SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

Case no: 2765/24
REPORTABLE

In the matter between:
RIEDWAAN WILLIAMS APPLICANT

and
THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN FIRST RESPONDENT
SHALENE SCHREUDER NO SECOND RESPONDENT
NAWAAL SANGER THIRD RESPONDENT
RAMEEZ LEWIS FOURTH RESPONDENT
ZIYAAD LEWIS FIFTH RESPONDENT
ATHRAA KENNEMEER SIXTH RESPONDENT
THE DEEDS REGISTRAR, CAPE TOWN SEVENTH RESPONDENT


Coram: BHOOPCHAND AJ
-;c, ..

Heard: 9 October 2025
Delivered: 6 November 2025
Summary: Application for an interim interdict pending final relief premised upon section
1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. Applicant in possession and occupation of a property for
almost four decades , owned by the City of Cape Town . The property was sold in a delayed
instalment sale to the original occupant and purchaser . Verbal a greement between the
original occupant and the Applicant that he would pay the instalments and municipal service
charges and take the transfer on full payment. The original occupant died in 2021. City wants
to transfer the property to the Executor of the estate for onward transfer to the heirs of the
deceased. Applicant risks losing the property if interdict delaying transfer not granted.
Applicant’s substantive case in part B of the application is tenuous. Factors taken into
consideration by the Court to grant an interdict in these circumstances. Justice must not be
rushed where rights, however imperfect, deserve a hearing before being extinguished.


ORDER

1 Pending the relief sought in Part B of this application, t he First and Seventh
Respondents are restrained from transferring Erf 2[…] in the municipality of Cape
Town held under title deed 5[…] to the Second, and/or Third, and /or Fourth, and /or
Fifth, and /or Sixth Respondents.
2 Costs are to stand over for later determination.


JUDGMENT



Bhoopchand AJ :

[1] The Applicant applies, pending the relief sought in part B of his notice of
motion for an interim interdict restraining the Respondents from transferring the
immovable property, Erf 2[…], held under title deed number 5[…], also known
as 1 […] N[…] Close, Tafelsig, Mitchells Plain (‘the propert y’) to either the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and/or Sixth Respondents. In Part B, the Applicant
sought orders declaring that the rights and title to the propert y are awarded to
Applicant pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of the Prescription Act , Act 68
of 1969 (‘the Prescription Act). Following the content of the First Respondent’s
(‘the City’) answering affidavit, the Applicant included a prayer that the City is
estopped from denying that the Applicant is entitled to claim ownership of the
property. If the declaratory orders in part B are granted , the Applicant seeks
transfer of the property to him under section 33(1) of the Deeds Registries Act
47 of 1937 (‘the Deeds Registries Act’)

[2] The Applicant is a 68-year-old illiterate pensioner. The City is the owner
of the property. The City sold the property to Faldela Lewis (‘Lewis’) on 19
May 1988, with the transfer delayed until payment. Lewis died on 21 August
2021 without taking transfer of the property . The Third to Sixth Respondents
are the heirs of Lewis’ s estate. None of the Second to Sixth Respondents filed
answering affidavits. The Seventh Respondent , the Registrar of Deeds, filed a
report.

[3] The Applicant alleges that d uring 1988, he was approached by Lewis to
take possession of the pro perty, pay the instalments under the deed of sale , and
settle the monthly municipal charges and taxes accruing against the property.
Lewis undertook to transfer the property to the Applicant once the full purchase
price was paid . The purchase price of R12 910, inclusive of interest , would be
paid in instalments of R46.88 per month commencing on 1 July 1988 and

paid in instalments of R46.88 per month commencing on 1 July 1988 and
continuing for a period of 30 years. If the purchase price was settled or reduced

by at least ten per cent, the City could require Lewis to transfer the property to
her name. Lewis was to assume possession and occupancy of the property
pursuant to the deed of sale on 1 May 1988.

[4] The Applicant accepted Lewis’s offer and took possession of the property
with his wife and two children .1 He paid the monthly instalments until the
purchase price had been settled and continues paying the municipal charges. He
claimed that Lewis had never resided on the property. The Applicant attempted
to contact Lewis over the years but was unsuccessful. In May 2012, he
approached the City’s Mitchells Plain housing branch to explain his agreement
with Lewis. He was advised to submit a petition to prove that he had been living
on the proper ty. The Applicant attached the petition he compiled from his
neighbours on 6 June 2012, confirming his long-term occupancy of the property
with members of his famil y. He has maintained occupancy of the property for
37 years to date. The City officials did not respond after he had submitted the
petition.

[5] In February 2022, the Applicant consulted with an official at the City’s
Human Settlements Office in Parow and re stated his position. By this time, he
had learnt of Lewis’s demise. He approached the Community Law Centre in
Athlone for assistance. The Community Law Centre communicated with the
Human Settlements Department on 7 March 2022 . The Applicant asserts that
both the City and Lewis knew he had continuously possessed the proper ty.
Based on this, he claims that he should be granted the rights and title to the
immovable property.

[6] The Applicant considered it important to emphasi se that Lewis's actions
were inconsistent with the conditions set forth in the deed of sale. Clause 12 of
the deed of sale stipulated that Lewis was required to occupy the property for a

1 The Applicant claims that he has occupied the property since 1986.

period of five years. During this time, she was prohibited from leasing,
mortgaging, assigning, or pledging the property without obtaining prior written
consent from the City. Pursuant to Clause 13 of the deed of sale, Lewis and her
successors in title were prohibited from transferring the property within five
years to any party not approved by the City, unless the property ha d first been
offered to the City. The Applicant contends that Lewis was not authorised to
offer him the property and claims that the City failed to investigate any breaches
by Lewis during the first five years. The City should have cancelled the deed of
sale.

[7] In March 2022, the Applicant received a letter from the City demanding
that he vacate the property , which was bequeathed to the Third to Sixth
Respondents under Lewis’ will. The Applicant attached a copy of the email
from the City’s conveyancers , who are in the process of transferring the
immovable property, and once they obtain the power of attorney from the City,
they will proceed with the transfer. He could not allow that to happen.

[8] The Applicant applied for an interim interdict to restrain the transfer of
the property to the Second to Sixth Respondents. He asserted a prima facie right
of possession with respect to the property. He had occupied the property as the
owner for more than thirty years. He had paid the purchase price and the City’s
municipal charges . Not once did the City take any legal steps to have him
evicted, but it has allowed him to continue living there as if he were the owner.

[9] His apprehension of irreparable harm stems from the City’s intention to
transfer the property to the Executor of Lewis’ estate . If the property is
transferred, it could be sold on by Lewis’ appointed heirs. The consequence is
that he would lose everything which he spent on maintaining and improving the
property and servicing the municipal charges. He contends that he would be

property and servicing the municipal charges. He contends that he would be
unable to recover any of these costs through the deceased’s estate.

[10] The Applicant contends further that the balance of convenience tilts in his
favour and refers to the circumstances he has raised in his affidavit. Finally, he
concludes that he has no other satisfactory alternative remedy to secure his
position and prevent transfer of the property. He contends that no monetary
claim could compensate him for the loss he would suffer if he lost possession of
the property.

The City’s answer

[11] The City’s answer was provided by the Director of Human Settlements,
Lawrence Valeta (‘Valeta’). He explained that the City owns housing units
developed with national and local government funds , which were historically
sold to purchasers on a loan/instalment basis. These included rental stock and
homeownership units built for sale. The City and the purchasers entered into
and concluded a deed of sale, paid a small deposit and agreed to pay the balance
of the purchase price over a period of between twenty and thirty years. A loan
account, like a mortgage bond, was created in respect of the outstanding capital
and interest. The loan account is billed for monthly insurance and
administration charges. The purchaser is entitled to transfer the property to their
name once the loan account has been paid in full. The City owns about 11,000
of these delayed transfer loan properties, where ownership must still be passed
to the purchasers under the relevant deed of sale.

[12] Valeta confirmed that Lewis purchased the property on 19 May 1988 on a
delayed transfer basis . The City remains the owner of the property. On 12
February 1993, Lewis applied to take transfer of the property as per clause 3(f)
of the deed of sale . The 10% was calculated at R1218.40. There is no record of
the payment being received. The City considered that Lewis was unable to pay
the amount. Following a letter written on behalf of the Applicant, the City

advised him o n 9 June 2004 that any agreement made between him and Lewis
concerning the alleged sale of the property was a private matter between the
parties and that the Applicant should seek legal assistance if he wishe d to
pursue the matter further.

[13] On 26 November 2012, the Applicant was again advised that if he wished
to acquire the property, he should approach the legal owners and make an offer
to purchase it from them. The letter concluded by stating that all monies would
have to be paid in full for the property to be transferred from the Cit y to Lewis.
A simultaneous transfer to the Applicant could then be arranged.

[14] On 26 November 2020, the Department of Human Settlements produced
a short memorandum that summarised the City’s interactions with the Applicant
and Lewis over the years. The City asserted that the Applicant was consistently
advised that the City c ould not transfer the property into his name and that he
should approach Lewis to take transfer , if that were their intention. The City
considered itself bound by the deed of sale as the onl y valid and binding
agreement.

[15] On 29 November 2023, the Departme nt of Human Settlements wrote to
the Executor to inform her of the City’s position. The City informed the
Executor that it had appointed an attorney to attend to the transfer and
registration of the property . It also informed the Executor that the housing loan
had been settled, and the property would be removed from the City’s insurance
scheme with effect from the date of registration of the transfer. The City
requested that the monthl y instalments be paid until the transfer is registered .
The City contended that there was no legal basis to interdict the transfer of the
property, and the City opposed the relief sought in both Part A and Part B of the
application.

[16] The City contended that the alleged oral agreement between the
Applicant and Lewis was not in writing and therefore contrary to the provisions
of section 2 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The City alleged that
Lewis’ tenancy of the property commenced in about 1982 and that she was
living on the property when she applied to purchase it in 1988. The City
claimed it did not have a record that the Applicant personally paid each
instalment as alleged, but denied that the Applicant had acquired ownership of
the property by way of acquisitive prescription. The City argued that if the
Applicant had the right to request the transfer of the property or wished to
enforce the supposed purchase agreement with Lewi s, there were sufficient
chances to settle the issue and formally document it with the deceased. Since the
Applicant did not do this, they have no legal right to stay on the property.
Therefore, the Executrix, representing the deceased’s estate, is entitle d to
exercise the contractual rights to the property.

[17] The City contended that there was no legal basis to interdict the transfer
of the property. The City’s answer to the Applicant’s averments motivating why
interim relief should be granted was largely a denial, alleging finally that the
Applicant had sufficient time over the years to resolve the issue of ownership.

The Applicant’s reply

[18] In re ply, the Applicant noted that none of the other Respondents ,
specifically the Executor and the third to sixth Respondents , ra ised any
objections. He argued that their lack of opposition showed they had no interest
in the property. The Applicant also criticised the City for not providing
confirmatory affidavits from its sources of information. Although the City knew
he had been living on the property since at least 2004, it took no action to
enforce the deed of sale with Lewis or evict him for unlawful occupation. He

further mentioned that he had contacted the City as early as 1995 to request
permission to renovate the property. In 2013, he sought to settle arrears with the
City and submitted documents to the Ombud for consent. He denies that the
deceased ever occupied, paid for, or maintained the property, and claims legal
entitlement to transfer through acquisitive prescription.

The Registrar of Deeds

[19] The Registrar of Deeds has submitted a report confirming that the
property is registered in the name of the City. However, in paragraph 2.2, the
Registrar notes an apparent inconsistency by stating that the erf is unregistered
and held under general plan TP 10432, while also referencing the parent
property. Additionally, the Registrar affirms that there are no interdicts,
attachments, or insolvency orders recorded against the property or its registered
owners. The Registrar further indicates that there is no objection to granting the
order requested in part B of the application. Any act of registration will be
subject to compliance with all relevant statutory provisions and the Deeds
Office requirements.

ASSESSMENT

[20] The Applicant requests an interim interdict to prevent the First and
Seventh Respondents from transferring the property currently in his possession,
pending the determination of ownership in part B of his application. Upon
review o f the Applicant’s founding documents, it is evident that the remedy
sought is of an interim nature. Although the Applicant alludes to final relief in
his replying affidavit and focuses much of his written argument on obtaining it,
he has not established a case for such relief in his founding affidavit. 2 The

2 Zondo and Another v Uthukela District Municipality and Another (D631/2014) [2014] ZALCD 32;
(2015) 36 ILJ 502 (LC) (5 August 2014) at para 2

application for interim relief was neither withdrawn nor amended to request
final relief under part B. The First Respondent accurately interprets the
Applicant’s heads of argument as seeking final relief.

[21] The City responded solely to the interim case and was taken aback by the
Applicant’s unexpected request for final relief in his heads of argument. All
pertinent matters should be addressed within the affidavits, rather than being
introduced during argu ment.3. The Court will address only the interim relief
requested and will not rule on final relief not properly before it.

[22] No legal relationship exists between the Applicant and the City. The City
acted as a conditional seller, transferring property to the late Lewis under an
instalment sale or conditional sale agreement. Until the full purchase price was
settled, the City maintained ownership of the property, effectively holding it as
security until all instalments were completed. The City’s decision to enter into
these agreements reflects a policy choice to facilitate home ownership among
historically disadvantaged communities, particularly in townships. The
occupant is a purchaser in terms of a suspensive condition . O wnership and
transfer are suspended until the full purchase price is paid. Possession and use
are granted to the purchaser in the interim. The agreement is regulated by statute
and informed by constitutional imperatives of housing, dignity, and equitable
access to land.

[23] In two-part applications for reviews, constitutional challenges, and urgent
interdicts, Part A relies on the merits of Part B, which underpins the Applicant’s
prospects of success. Pursuant to Rule 28, amendments to part B of an
applicant’s notice of motion are permissible. Applicants who foresee a potential
substantial change in the relief sought under part B should draft the
corresponding part A relief in neutral or adaptable terms, thereby avoiding

corresponding part A relief in neutral or adaptable terms, thereby avoiding

3 Swissborough Diamond Mines v Government of RSA 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 282 E-G and 324B

premature commitment to a specific formulation of part B th at may
subsequently require revision.

[24] The relief requested by the Applicant in Part A constitutes a restraining
order against the transfer of the property. This relief is based on section 1 of the
Prescription Act as well as the doctrine of estoppel, whic h prevents the First
Respondents from disputing the Applicant's entitlement to claim ownership of
the property. For the application to succeed as presented, the Applicant must
meet the criteria for an interim interdict and, in doing so, demonstrate that
section 1 of the Prescription Act is applicable. Section 1 pertains to the
acquisition of ownership by prescription. It reads as follows:

‘Subject to the provisions of this Chapter and of Chapter IV, a person shall by
prescription become the owner of a thing which he has possessed openly and as if he were
the owner thereof for an uninterrupted period of 30 years or for a period which, together
with any periods for which such thing was so possessed by his predecessors in title,
constitutes an uninterrupted period of 30 years.’

[25] Section 18 of the Prescription Act states that:

‘The provisions of this Act shall not affect the provisions of any law prohibiting the
acquisition of land or any right in land by prescription.’

[26] The Prescription (Local Authorities) Ordinance 16 of 1964 bars the
Applicant from acquiring the property through acquisitive prescription as the
City remains the registered owner of the property. 4 The ordinance established
that, after an uninterrupted period of 30 years of open possession, a person
could become the legal owner of municipal land, and the municipality's rights
would have been extinguished. This ordinance set a specific cutoff date for

4 See also section 3 of the State Land Disposal Act 48 of 1961, and section 5 of the City of Cape Town:
Immovable Property By-Law, 2014

claims, requiring that prescription must have been completed by August 7,
1974. The Applicant only acquired possession of the property in about 1988. He
cannot claim a right to ownership of the property through section 1 of the
Prescription Act, read together with section 18 and the 1964 ordinance.

ESTOPPEL

[27] After filing his replying affidavit, the Applicant sought to amend his
notice of motion a few days later to include a prayer declaring that the City is
estopped from denying that the Applicant is entitled to claim ownership of the
property. The Applicant alleged that the City treated him as the de facto owner
by accepting instalment payments from him until he had paid the full purchase
price, payments for municipal services , and approved the improvements he
effected to the property. The Applicant thus relies upon a representation by the
conduct of the City that he was the owner of the property . The actions taken by
the City for nearly forty years led to a reasonable assumption that he was the
legal owner of the property. The Applicant did not elaborate further on how the
City’s alleged representation could have misled him, or that he acted reasonably
in construing the representation as an acknowledgement of his ownership of the
property.5 Nor does he make any allegations about how he acted to his
detriment.

[28] The doctrine of estoppel does not supersede the statutory requirements for
title registration as stipulated by the Deeds Registry Act. The Applicant does
not provide any proof that he was the person paying the instalments and the
municipal charges. The fact that he alleges it and it is unchallenged by the City
does not mean that estoppel can succeed. When the Applicant contacted the
City about acquiring the property, the City told him on at least three occasions

5 Gencor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Technicrete v Potgieter 2004 (6) SA 491 (SCA)

that he should negotiate with the original purchaser. If he could provide proof of
the private sale between him and the original purchaser, they would have no
objection to performing a two-stage transfer - first to the original purchaser and
then to the possessor. None of the City’s actions could be construed as the City
considering the Applicant as the de facto owner.

INTERIM INTERDICT

[29] Against the foregoing backdrop, the Court turns to determine whether the
Applicant has satisfied the requirements for an interim interdict. The
requirements for the grant of an interim interdict are well known. 6 The
Applicant asserts that he has had the property as if he were the owner. A critical
requirement of acquisitive prescription is that the possessor must have
possessed the property "as if he were the owner thereof" ( nec precario ). The
Applicant’s entire claim rests on his oral arrangement with Lewis, the original
occupant. His payment of instalments and charges was not an assertion of
ownership against the City, but rather a performance of a contractual obligation
under a private agreement with the original occupant. This demonstrates that he
did not possess the proper ty with the intention of being the owner but rather
with permission from the original occupant.

[30] Neither was the Applicant’s possession of the property ‘adverse’ to the
rights of the true owner, which in this case is the City. 7 The Applicant’s
payments on the loan arrangement and for services were a continuation of
Lewis’s obligations under the deed of sale. This is not adverse possession, but
consensual possession derived from the contractual relationship . The execution

6 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464, Molteno
Brothers v South African Railways 1936 AD 321, Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W), Gool v Minister of
Justice 1955 (2) SA 682 (C), City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum [2016] ZACC 19; 2016 (6)

SA 279 (CC); 2016 (9) BCLR 1133 (CC)
7 Cf: Swanepoel v Crown Mines Ltd 1954 (4) SA 596 (A)ownership of land cannot be acquired by
acquisitive prescription if the possession was illegal or prohibited by statute

of the deed of delayed sale, along with the City's ongoing management of its
property, served as a continuous impediment to the commencement of any
potential prescription period.

[31] The Applicant was simply a substitute in an existing contract ual
relationship. The lack of a written agreement between the Applicant and Lewis
means that he has no legally enforceable claim of ownership against Lewis’
estate. Lewis was the person with whom the City had a contract and who
therefore had a valid claim to the property. The Applicant has no direct
contractual relationship with the City. His claim to ownership is not a
vindicatory or quasi -vindicatory claim against the City. Any claim he has for
recovery of his payments would be against the deceased's estate.

[32] The Applicant asserts that, should the property be transferred to the estate
of the deceased and he subsequently obtains the relief requested in part B of his
application, the property may already have been liquidated by the Second to
Sixth Respondents. Consequently, he would forfeit all expenditures incurred in
maintaining and enhancing the property, as well as payments made towards
municipal accounts, which were undertaken with the understanding that he
would ultimately acquire transfer of the prope rty. He is concerned that he may
not be able to recover his expenses from the deceased's estate. Given the
weakness of his prescription claim, the Court hesitates to accept that the harm to
the Applicant is genuinely irreparable. Most of the harm he faces is financial,
and he has pointed out alternative remedies himself.

[33] The Court must balance the potential prejudice to the Applicant should
the interdict be denied against any prejudice to the Second to Sixth Respondents
should it be granted, notwithstanding that their interests have not been explicitly
presented. The Applicant’s claim arises from a verbal agreement and appears to
reflect a misunderstanding of the law. In contrast, the heirs possess a valid claim

under the terms of the deceased’s will, and the City is contractually obligated to
transfer the property to them. Issuing an interdict would postpone the settlement
of the deceased's estate and impede the rightful claims of the heirs. The City is
merely carrying out its contractual and legal re sponsibilities. P reventing the
transfer would disrupt its procedures and valid obligations.

[34] A Court would be hard pressed to grant an interim interdict to the
Applicant in these circumstances. However, the Court cannot ignore the
backdrop against which this application arises , i.e., township housing under the
policy of separate development and the unusual facts that inform this
application. Under section 25 of the Constitution, arbitrary deprivation of
property is prohibited. If the City se eks to evict or dispossess without due
process, the possessor may invoke constitutional protection, even if he is not the
owner. Moreover, section 26 (right to housing) and section 34 (access to courts)
bolster the claim for interim relief, especially if e viction would cause hardship
or violate the Applicant’s dignity. At this interim stage, this Court does not need
to examine these rights in detail.

[35] The Applicant’s substantive claims based on acquisitive prescription and
estoppel are legally tenuous. However, the Court cannot ignore that the
Applicant has occupied the property for almost four decades and has paid the
purchase price and municipal service charges during his tenure of possession.
The City benefited from his payments and occupation. The estate of the original
purchaser seeks to transfer the property he paid for. Denying him ownership
now would unjustly enrich the heirs and deprive him of dignity. The Court
accepts that it should tread carefully and adopt a cautious, constitutionally
sensitive approach, recognising the human dimension of long -term occupation.
The City has not exercised any of its rights under the deed of sale; instead, it has

The City has not exercised any of its rights under the deed of sale; instead, it has
assisted the Applicant’s possession of the property by approving the additions

he allegedly made to the property. The City has acquiesced or failed to act over
decades. The possessor’s belief in ownership, long -term occupation, and the
City’s acquiescence may support a prima facie right to remain, pending final
determination of ownership. He has a t least a prima facie right to possess the
property until the issue of its ownership is resolved.

[36] If the property is transferred to the deceased’s estate, the Applicant may
lose possession, and the estate may dispose of the property . The estate does not
have the property. The Applicant’s long -standing occupation and investment
may be lost. The harm to the Applicant may not be easily reversible , especially
if third-party rights intervene. The estate can wait , whereas the Applicant risks
losing his home. The City has no objection to a two-stage transfer if the
Applicant can prove the agreement between him and Lewis. Thus, while the
balance of convenience may not favour the applicant, it is not so adverse as to
preclude interim relief . Preserving the status quo does not materially affect
either the City or the Second to Sixth Respondents.

[37] Damages as an alternative relief may be inadequate given that the
Applicant seeks ownership of the property. Damages would not restore
possession. The applicant’s claim is not purely financial . It is about recognition
of long-standing occupation and the fairness of transfer . These circumstances,
while not conferring title, raise serious que stions of equitable entitlement and
procedural fairness. The applicant faces irreparable harm if the property is
transferred and he is evicted before his claim is adjudicated. The declaratory
relief sought in part B may take time to get to adjudication.

[38] Although the balance of convenience favours the estate, the interests of
justice require that the status quo be preserved. An interim interdict, though
exceptional in the face of poor merits, may be justified where irreparable harm

exceptional in the face of poor merits, may be justified where irreparable harm
looms and the dispossession would truncate a decades-long relationship with the

property. Such judicial caution does not endorse the applicant’s claim to
ownership but affirms the principle that justice must not be rushed where rights,
however imperfect, deserve a heari ng before extinguishment . Accordingly, the
interim interdict is granted pending final determination of the applicant’s rights.



CONCLUSION


[39] The applicant sought an interim interdict to prohibit the transfer of the
property he currently occupies into the deceased's estate until his claim to
ownership is conclusively resolved. While his reliance on acquisitive
prescription and estoppel may ultimately fail, he has demonstrated a prima facie
right to pursue equitable relief arising from long -standing possession, payment
of the purchase price, and the City’s conditional willingness to facilitate
transfer. The risk of irreparable harm is manifest. Transfer may extinguish his
claim and disrupt his occupation. The balance of convenience favours
preserving the status quo, and no satisfactory alternative remedy offers adequate
protection. The requirements for interim relief are accordingly met.


[40] The Applicant has been represented by his attorney and advocate on a pro
bono basis. They did , however, seek a costs order against the City if they
prevailed with this application. On further reflection, the Applicant requested
that the costs of this application stand over for later determination. The Court
supports this stance, and it will be reflected in the order that follows.

ORDER



1. Pending the relief sought in Part B of this application, the First and Seventh
Respondents are restrained from transferring Erf 2[…] in the municipality of Cape
Town held under title deed 5[…] to the Second, and/or Third, and /or Fourth, and
/or Fifth, and /or Sixth Respondents.
2. Costs are to stand over for later determination.





___________________
BHOOPCHAND AJ
Acting judge
High Court
Western Cape Division


Judgment was handed down and delivered to the parties

by e-mail on 06 November 2025.





Applicant’s Counsel: J T Benade
Instructed by: M S Nacerodien Attorneys
First Respondent’s Counsel: G Solik
Instructed by: Diale Mogashoa Attorneys