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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2025-171943
1. REPORTABLE: NO
2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3. REVISED: YES
DATE 7 NOVEMBER 2025
SIGNATURE: J ROUX AJ
In the matter between:
TWINS IMPORT AND EXPORT (PTY) LTD Applicant
And
IVAN PASHEV MARINOV, AI SKY CC Respondent
JUDGMENT
Roux AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an urgent application for interim interdictory relief pendente lite, brought
by the Applicant to restrain the Respondents from infringing its registered trademark
“MAXGROWPLUS” and disseminating injurious falsehoods concerning its
agricultural products. The relief sought is of a temporary nature pending the
institution of an action for final relief. Having considered the extensive arguments
presented by counsel in their heads of Argument (which assisted the court to focus
on the crux of the i ssues at stake and for which I thank counsel), the evidence
contained in the filed affidavits, and eloquently articulated oral submissions, this
Court granted an order in favour of the Applicant on 5 November 2025 in terms of the
notice of motion, suitably amended, and reserved the costs of the application for
determination at the trial.
[2] The Respondents opposed the application, raising a series of preliminary
objections—relating to jurisdiction, the signature of the notice of motion, and the
deponent’s authority —and further contend that the matter lacks urgency and is
founded on speculation and hearsay. On the merits, they deny engaging in
impugned conduct and assert that the Applicant has not made out a prima facie case
for interim relief.
URGENCY
[3] The Applicant’s case on urgency is that the Respondents’ actions —specifically
the use of the MAXGROWPLUS mark in email communications and social media,
the decanting and relabelling of its products, and the circulation of statements that its
products are “unregistered” and “illegal”—pose an imminent threat to its goodwill in a
developing agricultural market. The Applicant’s founding affidavit shows that this
conduct came to light through correspondence received on 16 September 2025, and
the application was launched promptly thereafter on 19 September 2025.
[4] The Respondents argue that the matter is not urgent, that any urgency was
self-created, and that the Applicant could obtain substantial redress in due course.
However, the Respondents’ approach conflates self -created urgency with the
absence of urgency. The Applicant’s prompt reaction, coupled with evidence of
continuing reputational harm, satisfies the test in East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v
Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 196. The harm to reputation and
market confidence is inherently difficult, if not incapable of adequate quantification,
and I am satisfied that the Applicant cannot be afforded substantial redress in due
course. This, coupled with the entire conspectus of facts relevant to urgency,
course. This, coupled with the entire conspectus of facts relevant to urgency,
considering Rule 6(12) and the relevant (well established) case law, renders the
applicant of sufficiently urgency to be dealt with as such.
POINTS IN LIMINE
[5] The Respondents’ preliminary objections —relating to jurisdiction, the signature
of the notice of motion, and the deponent’s authority —are without merit. The
Applicant’s director, Ms Peneva, expressly avers that she is a director and therefore
enjoys ostensible and implied authority to institute proceedings on behalf of the
company. The law is clear that authority to depose to an affidavit is unnecessary;
only the institution of proceedings requires authorisation (Ganes and Another v
Telecom Namibia Ltd 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA)). No Rule 7 was filed, which precludes
the Respondent’s challenge.
[6] The Respondents’ reliance on a jurisdiction clause is similarly misplaced. The
alleged distribution agreement containing a clause conferring jurisdiction on
Bloemfontein or Cape Town (legally untenable as it is) was terminated before the
present dispute, and the subject matter of this application arises not from that
agreement but from statutory trademark and anciliary rights. There is no bar
preventing this Court from entertaining urgent relief of this nature. No other court
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. The Respondent’s registered address is in this
jurisdiction.
THE MERITS
[7] The requirements for an interim interdict are settled: a prima facie right, a
reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm, a balance of convenience in the
Applicant’s favour, and absence of an adequate alternative remedy (Setlogelo v
Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W)).
[8] The Applicant has established at least , if not final, a prima facie right in its
registered MAXGROWPLUS trademarks on the first requirement. The Respondents’
own admissions — that they used the email address m[...], repackaged the
Applicant’s goods, and printed unauthorised labels reflecting the Applicant’s mark —
constitute explicit acts of trademark infringement under section 34(1)(a) of the Trade
Marks Act 94 of 1993.
[9] The Respondents’ heads merely assert that “no case has been made out” and
that “there is no proof” of ongoing infringement. These are conclusory statements
that “there is no proof” of ongoing infringement. These are conclusory statements
unsupported by sufficient, cogent evidence from the answering affidavit. In motion
proceedings, bald denials do not create a genuine dispute of fact. The Respondents
have not disputed the existence of the email address or LinkedIn profile, nor denied
the act of relabelling goods bearing the Applicant’s mark , nor communication with
product “complainants” by mid September, in fact soliciting those (materially similarly
worded) complaints.
[10] Regarding injurious falsehoods, the Applicant annexed correspondence showing
that the Respondents actively solicited (peculiarly similarly worded) customer
complaints and described the Applicant’s products as “not registered” and “not legal
for sale.” This occurred as late as September 2025, post the common cause
termination. Instead of addressing this, the Respondents paradoxically repeat these
assertions in their own papers, thereby confirming the defamatory nature of their
statements. Their argument that these were merely “customer complaints” is
unsustainable — the Respondents’ role in circulating and amplifying those claims
renders them liable for their own statements.
[11] The Respondents’ insistence that the Applicant’s “NO FROST” product was
unregistered further undermines their credibility. The Applicant demonstrated that
this product was never placed on the market and that the Respondents unlawfully
applied a mock -up label to repackaged goods. Therefore, the Respondents'
misrepresentation forms part of the conduct the Applicant seeks to restrain.
[12] The apprehension of future infringement is well-founded. The Respondents have
previously used the marks unlawfully, refused to give undertakings to desist, and
displayed a continuing disregard for the Applicant’s proprietary rights. Had the
undertakings been provided, the application would probably not have been
necessary. The requirements of irreparable harm and balance of convenience are
accordingly met.
[13] The Respondents’ argument that the matter should be dismissed because of
“disputes of fact” ignores the correct approach under Webster v Mitchell. On the
undisputed and inherently probable facts, the Applicant could obtain final relief in due
undisputed and inherently probable facts, the Applicant could obtain final relief in due
course; the Respondents’ denials do not cast serious doubt on its case. The balance
of convenience also favours the Applicant, whose brand reputation would suffer
immeasurable and continuous prejudice if relief were refused. In contrast, the
Respondents stand to suffer no legitimate harm by being restrained from unlawful
conduct.
[14] The Respondents’ opposition was ill -conceived. They were allowed to avoid
litigation by providing a written undertaking but declined to do so. In conclusion, the
Respondents’ arguments fall short of a cogent factual or legal foundation. Their
opposition relies largely on bare denials, procedural quibbles, and assertions
inconsistent with their own admissions. The Applicant, by contrast, has established
all elements of interim relief and is entitled to the protection of its trademark and
reputation pending trial.
ORDER
The following order is made:
1. The application is heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. Pending the final determination of an action to be instituted by the Applicant
within 15 days:
(a) The Respondents are interdicted and restrained from using, in the course
of trade, the name or mark MAXGROWPLUS, or any confusingly similar
mark;
(b) The Respondents are interdicted from making or disseminating any false,
misleading, or disparaging statements to customers or the public
concerning the Applicant or its products;
(c) The Respondents are directed to deliver up to the Applicant all goods,
labels, packaging, or promotional materials bearing the
MAXGROWPLUS mark or any mark confusingly similar thereto.
3. The costs are reserved for determination by the trial court.
J Roux AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ and or
parties’ representatives by email and by being uploaded to CaseLines. The date and time
for the hand down is deemed to be 10h00 on 07 November 2025.
APPEARANCES
Attorneys for applicant: Roux Potgieter Attorneys
Counsel for applicant: Roux Potgieter – attorney with right of
appearance
Attorneys for respondent: Marina Naydenova Attorneys
Counsel for respondent: Alexia Vosloo-de Wit
Date of Hearing: 05 November 2025
Judgment delivered: 07 November 2025