REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1) REP O RT ABLE: NO
(2) O F INTERE ST TO O THER JUD G ES: NO
(3) RE VISED : YES
04/11/2025
DA TE SIGNA TUR E
In the matter between:
HAFIZ SAQIB SADDIQ
and
THE STATE OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE MINISTER OF POLICE
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
HOME AFFAIRS
Case Number : 017605/2024
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
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THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS Sixth Respondent
THE HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR
PRIORITY CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS Seventh Respondent
THE HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR
PRIORITY CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS Eighth Respondent
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT Ninth Respondent
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Tenth Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
___________________________________________________________________
Mahosi, J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of
this Court, handed down ex tempore on 24 May 2024, in which the applicant’s main
application was dismissed.
[2] The main application sought, in essence, an order for "anticipatory bail" and
an interdict restraining the respondents from harassing or arresting the applicant
without just cause. The respondents, while served with the application, did not file
opposing papers. The applicant places significant weight on this fact, arguing that it
should have led to a default judgment in his favour.
[3] Having considered the applicant’s founding affidavit and legal submissions,
this Court dismissed the application. The applicant now seeks leave to ap peal that
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dismissal.
[4] The applicant’s grounds for leave to appeal, as distilled from his papers, can
be summarised as follows:
4.1 The Court erred by failing to properly consider the issues of bail before
arrest and the interdict.
4.2 The Court failed to consider all the facts placed before it, particularly
international case law regarding interim or anticipatory bail.
4.3 The Court failed to consider that the respondents' non-opposition and
their request to be kept updated indicated that granting the application
would not prejudice them.
4.4 The Court should have found that the applicant was a victim of unlawful
harassment and should have granted the interdict.
4.5 The Court should have declared the conduct of the respondents'
representatives unconstitutional and an abuse of state resources.
4.6 The Court should have ordered the respondents to amend the Criminal
Procedure Act to include a provision for “anticipatory bail.”
4.7 The Court erred in not granting a default judgment due to the
respondents' failure to oppose the application.
[5] Section 17 of the Superior Courts Act
1 regulates the granting of applications
for leave to appeal. The test pertinent to the present matter is set out in section
17(1)(a) as follows:
“(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are
of the opinion that -
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
1 Act 10 of 2013.
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(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be
heard, including conflicting judgments on the m atter under
consideration;”
[6] It is apparent from the above provisions that the test for granting leave to
appeal is stringent. It is not enough for an applicant to be dissatisfied with the
outcome. Instead, he must demonstrate a sound and rational basis for the conclusion
that there is a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different
conclusion. Thus, mere disagreement with the Court's assessment is insufficient.
[7] In the current matter, the applicant sought “anticipatory bail”, which is not
recognised in our law, and his case for an interdict was not established on the
papers. In the circumstances, this Court is not persuaded that another court would
arrive at a different conclusion. The applicant's contention that this Court was obliged
to grant a default judgment is a misapprehension of the law. The role of a Court is to
consider whether the applicant, on his own papers, has made out a case for the relief
sought. The fact that a respondent does not oppose does not automatically entit le an
applicant to an order. The Court must still be satisfied that the application is legally
sound and that the relief sought is competent. In this case, even in the absence of
opposition, the applicant's pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action recognised
by our law for "anticipatory bail" and were also unable to establish the necessary
facts for a final interdict. An appeal on the above grounds is, therefore, without merit.
[8] The applicant also invokes the "interest of justice" ground. However, where, as
herein, an appeal has no reasonable prospects of success, it cannot be in the
interest of justice to grant leave. Instead, granting it would amount to a waste of
scarce judicial resources and prolong a matter that is legally untenable. For the
above reasons, this application stands to be dismissed.
[9] Accordingly, the following order is made:
[9] Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.
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_____ _
D. Mahosi J
Acting Judge of the High Court
Date of hearing: 10 October 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties' representatives through email and uploaded on Caseline. The hand-down
date is deemed to be 4 November 2025.
Appearances
For the applicant: Self