pay due respect to the route selected by the decision
maker. This does not mean, however, that where the decision is one
which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which
is not reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of
9
the reasons given for it, a Court may not review that decision. A Court
should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of
the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker."
[20] In National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling
Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at par 63, the Constitutional
Court stated: "There is yet another and very important consideration
when the balance of convenience is struck. It relates to separation of
powers. In !TAC we followed earlier statements in Doctors for Life and
warned that -
'(w)here the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific
powers and functions to a particular branch of government, courts may
not usurp that power or function by making a decision of their preference.
That would frustrate the balance of power implied in the principle of
separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a court is not to make
decisions reserved for or within the domain of other branches of
government, but rather to ensure that the concerned branches of
government exercise their authority within the bounds of the
Constitution. This would especially be so where the decision in issue is
policy-laden as well as polycentric".
[21] The Constitutional Court stated in Economic Freedom Fighters v
Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) at para 92: "The
judiciary is but one of the three branches of government. It does not have
unlimited powers and must always be sensitive to the need to refrain
10
from undue interference with the functional independence of other
branches of government. It was with this in mind that this court noted:
'Courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the
Constitution's design to leave certain matters to other branches of
government. They too must observe the constitutional limits of their
authority. This means that the judiciary should not interfere in the
processes of other branches of government . . . "
[22] In Peer v Chairperson: Medical and Dental Professions Board
and Others (76888/2010) [201 0] ZAGPPHC 246 (24 December 2010),
Botha J held: " ... it is clear that the legislator did not grant the court, or
the appeal committee, or any official, the power to grant relief from the
harsh effect of section 42(1A) if an appeal is noted against an erasure
or a suspension."
[23] The Act entrusted the Professional Conduct Committee with
discretion, and this Committee exercised that discretion by finding the
applicant guilty on the two charges and imposing the sanction. The legal
position, as set out in Bato Star Fishing supra, is clear, and it is not for
this Court to intervene with such discretion.
The applicant's prospects of success in the pending appeal and/or review
and/or envisaged appeal: prima facie right:
[24] To establish a prima facie right, the applicant must demonstrate
a good prospect of success in the main application. In amplification,
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exceptional circumstances must be shown before an interim interdict will
be granted.4
[25] It is not for this Court to make a definite finding on the applicant's
prospects of success in the pending appeal and/or review and/or the
envisaged appeal. What the Court should be satisfied with is that there
is a strong case for the interim relief to be granted, being mindful only to
grant the interim relief under exceptional circumstances.
[26] The review application is premised on the alleged bias of the
members of the Professional Conduct Committee and the failed recusal
application.
The pending appeal concerns the handling of evidence, specifically how
it was accepted, interpreted, and applied by the Committee. The appeal
also challenges the severity of the sanction imposed.
[27] When the applicant did not appear when the charges were put to
him, a plea of not guilty on all the charges was recorded. Thereafter, the
applicant was legally represented, and he was able to cross-examine
witnesses and make submissions before his conviction and the
imposition of the sanction. The applicant was charged and found guilty
of sexual misconduct, not of some intrinsic aspect of medical negligence.
The Committee was in the best position to consider and evaluate the
evidence presented to it. It is further a trite position that an appellate
4 Pretorius v Health Professions Council of South Africa and another 2024 JDR 2599 (GP) at par 45
12
body should be slow to intervene in a sanction unless such a sanction is
shockingly disproportionate.
[28] Upon analysing the record of proceedings, the manner in which
the inquiry was conducted, the charges laid, evidence presented and
being challenged, the probabilities on the evidence, the conviction, and
the sanction imposed, I cannot find that any of these grounds constitutes
a strong prospect of success on either the review and/or the pending
appeal or the envisaged appeal.
The applicant's prejudice should the interim order not be granted:
[29] The applicant's prejudice is of a financial nature in that he cannot
earn an income as a medical practitioner. It is inescapable to find that
the sanction, in fact, prejudices the applicant.
[30] Prejudice is but one of the requirements that have to be met. It
cannot be looked at in isolation and does not, on its own, warrant an
interim order.
The balance of convenience:
[31] Returning to the purpose of section 42(1A): it is meant to shut the
doors of a medical practice pending an appeal. The sole purpose of
section 42(1A) is to protect the public against a medical practitioner who
has been suspended or whose name has been removed from the
13
register. This statutory protection of the public is where the respondent's
balance of convenience vests.
[32) The applicant's balance of convenience centres around his ability
to earn an income and to make a living. These are serious aspects to
consider.
[33] The charges relate to sexual misconduct towards female patients
and are not premised on any medical negligence. South Africa is
plagued by the sexual exploitation of women and children, and as such,
the courts, almost daily, express themselves on this aspect.
[34] The purpose of section 42(1A) is to protect the public. In my view,
that protection becomes more prevalent where a medical practitioner is
convicted of sexual misconduct. Unless there are exceptional
circumstances present, the doors of such a medical practice should not
be opened pending the exercise by the medical practitioner of his rights
of appeal.
[35] The applicant's financial detriment does not constitute
exceptional circumstances, and as such, the balance of convenience
convincingly favours the respondent herein.
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[36] In amplification, and as already stated, it is not for this Court to
intervene with the statutory discretion imposed by section 42(1A). As
such, it follows that the balance of convenience favours the respondent.
Conclusion:
[37] The applicant has failed to show exceptional circumstances to
warrant the granting of an interim interdict. It is not for this Court to
intervene in the stringent dictates of section 42(1A). It follows that the
application must be dismissed.
Costs:
[38] There is no reason why costs should not follow the outcome. The
respondent prayed for costs on scale C, and such costs are justified.
Order:
[39] Consequently, I make the following order:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application
on scale C .
Minnaar AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Heard on
For the Applicant
Instructed by
For the Respondent
Instructed by
Date of Judgment
15
: 10 October 2025
: Adv. M Hugo
: Bruce Scott Attorney
: Adv. J G Rautenbach SC
: Tlhatlha Attorneys
: 4 November 2025