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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN



Not Reportable
Case no: 2025-127911

In the matter between:

JOHANNES JACOBUS VENTER FIRST APPLICANT
KARI VENTER SECOND APPLICANT

and

MARCO RAYMONDE HELFER FIRST RESPONDENT
GAVIN BRIAN ROBERTSON SECOND RESPONDENT
GEORG MARTIN HAAS THIRD RESPONDENT
MELANIE JO DE OLIVIERA FOURTH RESPONDENT
MURRAY SIMPSON EASTON FIFTH RESPONDENT
KEVIN KRIEGE SIXTH RESPONDENT
JACQUELINE NUTMAN SEVENTH RESPONDENT

KEEGAN JAMES NICOL EIGHTH RESPONDENT
AUDREY MCNEAL NICOL NINTH RESPONDENT

Coram: COOKE AJ
Heard: 10 and 28 October 2025
Judgment: 12 November 2025


ORDER



[1] The first, second, third, eig hth and ninth respondents are interdicted and
restrained from parking vehicles on the servitude area at 1 […] H[...]
Road, Higgovale, Cape Town, in such a manner as to unreasonably
obstruct the applicants from entering and exiting their property and
exercising their right of way.

[2] The parties shall pay their own costs , save that the applicants shall pay
the costs of the amendment application dated 28 October 2025, including
the costs of opposition, on the attorney and client scale , with counsel ’s
fees to be taxed on scale B.


JUDGMENT

[1] This case is , in essence, a parking dispute between neighbours. The
applicants, who own the property at 1 [...] T[...] Road, Higgovale, Cape
Town, and are referred to in this judgment as ‘the Venters’, enjoy a right
of way over the neighbouring driveway at 1[...] H[...] Road ( ‘the
driveway’). The Venters complain that the respondents , who reside at
1[...] H[...] Road, park in a manner which impedes access to the Venters’
property. The dispute raises questions regarding the interpretation of a
right of way servitude, and the obligatio n of neighbours to act
reasonably, and in accordance with the constitutional principle of ubuntu.

[2] On 31 July 2025, the Venters launched an application in terms of which
they sought a n order interdicting and restraining the respondents from
parking vehicles on the driveway. In due course it became apparent that
the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents were no longer owners of
units at 1[...] H[...] Road, prompting the Venters to withdraw their claims
against them. In this judgment I shall refer to the remaining respondents
as ‘the residents’. On 12 September 2025 , Miller AJ postponed the
application for a hearing scheduled on 9 October 2025. The hearing date
was in due course changed to 10 October 2025.

[3] On 19 September 2025, the residents delivered an answering affidavit in
which they opposed the relief sought by the Venters on the following
grounds:

a. the Venters failed to cite the owner of the property over which the
servitude is registered, namely the Kloof H eights Body Corporate
(‘the body corporate’);

b. the requirements for an interdict had not been satisfied, and in
particular the Venters do not have a clear right to prevent the
residents from parking on the servitude area;

c. the right of way has, in any even t, either become extinguished or
falls to be cancelled because of the construction of a second
driveway to the Venters’ property from the opposite side of the
property, via T[...] Road;

d. the Venters are building on their property, and the residents expect
the servitude will be employed to cater for the additional traffic
caused by their tenants which would be an abuse of the servitude;

e. the Venters failed to maintain the servitude road; and

f. the Venters alleged no facts from which the court could conclude
that it would be just and equitable for the residents to be restrained
from parking on the servitude and therefore the interdict, being a
discretionary remedy, should not be granted.

[4] On the day of the hearing , an inspection of the driveway was conducted
in terms of an agreement dated 9 October 2025. In this agreement,
consideration was given to the judgment of Farlam AJ in Rosevean
Investments 0028 (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others ,1 and it was
provided that the inspection shall not alter the evidential position of
either party nor affect the application of the Plascon-Evans principle in
relation to factual disputes. During the inspection, I observed the entire
servitude area and the driveway in the configuration ordin arily used by

1 2025 (3) SA 616 (WCC).

the residents (save that certain of them were apparently in Johannesburg
for work). The Venters’ garage door was opened, and I was show n the
interior layout and the spatial rela tionship between the garage a nd the
servitude. In addition, counsel highlighted features relevant to access and
parking, including the width of the servitude road and the position of
existing structures or obstructions.2

[5] After hearing argument, and h aving regard to the claim that the body
corporate ought to have been cited in the proceedings, I postponed the
application to 28 October 2025, to allow the body corporate an
opportunity to file such papers as it may consider necessary. The body
corporate delivered a belated affidavit on 27 October 2025. This was the
day before the matter was scheduled to be heard again. The body
corporate protested that it should have been joined and reserved its rights
to bring any application it may be advised to institute . T he body
corporate did not , however, address the substance of the application . It
stated that it continued to manage access and parking on the servitude
area consistently with the civiliter modo3 principle. It further indicated
that it ha d been considering / implementing practical measures pending
the final determination of any variation or cancellation of the servitude .
These measures included possible parking demarcation, to facilitate use
by the residents and the Venters’ reasonable access.


2 It appears that inspections of this nature are not without precedent. See Penny and Another v Brentwood
Gardens Body Corporate 1983 (1) SA 487 (C) at 488B.
3 For a discussion of this phrase, see AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (2016) page 247ff – the
servitude holder must exercise the servitude entitlement with d ue regard for the interests of the servient
owner, in other words civiliter or reasonably.

[6] During the resumed hearing on 28 October 2025 , the Venters moved an
amendment of their notice of motion in terms of which they sought to
introduce the following alternative relief:

‘the Respondents be interdicted and restrained from parking vehicles on the servitude
area at 1 […] H[...] Road, Higgovale, Cape Town, in such a manner as to
unreasonably obstruct the applicants from entering and exiting their prop erty and
exercising their rights of way.’

[7] After hearing argument , I decided to allow the amendment. I did so
principally for the following reasons:

a. In my view , the amend ed relief was covered by the allegations
made in the papers and could well have been sought under the
rubric of ‘further and/or alternative relief’.4

b. Furthermore, the proposed alternative relief accorded with the
allegations made by the residents themselves. For instance, in the
answering affidavit the residents accepted that they may not
impede the Venters’ reasonable access to their garage, and that the
servitude contemplates that motor vehicles would be parked in
such a way as to provide sufficient space for the Venters to enter
and exit their garage.

c. In addition, although the Venters’ original notice of motion sought
an order interdicting parking altogether, the founding affidavit
indicated a more nuanced ap proach, alleging that the residents

4 See Port Nolloth Municipality v Xhalisa and Others ; Luwalala and Others v Port Nolloth Municipality
1991 (3) SA 98 (C).

should be interdicted from parking vehicles or otherwise
obstructing the servitude right of way.

d. The residents dealt comprehensively with the issue of obstruction
in their answering affidavit, and both heads of argument canvassed
this issue.

[8] In the circumstances, I did not consider that there would be any prejudice
to the residents if the amendment wer e to be allowed. As regards costs,
the Venters sought an indulgence , and the residents’ opposition was
neither frivolous nor vexatious. Therefore, the Venters should bear the
costs of the application, including the costs of opposition.5

[9] As to the scale of the costs, the amendment application was sought on the
morning of the resumed hearing. In my opinion the amendment could and
should have been sought much earlier . There was no need to wait for the
body corporate’s papers, if any. To the contrary, the Venters should have
disclosed their intentions before the body corporate was required to
deliver its papers. The belated application caused the hearing to be stood
down until after lunch to allow the residents to file an opposing affidavit .
The residents were placed under severe time pressure , and the hearing
eventually consumed the entire day. The delay in delivering the
amendment application was consequently disruptive, and prejudicial to
both the reside nts and the court. It was, in effect, vexatious.6 The
residents should not be out of pocket for these costs. In my view it would

5 Grindrod (Pty) Ltd v Delport and Others 1997 (1) SA 342 (W) at 347C-E.
6 In re Alluvial Creek Ltd v SADTC 1929 CPD 532 at 535 ; Nel v Waterberg Landbouwers Ko -operatiewe
Vereeniging 1946 AD 597 at 607.

be appropriate if the Venters bear these costs on the attorney and client
scale.

[10] I now turn to the merits of the application. There are two animating
principles which arise in relation to servitudes. First, the owner of the
dominant tenement (in this case the Venters) is entitled to ‘effective use’
of the servitude. Second, such use must be exercised by imposing the
lightest possible burden on the servient tenement (in this case 12 H[...]
Road).7 In the context of this case, these principles mean that the Venters
are entitled to effective use of the right of way, but they must exercise
this right by imposing the lightest possible burden on the residents.

[11] The Supreme Court of Appeal noted in Mannaru that the relationship
arising from the exercise of a servitude is fraught with tensions that may
escalate into disputes, for the most part, between the user rights of the
dominant owner and the rights of the servient owner. The approach
adopted by our courts in resolving such disputes is reliance on the
principle of civiliter modo – being a particular expression of the
principle of reasonableness.8

[12] In my view the common law principles relating to servitudes should
also be interpreted within the context and framework of the
Constitution,9 and with particular emphasis on the value of ubuntu.10 In

7 The Law of Servitudes pages 412-3. See also Mannaru and Another v McLennan -Smith and Others 2023
(2) SA 150 (SCA) paras 12-18.
8 Para 13.
9 See in this regard The Law of Servitudes page 37ff.
10 See Sunset Ridge Estate Home -Owners Association v Van Deventer and Others (035234/2022) [2024]
ZAGPPHC 220 (5 February 2024) paras 50, 54 and 58.

this regard, I agree with the approach suggested by Kotzé and
Boggenpoel:11

‘In a constitutional context characterised by its insistence upon equality, freedom and
human dignity, neighbour law can no longer be construed in terms of notions of the
rights of competing but more or less equal property owners and property occupiers.
From a constitutional perspective, the role of neighbour law should be to provide just
and equitable solutions for conflicts arising from the fact that neighbours from
different social, cultural, customary and religious backg rounds and with different
rights and interests are living together in close proximity. To this end, broader
constitutional values such as ubuntu may be infused in the common law
reasonableness test to assist courts in balancing competing rights and interes ts in a
principled way to "promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good
neighbourliness and shared concern". uBuntu not only places focus on one's concern
for one's fellow neighbour, communitarianism and social solidarity but also
encompasses many "other values such as fairness, empathy, justice, sympathy, equity
and compassion". In this way, the principle of reasonableness, and the concept
of ubuntu may inform the exercise of rights and interests in a community, as these
concepts emphasise sharing, co-responsibility and "the mutual enjoyment of rights by
all".’

[13] Van der Walt expressed a similar idea in The Law of Neighbours: ‘…
neighbour law embodies and represents an element of good
neighbourliness, of citizenship, of co mmunity, that reflects the
transformative intentions of the Constitution, instead of being just a
purely private or economic relationship.’12

11 Kotzé T and Boggenpoel Z ‘Living Together as Neighbours: Rethinking the Reasonableness Standard in
Nuisance Law Under the Constitution ’ PER / PELJ 2021(24) - DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-

3781/2021/v24i0a11169 page 6 . Footnotes not included. These authors argue that the courts should apply
the reasonableness test in neighbour law by considering all the relevant circumstances of the case,
including the values (ubuntu) and ideals of the Constitution (page 25). In my view the same may be said for
the application of the similar principles in the closely related field of servitudes.
12 AJ van der Walt The Law of Neighbours (2010) page 6. See also the concluding views at pages 66-68.

[14] While the common law requires that neighbours act reasonably, the
Constitution shows what a reasonable neighbou r looks like. She is not
only concerned with advancing her own private interests but cares also
for the needs of her neighbours. She seeks mutually beneficial solutions.
The mindset of the reasonable neighbour is one of collaboration, not
competition. She sees herself not as an is olated individual, but a part ner
in an interdependent community of persons, all of whom are to be
respected and valued.

[15] Against this backdrop, I now consider the relief sought by the Venters
in this application. The Venters seek interdictory relief. The
requirements for a final interdict are well -known. The Venters must
show: (a) a clear right on the ir part; (b) a n injury actually committed or
reasonably apprehended ; and (c) the absence of any other satisfactory
remedy available to them. These requirements are addressed below.

[16] The notarial deed of servitude registered on 3 March 1966 , confers
upon the Venters’ property, as the dominant tenement, ‘a servitude right
of way across the servient tenement in order to g ive the owner for the
time being of the dominant tenement access to and from H[...] Road,
Oranjezicht’. On 11 February 1987 , the servitude was amended by way
of a notarial deed. The relevant parts of the amendment are as follows:

‘that the said NORMAN JOHN OSBURN as owner of the dominant tenement,
agrees and undertakes that he and his successors in title shall be responsible for the
maintenance and upkeep of the aforesaid roadway...

that save only for this right of way neither the said NORMAN JOHN OSBURN nor
his successors in title of the dominant tenement shall have any rights of whatsoever
nature over the servitude area, in particular the right to park a motor vehicle thereon,
except that persons desiring access to the dominant tenement solely for the purpose
of delivering goods or providing services shall be permitted to park their vehicles on
the said servitude area for a reasonable period of time for such purposes...

that the servitude created in the said Notarial Deed of Servitude No. 157/1966 shall
be extended in area...’

[17] The deed of servitude must be construed in accordance with the
modern approach to the interpretation of legal instruments. It thus falls to
be assessed ‘ holistically: simultaneously considering the text, context
and purpose’.13

[18] The Venters initially sought an order that the res idents be interdicted
and restrained from parking vehicles on the driveway altogether. The
servitude, however, does not expressly prohibit the residents from
parking on the driveway. The amendment to the servitude did expressly
prohibit the own ers of the dominant tenement (ie the Venters) from
parking on the driveway, save in certain specific instances. Had it been
the intention to also preclude the residents from parking on the driveway,
I expect the servitude would have expressly stated this. In my view it is
implicit from the amendment that the residents are not so precluded.

[19] Furthermore, the servitude should be construed in a way which
imposes the light est burden on the servient property. This is consistent
with the principle that where a ro ute is undetermined on a right of way,

13 Huntrex 277 (Pty) Ltd v Berzack and Others 2025 (4) SA 347 (CC) para 57.

the dominant owner may designate a specific r oute across the servient
land, provided that this right is exercised with appropri ate consideration
for the servient owner's interests and does not impose an undue burden
on the servient land. 14 This is also consistent with the constitutional
imperatives discussed above.

[20] I am satisfied that the Venters have demonstrated a definitive
entitlement to the effective use of the right of way over the driveway.
However, having regard to the configuration of the driveway, it appears
to me that it is possible for some vehicles to be parked on the driveway
in a manner that does not obstruct the effective use of the driveway by
the Venters. In these circumstances , to prohibit the residents from
parking on the driveway al together, would conflict with the lightest
burden principle, and w ould impose an unnecessary burden on the
servient land. It would also clash with the caring and communitarian
philosophy underlying the value of ubuntu. In the result , I do not
consider that the servitude created a n absolute ban on parking on the
driveway. It follows that the mere fact that the residents parked on the
driveway was not a breach of the Venters ’ rights. Therefore, for this
reason alone, the Venters are not entitled to the interdict sought
originally in the notice of motion.

[21] I now turn to the alternative relief which was introduced by the
amendment granted at the hearing on 28 October 2025 . In my opinion ,
the effective use principle entails the Venters being entitled to drive a
vehicle in and ou t of their garage in a single motion, without having to

14 Law of Servitudes page 419.

execute multiple point turns. 15 Having regard to all the evidence placed
before me, including the allegations in the affidavits, the photographs
provided, as well as the video evidence, I con clude that there have been
instances where the residents have parked in such a way as to obstruct
the Venters’ reasonable access to their property , including most
particularly, vehicular access to the left hand (easterly) side of their
garage. CCTV stills showed that this conduct persisted between the first
hearing and the resumed hearing. In the circumstances, an infringement
has been committed and, I believe, it may reasonably be apprehended
that absent an interdict the residents will continue to infringe the
Venters’ right of way.

[22] To my mind, an interdict is the only satisfactory remedy available to the
Venters. This is not the kind of case where a party may be expected to
resort to a claim for damages . The injury constitutes an ongoing
infringement of the Venters’ rights, and the question of damages will be
difficult to assess . Pursuing such a claim will be costly and protracted.
To my mind, the Venters cannot justifiably be expected to wait for their
rights to be determined at trial . I also disagree with the residents’
contention that the Venters should limit themselves to accessing their
property from T[...] Road. It is not possible to access the garage by a
vehicle from T[...] Road. In any event, the Venters have a right to access
their property from H[...] Road, via the driveway, and are entitled to use
whichever access point they prefer. The requirements for an interdict
have therefore been satisfied in relation to the alternative relief.


15 Compare Berdur Properties (Pty) Ltd v 76 Commercial Road (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 62 (D) at 68C-D – a
vehicle proceeding down the road should be able to do so unimpeded.

[23] Regarding the contention that the court should not exercise its discretion
in favour of the Venters, the court does not have a general discretion to
refuse a final interdict. Any discretion which the court has is bound up in
the question of an alternative remedy (in which case, see above). As was
pointed out in Hotz,16 withholding the interdict would de prive the
aggrieved party of a remedy for the injury . This would infringe the right
to access the courts.

[24] With respect to the non-joinder defence, in my view the body corporate
possesses very little, if any interest in the alternative relief. 17 Certainly,
its interest does not constitute a ‘direct and substantial interest’ in the
sense that it has a legal interest in this relief . Put differently, the order
granted can be executed without prejudicing the body corporate.18 In any
event, the body corporate was served with a copy of the papers and was
afforded an opportunity to file its own papers. It elected not to do so. In
my view, adequate steps were taken to ensure that the court’s judgment
will not prejudicially affect the body corporate ’s interests.19 If the body
corporate was indeed in the process of finalising an application to annul
the servitude agreement, as alleged by Mr Helfer on 19 September 2025
(which application has been mooted since 2008), the time afforded to it
by the postponement order should have been adequate to launch such an
application, if it wished to do so.


16 Hotz v University of Cape Town 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) at para 29.
17 Unlike Vlakplaats Estates (Pty) Ltd v Geral 1963 (3) SA 31 (T) (Vlakplaats), the alternative relief does
not require the court to define the precise rights and duties of the owner whose property is affected by the
servitude.
18 Roeloffze NO and Another v Bothma NO and Others 2007 (2) SA 257 (C) para 42.
19 See Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minster of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A) at 659.

[25] In addition, in Amalgamated Engineering, the appeal court observed that
the doctrine of res judicata may sometimes give valuable guidance as to
whether a third party should be joined or not.20 The common law rules
on obligatory joinder seek to prevent a third party who has not been
joined, and against whom the order of the court would not be res
judicata, from approaching the courts again in respect of the same
subject matter and possibly obtaining an order irreconcilable with the
order that was made in the first instance. 21 The residents constitute the
entire ownership of the body corporate. It seems to me that the residents
are the alter ego of the body corporate. They are represented by the same
legal team, and the chairman of the body corporate (Mr Helfer) deposed
to the answering affidavit on behalf of the residents. It is also instructive
that the special resolution dated 7 Au gust 2025, annexed to the
answering affidavit purportedly to substantiate the deponent’s authority,
was in fact a resolution by the body corporate.

[26] In the Man Truck case the court held that the sole members of the close
corporations in question were suffi ciently closely identified with the
corporations to constitute the privies of the corporations. 22 Similar
reasoning may be applied in this case. The residents are sufficiently
closely identified with the body corporate, to be treated as being the
same party. The body corporate would therefore be regarded in law as
being the same as the residents for the purpose of the res judicata rule.23
To my mind, if the body corporate were to bring proceedings against the

20 At 660.
21 DE van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice 10-5, citing Watson NO v Ngonyama and
Another 2021 (5) SA 559 (SCA) para 53.
22 Man Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Dusbus Leasing CC & Others 2004 (1) SA 454 (W). See also Ilima
Projects (Pty) Limited (in liquidation) v MEC: Public Transport, Roads and Works 2019 JDR 0567 (GJ).

23 See Voet 44.2.5, discussed in Amalgamated Engineering at 654. For this reason also the present case is
distinguishable from Vlakplaats.

Venters that gave rise to the same issues as have been ventilated in this
matter, the principle of res judicata (at least in the form of issue
estoppel) would be applicable, thereby binding the body corporate to this
judgment. For all these reasons I do not consider th at the non -joinder
defence should be sustained.

[27] As to the allegation that the servitude has become extinguished or falls to
be cancelled, as was pointed out by Van Zyl AJ in Turnbury House,24
servitudes are in principle of unlimited duration and can only be
terminated under specific circumstances, none of which are applicable in
this case. Until the servitude in question is terminated, it remains in full
force, and the Venters are entitled to enforce it. In my view, if the
residents or the body corporate wished to advance this contention they
should have brought a counter application .25 Indeed, as indicated above,
Mr Helfer stated in the answering affidavit that the body corporate
intended to launch its own application to cancel the servitude agreement.
It appears that no such application has been brought , despite the body
corporate being afforded an opportunity to file papers in this matter . I
therefore do not consider that the alleged deficiencies and shortcomings
in the servitude constitute a defence to the interdict sought in these
proceedings.

[28] With respect to the allegation that the servitude will be abused by tenants
in the future, if that occurs the residents may seek rel ief at that point in
time. Currently there is no evidence that the servitude is being abused.


24 Turnbury House Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wallin and Another 2022 JDR 1428 (WCC) para 11.
25 Compare Turnbury House paras 41-43.

[29] Concerning the allegation that the Venters have failed to maintain the
servitude, no evidence was adduced to support this allegation, nor was
this point advanced in argument. The Venters, for their part, denied that
they had refused to maintain the driveway and asserted that they remain
willing to comply with any obligation imposed by the deed. In my view,
even if the Venters had failed to discharge their obligation to maintain
the driveway, that would not be a ground for the residents to breach their
obligations.

[30] Finally, I turn to the question of costs . The Venters have only succeeded
with relief that was sought belatedly at the second hearing . In my vie w,
the res idents were entitled to oppose the application to ensure that the
primary relief was not granted. The Venters have, however, obtained
some success in the application and most of the defences raised by the
residents in their answering affi davit have been dismissed . It seems,
furthermore, that even if the Venters had pursued the alternative relief at
the outset, such relief would also have been opposed by the res idents. In
this regard, I note that the res idents contended, wrongly, that they had
not impeded the Venters’ reasonable access.

[31] As to the corre spondence which preceded the application, the Venters
may be criticised for demanding a complete cessation of parking, but the
residents also failed to engage meaningfully with the demands, until it
was too late. The values of the Constitution require that neighbours seek
solutions not through individualistic competition, but through a common
desire to promote th e mutual enjoyment of rights by all. 26 I am left with
the impression that the Venters’ aim was to deprive the residents of their

26 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 224.

right to park on the driveway altogether, while the residents were intent
on negating, or at least limiting, the Venters’ right of way. The parties
did not demonstrate concern for the interests of their fellow neighbours,
nor did they adopt a community-oriented disposition. Instead, they
pursued their own interests at the expense of their neighbours. In all the
circumstances, I do not consider that either party should be awarded their
costs and I therefore direct that the parties pay their own costs (save in
relation to the costs of the amendment, as discussed above).

[32] During the initial hearing on 10 October 2025, I urged th e parties to
consider settling the matter. I pointed out that the interdict sought in the
application is a blunt instrument for resolving a dispute of this nature. I
am conscious that the order I intend granting may give rise to further
disputes. It would be preferable if the parties agreed precisely where the
residents may park their vehicles, and paint lines demarcating the
acceptable parking spaces. To this end, consideration could be given to
the kind of access required by the Venters to their garage . The allotment
of parking spaces could be tailored accordingly . It appears that the
demarcation of parking bays was agreed as a short -term solution
between the Venters’ predecessor in title, and the body corporate , as
long ago as 13 December 2004. It appears further that this is an
intervention now under consideration by the body corporate.

[33] I am not, however, competent to grant this kind of relief.27 All I can do is
urge the parties to engage with each other in a manner that promotes the

27 Fischer and Another v Ramahlele and Others 2014 (4) SA 614 (SCA) paras 13-14.

spirit of ubuntu, and the constitutional vision of a caring society based
on good neighbourliness and shared concern.28


Cooke AJ:

_____________________________
DJ COOKE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT


Appearances

For applicants: D van der Linde
Instructed by: Randall Titus Attorneys

For first to third and eighth
to ninth respondents: S Pitcher
Instructed by: Lamprecht Attorneys

28 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37.